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Focusing on the legacies of the Algerian War of Independence (1954-62), this thesis
challenges the perception that this was the ‘war without a name’ by exploring the ways in
which memories have been preserved, mobilised, and transmitted by those who experienced
the conflict, but who have generally operated under the radar of public consciousness. In
particular, it examines the pieds-noirs, the former European settlers of Algeria, and the
harkis, Algerians who fought for the French as auxiliaries during the war. Finding their lives
in Algeria untenable upon independence, both populations migrated en masse to France
where they have organised collectively as diaspora communities to challenge the hegemony
of official narratives in order to legitimate their own interpretations of this contentious past.
The purpose of such an investigation is to re-evaluate the conventional historical periodisation
of a ‘forgotten’ war that made a dramatic return to public attention during the 1990s by
revealing a continual presence of memory and commemorative activity within these
communities. Through consultation of a wide range of sources, including extensive use of
previously neglected audiovisual material, the historical recollections of these two
communities are reconstructed in detail and examined from a comparative perspective. This
thesis also seeks to analyse and historicize the present guerres de mémoire phenomenon
whereby as the public profile of the war has risen in recent years, the different historical
interpretations held by groups such as the pieds-noirs and harkis have increasingly come into
open conflict, particularly over the issue of commemoration with each seeking to see their
version of the past enshrined in official rituals and monuments. Finally, the thesis offers new
historical context intended to contribute to enhancing understanding of the ongoing process
by which France continues to ‘face up’ to its colonial past and deal with the complex
contemporary legacies of this era.
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The Algerian War of Independence lasted from 1954 until 1962. It pitted the independence-
seeking guerrilla force, the Front de libération nationale (FLN), against a French government
and army determined in the wake of the Second World War and Dien Bien Phu to avoid
another humiliating military defeat at all costs and under pressure from a settler population of
just over one million to maintain the French flag in Algeria. In addition, Algeria was not
merely a piece of the empire, but an integral part of France comprising its southern most
départements. Consequently, while the protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco gained
independence relatively peacefully, Algeria was a different matter altogether. Noted for the
brutality of tactics used by both sides, including the systematic use of torture by the French
army, the conflict is estimated to have cost the lives of at least 150,000 Algerians, possibly up
to 350,000, and tens of thousands of French soldiers, including approximately 60,000 native
auxiliaries. Violence was furthermore not confined to the periphery with the activities of the
FLN in France, including their bitter struggle for power with Messsali Hadj’s Mouvement
national algérien (MNA), the terror tactics of the clandestine paramilitary Organisation armée
secrète (OAS)1, and the ferocity of police repression on 17 October 1961, all bringing
bloodshed to the streets of the metropole.2 The war was also highly destabilising in political
terms, bringing down the Fourth Republic, prompting the controversial return to power of
General Charles de Gaulle and leading to the creation of the Fifth Republic. Although
ostensibly ending hostilities, the signature of ceasefire accords at Evian in March 1962
actually led to an escalation of certain forms of violence, while the declaration of Algerian
independence on 3 July 1962 came amidst the exodus of almost the entire settler population.
Widely deemed to have been a conflict won militarily but lost politically, the end of French
Algeria was a major blow to national prestige that de Gaulle sought to assuage through
recourse to the idea of an inevitable tide of history and by turning the nation’s attention to
modernisation, consumerism, and Europe.3
Confirming the adage ‘rien de tel que la mauvaise conscience pour favoriser l’oubli’,
de Gaulle’s decision to turn the page on this ingloriously conducted and concluded conflict
1 The OAS, a clandestine paramilitary group formed in 1961, used extreme violence in a bid to derail
the independence process. Their most high profile acts included the failed assassination attempt on
General de Gaulle at Petit Clamart and the blinding of five year old Delphine Renard who was caught
in the blast from a bomb intended for the Gaullist Minister of Culture André Malraux. Although
defunct by 1963, with many of its leaders either in prison or having been executed for treason, the OAS
has continued to live in the hearts of many Algérie française partisans.
2 On 17 October 1961, the metropolitan-based branch of the FLN mobilised thousands of Algerians for
a peaceful march through the streets of the capital in protest over a curfew recently imposed by Prefect
of Police, Maurice Papon. The savage repression of the demonstration by police and harkis of the
Force de police auxiliaire (FPA), left up to 200 dead and many more wounded.
3 For an extended discussion of this idea see Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The
Algerian War and the Remaking of France, (Ithaca; London, 2006).
2manifested itself in a potent state silence. This was compounded by a series of amnesties
granted to participants on both sides and a lack of official commemoration either of the war,
or those who fought in it.4 Even the term ‘war’ was to be avoided in favour of euphemisms
such as ‘les événements’, while historians wishing to investigate these years were hampered
by the highly restricted access to state archives.5 Consequently, the events of 1954-1962 were
not formulated into a consensual narrative nor inserted into the nation’s official memory;
instead they were effectively forgotten in what appeared to be a troubling case of national
amnesia.6
However, not everyone succumbed to this malady. Two pockets of resistance in
particular stand out: the former settlers, or pieds-noirs, and the harkis, those Algerians who,
for a variety of reasons, ended up fighting under the French flag. Both populations spent the
war in Algeria but in 1962 migrated en masse to France where they attempted to rebuild their
lives. Focusing on a particular aspect of this endeavour, this thesis seeks to examine the ways
in which these two exiled communities organised themselves in order to compose, mobilise,
and articulate their collective memories of the recent past. The purpose of such an
investigation is to challenge the conventional historical periodisation of a ‘forgotten’ war that
made a dramatic return to public attention during the 1990s by revealing a continual presence
of memory and commemorative activity both within these communities, but also between
them and other memory carriers connected to the war. The evolutions and interactions of
these collective memories support recent scholarly findings that question the idea of a neat
division between the colonial and postcolonial periods by demonstrating how the former
frequently bleeds into the latter.7 It furthermore offers vital context that will hopefully deepen
understanding and enhance future analysis of the ongoing process by which France continues
to ‘face up’ to its imperial past and deal with the complex contemporary legacies of this era.
4 Gilles Manceron and Hassan Remaoun, D’une rive à l’autre: la guerre d’Algérie de la mémoire à
l’Histoire, (Paris, 1993), p.23.
5 The reluctance to term the events in Algeria a ‘war’ stemmed from the fact that such a designation
would also involve admitting either that Algeria was a separate entity to France thus giving credence to
the FLN’s claims for independence, or that the two sides were part of the same whole which meant that
what was occurring was a civil war, a phenomenon that sat uncomfortably with a population still trying
to heal the domestic divisions engendered by the Second World War.
6 Jean-Pierre Rioux, ‘La flamme et les bûchers’ in La guerre d’Algérie et les Français, ed. by Jean-
Pierre Rioux, (Paris, 1994), p.501.
7 Among many recent works see, Alec G. Hargreaves (ed.), Memory, Empire and Postcolonialism:
Legacies of French Colonialism, (Oxford, 2005); Andrea L. Smith, Colonial Memory and Postcolonial
Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria and France, (Bloomington, 2006); Nicolas Bancel, Pascal
Blanchard, and Sadrine Lemaire, Culture postcoloniale: Traces et mémoires coloniales en France,
(Paris, 2006); Tahar Ben Jelloun, French Hospitality: Racism and North African Immigrants, (New
York, 1999).
3‘The war without a name’
According to the traditional chronology and historiography, state-sponsored occultation
meant that there were few popular representations of the war in stark contrast, as is often
noted, to treatments of the Vietnam War in America, particularly cinematically.8 This
situation was reflected historiographically by the dominance of the theme of absence in works
concerning the memory of the war. John Talbott’s phrase, ‘the war without a name’, became
universal shorthand for the perception of a conflict that had been buried under a mound of
shame and silence ‘like a dark treasure of guilty family secrets’.9 Yet this image of absence
needs to be reconciled with the reality of multiple texts, almost 3000 by the end of 1997,
dealing with the war across a range of genres, but especially personal testimony and historical
fiction.10 This ‘war of a thousand and one books’ is explicable primarily by the lack of public
discourse which left those involved in the conflict no alternative but to look to writing as a
‘private substitute for the physical lieux de mémoire…inevitably lost together with French
sovereignty over Algeria’.11
The juxtaposition of absence from above with proliferation from below persisted until
the 1990s when changes in the social, political, and academic environment began to bring
these two poles closer together. This was the decade that witnessed the return of the war to
public consciousness in a range of guises. Following Robert Frank’s observation that ‘en
matière de mémoire comme de stratégie, les Français sont souvent en retard d’une guerre’,
this development was, in large part, prompted by the renewed attention being devoted to
another ‘dark’ episode in French history, the Vichy years.12 This was especially the case
following the trial of Maurice Papon for crimes against humanity for his role in the
deportation of Jews as préfet of the Bordeaux region during the Second World War. This case
8 For further information of this subject see, Benjamin Stora, Imaginaires de guerre: les images dans
les guerres d’Algérie et du Vîet-nam, (Paris, 2004); Philip Dine, Images of the Algerian War: French
Fiction and Film, 1954-1992, (Oxford, 1994); Philip Dine, ‘(Still) A la recherché de l’Algérie perdue:
French Fiction and Film 1992-2004’, Historical Reflections, 28.2 (2002), 255-275.
9 Talbott, John, The War Without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962, (London, 1981); Mike
Mason, ‘Batailles pour la mémoire’, Journal of African History, 35 (1994), 305. However, perhaps the
best historical analysis of this phenomenon remains Benjamin Stora’s La gangrène et l’oubli, (Paris,
1991).
10 See Benjamin Stora, Le dictionnaire des livres de la guerre d’Algérie, 1955-1995, (Paris, 1996). This
particular statistic represents Stora’s most recent estimate, which he gave in an interview in La
Tribune, 21 October 1997.
11 Stora, La gangrène, pp.238, 255; Benjamin Stora, ‘Guerre d’Algérie: les instruments de la mémoire’
in La guerre d’Algerie dans la mémoire et l’imaginaire, ed. by Anny Dayan Rosenman and Lucette
Valensi, (Paris, 2004), p.220; Dine, Images, p.7. It also provides a compelling argument for the kinds
of investigations undertaken by Stora and Dine into cinematic and literary images of the war, although
the visibility and accessibility of these sources at a time when archival access was still problematic
probably also played a role. See, Benjamin Stora, Le livre, mémoire de l’Histoire: Réflexions sur le
livre et la guerre d’Algérie, (Paris, 2005).
12 Robert Frank, ‘Les troubles de la mémoire française’, in La guerre d’Algérie, p.604.
4also brought to light Papon’s tenure as Paris Police Chief during the infamous 17 October
1961, thus fixing the idea of some kind of continuity between the two conflicts in the minds
of many. Indeed, there have been several attempts to map Henri Rousso’s ‘Vichy Syndrome’
paradigm onto the chronology of the memory of the War of Independence in order to claim
the existence of a comparable ‘Algerian Syndrome’.13 Rousso himself recently weighed into
this debate, arguing that while there were certain similarities, including the central role played
by the concepts of ‘devoir de mémoire’ and ‘victimhood’, as well as the shared difficulty of
creating a consensual form of national commemoration, the two wars remained distinct as did
their commemorative trajectories.14 Irrespective of periodisation however, the public
processing of the Vichy years sensitised the general population to the issues of memory and
silences with respect to traumatic pasts, both highly pertinent to the War of Independence.15
Between the broadcasting of the documentary series Les années algériennes by
Benjamin Stora and Peter Batty’s La guerre d’Algérie at the beginning of the 1990s, which
increased public awareness of the complexities of the war while generating considerable
debate in the process, and Parliament’s acknowledgement in 1999 that ‘les événements’ had
in fact been ‘une guerre’, the conflict was rarely out of the public spotlight.16 At the political
level, ‘conditions de retour’ were created by the outbreak of the first Gulf War and the so-
called ‘Second Algerian War’, along with the co-incidence in power of President Jacques
Chirac, who served in the war, and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, who cut his political teeth
as an active opponent of the conflict. The 1990s also witnessed the retirement and passing of
many key figures associated with the war, leaving the way clear for the emergence of a new,
unconnected generation with a very different perspective. Some have again linked this back to
Vichy with Stora arguing:
Il a fallu attendre trente ans, le temps d’une génération, pour que le film Le chagrin et
la pitié incite les Français à accepter une histoire moins mythique…De la même
façon, à la veille du trentième anniversaire des accords d’Évian, il est temps
aujourd’hui…d’assumer dans tous ses aspects l’histoire de cette guerre.17
13 Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France Since 1944, trans. Arthur
Goldhammer, (Cambridge, MA; London, 1991). For scholars seeking to connect the two ‘syndromes’
see, Anne Donadey, ‘“Une certaine idée de la France”: The Algerian Syndrome and Struggles Over
French Identity’, in Identity Papers: Contested Nationhood in Twentieth Century France, ed. by Steven
Unger and Tom Conley (Minneapolis, 1996), pp.215-233; David Schalk, ‘Of Memories and
Monuments: Paris and Algeria, Frejus and Indochina’, Historical Reflections, 28.2 (2002), 241-254.
14 Henry Rousso, ‘Les raisins verts de la guerre d’Algérie’, in La guerre d’Algérie (1954-1962), ed. by
Yves Michaud, (Paris, 2004), pp.141-143.
15 Raphaëlle Branche, La guerre d’Algérie: une histoire apaisée? (Paris, 2005), p.99.
16 Les années algériennes (four episodes), aired 23 September 1991 to 8 October 1991 (A2); La guerre
d’Algérie (five episodes), aired 12 August 1990 to 13 September 1990 (France 3).
17 Stora, La gangrène, p.9.
5Academically this changing of the guard was represented by the rise to prominence of
Raphaëlle Branche and Sylvie Thénault, both of whom have taken advantage of improved
archival access to produce in-depth and innovative meditations on specific and, in Branche’s
case, taboo aspects of the conflict.18 These substantial monographs with their detailed and
sustained analysis have been widely acclaimed as heralding a new style of research, taking
over from the previous breadth at the expense of depth model epitomised by the dominance of
articles and edited collections.19
‘Un kalédiscope de mémoires éclatées’
All of these developments meant that by 2004, Stora and Mohammed Harbi felt confident
enough to proclaim ‘la fin de l’amnésie’ with respect to the war.20 Going further, Rousso
argued for a longer gestation period with roots going back into the 1980s, but also that the
‘end of amnesia’ had, over the course of the 1990s, evolved into a state of ‘hypermnésie’,
characterised by ‘une présence continuelle et presque obsédante dans l’espace publique
contemporain’.21 This broadly parallels the evolution of the Vichy Syndrome whereby the
‘duty to remember’ came to undermine the legitimacy of the ‘right to forget’ leading to a state
of ‘obsession’.22 However, while 1940, and also 1914, were ‘des expériences quasi
unanimes’, the Algerian War replaced universality with ‘une multitude de solitudes…chacun
pour soi’, a fact reflected in the multiple groups currently resident in France connected to the
war, each of whom possesses their own particular interpretation of those years.23 These range
from veterans who resented the fall of another communist domino after the shame of
Vietnam, to the porteurs de valise who had actively aided the independence struggle, to the
harkis who fought for the French against their fellow countrymen, and the pieds-noirs who
18 Sylvie Thénault, Une drôle de justice, les magistrats dans la guerre d’Algérie, (Paris, 2001);
Raphaëlle Branche, La torture et l’armée pendant la guerre d’Algérie 1954-1962, (Paris, 2001).
19 For edited collections, alongside Rioux’s La guerre d’Algérie et les français, see Charles-Robert
Ageron (ed.), La guerre d’Algérie et les Algériens, (Paris, 1997); Charles-Robert Ageron (ed.), La
guerre d’Algérie au miroir des décolonisations françaises, (Paris, 2000); Jean-Charles Jauffret (ed.),
Militaires et guerrillas dans la guerre d’Algérie, (Brussels, 2001).
20 Mohammed Harbi and Benjamin Stora (eds.), La Guerre d’Algérie 1954-2004: la fin de l’amnésie,
(Paris, 2004). While this may be true in an objective sense, the ideas of amnesia and absence have
retained a strong hold on popular imagination. This is fed by a media and publishing industry that
continues to present the conflict as a perpetual site of rediscovery and to claim that their latest
contribution will be the one to ‘break the silence’ by revealing some ‘hidden’ aspects of the conflict for
the ‘first time’.
21 Rousso, ‘Les raisins verts’, p.139. Patricia Lorcin advances a similar proposition when she writes
that the silence surrounding the war ‘fissured’ before being officially broken in the 1990s. Lorcin,
Patricia M.E. (ed.), Algeria and France 1800-2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia, (New York, 2006),
p.xxv.
22 Éric Conan and Henry Rousso, Vichy an Ever-Present Past, trans. Nathan Bracher (Hanover, NH;
London, 1998), p.4.
23 Philippe labro, Des feux mal étients, (Paris, 1980), p.354.
6generally viewed the colonial period as a blessing for all concerned and independence as the
tragic sacrifice of a priceless piece of France. As the profile of the war has risen generally,
this ‘kalédiscope de mémoires éclatées’ have increasingly come into open conflict,
particularly over the issue of when and how to commemorate the war, with each group
seeking to see their version of the past enshrined in official rituals and monuments.24 So
intense has this competition become that it has acquired the epithet ‘les guerres de mémoire’.
The fragmentation of memories of the war is a well-documented and widely accepted
fact, most succinctly summarised by Stora’s concept of ‘cloistered remembering’ whereby
each group carries specific memories that are ‘tronquées, partielles et partials’, a phenomenon
that manifests as the tendency to ‘aller voir “son” film, reviver “ses” propres engagements ou
esperances’.25 Martin Evans, building on Alistair Thompson’s notion of ‘composure’, further
explains this impulse writing:
We compose memories so that they will fit in with what is seen as publicly
acceptable; or if they have been excluded from general public acceptance, we seek
our own particular public which affirms our identity and the way we want to
remember our lives.26
Underpinning the conclusions of several historical works, this situation is regularly
denounced, particularly in light of its implications for national history and memory. Richard
Derderian, for example, has criticised the ‘continued valence of non-interactive group
memories’, which he believes ‘complicates the prospects for achieving a larger consensus of
memory’.27 More generally, John Gillis has made explicit the societal consequences of
remaining trapped within cloistered remembrances:
[D]emocratic societies need to publicise rather than privatise the memories and
identities of all groups, so that each may know and respect the other’s version of the
past, thereby understanding better what divides as well as unites us. In this era of
plural identities, we need civil times and civil spaces more than ever, for these are
essential to the democratic processes by which individuals come together to discuss,
debate and negotiate the past and, through this process, define the future.28
24 Charles-Robert Ageron, ‘Conclusion’ in La guerre d’Algérie, p.623.
25 Stora, Imaginaires, p.190; Stora, Le livre, p.196; Stora, La gangrène, p.248.
26 Martin Evans, The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algerian War (1954-1962),
(Oxford, 1997), p.12.
27 Richard L. Derderian, ‘Algeria as a lieu de mémoire: Ethnic Minority Memory and National Identity
in Contemporary France’, Radical History Review, 83 (2002), 29.
28 John R. Gillis, Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, (Princeton, 1994), p.20.
7Such invocations feed into a wider debate about the need to move from memory into history
with respect to the Algerian War, a reference to the fact that although the conflict has now
been ‘named’, it has been neither interrogated nor integrated, remaining, in the words of
Tahar Ben Jelloun, ‘stated but not assimilated’.29 This failure is attributed not to ignorance
since, as Stora is keen to stress, historians have now ‘fait leur travail’, but to a flawed process
of transmission and socialisation whereby the state has proven incapable of using this greater
knowledge to create unifying narratives and consensual commemorative gestures to transcend
divisions.30 Arguably, this is symptomatic of the more fundamental problems France has had
‘coming to terms’ with decolonisation, particularly surmounting the challenge of reconciling
the defence of the ‘one and indivisible’ Republic with the shift from a unitary colonial
discourse, and thus a ‘cohesive national identity’, to a ‘plethora of competing postcolonial
memories’.31
However, with a wealth of literature and column inches already devoted to these
issues, this thesis is concerned less with identifying examples of the phenomenon of
cloistered remembering and more with investigating the groups and the processes involved.
Until recently, little attention was paid to collective entities such as the pieds-noirs and harkis
in France and even today the focus remains concentrated upon the context of the ‘return’ of
the war in the 1990s and the resultant memory wars phenomenon. A clear line is thus drawn
between absence prior to the 1990s and presence after this point, creating a false dichotomy.
It is also the case that the widespread acceptance of cloistered remembering with respect to
the War of Independence has not prompted any investigation into the actual content of these
memories, the groups carrying them, nor, most importantly, what these groups were doing
before the war became a ‘publicly acceptable’ topic in the 1990s; namely how they
communicated and interacted with their own ‘particular public’ in order to ‘remember their
lives’ prior to this.
From the ‘age of memory’ to the ‘age of history’
One explanation for this neglect of sub-state memory carriers can be found in the dominance
of Pierre Nora’s Les lieux de mémoire as the paradigm through which to study collective
29 Stora, Le livre, p.178; Ben Jelloun, French Hospitality, p.10.
30 Benjamin Stora and Thierry Leclère, La guerre des mémoires: La France face à son passé colonial,
(Paris, 2007), p.28.
31 Éric Savarese, Algérie, la guerre des mémoires, (Paris, 2007), p.14. For a more extensive treatment
of this issue see, Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard, and Sadrine Lemaire (eds.), La fracture coloniale:
La société française au prisme de l’héritage coloniale, (Paris, 2005); Nicolas Bancel, Pascal
Blanchard, and Françoise Vèrges, La République coloniale: essai sur une utopie, (Paris, 2003).
8memory in France, particularly its equation of ‘collective’ with ‘national’.32 In common with
most academic treatments of this subject, Nora’s understanding of collective memory begins
with the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs whose principal works on the subject, Les cadres
sociaux de la mémoire and La mémoire collective, have become almost canonical since their
re-discovery in the 1970s.33 Halbwachs, a Durkheimian, constructed his theory in answer to
the individualistic conceptions of memory advanced by Freud and by Halbwachs’ former
mentor, Henri Bergson. To Bergson’s argument that ‘la mémoire est une expérience vécue
des images du passé enfouies dans l’indivdu’, Halbwachs responded that to remember was
not to ‘revivre’, but to ‘reconstruire’ a past via ‘des cadres sociaux du présent’.34 For
Halbwachs therefore, all memory is collective and able to endure only through cadres
sociaux, the conceptual schemes and frameworks provided by social groups and the spaces
they occupy.35 Significantly, memory is not a given, ‘complete and entire in the subterranean
galleries of the mind’, but rather a present-orientated social reconstruction of the past. 36 This
makes Halbwachs, according to Lutz Niethammer, ‘a demand-side theoretician of intellect’
whereby ‘needs create the representations of the tradition and their accentuations in turn point
to the needs and interests of the group in question’.37Additionally, the socially framed nature
of memory endows it with a shelf life; the memory can endure only as long as the group.
Finally, the prominence, or social standing of the group in question has important
implications for the durability, visibility and power of the memory.38
All these elements of Halbwachs’ thought can be found in Nora’s theory of collective
memory, which he explains via the key concept of a lieu de mémoire, defined as:
32 Pierre Nora, Les lieux de mémoire, (7 vols; Paris, 1984-1992). Available in English as Realms of
Memory, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, (3 vols; New York, 1994-1998).
33 Maurice Halbwachs, Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire, (Paris, 1925); La mémoire collective, (Paris,
1968). Halbwachs’ work has not, however, been accepted uncritically with scholars from Marc Bloch
to Hayden White voicing concerns. For a range of these critiques see, Peter Burke, ‘History as Social
Memory’, in Memory: History, Culture and the Mind, ed. by Thomas Butler, (Oxford, 1989), p.98;
Hayden White, ‘Catastrophe, Communal Memory and Mythic Discourse: The Uses of Myth in the
Reconstruction of Society’, in Myth and Memory in the Construction of Community: Historical
Patterns in Europe and Beyond, ed. by Bo Stråth, (Brussels, 2000), p.53; Barbara A. Misztal, Theories
of Social Remembering, (Maidenhead, 2003), pp.50-56; Lutz Niethammer, ‘Maurice Halbwachs:
Memory and the Feeling of Identity’, in Myth and Memory, pp.82-84.
34 Gérard Namer, ‘Postface’ in Les cadres sociaux, pp.317, 329.
35 Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, trans. Francis J. Ditter and Vita Yazdi Ditter, (New
York, 1980), pp.23, 33. This is even true of events with a sole witness or participant because in order to
recall that occasion it is necessary to relate it to other people, impressions, or comments.
36 Lewis A. Coser, ‘Introduction’, in Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, trans. Lewis A.
Coser, (Chicago, 1992), p.22.
37 Niethammer, ‘Maurice Halbwachs’, p.82.
38 The issue of power is a particularly intriguing point in relation to memories of the War of
Independence given that many of the groups holding such memories, like the harkis, were socially
disempowered, while the most powerful group, the state, appeared to possess no memory of the
conflict.
9Any significant entity, whether material or non material in nature, which by dint of
human will or the work of time had become a symbolic element of the memorial
heritage of any community.39
These lieux are not stable sites of memory but ‘hybrid places’ that thrive because of their
capacity for change. Examples include the Pantheon, the Tour de France, La Petite Lavisse,
and coffee; symbols that epitomise ‘Frenchness’ but whose precise significance and meaning
have altered over time. Nora’s self-proclaimed goal is ‘to reinterpret the history of France in
symbolic terms’, to offer a ‘history of the second degree’ by which he envisions a history
‘less interested in “what actually happened” than in its perpetual reuse and misuse, its
influence on successive presents’.40
The impetus for Nora’s magnum opus was his sense that ‘memory is constantly on
our lips because it no longer exists’.41 We have moved out of the ‘age of memory’ he argues,
where memory was collective, spontaneous, unselfconscious lived experience, into the ‘age of
history’ where memory is a duty incumbent upon the individual, something apart from us to
be analysed, archived, and artificially preserved in libraries, museums, and monuments.42
Paralleling Richard Terdiman’s idea of a ‘memory crisis’ in the nineteenth-century, Nora
argues that the magnitude of events like the French Revolution and World War One severed
the organic connection to the past, their enormity making it difficult for those who lived
through them to remember what life was like ‘before’.43 This disconnection between past and
present brought about the realisation that there was nothing natural and inherent about
memories. The result was a shift from memory contained within to memory projected
without, invested in tangible spaces and declaring its presence through external signs. From
this dislocation stemmed alienation and ultimately historicism, hence Nora’s lament that ‘We
no longer celebrate the nation, but we study the nation’s celebrations’.44 What Nora appears
to mourn most is the fact that ‘history is now a social science, memory a purely private
phenomenon’.45 He has been especially vocal in warning of the dangers inherent in this
arguing, in a critique reminiscent of denunciations of cloistered remembering, that private
memory has become ‘a dynamic of self-enclosure, a lack of understanding of the other,
alienation from one’s own history, a means of legitimising oneself, the loss of common
39 Pierre Nora, ‘Preface’ in Realms of Memory, vol. 1, p.xvii.
40 Ibid. p.xxiv.
41 Pierre Nora, ‘Between History and Memory’ in Ibid. p.1.
42 Ibid. pp.10-14.
43 Richard Terdiman, Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis, (Ithaca; London, 1993), pp.31-
32.
44 Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, p.8. This echoes Halbwachs’ point that ‘General history starts
only when tradition ends and the social memory is fading or breaking up’. Halbwachs, The Collective
Memory, pp.78-79.
45 Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, p.11.
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ground and very often a powerfully aggressive ethnic nationalism’.46 According to Richard
Derderian, Nora therefore conceived of Les Lieux as a ‘rescue project’, designed to ‘shore up
France’s shared but now endangered sites of memory by revealing their inner workings’.47
Nora’s claim to deconstruction is therefore slightly disingenuous. He is happy to
analyse the fluctuations in meanings of symbols, as long as the bedrock of Frenchness on
which the symbol in question rests is never threatened. Consequently, as critics have been
quick to point out, ‘nation’ is treated in Les Lieux as a material-cultural reality, rather than the
political representation, or ‘imagined community’, that it actually is. As Hue-Tam Ho Tai
notes:
For all Nora’s embrace of polyphony and polysemy, the French nation of Realms of
Memory is a given rather than a problem or a project… This is a France that is
indivisible even when understood differently over time and by different segments of
the population.48
Furthermore, what Nora assumes to be a ‘unified national consciousness’ may in fact be a
dominant memory, a conception of France formulated by the winners. Alternative visions of
the nation, for example that held by descendents of North African immigrants, are relegated
to ‘dominated sites’. Tai then uses Nora’s own definition of these sites as ‘places of refuge,
sanctuaries of instinctive devotion and hushed pilgrimages’ in order to imply that the
memories Nora sidelines in fact exhibit precisely the characteristics of ‘true’ memory whose
contemporary absence he mourns. Tai concludes by suggesting that by exposing ‘history-as-
commemoration’, which he regards as ‘another name for official history’, Nora and his
disciples have created a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby all memory, even more organic and
‘true’ counter-memories, will eventually be historicised and thus destroyed. ‘If there seems to
be a surfeit of commemoration’ Tai remarks, ‘it is because hitherto-silenced minorities have
become vocal even as the politics of both history and memory have been exposed’.49 In a
similar vein, Nancy Wood takes issue with Nora’s exclusive identity politics, arguing that his
nation, defined through its symbolic representations, ‘excludes from its embrace those
46 Pierre Nora cited in Richard L. Derderian, North Africans in Contemporary France: Becoming
Visible, (Basingstoke, 2004), p.168.
47 Ibid. p. 179. See also Steven Englund, ‘The Ghost of Nation Past’, Journal of Modern History, 64
(1992), 301-302.
48 Hue-Tam Ho Tai, ‘Remembered Realms: Pierre Nora and French National Memory’, American
Historical Review, 106 (2001), 910.
49 Tai, ‘Remembered Realms’, 920-921.
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“strangers” who do not have the same emotional investment in “les lieux de mémoire” of “la
patrie”’.50
Wood’s intention is to highlight the increasing redundancy of over-arching state-
centric explanatory frameworks with respect to collective memory, yet most significant recent
French contributions to memory studies have adopted similar approaches. For example,
although Rousso defines collective memory as ‘an ensemble of representations and attitudes
towards the past, proper to a collectivity and variable in time’, it never occurs to him that
there are other ‘collectives’ outside of, and more specifically beneath, that of the nation.51 His
work on the ‘Vichy Syndrome’ has therefore been criticised for focusing on ‘a largely public,
often official and narrowly political memory’.52 Stora has similarly been taken to task for
privileging official memory, particularly in his focus on recognition and reconciliatory
gestures emanating from the state as the solution to the current memory wars problem.53
Concentrating on institutions at the highest level also explains the centrality of the role played
by ‘absence’ in his work and that of other historians.54 Collectively, Claire Gantet finds Nora,
Stora, and Rousso guilty of purveying history that emphasises dates and physical traces ‘au
detriment de la circulation des mémoires dans une société et de la communication à l’intérieur
d’un groupe’, with the result that ‘la mémoire tend à être réduite aux usage politiques du
passé, et identité à un processus social imposé “par en haut”’.55
Restoring social agency
The obvious question to ask is therefore whether another, less ‘top down’, definition of
collective memory would reveal a different picture of the evolution of memories of the war?
The Popular Memory Group, which evolved out of Birmingham University’s history
department in the early 1980s, offered one such option when they argued that memory is not a
single account of the past imposed by one group upon another, but a relational nexus of
contested and competing representations in which hegemonic interpretations are the
temporarily prevailing results of a constant process of negotiation.56 Significantly, this
50 Nancy Wood, ‘Memorial Militancy in France: “Working Through” or the Politics of Anachronism?’,
Patterns of Prejudice, 29.2 (1995), 93.
51 Henry Rousso, ‘Pour une histoire de la mémoire collective: L’après Vichy’, in Histoire politique et
sciences sociales, ed. by Denis Peschanski, Michael Pollak, and Henry Rousso (Paris, 1991), p.251
52 Alon Confino, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method’, American Historical
Review, (December 1997), 1394.
53 William, B. Cohen, ‘The Algerian War and French Memory’, Contemporary European History, 9.3
(2000), 492.
54 William, B. Cohen, ‘The Algerian War, the French State and Official Memory’, Historical
Reflections, 28.2 (2002), 228.
55 Claire Gantet, ‘La mémoire, objet et sujet d’histoire. Enquête sur l’historicité et sur l‘écriture de
l’histoire’, Francia, 28.2 (2001), 114.
56 Popular Memory Group, ‘Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method’, in Making Histories: Studies
in History-Writing and Politics, ed. by Richard Johnson, (London, 1982), pp.211-236. This
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definition of memory also provides an appealing alternative to the history versus memory
paradigm of which Pierre Nora is merely the most high profile exponent. For Nora there is a
distinction to be made whereby ‘Memory is life, always embodied in living society’, while
history is ‘the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer’.57
However, various commentators have pointed out that Nora himself struggles to maintain
such a rigid separation and that ‘a certain fuzziness’ creeps into his deployment of history and
memory in places.58 For other historical practitioners this problem is avoided through the
acceptance that memory ‘is dialectically related to historical thought, rather than being some
kind of other to it’.59
Memory is therefore not a separate entity, floating somewhere in the cultural
atmosphere, but is instead an organic compound which takes shape within the societies it
concerns.60 As John Gillis reminds us, ‘identities and memories are not things we think about
but things we think with. As such, they have no existence beyond our politics, our social
relationship and our histories’.61 This renders an either/or choice between history and memory
unnecessary and can also help to guard against another frequent criticism of memory studies:
its atomization. The fragmentation of the field and its tendency to define itself topically –
monuments, films, museums, repressed memory – means that it ‘runs the risk of becoming an
assemblage of distinct topics that describe in a predictable way how people construct the
past’, rather than providing answers to the more productive questions such as: Who is
constructing these pasts and why? Which ones are accepted, rejected, or contested and why?62
When Nora bemoans the commemoration phenomenon, which he cites as at the root of the
contemporary privatization and atomization of memory, he appears to place the blame on the
groups themselves, claiming that each commemoration has become ‘a search for the one
thread in the social fabric of the present which will permit direct contact with the irrevocably
dead past’.63 However, fragmentation is equally a product of historiography given the
propensity of historians to study particular manifestations of collective memory in isolation
understanding of collective memory has resonated with many historians, including Martin Evans who
describes the field of public representation with respect to the War of Independence as being ‘crossed
by competing constructions of the past often at war with each other’. Evans, The Memory of
Resistance, p.10.
57 Nora, ‘Between History and Memory’, p.3.
58 Tai, ‘Remembered Realms’, 915.
59 Raphael Samuel, Theatres of Memory: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture, vol.1, (London,
1994), p.x.
60 Jay Winter, ‘Forms of Kinship and Remembrance in the Aftermath of the Great War’, in War and
Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, ed. by Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, (Cambridge, 1999),
p.40.
61 Gillis, Commemoration, p.5.
62 Confino, ‘Collective Memory’, 1387.
63 Pierre Nora, ‘The Era of Commemoration’ in Realms of Memory, vol. 3, p.626.
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from each other and from broader social contexts, rather than thinking about them as ‘a many-
layered and changing collection of discourses about the past’.64
Two historians in particular have challenged the hegemony of Nora’s paradigm not
only by pointing out its weaknesses, but also by proposing an alternative conception that
embodies many of the attributes discussed above. Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan most
obviously distance themselves from Nora’s theory of collective memory by rejecting the term
altogether on the basis that ‘the ‘collective memory’ of war is not what everybody thinks
about war. It is a phrase without meaning when we try to disentangle the behaviour of
different groups within society’.65 Winter and Sivan instead advocate the phrase ‘collective
remembrance’ to acknowledge that memory is a plural and socially framed phenomenon that
involves ‘gathering together bits and pieces of the past, and joining them together in public’.
For Winter and Sivan the ‘public’ is ‘the group that produces, expresses and consumes [the
past]’ while what they create is ‘not a cluster of individual memories; the whole is greater
than the sum of the parts’.66 This harks back to Halbwachs’ contention that there are as many
memories as groups. But whereas Nora acknowledges this before going on to unite these
disparate groups into a single collective on the basis of their shared national affiliation,
Winter and Sivan seem happy for there to be multiple entities that are not mutually exclusive
as Nora assumes sub-state private memories to be.
Central to all of this is the concept of agency. Rather than viewing communities as
the passive recipients of discourses dictated from above, it is important to remember that
these groups are active participants in a multi-directional process. For Winter in particular,
the work of collective memory is done primarily by agents of remembrance operating in civil
society. Borrowing from anthropology, he terms these groups of agents ‘fictive kin’, a phrase
he uses as ‘shorthand for a multiplicity of groups’, with ‘fictive’ meant to imply constructed
and created, rather than imaginary or untrue.67 These are small-scale agents whose work is
‘liminal’ allowing them to occupy ‘the space between individual memory and the national
theatre of collective memory choreographed by social and political leaders’.68 Thus although
primarily concerned with locally-rooted social action, Winter remains aware that fictive kin
memories are not formed in isolation, and that there is continual dialogue between
individuals, groups, and the state.
64 Josie McLellan, Antifascism and Memory in East Germany: Remembering the International
Brigades, (Oxford, 2004), p.5.
65 Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan ‘Setting the Framework’, in War and Remembrance, p.9.
66 Ibid. p.6.
67 Winter, ‘Forms of Kinship’, p.41.
68 Ibid. p.41.
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‘La mémoire française est pleine d’Algérie’
Winter’s fictive kin concept is particularly interesting because of the way he applies it to the
‘dense networks of filiation’ that emerged following the Great War, often in the form of
associations. Dedicated to providing assistance, support, and forums in which to campaign for
recognition, recompense, and respect, Winter views these as the ‘hidden prehistory of many,
more visible, forms of collective remembrance’.69 In the context of the War of Independence,
it could equally be argued that the absence of public commemoration and the attention this
has attracted worked to conceal a rich ‘undergrowth of non-official activity’ that preceded the
statues and plaques now being unveiled across France.70 Between 1954 and 1962, 2.3 million
Frenchmen served in Algeria, approximately 4.6% of the population, while there are an
estimated 6 million people in France today with a direct personal link to the war, including
over one million pieds-noirs, an equal number of Algerian immigrants, and thousands of
harkis, plus their descendants.71 It seems implausible to suggest that none of these groups has
made any effort to remember the war, especially given their regional concentration coupled
with their difficulties integrating into an often suspicious and hostile French society. In fact,
Stora raises the possibility of a neglected wealth of memory and memory activity behind
official occultation as early as La gangrène, only to leave it tantalisingly unexplored:
Mais la mémoire réelle de cette guerre …elle n’a jamais cessé de fonctionner...Aucun
peuple, aucune société, aucun individu ne saurait exister et définir son identité en état
d’amnésie; une mémoire parallèle, individuelle trouve toujours des refuges lorsque
les pouvoirs veulent la rendre captive, ou l’oubli.72
Stora is not the only scholar to note that ‘la mémoire française est pleine d’Algérie’, although
virtually none have gone on to investigate this presence further.73 The dominance of Nora,
Rousso, and Stora seems to have produced a rather narrow way of ‘doing’ memory studies
with respect to French history, especially twentieth century periods. Confusing ‘occultation’
with ‘oubli’ has perhaps blinded historians to the possibility of alternative narratives and
69 Ibid. p.47.
70 Nor does the advent of official commemoration necessarily mean that all other forms of non-official
remembrance will cease. Indeed, the controversies that have surrounded recent initiatives suggest that
many are far from satisfied by the government’s efforts to date.
71 Stora, La gangrène, p.294; Neil MacMaster, ‘The Torture Controversy (1998-2002): Towards a
“New History” of the Algerian War’, MCF, 10.4 (2002), 451; Benjamin Stora, Le transfert d’une
mémoire: de l’ “Algérie Française” au racisme anti-arabe, (Paris, 1999), p.71
72 Stora, La gangrène, p.319.
73 Frank, ‘Les troubles’, p.604.
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counter-memories, or at least led them to neglect their importance in favour of collective
memories created and transmitted from ‘above’.74 Indeed, Winter and Sivan’s collaborative
project was partly inspired by a desire to correct Nora’s ‘premature and misleading obituary’
of popular memory by providing evidence of its vibrancy and ongoing relevance.75 A similar
corrective seems particularly necessary with respect to the War of Independence given that
many of the groups affected have experienced extreme dislocation, have been denied social
legitimacy and, consequently, do not form part of the national symbolic heritage so
meticulously catalogued by Nora. This suggests that the traditional structures of memory
transmission, particularly family and fictive kin, may have assumed greater prominence as
support networks, remaining more intact than is true for society in general. Furthermore, the
lack of lieux de mémoire, not simply monuments but also battlefields, cemeteries, even homes
for many, leave milieux de mémoire as all that these groups have. It therefore seems logical to
suggest that these actors are the most likely to be living with their memories, even beyond the
generations directly involved, because there have been no external sites, rituals, or narratives
enjoying broad recognition and legitimacy onto which to project and fix their memories. It is
these communities to which attention should be turned as part of an effort to broaden both the
definition of collective memory in French history and our understanding of the evolution of
memories of the War of Independence.
In looking for evidence of such strata of sub-state collective memories, the obvious
place to start is with associations, a particularly French penchant that combines all of
Winter’s key elements being simultaneously collective, public, plural and agency-driven.76
Defined as ‘le lien social qui explique une identité transportée au delà des murs et des
processus d’activation sociale de groupe’, associations reflect the fact that it is impossible to
maintain a community without ‘un reséau dynamique de sociabilité’ that undertakes the task
of ‘auto-définition’ and ‘auto-promotion’.77 As Halbwachs argued, individual recollections
have to be ‘fixed’ and continually reiterated in order for them to become collective. This act
of collation and enunciation requires active agents, what Gérard Noiriel calls ‘memory
entrepreneurs’ and Nathan Watchel terms ‘memory bearers’, who are crucial because they
74 Robert Frank stresses that to forget is to ‘vider la mémoire de ses souvenirs’, whereas with the War
of independence it was more a case of memories that were ‘longtemps enfouis, cachés, contenus’. This
is why they were able to ‘resurgir violemment à la surface lorsque l’actualité déchire un coin du voile’,
as happened during the 1990s. Ibid. p.604.
75 Winter and Sivan, ‘Setting the Framework’, p.3.
76 For further information on the history of associations in France see Martine Barthelemy,
Associations un nouvel âge de la participation, (Paris, 2000); Bernard Roudet, Histoires des
associations: relations à l'insitution municipale et repérage des conflits, (Grenoble, 1987); Bernard
Roudet, Des jeunes et des associations (Paris, 1996)
77 Suzy Guth, ‘Un lien social identitaire: les associations de pieds-noirs’, in Les Rapatriés d’Algérie en
Languedoc-Roussillom 1962-1992, ed. by Mohand Khellil et Jules Maurin, (Montpellier, 1992), p.161;
Jean-Jacques Jordi, ‘1962 l’arrivée des Pieds-Noirs’, Autrement: Français d’ailleurs, peuple d’ici, 81
(1995), 123; Éric Savarese, L’invention des Pieds-noirs, (Paris, 2002), p.120.
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‘choose from an infinite variety of individual memories those which are best suited to support
their cause and transform them into collective memory’.78 Therefore it is not the group per se
that explains the collective memory, but rather the group’s structure, particularly the way in
which individual recollections are connected in order to create a ‘collective consciousness’; as
Stora underlines, ‘la mémoire est aussi une affair des structures’.79
As repositories of, and vehicles for, the expression of collective memories,
associations have played a particularly significant role with respect to the War of
Independence. ‘Elles ont été à l’origine d’une abondante production sur l’histoire de cette
guerre’ writes Sylvie Thénault, before going on to list the many avenues through which they
have accomplished this including publishing testimonies, organising reunions, erecting
monuments, launching law suits, diffusing their own press and propaganda, even producing
their own television documentaries; all of which testifies to ‘une dynamise de la mémoire,
indépendant de l’État’.80 Abderahmen Moumen’s comment that any study of the identity and
memory of rapatriés from Algeria ‘implique une incursion dans les activités associatives’ is
therefore equally applicable to other memory carriers connected to the conflict.81 In terms of
methodology, this logically necessitates an incursion into all areas and mediums in which
associations are active. The research for this thesis consequently incorporates evidence drawn
from a range of sources, including received testimony, autobiographies, questionnaire
responses, association publications, audiovisual and online material, as well as the national
and regional press. Believing the whole to be greater than the sum of its parts, an integrated
approach to the processing and presentation of evidence was adopted, although this was
combined with an awareness of the respective strengths and weaknesses of each type of
source. The underlying principle was to analyse discourses constructed by these communities
rather than simply relying on representations offered by others on the basis that ‘Le discours
n’est pas simplement ce qui traduit les luttes ou les systèmes de domination, mais ce pour
quoi on lutte, ce par quoi on lutte’.82 Furthermore, associations have constituted the
fundamental tools with which the pieds-noirs and harkis have sought to build their collective
memories, making them an especially important organism through which to access and
78 Gérard Noiriel, ‘Immigration, Amnesia and Memory’, French Historical Studies, 19.2 (1995), 380;
Nathan Wachtel, ‘Introduction’ in Between Memory and History, ed. by Marie-Noëlle Bourget, Lucette
Valensi, and Nathan Watchel (Chur, Switzerland, 1990), p.14.
79 Wachtel, ‘Introduction’, p.9; Roger Bastide, ‘Mémoire collective et sociologie du bricolage’,
L’Année sociologique, (1970), 85; Didier Folléas, ‘An Interview with Benjamin Stora: Guerre
d’Algérie: la mémoire par les images’, Historical Reflections, 28.2 (2002), 208.
80 Sylvie Thénault, ‘France-Algérie: Pour un traitment commun du passé de la guerre d’indépendance’,
Vingtième siècle, 85 (January-March 2005), 121.
81 Abderahmen Moumen, Entre histoire et mémoire: Les rapatriés d’Algérie dictionnaire
bibliographique, (Nice, 2003), p.25.
82 Michel Foucault, L’ordre du discours. (Paris, 1971), p.12. Also cited in Mohand Hamoumou, ‘Les
harkis: une double occultation’, in Intégration et exclusion dans la société Française contemporaine,
ed. by Gilles Ferréol, (Lille, 1993), p.79.
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understand the narratives about the past they have carried and transmitted. However, before
turning to an examination of the construction and evolution of their collective memories, it is
first necessary to obtain a fuller picture of the two communities and their historical
trajectories.
The pied-noir community
The term pied-noir essentially refers to the settler community of French Algeria who made up
approximately 10 per cent of the population by 1954. Coming from a wide range of European
countries and for an equally diverse array of reasons, these men and women arrived from the
1830s onwards as France’s newest possession was pacified and settled. In 1889 and 1893,
naturalisation laws unilaterally conferred French citizenship upon them, placing them firmly
at the top of the colonial hierarchy. Although bestowed rather than requested, the nature of
daily life in French Algeria meant that this new identity quickly took root, not least in the
classroom where the Ferry Laws ensured that history began with ‘nos ancêtres, les Gaulois…’
The First and Second World Wars provided these ‘new’ French with an opportunity to prove
their fidelity to the motherland, which they did by enlisting in disproportionately high
numbers. The end result was, as Jean-Jacques Jordi has noted, that ‘les liens qu’entretenaient
les Français d’Algérie avec leur regions ou leur patrie d’origine s’estompent, et l’attachment
du milieu natal devient plus fort que le souvenir des origins paternelles’.83
Intimately entwined with France’s colonial project in Algeria, the settlers equally
considered themselves and their land to be integral parts of the French nation. Algérie
française was thus not simply a phrase, but an indisputable reality for these people. It was
also a reality they wished to see perpetuated, hence their opposition to the independence-
seeking FLN. However, after eight years of bitter and bloody conflict Algeria ceased to be
part of France in July 1962. The rapidly escalating violence that followed the signing of the
Evian Accords in March 1962, led the settler community to believe that their lives would be
untenable under FLN rule.84 Consequently, over 90 per cent, or almost one million people,
left Algeria over the course of that summer; the majority headed for France.85
83 Jean-Jacques Jordi, ‘Les pieds noirs: constructions identitaires et réinvention des origines’, H&M,
1236 (March-April 2002), 19.
84 Although the pieds-noirs subsequently claimed that the FLN always intended to drive them out once
independence was secured, the Evian Accords actually envisaged that the majority of settlers would
remain because this was the most convenient outcome for both France and Algeria.
85 This included over 100,000 Jews who, having been given French nationality by the Decret Crémieux
of 1870, opted in 1962 to place their French citizenship above their historical, cultural, and
emotional ties to Algeria. Although they constitute a fascinating and significant post-war collective
memory case study, doing them justice would require a separate thesis. This is especially true given the
complexity of the connections between the Jews of Algeria and various other groups in France,
including the pieds-noirs. While some Algerian Jews have opted to subsume their religious and
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Believing France had been victorious militarily and therefore regarding the Evian
Accords as an act of incomprehensible capitulation that unnecessarily sacrificed French
Algeria, the predominant sentiments among the settlers were bewilderment and anger.
Betrayed and abandoned by France, they felt that their only choice in the summer of 1962
was ‘la valise ou le cercueil’.86 The hasty and improvised nature of many departures, as well
as the sheer volume of people leaving meant that most settlers were only able to take with
them what they could carry. The trauma of this experience transformed exile into the defining
characteristic of the displaced settlers. Indeed the death of French Algeria, for the country was
not only lost to the settlers in 1962 but ceased to exist altogether, coincided with the birth of
the pieds-noirs as a population.87 The diversity of their lives as French Algerians up to that
point was erased, replaced by a collective rapatrié identity that revolved around the
foundational event of their exodus, permanently fixing their gaze over their shoulder on what
had been lost.88 When writing his memoirs, Gérard Crespo acknowledged that ‘en réalité, les
peuples de la colonisation ont été différents selon les époques et les régions’, but went on to
state that ‘[a]près 1962 beaucoup des choses changeront et les pieds-noirs se trouvent une
unité dans l’adversité’.89
During the colonial era, the dominant position of the settlers meant that they did not
have to consciously grapple with their identity; they could simply take it for granted. Algerian
independence destroyed this sense of security, jettisoning the pieds-noirs not only into an
alien country, but also into an alien social position. The trauma of this rupture produced a
fixation on ‘une terre idealisée’, the lineaments of which became more vivid and more perfect
in direct proportion to the turmoil and distress of the present.90 The pieds-noirs therefore
arrived in France in 1962 with few worldly possessions, but a long list of grievances. These
ethnic specificity within the larger pied-noir identity, others have deliberately cultivated a separate
associational network, leaving a shifting centre ground composed of those who have either attempted
to straddle this divide, or who move between the two poles depending on circumstances. This
dissertation will therefore concern itself only with those rapatriés and associations who define
themselves as pied-noir.
86 This phrase has become emblematic of the situation as the settlers perceived it in 1962. It was also
the title of one of the earliest post-war pied-noir memoirs. See Anne Loesch, La valise et le cercueil,
(Paris, 1963)
87 Although this identity had begun to take shape during the latter stages of the war as the settlers
became conscious of themselves as a collective and of the magnitude of the threat to their position, the
summer of 1962, and the exodus in particular, represents the point at which it crystallised. Jordi, ‘Les
pieds noirs’, 22.
88 With respect to the settler community prior to 1954, it should be noted that although the cliché of the
rich and exploitative colon does bear some semblance to reality, reflecting the privilege of certain
settler lives in French Algeria, the population as a whole was diverse. Overall the standard of living in
Algeria was lower than that in mainland France, while incomes also varied between urban centres such
as Algiers and the bled. Location further affected the nature of relationships between the settlers and
the other inhabitants of the colony, with interactions generally considered to be closer, or certainly
more frequent, in rural areas where the proximity between different communities was greater.
89 Gérard Crespo, Un enfant là-bas dans la guerre, ici dans l’indifférence, (Hélette, 1997), p.12.
90 Jordi, ‘1962’, 114.
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were compounded by the lack of facilities initially available to assist with their installation,
the French having anticipated an exodus of 400,000 over four years, not one million in the
space of a couple of months, as well as the reluctance of successive governments to offer
compensation for their losses. As one headline from the time proclaimed: ‘Désordre,
improvisation, humiliations. Impossible pour les rapatriés de sentir “chez eux”’.91 The
situation was exacerbated by the lack of familial or kinship networks to help ease their
transition into their new world, as well as by the fact that the pieds-noirs also felt themselves
and their history to have been misunderstood by their metropolitan cousins who tended to
stereotype them all as colons who ‘fait sueur les burnous’. Finding no wider community open
to including them, indeed many considered the French community to be actively closing
ranks against them, the pieds-noirs naturally turned in on themselves. Herein lies the roots of
the insularity of which the community are often accused; what Jordi has described as the
‘solidarité excessive et exclusive’ which manifests itself in ‘la recherche du médecin rapatrié,
du boulanger rapatrié…avec quel on pourra parler de “là-bas” et évoquer un passé regretté,
qui ne saurait revivre certes, mais qui n’appellerait pas en retour des condemnations ou
opprobres’.92 These factors combined to produce a powerful sentiment of victimhood and a
range of perceived injustices to be rectified.
One of the principal ways pied-noirs have sought redress for their grievances is
through associations. As the saying goes ‘Quand deux pieds-noirs se recontrent et commencer
à évoquer leurs souvenirs, ils créent trois associations’.93 Between 400 and 800 such
associations are believed to exist to which 10 to 15 per cent of the pied-noir population
belong.94 The purpose of this thesis is to explore the role played by these associations in the
creation, codification and transmission of a collective pied-noir memory after 1962. This
examination is framed by the following key questions: What shape does this collective
memory assume and how does it evolve over time? How is it mobilised and to what ends? To
what extent is it affected by interactions with other memory carriers? What are these
associations ultimately seeking and to what extent can they be deemed to have succeeded in
their quest? In attempting to provide answers to such questions, this dissertation necessarily
builds on the work of various scholars of the pied-noir community such as Jean-Jacques
Jordi, Clarisse Buono, Michèle Baussant, Joëlle Hureau, Valérie Esclangon-Morin and Eric
91 ‘Les années mélancholiques’, Les pieds-noirs: Histoires d’une blessure, aired 7 April 2007 (Fr3).
92 Jean-Jacques Jordi, ‘Archéologie et structure du réseau de sociabilité rapatrié et pied-noir’, Provence
Historique, 47 (1997), 182
93 Ibid. 177.
94 Roche Roche, ‘Pieds-noirs: le “retour”’, MCF, 2.2 (1994), 153; Maurice Calmein, Les associations
pieds-noirs, (Carcassonne, 1994), p.15; Jean-Jacques Jordi, De l’exode à l’éxil: rapatriés et pieds noirs
en France: l’exemple marseillais, 1954-1992, (Paris, 1993), p.179; Rosemary Averell Manes, The
Pieds-Noirs 1960-2000: A Case Study in the Persistence of Subcultural Distinctiveness, (Bethesda,
MD, 2005), p.52.
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Savarese. However, the approach adopted here differs in several crucial respects from those
taken previously. No attempt will be made to establish a typology of pied-noir associations
since Buono has already provided this.95 In addition, such an endeavour would distract from
the main concern here, which is to trace and analyse the development of the collective
memory of a community from a holistic standpoint. This in no way seeks to deny the
heterogeneity of the pieds-noirs, nor of their associations. In fact this diversity serves as a
necessary foundation upon which to build a profile of points of commonality and difference.96
In light of this, establishing artificially clear-cut divisions between different types of pieds-
noirs organisations seems unnecessarily restrictive and reductive, particularly given the
fluidity that characterises associational allegiances within the community.
The research for this investigation was deliberately based upon as wide a range of
associations and their publications as possible, from those with a particular regional focus like
L’écho d’Oran, known as L’écho de l’Oranie from 1966, to those with a community-wide
remit not ostensibly tied to any association, such as the monthly Pieds-Noirs Magazine
(PNM).97 Issue-specific organisations such as the Groupement national pour l’indemnisation
des biens spoliés ou perdus outre-mer (GNPI) were included with broader entities such as the
Cercle Algérianiste. Long-standing collectives such as the Association nationale pour des
français d’Afrique du Nord, d’outre-mer, et de leurs amis (ANFANOMA), founded in 1956
and still going strong today, were considered alongside more recent arrivals on the pied-noir
associational scene such as Véritas whose first newsletter appeared in 1996. Naturally within
such a sample there is considerable diversity in terms of size, activeness, personalities, and
political orientations, particularly when the time span of this study is taken into account.
Given this variety, internal histories of these associations will not be provided, except in
instances where this has a direct bearing on the nature of the memory being carried. It is also,
once again, beside the point of this investigation, which is concerned less with the practical
history of pied-noir associations and more with the evolution of the representations of the past
that these groups are the vehicles for.
Finally, this analysis hopes to distinguish itself from prior work in its pluralistic
understanding of the relationships that exist within and beyond the pied-noir community. The
95 Clarisse Buono, Pieds-noirs de père en fils, (Paris, 2004).
96 The use of the phrase ‘pied-noir community’ should therefore be taken as a convenient and
necessary shorthand to designate a collection of disparate individuals and does not in any way imply
that all members of that group are deemed to think, feel, and react homogeneously, nor that all pieds-
noirs identify with this community at all times.
97 Beginning life as Pieds-Noirs Magazine in 1990, four years into its existence, the name Pieds-Noirs
d’Hier et d’Aujourd’hui was adopted which the journal retains to this day. Although the magazine has
no stated associational allegiance, co-founder Jean Marc Lopez has close ties to the far right Union
syndicale de défense des intérêts français repliés d’Algérie (USDIFRA). Consequently, the contents of
the publication often reflect the priorities of USDIFRA and its off-shoot the Conseil national supérieur
des rapatriés (CNRS).
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recently published Les rapatriés d’Afrique du Nord by Valérie Esclangon-Morin contains a
wealth of detail, but focuses very much on the interaction between the French state and
various rapatrié groups, analysing ‘les différentes measures mises en place par les pouvoirs
publics et face à elles, étudier la façon dont elles ont été réçues et acceptées par les rapatriés
ainsi que les formes d’influence qu’exercent ces mêmes rapatriés sur l’État’.98 While not
denying the value of such an approach, indeed retaining the multi-directional approach to
interaction, the intention here is to simultaneously expand the framework to include
horizontal exchanges among various pieds-noirs associations, as well as between them and
other groups such as harkis, Algerians in France, the media, and the academic community.
The fulfilment of this agenda dictates a thematic organisation of material. This will also
hopefully guard against a simply narrative history and instead facilitate an analysis of the
many ways in which pied-noir associations have sought to mobilise and articulate visions of
the past in service of the present, as well as how these interpretations have altered in the years
since the end of French Algeria.
The harki community
Alongside the pied-noir population, this dissertation will also consider the harki community.
Harki derives from the Arabic word ‘harka’, meaning movement. Although, the first harka
was created in the Aurès by the ethnologist Jean Servier, it was Resident Minister Robert
Lacoste who regularised and institutionalised their use as mobile units to undertake offensive
military operations in February 1956.99 By September 1957, there were approximately 10,000
harkis. This figure then rose to 61,600 in January 1961, before dropping back down to 5000
by April 1962.100 However, as the conflict progressed, harki increasingly became a generic
term signifying all native auxiliaries, which is the sense in which it will be used here.101 The
number of harkis so defined fluctuated throughout the war, peaking at 210,000 in 1958, but
falling considerably in the final months of the conflict.102 Principally of rural origin, illiterate,
and unskilled, harkis were very different to the indigenous Muslim elite of colonial Algeria,
98 Valérie Esclangon-Morin, Les rapatriés d’Afrique du Nord de 1956 à nos jours, (Paris, 2007), p.18.
99 Claude Liauzu, ‘Préface’ in Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, Nos mères: paroles blessées: Une autre histoire
de harkis, (Léchelle, 2006), p.14.
100 Ibid. p.14.
101 Harki could thus refer to the moghaznis assigned to protecting the Sections administrative
spécialisées (SAS), the French doctors, social workers and teachers charged with winning the hearts
and minds of the Algerian people; the men who comprised the Groupes d’auto défense (GAD) tasked
with protecting isolated villages; the Groupes mobiles de sécurité (GMS) of the rural police force; and
finally the ‘assas or guardians.
102 Charles-Robert Ageron, ‘Le “drame des Harkis”: mémoire ou histoire?’ Vingtième siècle, 68 (2000),
3.
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many of whom had opted for French nationality prior to 1954 and whose support of the
French cause was often motivated by conviction rather than compulsion or necessity.103
When the ceasefire was proclaimed on 19 March 1962, the harkis were generally
given three options: engage in the regular French army which would mean going wherever
the army went, accept licenciement avec primes and return to civilian life, or postpone
making a definite choice by enrolling for a six month period as a civilian contractual agent.104
There was disquiet among the harkis at this time, most famously captured by a Cinq colonnes
à l’une interview with an auxiliary who confessed feeling his life in danger because ‘J’ai
travaillé sous le drapeau français’.105 However, 21,000, or 81.2 per cent of those still in active
service, felt sufficiently reassured by various guarantees to accept their final pay and hand
over their uniforms.106 Never having wanted to get caught up in the war in the first place,
these men were keen to return to the lives they had been forced to suspend. ‘Je préférais rester
dans l’espoir de vivre enfin en paix dans mon pays avec les miens’, explained one harki, ‘j’ai
donc rendu arme et paquetage’.107 Such hopes were however quickly shattered as waves of
terrible violence broke across the country. Although this process began in April 1962, the
intensity of the massacres of the harkis and their families varied with July and August
constituting the most acute months. There is no agreement on how many were killed during
this period with estimates ranging from ‘plusieurs milliers’ to 150,000, although perhaps a
better sense of the magnitude of the killings can be gained from consideration of anecdotal
evidence such as that of the wife of a harki who lost twenty-eight members of her family and
closest friends during this period.108
103 This elite comprised locally and nationally elected representatives; notables such as Caïds,
Bachagas and Aghas; members of the liberal professions such as teachers and lawyers; as well as
career soldiers and officers.
104 Ageron, ‘Le “drame des Harkis”, 4.
105 ‘Algérie fin de la guerre’, Cinq colonnes à l’une, aired 6 June 1962 (Channel 1).
106 With their lives and families in Algeria, harkis were understandably reluctant to leave. They had
furthermore received guarantees from the FLN that they would not be subjected to reprisals, while the
substantial number of French troops still present who had promised to provide protection for those who
felt threatened provided further reassurance. Finally, the Evian Accords, while not making specific
reference to the harkis, did contain clauses providing general guarantees of safety for civilians in
Algeria in the post-ceasefire period. Ageron, ‘Le “drame des Harkis”’, 4. For comparative statistics on
the number of harkis deemed to be at risk from the FLN see, Mohand Hamoumou, Et ils sont devenu
harkis, (Paris, 1993), pp.120-121. For the provisions made by the Evian Accords see, Accords d'Évian,
Chapter II, Part A, Article 1; Chapter II, Part A, Article 2. Available at
www.el-mouradia.dz/francais/algerie/histoire/accordevian.htm [16 October 2008].
107 Brahim Sadouni, Français sans patrie: La Reconnaissance, (Rouen, 1985), pp.7, 97.
108 The earliest estimate came from the Le Monde journalist Jean Lacouture who advanced a figure of
10,000 on 13 November 1962. Thirty years later, he revised his calculation upwards to 100,000. This is
also the statistic quoted by the majority of harki and pied-noir associations, although some claims go as
high as 150,000. Academics however, tend to congregate around the lower figure of 60,000 to 75,000,
although Charles-Robert Ageron always refused to be more specific than ‘plusieurs milliers’. William
B. Cohen, ‘The Harkis: History and Memory’ in Algeria and France 1800-2000, p.168; Michel Roux,
Les harkis: les oubliés de l’histoire 1954-1991, (Paris, 1991), p.203; Charles-Robert Ageron, ‘Les
supplétifs algériens dans l’armée française pendant la guerre d’Algérie’, Vingtième siècle, 48 (October-
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The scale and ferocity of this violence made the position of the harkis and their
families in the newly independent Algeria untenable. France was the obvious choice of
refuge, but with strictly enforced quotas in place, crossing the Mediterranean to safety was
not a simple matter.109 William Cohen claimed that government organised repatriation
programmes brought 25,000 harkis and their dependants to the French mainland between
1962 and 1967, while a further 68,000 entered the country by unofficial means, frequently
with the assistance of their former officers who acted in direct contravention of orders from
their metropolitan-based superiors.110 Again, these figures are by no means consensual with
other academic estimates ranging from 65,000 to 100,000.111 Statistics were further
complicated by the fact that there was more than one wave of arrivals. Although 1962 saw the
largest disembarkations, there was a steady stream of refugees after this with spikes in 1965
and 1968 when many harkis who had been taken prisoner by the FLN were released. In light
of this, the 1968 census figure of 138,458 ‘French Muslims’, the contemporary administrative
label for harkis and former Muslim notables, of which 88,000 had been born in Algeria, is
frequently cited.112
At least half of those lucky enough to make it to France, and certainly the vast
majority of those who came through official channels, were initially placed in centres
d’accueil.113 As with the pieds-noirs, the French government had not anticipated an en masse
arrival of harkis and thus neither strategies nor structures were in place to provide for their
accommodation. Camps were either hastily constructed or modified leaving many harkis
living on sites that had recently housed suspected FLN and OAS militants. These camps, in
places such as Rivesaltes, Saint-Maurice-l’Ardoise and Bias, were conceived of as temporary
expedients that would gradually become obsolete as the harkis integrated into French
society.114 And indeed some of the estimated 42,500 people who passed through the camps
December 1995), 12, 20. The anecdotal evidence is that of Fatima Besnaci-Lancou’s mother taken
from her autobiographical memoir Fille de harki: Le bouleversant témoignage d’une enfant de la
guerre d’Algérie, with Marie-Christine Ray, (Paris, 2005), p.37.
109 The most infamous example of this was a telegram sent by Louis Joxe, Minister for Algerian
Affairs, on 16 May 1962 reminding the High Commissioner that attempting to transfer auxiliaries to
France was prohibited. This was followed by a confidential directive issued on 15 July stating that ‘Les
supplétifs débarqués en métropole, en dehors du plan général, seront renvoyés en Algérie’. Cited in
Benjamin Stora, Algeria 1830-2000 A Short History, (Ithaca, 2001), p.101.
110 Cohen, ‘The Harkis’, p.169.
111 Emmanuel Brillet, ‘La contingence et la geste: le harki, l’indicible du “mouvement de l’histoire”’,
in L’époque de la disparition: Politique et asthétique, ed. by Alain Brossat and Jean-Louis Déotte,
(Paris, 2000), p.33; Roux, Les harkis, p.230.
112 Mohand Hamoumou, ‘L’histoire des harkis et Français musulmans: la fin d’un tabou?’ in La Guerre
d’Algérie 1954-2004, p.338.
113 Dominique Schnapper, ‘Preface’ in Et ils sont devenus harkis, p.8.
114 For a full list of the camps and their locations see Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, ‘Harkis: le
paradoxe identitaire’, Regards sur l’actualité, 175 (November 1991), 36. For a detailed breakdown of
the changing populations and functions of Saint-Maurice-l’Ardoise see Tom Charbit, ‘Sociographie des
familles de harkis de Saint-Maurice-l’Ardoise. Synthèse partielle de l’enquête réalisée pour la
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between 1962 and 1969 remained there only briefly before being dispersed into the wider
populace.115 Others, however, were not so lucky and were simply transferred to other forms of
government-allocated accommodation such as the specially created hameaux forestiers which
operated along the same principles as the camps, albeit with slightly greater freedoms and
employment in the forestry service for the men.116 An additional potential fate, especially in
later years, was for harkis to be regrouped in purpose-built cités urbaines located on the
outskirts of towns such as Lodève in the Hérault region. The unluckiest harkis were those
deemed incapable, on grounds such as age or injury, of integrating and for whom the camps
became their long-term homes. In 1981 there were still 28,500 people, or 3560 families,
living in what the government termed zones à forte concentration, while the following year
the Secretary of State for rapatriés estimated that almost half the harki population were
suffering from ‘des difficultés matérielles sérieuse’.117 Almost a decade later, 100,000
members of the harki community were still considered to be ‘in difficulty’ with youth
unemployment estimated to be as high as 80 per cent in some areas.118
These isolated institutional environments have become emblematic of the experience
of harkis and their families in France and are deemed symptomatic of the wider process of
forgetting to which the harkis and their role in the War of Independence were subjected, from
whence comes the ubiquitous epithet ‘les oubliés de l’histoire’. Furthermore, in spite of the
intensity and magnitude of their experiences, a harki memory of the War of Independence
and its immediate aftermath was, for many years, notable by its absence within the
community itself. ‘Nous ne parlions pas plus jamais de notre passé, comme si notre pays
d’origine n’avait jamais existé’, one fille de harki explained.119 The reasons harkis were so
reluctant to speak of their past were multiple and worked in varying combinations. Powerful
external narratives, linguistic and cultural barriers, physical isolation, economic and social
disempowerment, mixed with a potent sense of fear and exacerbated by the difficulty of
articulating a past many were themselves still struggling to come to terms with all played
their part in depriving the harkis of a voice in the years following their arrival in France. This
Direction de la Population et des Migrations’, (May 2005). Available at
http://www.rapatries.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Sociographie_des_familles_de_harkis_de_Saint.pdf. [12
November 2008]
115 Wihtol de Wenden, ‘Harkis’, 36.
116 Initially forty-two such hamlets were established, although the number quickly rose to between 47
and 75 (not all were simultaneously operational); 23 hamlets were still in use in 1982. Maurice Faivre
advances a slightly different set of statistics, claiming that between 1962 and 1963, 41,000 passed
through the camps at Rivesaltes, St-Maurice’l’Ardoise, Bourg-Lastic, Larzac and Rye. In addition,
1800 soldiers were demobilised in the mainland while a further 1500 harkis were released from FLN
prisons in 1965 and 1968 and gathered in the Château de Landas in France. Wihtol de Wenden,
‘Harkis’, 36; Maurice Faivre, ‘La communauté des harkis’, Le Casoar, 116 (January 1990), 39.
117 By this point these zones consisted principally of the hamlets and cités, as opposed to the camps.
Hamoumou, ‘L’histoire des harkis’, p.339; Hamoumou, Et ils sont devenus harkis, p.20.
118 Wihtol de Wenden, ‘Harkis, 40.
119 Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki, p.109.
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situation persisted until the 1970s when a new generation, the fils de harkis, matured and
mobilised in order to rehabilitate the history and identity of their parents and by implication
of themselves. Unlike the pieds-noirs therefore, the gestation of a harki collective memory
followed a more circuitous route.
Interestingly, the historiography of the harkis has mirrored the history of the
community and its memory. Although les oubliés de l’histoire was for many years an
accurate description from an academic perspective, the situation today is very different. Since
the beginning of the 1990s, numerous books and articles exploring the history of the harkis
and their families have appeared, frequently written by historians and sociologists who are
themselves descended from harkis.120 In light of the long-standing silence that surrounded this
aspect of the Algerian War, these works have tended to focus primarily on establishing a
comprehensive account of the war and post-war years. Other authors have chosen to
concentrate on the second generation and have adopted a more sociological approach,
highlighting the difficulties these men and women have had integrating into French society
and the crise d’identité provoked by feeling torn between two countries and cultures.121 What
is unusual, however, in a field where studies of memories of the war have been so prominent,
certainly since the 1990s, is how little attention has been devoted to this particular aspect of
harki history. Although recent years have witnessed a more concerted effort to obtain
testimonies from within the community, this corpus remains relatively small.122 It is also
characterised by a lack of sustained analysis of the mechanisms of transmission at work, the
role of actors and narratives outside of the community, and of the impact of evolutions in the
broader social and commemorative context in France. This thesis is intended to begin to
redress the balance by focusing on the processes through which representations of the history
120 Particularly well-regarded within this canon are, Roux, Les harkis; Hamoumou, Et ils sont devenu
harkis; Jean-Jacques Jordi and Mohand Hamoumou, Les harkis, une mémoire enfouie, (Paris, 1999);
Laurent Muller, Le silence des harkis, (Paris, 1999); Nordine Boulhaïs, Histoire des harkis du Nord de
la France, (Paris, 2005).
121 See amongst others, ‘Les harkis et leurs enfants’, H&M, 1135 (September 1990); Mohand
Hamoumou, ‘Révoltes des enfants d’anciens harkis: quelques clés pour comprendre’, Esprit, 174
(September 1991), 112-114; Laurent Muller, ‘Les enfants de harkis et leurs parents: entre distance et
proximité’, Cultures et Sociétés, 4 (Winter 1994), 7-16; Laurent Muller, ‘Le silence des pères et
l’identité problematique des enfants de harkis’, Cultures et Sociétés, 8 (Winter 1996), 39-48;
Mohamed Kara, Les tentations du repli communautaire: le cas des Franco-Maghrébins en général et
des enfants de harkis en particulier, (Paris, 1997); Stéphanie Abrial, Les enfants de harkis de la révolte
à l’intégration, (Paris, 2001); Emmanuel Brillet, ‘A Remarkable Heritage: The ‘Daily Round’ of the
Children of the Harkis, between Merger and Villification’, Immigrants and Minorities, 22.2-3 (July-
November 2003), 333-345; Géraldine Enjelvin, ‘Les Harkis en France: carte d’identité française,
identité harkie à la carte?’, MCF, 11.2 (May 2003), 161-173.
122 For collections of received testimony see Bernard Derrieu et al., La Cité de Tapis: une communauté
de rapatriés d’Algérie, (Pézenas, 1997); Stéphan Gladieu and Dalila Kerchouche, Destins de harkis:
Aux racines d’un exil, (Paris, 2003); Jean-Jacques Jordi, ‘Khélifa Haroud: harki 1957-1967’, in Des
hommes et des femmes en guerre d’Algérie, ed. by Jean-Charles Jauffret, (Paris, 2003), pp.360-361;
Francis Mauro and Bathoche Mahious, Compiègne, terre d’accueil pour les harkis: Témoignages,
(Agincourt, 2004); Besnaci-Lancou, Nos mères; Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, Treize chibanis harkis, (Paris,
2006).
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and memory of the harki community have been constructed and reconstructed by various
groups over the years.
One of the main memory carriers who offered interpretations of the harkis and their
history during the period when they were not speaking for themselves were the pieds-noirs.
While this was by no means a disinterested act, it also reflected the longstanding links
between the two communities. People tend to forget, Janice Gross remarks, that the settlers
lived side-by-side with the indigenous population ‘often as neighbours and even as friends’ a
quotidian fact that created ‘a fabric of shared experience and authentic cultural memory’.123
Although complex and not always harmonious, these relationships did not simply cease when
the two groups crossed the Mediterranean in the 1960s, although they did change. Posing
questions about just how ‘cloistered’ memories of the War of Independence are, the pieds-
noirs and harkis therefore offer one of the most interesting and sustained histories of
interaction out of all the memory bearers related to the war. This makes them a strong choice
for a comparative study, as does their mutual experience of exile following the conclusion of
a war in which they were on the losing side. Furthermore, unlike Nora and Rousso, history
and memory are not treated as wholly separate concepts by pieds-noirs and harkis, especially
in their collective commemorative activities where the two are regularly combined. More than
the simple fact of amalgamation, what is fascinating about this are the coincidences in the
rationales that underpin this phenomenon, the ends to which it is used, and the implications in
terms of their relationship with other memory carriers and narrative constructions of the
Franco-Algerian past.
Yet in spite of the similarities, there are several key differences between pieds-noirs
and harkis, the roots of which extend back into the colonial period. Consequently, in 1962 the
two groups found themselves in very different positions, producing two distinct post-war
trajectories in terms of the development of their collective memories. Exploring these
disparities over the decades since the end of the War of Independence enables us to appreciate
the continually evolving nature of collective representations, as well as to analyse the impact
of changing broader social, political and cultural contexts. This arguably brings us full circle
back to Nora’s idea of a history of the ‘second degree’, only with a less rigid and more
inclusive definition of the scope of such an undertaking and of the actors involved.
123 Janice Gross, ‘France and Algeria: Performing the “Impossible Memory” of a Shared Past’, in
Memory, Empire and Postcolonialism, p.217.
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The Pied-Noir Community
1. From Practical Beginnings to the Cultural Turn, 1962-1991
Practical beginnings
The importance of studying pied-noir associations lies in the fact that they are ‘des
organismes capables de rassembler sur des thèmes qui reflètent les préoccupations du plus
grand nombre’, even if that number does not in any way include all pieds-noirs at all times.124
This was particularly true during the early years of their existence. Groups such as
ANFANOMA, described by Jordi as the most representative pied-noir association in the
1950s and 1960s, were born out of the unprecedented need for ‘entraide et soldiarité’ on the
part of the recently exiled community in light of the perceived failure of the state to provide
for the new arrivals.125 ANFANOMA, who claimed a membership of 250,000 by 1962, thus
dedicated itself to ‘aider les rapatriés à résoudre certains problèmes particulières’, namely
obtaining shelter, work, and compensation.126 Organisations like this formed quickly in part
because they were able to capitalise on an established tradition of lobbying and structures
developed by Algérie-française partisans during the War of Independence. Indeed, the speed
at which pied-noir associations emerged is striking, as is how enduring they have proved to
be with ANFANOMA celebrating its fiftieth anniversary in 2007. By championing immediate
and widely shared concerns such as logement and indemnisation, the first pied-noir
associations made themselves into ‘un instrument identificatoire, permettent à la communauté
disloquée de se reconnaître et d’être reconnue’.127
In addition to serving as mirrors reflecting the priorities of the community at given
moments, associations also function as valuable ‘greniers communs’; storing but also sorting
the stock of collective memories before deciding which reserves to draw upon in particular
circumstances.128 Today it is this facet, particularly in its combative guerres de mémoire
guise, which attracts the most attention from scholars, the media, and the pieds-noirs
themselves. Yet interestingly this aspect was not to the fore during the initial phase of
association formation. Instead, practical concerns dominated until the 1970s when these
124 Valérie Esclangon-Morin, Les rapatriés d’Afrique du Nord de 1956 à nos jours, (Paris, 2007, p.19.
Although Rosemary Averell Manes claims that 10 to 15 per cent of the pied-noir population are
formally affiliated to a pied-noir association, establishing reliable membership figures for these
associations is virtually impossible, not least because few openly declare exact numbers. Indeed, even
estimating how many associations exist has proven contentious.
125 Jean-Jacques Jordi, ‘Archéologie et structure du réseau de sociabilité rapatrié et pied-noir’,
Provence Historique, 47 (1997), 179.
126 Marcel Fenouillet, ‘Naissance et histoire de l’ANFANOMA’, in Mémoires de la colonisation:
Relations colonisateurs-colonisés, ed. by Régine Goutalier, (Paris, 1994), p.110.
127 Joëlle Hureau, ‘Associations et souvenir chez les français rapatriés d’Algérie’, in La guerre
d’Algérie et les Français, ed. by Jean-Pierre Rioux, (Paris, 1990), p.517.
128 Joëlle Hureau, La mémoire des pieds-noirs de 1830 à nos jours, (Paris, 2001), p.259.
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began to give way to a more commemorative orientation. It is therefore important to explore
the reasons behind this change in direction and the impact it had upon the pied-noir
associational network.
Practical rallying points that could be translated into tangible gains were the basis of
the majority of early pied-noir associations, providing unifying foundations that later cultural
incarnations built upon. Addressing immediate concerns common to all newly arrived
rapatriés gave groups such as ANFANOMA a strong and broad base of support. This allowed
them to tap into the rapidly developing culture of abandonment and victimhood, although this
is not to deny that the needs of the pieds-noirs in this period were urgent and often
inadequately met. Seeking clear progress from the government on a raft of issues from
accommodation to amnesties, in 1965 the Front national des rapatriés (FNR) was created.
Uniting representatives from the principal associations of the time including ANFANOMA
and its main rival, the Rassemblement national des français d’Afrique du Nord et d’outre-mer
(RANFRAN), its objective was to ‘poursuivre plus énergetiquement l’aboutissement de
toutes les revendications morales et matérielles’ of the rapatrié community.129 The FNR was
motivated by the belief that only by unifying their voices could the pieds-noirs hope to attract
the government’s attention. Although the actual impact of the pieds-noirs was negligible in
terms of modifying electoral patterns, it took years for this to be confirmed, leaving ample
time for their perceived block-vote potential to be capitalised upon.130 No one association was
more successful in politicking in this fashion than the Rassemblement et coordination
unitaires des rapatriés et spoilés (RECOURS) formed in 1976 with the precise intent of
exploiting what they regarded as the only ‘arme efficace’ which remained to the pieds-noirs,
‘leur bulletin de vote’, by mobilising the community to vote tactically in order to pressure the
incumbent government into concessions.131
The issue that brought together the moral, material and political aspects of early pied-
noir activism most effectively was indemnification. It also emerged as the most consistently
high profile of the initial causes championed by pied-noir associations with accommodation,
the most immediate concern in the summer of 1962, ceding the spotlight as vast building
programmes were quickly implemented. In 1963, the single-issue GNPI was established with
the goal of promoting ‘les mesures susceptibles de permettre la réparartion et l’indemnisation
des préjudices de toutes natures qu’elles ont pu subir du fait des événements survenus dans
les territoires d’Outre-Mer qui étaient antièrement placés sous la souvraineté, le protectorat ou
129 Esclangon-Morin, Les rapatriés, p.165.
130 The impression that the pied-noir community possessed the power to influence elections stemmed
largely from nationalist Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignacour’s garnering of 5 per cent of the vote in the 1965
election, placing him fourth overall. His campaign, managed by Jean-Marie Le Pen, revolved around
mobilising disgruntled Algérie-française partisans, but was sufficiently effective to split the vote on the
right and force de Gaulle into a second round run off against François Mitterrand.
131 Esclangon-Morin, Les rapatriés, p.239.
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la tutelle de la France’.132 The remit of the GNPI thus extended beyond the pieds-noirs to all
those who had been dispossessed as a result of decolonisation. This scope was reflected in
early issues of their Bulletin d’information, which carried reports on the progress of
indemnification campaigns across the globe.133 However, this geographical breadth was
combined with a very narrow definition of purpose. Other rapatrié causes were eschewed lest
they distract from the overriding goal of just recompense for material losses. As a 1964 report
on the annual pied-noir gathering at Nîmes made clear, ‘Il est délicat pour le GNPI de
participer à toutes les réunions aux quelles nous sommes conviés. Sans doute conviendrait-il
de se limiter aux seules réunions ayant pour objet essentiel sinon unique le problème de
l’indemnisation’.134
For the GNPI, compensation was a judicial issue, demanded solely on the basis that it
was a legal right afforded to all rapatriés under the French constitution. The immense detail
into which many of the articles went suggests that while readers may have been highly
informed, they were unlikely to have been inspired. This contrasted with the approach
adopted by other organisations that took up the indemnification cause but combined
constitutional rights with the more emotive idea of a national duty and debt owed by France
to its victimised citizens. The 1975 indemnification guide, Plaidoyer pour un million de
victimes, aptly expresses this material and moral fusion, juxtaposing practical advice and
layman’s explanations with impassioned paragraphs evoking the plight of these ‘nouveaux
parais’, ‘citoyens de la deuxième zone’ whose only crime had been their desire to ‘demeurer
français’.135 The empirical-emotional synthesis proved highly effective in giving
indemnification and those associations who championed it a shelf life beyond the various
measures intended to resolve the issue. This became particularly important in 1987 with the
fourth, and widely touted final, compensation law pushed for and passed under the
premiership of Jacques Chirac.136 Incumbent Secretary of State for rapatriés André Santini
referred to the legislation as ‘la pièce maîtresse de la politique en faveur des rapatriés’ when
selling it to the Sénat on 12 June 1987.137 The series of partial and compromised laws of
1970, 1974, and 1978 paled in comparison to this latest proposal, which was deemed
comprehensive and generous enough to win the approval of many pied-noirs. Even
132 Article 2 of the GNPI.
133 The GNPI’s Bulletin was published monthly from its inception until 1971. After this point it
appeared on a roughly bi-annual basis, although both its schedule and its quality have been highly
erratic.
134 Bulletin d’information du GNPI, 9 (15 July 1964), 20.
135 Jacques Ribs, Paidoyer pour un million de victimes, (Paris, 1975), p.12. This dualistic approach was
also adopted in the prequel volume L’indemnisation des Française dépossedés outre-mer, (Paris,
1971).
136 Indeed it was almost the final word, its provisions not being substantially modified until 2005.
137 Esclangon-Morin, Les rapatriés, p.302.
30
RECOURS porte-parole Jacques Roseau admitted that the provisions were satisfactory;
although he added that the law had been a long time coming.138
By effectively settling the twenty-five year old indemnification issue, the law of 16
July 1987 removed, almost overnight, an integral plank from the platform of a large number
of pied-noir associations forcing a radical rethink of how unity, activism and thus their
existence could be maintained.139 It cannot be mere coincidence that in June 1987
ANFANOMA’s journal, France-Horizon, devoted a full page to defending the utility of
continuing to have rapatrié associations, arguing ‘Il s’agit de la défense et l’illustration de
notre patrimoine matériel, bien sur, mais aussi d’ordre intellectuel, moral et spirituel’.140
Some associations adapted better than others to the new circumstances with the GNPI finding
the transition particularly difficult for obvious reasons. Although they did allow some dilution
of their purity of focus, this cannot be regarded as part of any concerted attempt to broaden
their remit for the post-indemnification period since their fundamental campaign style and
content remained unchanged on the basis that the provisions of 1987 were of only a ‘très
partielle’ nature, containing ‘importantes lacunes’ and ‘quelques exclusions arbitraries’.141
This becomes particularly apparent when the GNPI’s efforts are placed alongside those of
associations like ANFANOMA who quickly recognised that the stakes had altered and
consciously adjusted their priorities to accommodate this.142 Without ever renouncing their
original goals, the association now acknowledged that ‘les préoccupations matérielles ont
longtemps été dominantes sans être exclusives’. This allowed ANFANOMA to open itself to
‘la mémoire et à la culture’ with the result that, as the current president Yves Sainsot
explained, ‘défense et mémoire sont deux domains aujourd’hui équilibrées’.143 This flexibility
has helped ensure that despite being significantly diminished in size from their 250,000
heyday in the 1960s, ANFANOMA remains one of the most prominent pied-noir
associations.
138 ‘Plateau: Enrico Macias, Martha Villalonga et Jacques Roseau’, Midi 2, aired 27 June 1987,
(Channel 2). Made at a national rassemblement to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
arrival of the pieds-noirs, Roseau’s comments illustrate that the 1987 law was not formulated in a
vacuum. Rather it emerged out of a favourable combination of factors including the election of the
broadly sympathetic Chirac as Prime Minister in 1986, the popular appointment of André Santitni, and
the pressure placed upon the government by the approaching anniversary to draw a line under the
rapatrié ‘problem’.
139 Of course the indemnification issue did not disappear entirely since it was always possible to find
room for improvement in the legislation, particularly in its application. However, compensation never
regained its early prominence after 1987.
140 Yves Sainsot, ‘Notre légitime défense’, FH, 283 (June 1987), 4.
141 Bulletin d’information du GNPI, 143 (April 1996), 1-2; 144 (September 1996), 8.
142 It should, however, be noted that the GNPI remained sufficiently successful to still be publishing its
Bulletin as late as autumn 2000.
143 ANFANOMA questionnaire response. Sainsot’s remarks are supported by Marcel Fenouillet who
described ANFANOMA’s objective in the mid-990s as ‘d’obtenir une réhabilitation de l’histoire des
Français d’Outre-Mer’. ‘Naissance et histoire de l’AFANOMA’, p.111.
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‘Sauver une culture en péril’
ANFANOMA’s move into the realms of memory and culture was part of a wider trend that
saw these two topics steadily rise to the top of association agendas. Esclangon-Morin regards
this development as the next natural stage in the maturation process; after initial
preoccupations with integration and success came ‘le temps de la réactivation d’un
mécanisme identitaire’.144 Only once immediate material concerns had been dealt with did the
pieds-noirs find time to consider what it meant to be a pied-noir in a broader sense. As one
Algérois gentleman recounted:
Quand vous arrivez et que vous avez tout perdu, il faut tout recommencer. Alors, au
début la priorité c’est de trouver un travail, se loger tout refaire. Après, mais
seulement quelques années après, quand tout allait mieux et que j’avais retrouvé une
situation, j’ai commencé à m’investir dans les associations, dans le travail de
mémoire.145
This individual trajectory appears to have been mirrored at the collective level with the 1987
law playing a key role. However, others have sought explanations for the change of focus
beyond the community itself. In contrast to Esclangon-Morin, Buono highlights the events of
May 1968 and the subsequent flourishing of sub-national identities as crucial to the pieds-
noirs because it enabled them to press for recognition on the basis of a unique regional
identity, akin to a Bréton or a Corsican.146 Evidence in support of this theory can be found in
the early 1970s trend towards amicales centred upon particular regions (Amicale des
Oraniens des Bouches-du-Rhône), villages and quartiers (Amicale des anciens de Bab-el-
Oued), or even occupations (Les anciens des écoles agriculture d’Algérie).
Community-specific developments thus combined with broader social changes to
produce a fertile soil in which a new basis of pied-noir unity and identity took root. The
association that exemplifies this cultural turn is the Cercle Algérianiste. Formed in 1973 by a
group of self-identified ‘jeunes pieds-noirs’, the Cercle appreciated that the times were
changing and that a new kind of association would be needed to ‘redonner une vigueur
nouvelle à la communauté “Algérie Française”’, in order to ‘retremper notre foi’.147 This new
faith was to be propagated through the organisation’s quarterly journal, L’Algérianiste, which
informed members in 1976 that:
144 Esclangon-Morin, Les rapatriés, p.327.
145 Cited in Éric Savarese, Algérie, la guerre des mémoires, (Paris, 2007), p.108.
146 Clarisse Buono, Pieds-noirs de père en fils, (Paris, 2004), p.66.
147 ‘Manifeste’, L’Algérianiste, (1975).
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Le temps des associations de rapatriés, que nous connaissons, depuis 1962, qui ont
été si utiles à soulager les misères et à défendre les intérêts de nos compatriots,
s’éteindra certainement dans les années à venir et nous restons seuls, face à nous-
mêmes, avec l’enorme devoir de ne pas laisser engloutir l’âme de notre peuple.148
The mission of the Cercle was thus clear from the outset and expressed in their motto ‘sauver
une culture et une communauté en péril’. Beyond the pages of their journal, this goal was to
be achieved through a range of culturally orientated initiatives including study groups, a
literary prize, exhibitions, and participation in ‘manifestations culturelles et de souvenir’, all
of which would serve to ‘faire connaître les plus belles pages de notre histoire, dénoncer à
l’occasion le mensonge et l’hypocrise qui l’entourent, raconter ce que fut la vie quotidienne
de notre people…préserver son langage, son esprit, et ses qualités…’149 The basic premise
was to mobilise memory and history in the service of ‘truth’ and against the threat of
oblivion.150 Today this is the essence of most pied-noir associations, but in the early 1970s the
Cercle, by consciously redirecting the focus away from the material and into the memorial,
represented a new and innovative approach to communal identification.
Where the Cercle led however, others followed, with PNM declaring in its fifth issue:
‘Notre but n’est pas d’alimenter la complainte du vieux Pied-Noir spoilé…mais de participer
à la régénération du tissu communautaire et de réunir les générations sur le devenir d’une
réalité culturelle incontournable: L’âme Pied-Noir’.151 The growing importance of culture in
pied-noir associations signalled an acknowledgement of the utility of the concept as a
unifying and adherence-garnering tool. With the efficacy of basing unity on material loss
declining, associations had to find a new common denominator. History and memory,
embodied in the notion of an endangered culture, proved eminently suitable to the task,
providing an emotionally resonant, malleable, and renewable resource. A virtuous circle of
interaction was thus created whereby:
Les identités collectives sont investies dans le processus de reconstruction du passé,
car c’est aussi à travers l’émergence et la définition d’une mémoire collective que le
groupe prend conscience de lui-même, qu’ils dispose des outils lui permettant de se
définir en tant que tel.152
148 L’Algérianiste, (1976), 5.
149 L’Algérianiste, (1975).
150 Branche, La guerre d’Algérie, p. 13.
151 ‘Un magazine d’avenir: L’âme Pied Noir’, PNM, 5 (January 1990), 5.
152 Savarese, Algérie, p.46.
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What the Cercle Algérianiste made into a credo was a fear of forgetting which was in
reality the fear of being forgotten, a fate that could be avoided by joining together to preserve
the characteristics that epitomised the uniqueness of the pied-noir identity. Defining exactly
what these attributes were was not necessarily a smooth process, nor was agreeing what label
to subsume them under as demonstrated by the lengthy debates in the early issues of
L’Algérianiste over what term of self-identification should be used. In a bid to resolve the
issue once and for all, a questionnaire was distributed to members. The results revealed that
‘rapatrié’ was widely reviled because it denied the francité of the community, while ‘Français
d’Algérie’ was felt to restrict identity too narrowly to the war years, leaving ‘Algériens
d’Expression Français’ or ‘Francoalgériens’ to be mooted along with ‘Algérianistes’ as
possible alternatives. No clear winner could be declared on the basis of the 223 responses
received, although ultimately ‘pied-noir’ emerged as the victor simply in terms of frequency
and consistency of use across the years.153 That the Cercle felt the need to have this debate is
indicative of the wider context in which the definition of pied-noir was moving beyond the
purely legalistic idea of a person deserving of compensation on the basis of their status as
French citizens. The desire to be recognised as français à part entière embodied in the early
campaigns of associations such as ANFAMONA increasingly had to be reconciled with new
notions of the community as français entièrement à part. Crucially however the pieds-noirs
wanted to be entièrement à part on their own terms, coming to see their distinctiveness as
something to be proudly proclaimed and actively defended through the medium of
organisations like the Cercle against the assimilationist pressures of French society. Learning
to hold these two notions of identity in a productive tension was the task of associations
through the 1970s and 1980s. The shape of this new identity would take several years to
solidify and would draw on a range of sources, both old and new. What is striking, however,
is the extent of the consensus that was established and the effectiveness with which it was
then codified by associations.
153 Maurice Calmein, ‘Appellation contrôlée’, L’Algérianiste, (1977), 4-5.
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2. Developing the Pied-Noir Lexicon
French Algeria
Although the array of subjects treated by pied-noir associations is vast, there is a core canon
of constantly highlighted themes that underline particular attributes of the pied-noir identity
and patrimony. What is striking is how similar these are to the poles around which individual
pied-noir attentions gravitated in the years following the end of French Algeria as indicated
by the slew of memoirs and journals published during this period.154 In the translation from
individual to collective expression, the basic content of pied-noir history and memory has not
altered substantially. Instead, associations appear to have built upon the foundations of
individual testimony, centralising and codifying the narratives employed while
simultaneously strengthening the weight of evidence behind these claims by virtue of being
able to group multiple, mutually reinforcing accounts under the umbrella of a single
organisation.
The establishment of a successful collective memory requires that its contents be
accepted by and deemed relevant to the constituents of that particular body. Groups labour to
create stable histories and memories that are resistant to unsanctioned interpretations, both
internal and external, therefore those elements that cannot obtain wider legitimation tend to be
the nuances of personal experience lost in the translation from individual to collective
representations. While there are always exceptions, the pattern observed here is that
deviations from the quickly established norm diminish over the life of pied-noir associations
as the central identity of the group and its members becomes increasingly clearly defined and
firmly rooted. The observation of Anne Roche from her pied-noir oral interview sample that
‘nos témoins dans leur majorité ne cherchent pas à être originaux, mais à valider leur
témoignage par la réitération de faits (historiques et stylistiques) déja connus et acceptés dans
leur groupe de référence’ is borne out at the collective level where the reinforcement, and thus
substantiation, of a familiar and accepted set of narratives takes priority over novelty and
nuance.155
In light of this, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the principal discourses
advanced by pied-noir associations, their progressive distillation into a cohesive lexicon and
the ends to which this glossary has been mobilised. Consideration shall also be given to the
ways in which the past has been moulded to suit present needs and what this reveals about the
self-perception and commemorative needs of the pied-noir community. The most prominent
154 For a sample of these memoirs see, Francine Dessaigne, Déracinés!, (Paris, 1964); Francine
Dessaigne, Journal d’une mère de famille pied noir, (Paris, 1962); Josette Sutra, Algérie mon amour:
Constantine 1920-1962, (Paris, 1979); Fernande Stora, L’Algérie pour mémoire, (Paris, 1978); Marie-
Jeanne Rey, Mémoires d'une écorchée vive, (Paris, 1987).
155 Anne Roche, ‘Pieds-noirs: le “retour”’, MCF, 2.2 (1994), 159.
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and widely cited themes from pied-noir organisations and journals will thus be used as an
entry point into a broader examination of the pied-noir worldview and system of historical
logic. Following contemplation of the apparent paradox of an identity grounded in an idyllic
conception of Algeria under French control, but which was in fact forged when colonial rule
ended, it will assess the preferential place accorded to life prior to 1954 through the prism of
the three principal self-validating historical ‘truths’ on which the present-day collective pied-
noir identity is based: inter-ethnic harmony, entitlement, and innocence. This will then be
contrasted with presentations of the War of Independence in pied-noir associations and
literature in order to highlight the unequal weight accorded to the post-Evian period and the
messages this is intended to convey.
‘Si nous partons c’est contre coeur’
The identity that pied-noir associations have established for themselves and their members is
based around a series of contrasts: between then and now, between France and là-bas,
between the French and themselves. The starkest, but also most useful, of these juxtapositions
is between a perfect past and an imperfect present. In order to function successfully
associations need to be able to unify disparate individuals around certain common axes. With
respect to the pied-noir community, the most obvious factor on which to base such unity is
exile, the one experience shared by all members of the community. Not only was this a
moment of great trauma, it also represents the point at which the pied-noir identity was born,
hence its place at the heart of all associations. Consequently, the history and memory of the
exodus is something that is actively cultivated as the foundational event for pieds-noirs,
representing the ‘open sesame’ that allows entry into the community.156 The summer of 1962
emerges in associational literature as the clear demarcation between then and now; between a
happy, carefree life in Algeria and a difficult metropolitan trajectory marked by misery and
suffering. Construed as a wholly negative experience from departure through arrival, these
few weeks would, as Jordi notes, ‘structure a memory and forge a collective mentality that
persists to this day’.157
Recollections tend to focus on the ‘final morning’, with the decision to leave
presented as a deeply reluctant but necessary one; ‘si nous partons c’est contre coeur’.158
Violence, whether the specific death of someone close or the general sense of insecurity that
stemmed from the escalation of the conflict in its final months, is often cited as the crucial
156 Clarisse Buono, Pieds-noirs de père en fils, (Paris, 2004), p.81.
157 Jean-Jacques Jordi, ‘The Creation of the Pieds-Noirs: Arrival and Settlement in Marseilles, 1962’, in
Europe’s Invisible Migrants, ed. by Andrea L. Smith (Amsterdam, 2003), p.63.
158 ‘Les rapatriés’, Faire face, aired 24 November 1961, (Channel 1).
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factor prompting the realisation that staying was no longer a viable option. Articles entitled
‘L’A-Dieu’, ‘Un enfant quitte Oran’, and ‘Sur le bateau’ indicate the key stages of the
process. Their contents stress the chaos of the roads, airports, and ports; the queuing, often
over several days, without food or water; the constant fear of FLN attacks; and the pitiful
sight of families trying to carry entire lives in a suitcase. These evocations are frequently
accompanied by powerful visual images (see Appendix A). All accounts feature, and indeed
often end with, one last lingering look at Algeria and a contemplation of the magnitude of
what was occurring: ‘Lorsque le bateau prendra le large, je regarderai longtemps la côte
s’estomper jusqu’à ne plus devenir qu’un mince liseré bleu tout en pensant que nous ne
reverrions pas ce pays de sitôt, sinon jamais’.159 The hope, following this painful separation
from their homeland, was for a sympathetic welcome in France. ‘[O]n cherchait pour quelque
chose,’ recalled one pied-noir, ‘[mais] on trouvait rien’.160 The coldness of the reception
provided by their imagined national community left a profound impression and has remained
a source of considerable bitterness. Exile thus proved a double rupture, irrevocably separating
the community both from Algeria and from the metropolitan French.
In the years following 1962, the locus of pied-noir identity coalesced around a
collective self-perception defined negatively against France and, in many ways, against the
country they left behind which, as an independent nation, had become unrecognisable to
many. Over time however, this notion of difference acquired positive connotations and
associations began to proudly present themselves and their adherents as entièrement à part on
the basis of unique cultural and historical legacies. The regional particularities of colonial
Algeria thus became cultural differences in France, a progression that alludes to the other
central transformation of this period: the evolution from individual français d’Algérie into a
community of pieds-noirs. As associations took over from individual activists as the principal
memory carriers for the rapatrié population, the experience of a ‘bannissement individuel’
was converted into the unifying theme of ‘une mort collective’.161 Although the seeds for this
transformation were sown during the pieds-noirs’ first decades in France, what brought them
to fruition was the reorientation of priorities from material to cultural and commemorative
that took place during the 1970s and 1980s. The ascendancy of organisations like the Cercle
Algérianiste prompted a conscious appraisal of the contours of pied-noir identity that had
been steadily solidifying beneath surface preoccupations with the practicalities of
reinstallation.
159 Danielle Amendos, ‘Histoire d’exode’. L’Algérianiste, 106 (June 2004), 8.
160 ‘L’Algérie dix ans après. Deuxième volet’, Quatrième mardi, aired 30 May 1972, (Channel 1).
161 Michèle Baussant, Pieds-noirs mémoires d’exils, (Paris, 2002), p.7.
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‘Nos souvenirs sont notre avenir’
The counterpoint to this symbolic mass death was that disparate pre-war lives, when placed in
the hands of associations, were amalgamated into a collective vision of French Algeria. Once
again, a clear continuum exists between the visual and textual vocabulary of initial accounts
by authors such as Marie-Jeanne Rey and Francine Dessaigne and that of journals such as
L’Algérianiste or Aux échos d’Alger, not least because the works of these authors were widely
reproduced in association publications. Algeria is presented throughout as a paradise lost; a
status based explicitly on its geographical and climatic specificities. As Jean Marc Lopez, co-
founder of PNM, remembers, Algeria was a place where ‘Le cadre naturel était tellement
magnifique, les coleurs si vives, les odeurs si douces, que nous n’avions pas besoin de grand
chose pour être heureux’.162 Undiminished by the passage of time, these sensory impressions
retain the power to transport pieds-noirs back to their lost homeland. ‘Tout à coup,’ Francette
Mendosa explained to her readers, ‘un mode de vie, une ambiance, un monde bigarré, une
odeur particulière vous imprègnent. Vous êtes sur un sol familier, très familier’.163
Although the pieds-noirs had left Algeria, the reverse was not true. As the author and
editor Louis Gardel revealed: ‘Comme les autres pieds-noirs, j’ai perdu l’Algérie. Mais elle
ne m’a pas quitté. Elle ne me quittera jamais. Elle est en moi jusqu’à ma mort. Je suis fait
d’elle’.164 His sentiments are reflected in association literature where the notion of a unique
and irreplaceable land underlies virtually every page of almost every journal. The forms these
evocations take are multiple: L’Algérianiste and PNM, for example, both had long running
‘Villes et villages’ features which sought to present the history, but also recreate the
ambiance, of various significant Algerian towns. An additional flavour of the past was
provided through recipe columns or humorously conveyed through cartoons. PNM’s ‘le gang
du Sebou’, a mischevious trio of stereotyped children which consisted of Ernest the blonde
European ring leader, Driss, the Arabe with an unbridled love of couscous but an aversion to
soap, and Izaak from the Jewish community, recalled the fun-loving side of a carefree life là-
bas (see Appendix B). What the invocation of an idealised Algérie française demonstrates is
that the loss experienced by the pied-noir community was not just measured materially, but
‘l’atteignit dans l’âme’.165
162 Cited in Danielle Michel-Chich, Déracinés: les pieds-noirs aujourd’hui, (Paris, 2000), p.16.
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Collating these various souvenirs in a printed format complemented the
commemorative functions of annual rassemblements, enabling individual pieds-noirs to
locate and attach significance to their own experiences within those of a larger aggregate.
Associations thus conferred upon themselves the task of actively promoting and protecting
this cultural patrimony, in order to create a memorial store for both the contemporary
community and for posterity. In this way, the personal devoir de mémoire that inspired Roger
Colozzi to speak of ‘le souvenir impérrissable’ that he intended to guard ‘jusqu’à mon souffle
ultime’, was transferred to associations and became incumbent upon the community as a
whole.166 Benjamin Stora has referred to this as the ‘onzième commandement’, after the novel
by Andre Rossfelder, while Josseline Revel-Mouroz of the Centre d’études pied-noir (CEPN)
made it clear that:
Nous avons une identité culturelle bien plus large, bien plus riche, qu’il serait
malhonnête d’occulter. Nos parents, grands-parents et arrière-grands-parents nous ont
laissé un patrimoine que nous volons, que nous devons transmettre. Hélas, ce
patrimoine a été bien amputee en 1962, mais le devoir de mémoire demeure.167
This defence was rendered particularly imperative by the fact that French Algeria no
longer existed physically, but only in the minds of those who once lived there, hence the
prevalence of the idea that ‘Nos souvenirs sont notre avenir’.168 The consequent status of
pieds-noirs as living archives means that the information presented in journals can in some
ways be viewed as making a constructive contribution to the history of French Algeria,
providing access to information and sources beyond the narrow confines of official archives,
particularly with respect to events for which few conventional records survive. This can
furthermore be tied into a wider historiographical debate concerning the role of nostalgia, the
term most commonly associated with the pied-noir community. The word ‘nostalgia’ derives
from the Greek nostos meaning homecoming and algos meaning pain and arises typically in
the context of cultural stress, severe identity dislocation, and complex or rapid social
change.169 What makes nostalgia particularly applicable to the pieds-noirs is that it ‘defines
itself by its inability to approach its subject…There can be no nostalgia without the sense of
166 Roger Colozzi, ‘Mon Algérie’, L’Algérianiste, 100 (December 2002), 84.
167 Benjamin Stora, Le livre, mémoire de l’Histoire: Réflexions sur le livre et la guerre d’Algérie,
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le choc des décolonisations, ed. by Jean-Jacques Jordi and Emile Temine, (Aix-en-Provence, 1996),
pp.195-196.
168 Jean Bevilacqua, 'Pax Gallica ou Pax Americana?', PNM, 77 (March 1997), 5.
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irreversibility’.170 Nostalgia is frequently denounced due to its tendency ‘not to confront the
ghosts of history, but rather to establish a place where they may flourish forever’, and thus to
suppress the diversity of the past.171 Christopher Lasch regards the ‘victim’ of nostalgia as
‘worse than a reactionary; he is an incurable sentimentalist. Afraid of the future, he is also
afraid to face the truth about the past’.172 However others, notably Peter Fritzsche, have called
for a more sophisticated reading of nostalgia that acknowledges its constructive potential
alongside its paralysing elements.173 Speaking with reference to the French Revolution,
Fritzsche claims that ‘this presence of absence is worth paying attention to’ on the grounds
that it has the ‘effect of repeatedly scribbling up the clean slate of modern development and
raising unbidden questions about the origins of social identity, the givenness (sic) of the here
and now, and the possibility of contrary movements in the flow of history’.174 With respect to
the pieds-noirs, in 1962 they constituted an unwelcome visible reminder of a past most were
anxious to forget. And this has remained the case, in large part because of the deliberate
actions of the pieds-noirs themselves, particularly their refusal to suppress their cultural
heritage in order to seamlessly assimilate. Defending and disseminating their own
interpretations of the past represents a conscious effort not to allow others to write them out
of history, or impose simplified, caricatural definitions upon them such as ‘d’amiables
braillards prédateurs, se nourissent de merguez et s’abreuvant d’ainsette’.175 In this context
nostalgia can be viewed as a consciously formulated counter-history that poses questions
about the dominant public version.
However, it is important not to take this argument too far. Although the past
articulated by these associations provides a valuable snapshot of French imperialism and of
colonial mentalities, the inability of many pied-noir associations to acknowledge the
existence of nuances, or to recognise the validity of alternative viewpoints indicates the limits
of the constructive component in these accounts. As Stora has noted, there is a lack of self-
awareness among certain pieds-noirs which, amongst other things, renders them incapable of
appreciating, or at least admitting, that ‘ils sont prenante du fait colonial, c’est à dire d’un
système de privilèges dont ils bénéficient par rapport aux colonisés’.176 Finally, the refusal of
pieds-noirs to accept the validity of other perspectives means that rather than raising pertinent
questions about certain elements of different discourses, what associations ultimately seek to
do is replace these narratives wholesale with their own equally partial account.
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It is this element that makes it difficult to subscribe to the argument of Mémoire
d’Afrique du Nord that pied-noir nostalgia is simply a benign form of reminiscing. ‘Pourquoi
pas nous raconter quelque anecdote drôle, originale, quelque souvenir cocasse ou attendrissait
qui nous feraient parcourir avec vous des chemins de mémoire’, the association’s journal
asked.177 The answer lies in the fact that what most associations offer are not harmless
recollections, but a much more self-aware commemorative strategy based upon the
reiteration, in multiple formats, of certain key propositions relating to the history of the pieds-
noirs which make a particular point about the present-day identity of the community. As Éric
Savarese argues, it is implausible to regard the pied-noir culture as the spontaneous
development of ‘un corpus de symboles et d’emblèmes’ that served as a rallying point for ‘un
million d’individus subissant l’épreuve du rapatriement’. Instead, unity is the product of a
conscious ‘stratégie identitaire elaborée par des militants, au sein de structures associatives
parfaitement identifiables’.178 Therefore, in the same way that the pied-noir community is an
artificial construct, forged on the basis of the common denominator of exile, so too is the
history attached to the community by activists and associations. ‘In social practice’ writes
Lucette Valensi, ‘each group chooses what it will remember and organises its own amnesia’
meaning that what is presented as ‘remembrance’ is really ‘re-creation in light of current
circumstances and needs.179
It is thus not simply the case, as Hureau contends, that pieds-noirs ‘veulent seulement
que leur existence soit reconnue’; what is really at stake is legitimacy.180 Few are as militant
and overt about their quest as Gérard Garcia of ANFANOMA who describes himself as ‘mû
par la volonté de créer un nationalisme pied-noir, de conquerir une place dans la société
française’. 181 But the desire to establish a legitimate place within the national history is a
clear association objective since with legitimacy comes the ability to take public pride in
one’s past. This in turn creates more fertile ground in which to sow the seeds of transmission
for subsequent generations because an acknowledged and accepted collective memory carries
far greater cultural authority.182 It is therefore unremarkable that pieds-noirs have invented
ideological myths to justify their present position and to validate their worldview, or that the
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past they offer is not intended as something to be critically interrogated.183 In common with
all memory carriers, pied-noir associations have filtered the past to produce a history that is
‘volontairement enjolivée’ and which ‘gomme les zones d’ombres’.184 For Pierre Nora this
represents ‘l’aspect symbolique d’une lutte pour le pouvoir, pour le monopole du passé et la
reconquête devant la postérité de ce qui a été perdu dans la réalité’.185 What gives this general
impulse a particular edge is, as Daniel Leconte has highlighted, the fact that ‘pour les pieds-
noirs qui ont tout perdu, l’Histoire c’est ce qui reste’.186 The principal components of this
collective interpretation of the past - harmony, entitlement, and innocence - will now be
examined.
Multicultural Harmony
Different journals have particular favourite subjects. L’Algérianiste, for example, emphasises
the oeuvre civilisatrice of France in Algeria, while PNM prefers to concentrate specifically on
the Armée de l’Afrique, leaving La lettre de Véritas to focus in on the many failings of
General de Gaulle. However, these all exist within the same over-arching argumentative
framework. The great variety of topics inevitably covered by these publications, some of
which, like ANFANOMA’s France-Horizon, have been in circulation for more than four
decades, should not obscure the fact that at heart what they repeatedly address is a simple
triumvirate of themes, albeit in a range of guises. While the format may change, the central
messages do not. What is being offered is a self-enclosed system of historical logic that
legitimates the present-day status of the pieds-noirs as innocent victims of an unjust
decolonization and offers a strong, frequently re-iterated, and clear lexicon through which to
defend this position.
One of the key elements of this historical schema is the image of a harmonious multi-
ethnic colony in which ‘les pieds-noirs vivaient en bonne coopération avec les Arabes’.187
Another commonly employed metaphor is Algeria as a ‘melting pot’; convenient shorthand
for the formation of the cultural patrimony the pieds-noirs now defend.188 The fraternity that
characterised French Algeria is described by Anne Cazal as a ‘miracle’ through which ‘Des
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êtres différents, pourtant, dans leurs croyances comme dans leurs mentalités, se confondaient,
se soudaient dans le même amour de leur pays, de leur soleil et de leur lointaine Mère-
Patrie’.189 The events of May 1958 when, irrespective of creed or colour, ‘par amour,
l’Algérie toute entière est venue s’offrir à a France’, are deemed to offer further proof of
this.190 Similarly, when Le Figaro claimed that Algerian children were denied access to the
schools of the Republic during the colonial period, the Cercle Algérianiste responded with
three pages of photographs showing mixed classes from a range of towns and time periods in
their journal to prove that both populations had equal access to education, complementing
previous special themed issues devoted to the same subject (see Appendix C).
The presence of ‘inassimilable’ races that lived amicably side-by-side is the closest
most pieds-noirs come to conceding inequity, although, as Pierre Mannoni states defensively,
‘Le fait que des ethnies restent nettement individualisées n’autorise pas à conclure à un
mutuel racisme’.191 Until recently, the most common approach to the issue of racism was to
invoke the ‘bon Arabe’ that every pied-noir knew. The implication is that this one, ‘notre
Arabe’, was the exception to the ‘sale race’, though few associations put it as explicitly as
Anne Loesch: ‘Chacun de nous a “son”, a “ses bons Arabes”, et ce sont ses amis, même s’il
admet depuis toujours dans l’absolu que la race arabe est une “sale race”’.192 Attempting to
justify this position, René Lenoir claimed that it is not a simple matter to judge relations
between races and that to avoid over-simplified generalisations cases should be made person-
to-person, rather than community-to-community, even though associations usually take the
person-to-person example they have cited as indicative of relations throughout French
Algeria.193 It is also hard not to notice that ‘bons Arabes’ generally arise in the context of
serving the pieds-noirs: ‘le marchand de fromage, la voisine à qui on confiant le bébé, le
jardinier…’194 Or, that the examples of harmonious community interaction usually revolve
around the relatively superficial ‘charme d’échanges réciproques, en particulier les patisseries
traditionnelles des jours des fêtes’.195 Alongside these instances of specific contact with
individual, familiar Algerians exists the necessary generic category of faceless and unknown
‘Arabes’. These function as the ultimate ‘Other’, providing a screen onto which to project all
the stereotypical, negative characteristics of an indigenous race that the settlers needed to
remain superior to in order to legitimate and thus maintain the hierarchical structure of the
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colony.196 The ‘sale race’ thus exists in order to justify the inequalities of the colonial system,
while the ‘bon Arabe’ exists in order to exculpate the pieds-noirs from charges of racism and
of enjoying iniquitous privileges.197
‘Du chaos à la lumière’
Relations between races and religions were good, so the pieds-noirs argue, because the
Algerians recognised the hard work the settlers had put into establishing themselves and their
families, as well as the great benefits that had followed their arrival for local communities.
Deeply ingrained in association literature, the myth of pioneering ancestors challenges the
gros colon stereotype by offering readers humble people fleeing poverty and persecution in
search of a better future; people who arrived in Algeria with nothing and who, through hard
work and tenacity, succeeded in establishing modest but happy lives. From this investment in
the land and the sacrifices made – the death toll for the early settlers was extremely high due
to the inhospitable terrain and diseases such as cholera – stems a strong sense of roots and
entitlement. ‘Au fil des générations’, Jacques Roseau explained, ‘le sentiment de notre
pérennité dans cette terre française s’est installé dans l’esprit et le coeur de tous les Français
d’Algérie. Notre attachement à ce qui ne pouvait être que notre terre natale a été bien
évidemment passionnel’.198 A debt of gratitude is thus owed, and frequently acknowledged, to
these ancestors who provided the community with a positive practical and moral heritage to
take pride in. As Jean-François Gonzales defiantly stated: ‘Je n’ai pas du tout des regrets
d’être pied-noir, pas du tout d’honte à voir des ancêtres qui ont mis ce pays en valeur, au
contraire, j’ai un très grande fierté’.199 This Whiggish history in which the settlers are credited
with embarking upon an adventure which ‘ont fait passer l’ALGÉRIE du chaos à la lumière!’
is also reminiscent of late nineteenth and early twentieth century colonial literature which
older pieds-noirs certainly would have been familiar with.200 Individual trajectories are thus
amalgamated into a collective narrative of progress for the colony as a whole. This is then
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anchored within the broader, but equally positive, history of the French empire in which
Algeria played an integral role.
That colonial Algeria was ‘une création totalement française’ is something all pied-
noir associations agree on.201 The lack of an innate sense of national identity on the part of the
native inhabitants, due to centuries spent under foreign rule, is deemed to have rendered the
country a blank canvas onto which the French could project their own values and systems of
government. Within this narrative, the landing of French troops in 1830 serves as the
foundational moment in the history of the country signalling the beginning of a radical
transformation accomplished in co-operation with, rather than in opposition to, the wishes of
the indigenous Algerians. As Stora has noted, comparison is also frequently made to the
frontiersmen of the American West, in particular ‘le Texas’ on the basis of their shared
historical experiences involving ‘Grandes espaces et hautes plaines, aventuriers européens
fourbus et indigenes hostiles (mais soumis), charges héroïques de l’armée, et une société
attachée â son gloireux passé rural, face â un Nord lointain et industriel…’202 The details of
the bloody conquest and lengthy pacification process are largely ignored and the soldiers who
landed in 1830 cast instead as liberators who freed Algeria from the destructive tyranny and
backwardness of the Sublime Porte. The nationalist rebellion that broke out 124 years later is
thus denied legitimacy by the pieds-noirs who argue that Algeria had no identity separate
from that of France and that the country the FLN were claiming as their own had in fact never
existed. As Calmein boasted, ‘il ne s’agissait pas d’occuper un pays mais plutôt de fabriquer
de toutes pièces’.203 To support this view pied-noir publications frequently cite Ferhat Abbas’
statement that ‘Je ne mourrai pas pour la patrie algérienne parce que cette patrie n’existe
pas…’, conveniently ignoring important contextual details such as the date of this
proclamation, 1936, the evolution of Abbas’ nationalist views and his subsequent militant
trajectory.204
The establishment of Algeria as part of France’s empire is simply accepted as a
historical fact, no discussion of the legitimacy of colonialism as a policy is ever undertaken.
Instead, the French presence is justified with reference to the material benefits of their rule.
From the moment they set foot on Algerian soil, the French vastly improved all aspects of life
by building roads and railways, establishing extensive commercial enterprises such as
vineyards, and providing services such as sanitation, health care, education, and democratic
government (see Appendix D). Despite being greeted in 1830 with ‘un pays où régnait
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l’anarchie’, the French left behind in 1962 ‘un pays moderne’, an accomplishment that
‘mérite plus qu’un simple “merci”’.205 When recalling the scale of these achievements articles
often adopt a highly empirical perspective, as if veracity is somehow proportionate to the
volume of statistics quoted. Thus in ‘Quand l’Algérie était Française!’ we learn that ‘le
cadeau’ given to the FLN in 1962 was ‘enormous’, including 19,000 km of modern surfaced
roads at a cost of 15.5 billion new francs, 4250 km of railways, and five major airports valued
at 20 billion new francs.206 So numerous in fact were the contributions made by France that
the list goes on for twelve pages and then carries on into the subsequent issue of Aux échos
d’Alger. Algeria is therefore presented as an entirely French and a wholly positive creation.
As the Aux échos author reflected:
En écrivant ces lignes, je pense à tous ceux qui, par leur travail, leur courage et leur
acharnement, ont contribué à faire ce pays si beau, si riche et si prospère en son
temps, croyaient avoir réussi à en faire un havre de paix puisque nous vivons
cordialement avec toute la population sans distinction de race ni de religion.207
France thus restored Algeria to, and then enabled her to surpass, the greatness the land had
achieved during the Roman era with proof of the beneficence of this act lying in the gratitude
expressed to France by all her inhabitants. This gratitude is encapsulated by the Armée
d’Afrique which, to pieds-noirs, represents:
[Le] symbole de courage, d’honneur, d’héroïsme et de fidelité…une expression
magique qui force l’admiration et le respect non seulement pour les provinciaux que
nous sommes mais aussi pour cette France que nous avons aimée, à laquelle nous
étions fiers d’appartenir et que nous s’écrouler de jour en jour.208
The role of North African troops at places such as Monte Cassino in Italy, or in the Marseille
landings during the Second World War, feature prominently in association publications where
the idea of an ‘engagement consenti et voulu’ is continually stressed (see Appendix E).209
Furthermore, the ‘indéniable’ sacrifices made in order to protect the mère patrie place
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soldiers of all faiths within a heroic historical continuum that includes Bugeaud, Lamoricière,
Lyautey and Maréchal Juin, facilitating the inscription of this past and its actors
simultaneously in the history of both colony and metropole.210
Overall, colonialism for the pieds-noirs constitutes ‘une belle aventure’ and ‘une page
glorieuse de notre histoire que nous ne pouvons méconnaître’.211 Although this attitude is at
odds with contemporary sensibilities, the valorisation of a now almost universally discredited
form of rule makes sense when one considers it, as Esclangon-Morin does, as a strategy
designed to prove the reality of the settler community and their culture.212 It also becomes
comprehensible when viewed as an attempt by pieds-noirs to integrate their past with that of
la plus grande France. It is as if they hope to revive and then transfer the glory of this bygone
era onto themselves on the basis that they constitute the last surviving remnants of a project to
which their ancestors contributed greatly. ‘Nous sommes les dinosaurs d’une France éternelle,
d’une grande France’ lamented one pied-noir.213 In the innumerable articles underpinned by
this objective the thrust is primarily defensive, founded on the perceived need to correct
metropolitan misperceptions which have been shaped by a supposed leftist intellectual
hegemony that calls on the French to ‘se tourmenter’ and ‘se culpabiliser’ with respect to the
colonial past. Rather than buy into this apparently false ‘mauvaise conscience’, pied-noir
associations are determined to dispel ignorance and give their descendants a vision of the past
to be proud of. ‘Il faut mettre un terme à ce tissu de contre vérités qui s’étend comme un
linceul sur notre glorieux passé’, Véritas told their readers, perpetuating the impulse to take
control of the presentation of their own past evident from the earliest pied-noir memoirs and
adding yet another devoir de mémoire to the ever-growing pied-noir list.214
‘Le grand décolonisateur’
The toil of their ancestors, the peace and prosperity resulting from the French presence, and
the sacrifices willingly made in the course of defending these two intimately intertwined
lands all establish the right of the pieds-noirs to have been in Algeria and for Algeria to have
been considered an inalienable part of France. That the settler community was then deprived
of this right through no fault of their own forms a further central pillar in the pied-noir
worldview. Interestingly, the FLN are not directly blamed for their exile in 1962; a position
based on the corollary claim that Algeria was lost by France, rather than won by its own
210 Yves Nas, ‘8 novembre 1942 - 8 novembre 1992 Cinquantenaire du débarquement allié en Afrique
du Nord’, L’Algérianiste, 60 (December 1992), 3.
211 Emile Martin-Lakras, ‘Les chalances du soleil’, Mémoire plurielle, 16 (June 1998-October 1998),
18.
212 Esclangon-Morin, Les rapatriés, p.344.
213 Baussant, Pieds-noirs, p.416.
214 Hattab Pacha, ‘Les gauchistes’, p.3.
47
people. Pied-noir journals consequently rarely recognise the FLN as combatants in their own
right, preferring to paint them as simply a minority of savages subject to external pressures
for whom violence was the natural recourse. This stance serves the dual purpose of
highlighting the FLN’s unsuitability to rule, as well as the unrepresentative nature of their
rebellion, both of which legitimate the continuation of Algérie française, a concept the pieds-
noirs believe the majority of Algerians remained committed to.
The principal villain in this pied-noir-orientated drama is therefore General de Gaulle
since it was his introduction of the idea of ‘autodétermination’ and resultant plebiscites that
are blamed for the end of French Algeria. All pied-noir resentments over the way the war was
handled by the government in Paris are telescoped into de Gaulle. This hatred is given a
particularly sharp edge by the pied-noir belief that they were largely responsible for bringing
about de Gaulle’s return to power in 1958 and did so on the understanding that he was as
devoted to keeping Algeria French as they were:
Pour nous, c’était l’espoir. On avait l’impression que militairement nous avions déjà
gagné mais que, politiquement eut, il fallait gagner la seconde bataille. On avait
l’impression qu’avec de Gaulle on allait gagner la bataille politique.215
The sense of betrayal when this turned out not to be the case is palpable and remains an
extremely raw nerve within the community. Arguments relating to the inevitable tide of
history, or of colonies as an increasing impediment to the modernisation of France cut no ice
with the pieds-noirs who see in de Gaulle only ‘une politique d’abandon’ that is particularly
treacherous given the hopes aroused by 13 May 1958. In attempting to comprehend the jump
from ‘vive l’Algérie française’ in Mostaganem in June 1958, to self-determination as the
solution that ‘conforme au bon sens et à la justice’ in January 1961, the only reasons the
pieds-noirs can find are selfish ones pertaining to de Gaulle’s insatiable desire for prestige: ‘il
avait décidé, par orgueil et ambition personnelle de détruire et d’assassiner, en sacrifiant des
milliers d’êtres humains, ce plus beau fleuron du patrimoine français: l’Algérie’.216 Over a
century of collective hard work was thus sacrificed in a single sentence uttered by one man,
as ‘le maître de l’Élysée n’avait pas hésité à en confier le délicate alchimie à une phalange
d’apprentis sorciers aussi incompétents qu’irréductiblement affouillés’.217 The simplicity of
this reading of the past is made possible by the counterpart wholly positive presentation of
colonisation and of life in French Algeria. The refusal to engage with the complexities of the
first part of the narrative removes the need to do so with respect to the second. Decolonisation
215 Christian Gillet cited in Batty, La guerre, p.74.
216 Joseph Hattab Pacha, ‘Le mot du Président’, LV, 8 (December 1996), 2.
217 Georges Bosc, ‘Le sang d’un poète’, L’Algérianiste, 41 (March 1988), i.
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thus becomes simply the product of the egoistical whim of an individual, rather than an
intricate process with multiple loci and degrees of responsibility. This exonerates the pieds-
noirs from accountability for their fate since they appear as pawns in a larger political game
over which they had no control.
‘Fidelité à la parole donné’
Given his behaviour during the Algerian War, the pied-noir community object vehemently to
the accolades still accorded to de Gaulle for his role during the Second World War, pointing
out that ‘Jamais la personnalité de Staline, de Mussolini ou du Grande Mogul n’a été l’objet
d’un tel culte’.218 Yet while denigrating de Gaulle’s actions in 1940, associations
simultaneously seek to use the principle he established of legitimate opposition to a
government no longer acting in the best interests of the nation to justify illegal actions
committed in the name of the Algérie française cause, particularly the Generals’ putsch of
April 1961, the Petit Clamart assassination attempt, and the terrorism of the OAS (see
Appendix F). ‘De Gaulle, condamé à mort par coutume pour trahison, attaque contre la sûreté
de l’État et désertion à l’étragement en temps de guerre’ wrote putsch general Edmond
Jouhaud, ‘Notre action, de même, en avril 1961, était peut être illégal mais legitime à nos
yeux’.219 According to this system of logic, the putsch was an understandable response to the
betrayal of ‘autodétermination’, while the failure of April 1961 is then used to justify the
establishment of the OAS as ‘le dernier espoir des Français d’Algérie, fils des pionniers qui
avait crée l’Algérie et fait sa richesse’, all of which de Gaulle had jeopardised.220 The extreme
nature of the OAS is downplayed, with one pied-noir describing the group as composed of
‘les gens comme vous, come nous, comme moi’.221 There is almost never any mention of the
attacks they conducted against civilians in Algeria and France, while accusations that it was
precisely the OAS’s scorched earth policy that made the continued presence of the settlers in
Algeria untenable are always vehemently refuted. Instead, the OAS is presented as a popular
movement which ‘réunissait toutes les ethnies et toutes les courcents politiques dans un seul
but: sauver l’Algérie française’.222
Composed entirely of patriots, the OAS, particularly those activists who were
members of the French forces, understood the importance of ‘fidelité à la parole donnée’,
unlike de Gaulle. Alongside ‘fidelity’, ‘honour’ and ‘duty’ feature regularly in conjunction
with the putsch and the OAS. ‘Nous nous sommes donc rendus sans regrets’, wrote putsch
218 André Figueras, ‘Le Général est il un Dieu?’, PNM, 95 (November 1998), 20.
219 Cited in ‘Les quatre générals les plus décorés de France’, LV, 2 (April 1996), 1.
220 Calmein, Dis, c’était comment, p.17.
221 ‘Les années mélancholiques’, aired 7 April 2007.
222 ‘Les faussaires de l’histoire’, LV, 22 (April 1998), 5.
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participant Jean Florentin. ‘Nous avions fait ce que nous estimions être notre devoir jusqu’au
bout’.223 However, the most frequent allusions are to the Résistance and to the OAS as its
heir. In February 1997 Véritas ran a front cover depicting prominent OAS militants alongside
the caption ‘Non, ces hommes ne sont pas des égorgeurs, mais des Résistants et de vrais
patriotes’.224 One of the most prominent poster boys for this argument is Jean-Marie Bastien
Thiry who was put to death by firing squad for his role in the Petit Clamart assassination
attempt. The stoicism of this young, handsome, and devoted father during both his trial and
execution earned him the veneration of the pied-noir community which they express through
glowing biographies with titles such as ‘Bastien Thiry s’est sacrifié pour la France’ and even
on a stèle, paid for by Cercle Algérianiste members, that bears the inscription ‘Fusillés pour
avoir defendu l’Algerie française. N’oubliez jamais leur sacrifice’.225 ‘Nous voulons associer
à ce combat’, eulogised Colonel Bernard Moinet, ‘celui de ses vaillants compagnons dont les
noms furent évoqués il y a quelques instants, et qui ont tout sacrfié pour sauver la Patrie en
danger’.226 The actions of the pro-Algérie française lobby are deliberately not represented as
extreme responses to unique circumstances, but rather as the continuation of long established
political and moral traditions whose legitimacy is firmly established. As this and the other
examples cited demonstrate, the historical tenets promoted by pied-noir associations function
collectively to define an irreproachable identity for the community. Associations then seek to
inscribe that identity and the behaviour it engendered within recognisable and respected
national trajectories such as the French Empire and the Resistance in the hope that the
attributes attached to these glorious epochs will also be conferred upon the present-day pieds-
noirs and upon their descendants in the future.
The War of Independence
The concentration on the pre-1954 era, ‘ceux de l’Algérie heureux’, serves to heighten the
tragedy of what the pieds-noirs regard as the ignominious end suffered by French Algeria,
while simultaneously deflecting attention away from the specific context, causes and course
of French decolonisation.227 However, the ‘dark years’ of the War of Independence is not a
subject that pied-noir associations avoid entirely. Instead, because pieds-noirs generally turn
223 Jean Florentin, ‘Avril 1961…Fin de l’Armée d’Afrique’, L’Algérianiste, 79 (September 1997), 74.
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225 Bernard Moinet, ‘Bastien Thiry s’est sacrifié pour la France’, PNM, 55 (March 1995), 25. It is,
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the inauguration ceremony on the grounds that it was not an official event. His reluctance may also be
related to the fact that not all see Bastien Thiry in the same light as the Cercle Algérianiste.
226 Ibid. 25.
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to the past to legitimate their sense of themselves as victims of a historical injustice rather
than to explain what actually happened, the conflict is re-conceptualised to produce an
account that rests heavily on the events that had the greatest impact upon the settler
community, rather than necessarily the most significant moments of the war. November 1954
to March 1962 are largely skimmed over, although exceptions are made for particularly brutal
FLN operations such as the 1955 Philippeville or El Halia mine massacres. Instead, attention
is overwhelmingly concentrated upon the post-ceasefire period which encompasses the most
traumatic moments of the war for the pieds-noirs, including events on the rue d’Isly and in
Oran, the fate of the harkis and, of course, the exodus itself.
‘Non au 19 mars’
Interestingly, although the signing of the Evian Accords on 19 March 1962 serves as the
watershed point in the pied-noir chronology of the war, it is a date that the present day
community would prefer to see erased rather than remembered. Their principal objection is
that the ceasefire did not end the war. In fact, if anything, it signified an intensification of the
violence, with associations claiming more Europeans, and certainly more harkis, were killed
after this date than in all previous years of fighting:
Les accords d’Evian n’ont pas marqué le cessez-le-feu en Algérie, mais l’abandon de
quinze départements français et des populations qui les habitaient, à une force
minoritaire, subversive et terroriste dont les seuls consignes étaient celles d’une tuerie
permanente.228
In light of the casualties, commonly put at 150,000 harkis and 10,000 pieds-noirs,
‘celebrating’ 19 March is deemed tantamount to commemorating a defeat like Sedan or the
Armistice, something that ‘entraîne le mépris et l’oubli des victimes civiles innocents
assassinés’.229 In 1998, determined to prevent this, ANFANOMA, RECOURS and the Cercle
Algérianiste, the three associations with ‘la plus forte implantation’, adopted a ‘common
front’ on the issue. The group met with the Ministre des Anciens Combattants to collectively
denounce ‘le caractère inacceptable et insultant’ of commemorations being held on that
day.230 Behind this particular demonstration lies a long-established tradition of consensus on
this issue within the pied-noir community whereby petitions are regularly circulated and the
228 LV, 1 (March 1996), Insert.
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51
more activist elements are prepared to take to the streets to publicise their cause.231 Over the
course of a televised live outdoor debate to mark the twentieth anniversary of the cessation of
hostilities for example, a large crowd gathered holding aloft banners and verbally denouncing
the ‘shame’ of 19 March, their vehemence causing the host to threaten to terminate the
transmission at one point.232 Similar slogans were again on display in 2002 when a contre
manifestation was held in Marseille to protest over official commemorative services being
held in Paris, including the unveiling of a plaque by Mayor Bertrand Delanoë in Père
Lachaise to the dead and missing in North Africa between 1952 and 1962.233
As with many pied-noir crusades, this issue is formulated as a war to be waged
against the forces of falsehood and oblivion. While activity generally peaks during major
anniversary years, the momentum of the ‘non au 19 mars’ cause has accelerated noticeably
since 2000 because of a series of governmental discussions regarding the assignation of an
official date of remembrance for the War of Independence. The activities of the Fédération
nationale des anciens combattants en Algérie (FNACA), who advocate 19 March as the most
appropriate date for a national commemoration, have particularly enraged the pied-noir
community, especially following the group’s success baptising 2633 streets across France
with the name 19 mars.234 When one Mayor opted to replace the rue Bachaga Boualam with
the rue 19 mars, the reaction of Véritas was swift and unequivocal:
N’en déplaise à ces beaux messieurs de la FNACA qui ont trouvé, dans cette date, un
titre de gloire, c’est bien la honte du pays qui s’affiche, ainsi, sans aucune pudeur, sur
les murs des rues des villes et villages de notre douce France, terre d’asile, s’il en fut
et pays des droits de l’homme. LE SANG DE TOUS CES MORTS DE L’APRÈS 19
MARS 1962 SUITE, ENCORE, SUR LES MURS DE LA HONTE.235
In 2001, a date with deliberately no special war-related meaning, 5 December, was chosen as
France’s official day of commemoration.236 The ‘non au 19 mars’ campaigns have continued
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however, reflecting the determination of pied-noir associations to prevent any positive
significance being attributed to this date; a strategy indicative of their wider commitment to
inscribing their version of the past into the public narrative of the war and to prevent different
interpretations from gaining authority.
26 March and 5 July 1962: ‘des victimes civiles innocents abattués tragiquement’
Crucial to the pieds-noirs refusal to accept the conventional periodisation of the War of
Independence are 26 March 1962, when French troops fired on a crowd of pied-noir
demonstrators on the rue d’Isly in Algiers, and 5 July 1962, when several Europeans were
killed in Oran after violence broke out amidst independence celebrations. Although there
were also Algerian casualties, what makes this date particularly notable for the pieds-noirs
was the fact that the remaining French troops garrisoned in Oran, under the command of
General Joseph Katz and obeying orders from Paris, did not intervene to protect the settlers.
The centrality of these two ‘massacres’ to the pied-noir lexicon is indicated by the scale and
regularity with which they are covered by associations, many of whom also hold annual
gatherings on one or both of these dates.237 This has furthermore been the case from the early
1960s onwards with L’écho d’Oran running a lengthy piece in 1965, one year into its
existence, detailing how on 5 July 1962 ‘les Musulmans déferlant sur la ville européenne ont
enlevé et massacré hommes, femmes et enfants’.238 Commemoration of the two dates tends to
be framed with reference to other pied-noir tragedies in order to stress the cumulative sorrows
borne by the community. March, which alongside the rue d’Isly also witnessed the execution
of Jean-Marie Bastien-Thiry and the signing of the Evian Accords, is therefore often referred
to as the ‘mois de tous les malheurs’.239
One of the main premises tying 26 March and 5 July together is that they are
perceived as events that definitively set the pied-noir community apart, representing ‘la
rupture totale’ with both Algeria and France.240 Nicole Ferrandis, president of the association
Familles des victimes du 26 mars 1962 compares the rue d’Isly to Bloody Sunday in Ireland
because both involved ‘des victimes civiles innocentes abbattues tragiquement’. However,
whereas in Ireland it was a case of ‘de heurts entre forces de l’ordre anglaises et manifestants
237 This coverage tends to take the form of detailed eyewitness accounts, often reproduced from pre-
published memoirs. With respect to 26 March, two particularly popular works are Marie-Jeanne Rey’s
Mémoires d'une écorchée vive, and Francine Dessaigne’s Journal d’une mère de famille pied noir.
Indeed the two went on to co-author a volume that combined first hand accounts with archival research
in a self-proclaimed bid to unravel the truth about the events of that day. See Un crime sans assassins:
Alger 26 mars 1962, (Perros-Guirec, 1994).
238 Paule Mathieu, ‘5 juillet 1962. Le massacre des innocents’, EO, 12 (July 1965), 4.
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séparatistes’, in Algeria the Europeans were ‘victimes des forces censées les protéger, les
défendre’.241 Framed as ‘le précieux symbole d’une conscience dressée contre le cour de
l’Histoire’, the two events are used by associations to unify the pieds-noirs by affirming their
distinctiveness. This sense of isolation is reinforced by the feeling that the rue d’Isly and Oran
have both fallen victim to ‘la conspiration du silence’ orchestrated on behalf of a deliberately
falsified official history.242 In the face of such silence, it becomes imperative to make the truth
about both events known. As Georges Bosc stressed to members of the Cercle Algérianiste:
Aujourd’hui, trente ans après le drame tu, en mémoire des deux mille martyrs, mes
frères, immolés à Oran le 5 juillet 1962 et offerts en holocauste à la deésse
Indepéndance, je confie ma déposition en toute conscience du Tribunal de la Vérité,
afin que lumière et justice soient faites…243
Ever present is the idea of a duty incumbent upon the state to acknowledge its culpability and
to apologise for these tragedies, which some go so far as to classify as crimes against
humanity.244
As with other key moments in their history, deconstructing the narratives offered by
the pied-noir community about these two dates reveals a basic formula consistently applied.
Illustrative of this process is the fact that the general starting point for accounts of the rue
d’Isly and Oran is the tranquillity and fraternity that previously characterised the two
locations. Oran is depicted as possessing the harmonious mix of ‘cinq peuplements, trois
religions, une patrie’, while on the morning of 26 March 1962 the inhabitants of Algiers are
blissfully unaware of the fate that awaits them: ‘Alger: blanc, bleu, soleil…ce matin-là
certains des Algérois qui ouvraient leur fenêtre sur la beauté du monde, pouvaient-ils se
douter qu’ils vivaient leur dernier matin?’245 The fact that a ceasefire had been concluded only
days earlier following eight years of brutal warfare is strangely absent. Decontextualising
these events serves to heighten the impact of the violence, making it seem anomalous, rather
than placing it within a continuum of escalating conflict between 1954 and 1962. A similarly
stark juxtaposition exists between victims and aggressors with each side clearly delineated.
Consequently, when it comes to explaining the origins of the rue d’Isly demonstrations
241 ANFANOMA questionnaire response. Nicole Ferrandis is also ANFANOMA’s vice-president.
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associations are in agreement that ‘Les Algérois vont soutenir leurs frères de Bab-el-Oued’,
who for the past three days had been ‘prisonniers d’une armée française plus que
ménaçante’.246 Within this mutually affirming discourse the Europeans of Algiers are
confirmed as innocent victims, while the reasons behind the French military blockade remain
ill defined. That the quartier had been cordoned off in an attempt to break the power of the
OAS and the cycle of violence they had unleashed on the town since the Evian Accords is
usually omitted. The few articles that do refer to the OAS generally echo PNM’s
interpretation in which searching for OAS commandos was simply a pretext the French army
used to terrorise and render prostrate the Bab-el-Oued residents.247 Removing the OAS from
the equation simultaneously removes any shades of grey, leaving a clear line between
innocent and guilty. A similar black and white blame game is conducted with the events in
Oran where General Katz, by obeying orders to keep his men in their barracks during the
riots, is conveniently placed to act as the villain of the piece. Following the publication of his
memoirs, Katz was subjected to a particularly scathing PNM editorial which read: ‘Le
Général Katz réapparaît tel Dracula assoiffé du sang de nos martyrs… Comme cet individu
n’a pas la décence de se taire et de mourir oubliée de tous, nous devons réagir’.248 Blame is
further removed from the pied-noir community via the oft-quoted assertion that the rue d’Isly
and Oran were premeditated by the ultimate source of all pied-noir suffering, General de
Gaulle. Algiers inhabitant Roger Braiser thus recalls how he was telephoned on the morning
of 26 March 1962 by one of his former pupils, a Muslim, who warned him: ‘M’sieur, faites
gaffe! De Gaulle a donné des ordres. Il lui faut 400 morts dans les rues d’Alger d’ici ce soir’.
What comes to pass that day leads Braiser to conclude ‘Ainsi, comme à Oran, il n’y eut pas
de fatalité mais un complot organisé pour assassiner des innocents’.249 Furthermore, evoking
de Gaulle as Goliath to their David sets the rue d’Isly and Oran up as battles between
powerless but righteous individuals and an unscrupulous bully with an unfair advantage.
As with any bloody historical event, establishing the death toll tends to take centre
stage. The search for the elusive definitive statistic is one that all pied-noir associations and
their journals embark upon, producing a range of figures for Isly and Oran, usually rounded
up to the nearest hundred.250 These numbers are frequently combined with gore-laden
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accounts of how those people died and illustrated with photographs (see Appendix G). For
Henri Martinez, writing in L’Algérianiste, the sights he witnessed in Oran still produce
nightmares almost four decades later:
La famille executée sur place, la vieille décapitée à la hache sur le coin d’un trottoir,
ces garcons encore adolescents, presque coupés en deux par l’acharnement d’une
mitrailleuse, cette jeune femme qui mourra mille morts en seulement quelques jours
de faux sursis; cet homme dont les mains longtemps après la mort tentaient encore
d’endiquer le flot affreux jaillissant de sa gorge tranchée.251
‘À sa place,’ Anne Cazal concluded with respect to the French soldiers who fired, ‘je me
serais suicidée de honte’.252 Cazal’s moralising comes easily because for her, as for the
majority of pied-noir spokespeople, there are only two sides: good and evil, right and wrong.
This is history without context or nuance in which the characters are two-dimensional. It is
also history prone to stark generalisations and exaggerations expressed through inflated and
inflammatory language, as indicated by titles such as: ‘Alger 26 mars rue d’Isly: le sang, les
larmes, l’horreur’, ‘Oran…5 juillet 1962: le génocide’, and ‘Katz, l’Heydrich d’Oran’.253 In
the hands of pied-noir associations the rue d’Isly and Oran are reduced to unprovoked
tragedies that have been subsequently covered up. This places a burden of truth upon those
who lived through the events and thus can authentically recount what really happened,
particularly given the paucity of archival material relating to these events.254 This was the
inspiration behind Genviève de Ternant’s three-volume L’agonie d’Oran which sought ‘crier
à la face du monde ce que l’on a voulu cacher, oublier, nier’.255
‘Le drapeau identitaire’
What this chapter has sought to demonstrate is the existence and content of a pied-noir
lexicon that is expressed primarily through associations. This is the principal commemorative
shift between the immediate post-war era when associations were preoccupied with material
concerns, leaving history to be conveyed predominantly through individual testimonies and
memoirs, and the mid-1970s when culturally and commemoratively orientated associations
gained ascendancy. With the emergence of such associations came the centralisation and
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252 Cazal, ‘Imprescriptible!’, 3.
253 PNM, 13 (March 1991), front cover; EA, 89 (June 2005), front cover; PNM, 48 (July-August 1994),
16-17.
254 For a more detailed discussion of the archives relating to Oran see Fouad Soufi, ‘L’histoire face à la
mémoire: Oran, le 5 juillet 1962’, in La guerre d’Algérie dans la mémoire et l’imaginaire, p.134.
255 Geneviève de Ternant, L’agonie d‘Oran 5 juillet 1962, (3 vols; Calvisson, 1991-2000).
56
codification of a selective past designed to serve present needs. Consequently, a situation has
arisen whereby ‘tout rapatrié, s’il adhère et se sent appartenir à la communauté pied-noir,
porte en lui cette “metamémoire” qu’il assume et défend, persuadé qu’il s’agit là du drapeau
identitaire transmis depuis des générations d’ancêtres’.256 The purpose of these foundational
myths is to create a contemporary communal identity that recognises the duality of the pieds-
noirs as ‘un peuple en construction sur le sol africain’, but who are also an integral part of
France’s history and that ultimately tries to ‘renouer les fils distendus entre les deux
histoires’.257
While the pied-noir lexicon may be presented in a variety of guises, its fundamental
elements are immutable. The great strength of this codified history is that its essential
components are sufficiently malleable to be articulated in almost any context. These
representations are not about novelty, nuance, or interrogating the past since pied-noir
associations are not offering history for history’s sake. Instead they are capitalising on the
opportunity to reiterate a familiar and accepted vision within a safe space where a favourable
reception is guaranteed by a community of like-minded individuals who have all internalised
the same precepts. Over time this has created a clearly defined and strongly adhered to
patrimony that allows pieds-noirs to distinguish themselves positively from the metropolitan
French who now surround them, as well as offering a sense of familiarity which compensates
for the painful sense of being déraciné.
In spite of claims that the state and official history have forgotten the pieds-noirs
placing the devoir de mémoire entirely upon their shoulders, the initial silence surrounding
the years 1954 to 1962 and France’s reluctance to discuss its colonial past actually benefited
associations. The fact that no one apart from the pieds-noirs was openly discussing these
issues meant that there were few dissenting voices that associations needed to deal with. The
way was essentially left clear for the rapatrié community to construct its own internally
directed version of events. By the time contradictory interpretations and competition from
other memory carriers began to emerge on a significant scale in the 1990s, the pied-noir
lexicon was firmly established and its deployment so well rehearsed that it was able to
withstand these challenges. This is partly why there has been virtually no evolution in terms
of content; having successfully developed a ‘croyance indéfectible’, there was no need.258 In
fact, many associations regard the static nature of their history as proof of its veracity. It may
also be the case that the pieds-noirs have not altered their interpretations because they see no
change in the way they are perceived by their metropolitan cousins. They have carried on
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fighting the same battles because victory, in the form of outright acceptance of their
perspective, remains elusive.
The Social and Physical Dimensions of Memory
Consommant des souvenirs
So far the focus has been primarily on printed expressions of the pied-noir ‘metamemory’.
However, as Hureau reminds us ‘[l]a nostalgérie ne se réduit pas aux textes et images figés
sur le papier, elle est aussi terre conviviale’.259 Hureau’s conception of memory as a form of
social space is shared by pied-noir associations who gather regularly to commemorate a set
canon of religious, patriotic, and war-related dates including Ascension, 8 May, 11 November
and 26 March. ‘Il faut enfin apprendre à nous retrouver fraternellement unis, pour les dates
anniversaries qui nous tiennent à coeur et généraliser le calendrier “Algérie française” dans
toute la France’ explained the Cercle Algérianiste.260 Building on the notion that ‘chacun
d’entre nous est un peu la racine des autres’, this Algérie française calendar enables the pied-
noir community to maintain its coherence in the present by affording individuals a stable set
of occasions to ‘retrouver ses racines et d’affirmer son existence’ within a collective
framework; what Andrea Smith terms the opportunity to ‘reweave a social fabric’.261 The
absence of physical lieux de mémoire only heightens the poignancy of the places at which the
pieds-noirs gather. ‘Dès les lendemains du rapatriement’ Buono observes, l’espace
géographique des pieds-noirs se transforme en une construction mentale autour de laquelle
vont s’agréger une à une les pieces d’une culture artificielle’.262 These ‘lieux artificiels’, as
well as the actual act of gathering together, can therefore be regarded as attempts to re-create
the essence of la terre perdue.263 Cercle Algérianiste founder Maurice Calmein is worth
quoting at length on this point:
Quelle que soit l’origine du rassemblement, on retrouve partout la même atmosphère
où la joie des retrouvailles se mêle aux larmes des souvenirs douloureaux et où
domine le plaisir d’être ensemble... Plongeons furtif dans un passé heureux soudain
présent, loin de l’incompréhension métropolitain, bien au chaud, au coeur de la tribu,
259 Hureau, La mémoire, p.87.
260 ‘Congrès national’, L’Algérianiste, 1 (15 December 1977), 8.
261 ‘Editorial’, EO, 190 (May-June 1987), 6; Smith, Colonial Memory, p.188.
262 Buono, Pieds-noirs, p.60.
263 Raphaëlle Branche, La guerre d’Algérie: une histoire apaisée? (Paris, 2005), p.17.
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plaisir éphémère mais ô combien intense, faisant oublier d’un seul coups les
problèmes matériels, la dispersion des familles et l’angoisse du recommencement.264
Rassemblements therefore represent a way to reaffirm the existence and vitality of the pied-
noir community, renewing the faith of adherents in themselves and their collective identity.
Every Ascension Day since 1966, for example, pieds-noirs have flocked to the
purpose-built cathedral of Notre Dame de Santa Cruz in Mas-de-Mingue, Nîmes that now
houses the famous statue of the Virgin Mary which, legend has it, saved the people of Oran
from cholera in 1849. Attracting around 10,000 people in the 1960s, crowds peaked at over
100,000 in the 1980s. Although attendance is much lower today, Nîmes has retained its crown
as the best-attended pied-noir event.265 Providing the opportunity to ‘mêler culture et
convivialité’, this form of memorial activity is naturally heightened in significant anniversary
years; 1987, 1992, and 1997 were thus marked by national rassemblements in Nice, Paris, and
Marseille respectively. Nice and its successors offered the familiar opportunity to reunite with
old friends, to share memories and to indulge in bittersweet reminiscences but on an
unprecedented scale; an estimated 300,000 pieds-noirs descended on Nice between 25 and 28
June 1987.266 It was, as Roseau explained, a case of ‘Toutes confessions réunis, confondus et
c’est une immense histoire d’amour…qui était baigné de larmes, de soleil, de sang, mais
démontrable éclat de rire…’267
For associations, these gatherings offered an unparalleled opportunity to demonstrate
the numerical strength, cohesion, and vitality of the pied-noir population to the wider world
by providing a forum in which to ‘se proclamer sa culture et la fiérté de sa couleur’.268 The
Cercle Algérianiste stall at Nice was thus deemed a success on the basis that through
‘l’évidence, par preuves et arguments’, they had exposed ‘une Algérie méconnue et une
France oubliée’, something that ‘pour beaucoup de nos visiteurs, fut une révélation’.269 More
broadly, the unprecedented size of the Nice gathering, its coincidence with the new
indemnification law and the quarter century anniversary, plus the range of official figures in
attendance, including Chirac, created a significant media frenzy. Many local newspapers ran
front-page pieces, while most national television channels featured the rassemblement in their
news programmes. Coverage was generally positive with the emphasis placed upon the pieds-
noirs’ integration and economic success, as well as their status as an established and accepted
264 Cited in Ayoun and Stora, Mon Algérie, p.126.
265 Branche, La guerre d’Algérie, p.17.
266 Rosemary Averell Manes, The Pieds-Noirs 1960-2000: A Case Study in the Persistence of
Subcultural Distinctiveness, (Bethesda, MD, 2005), p.119.
267 ‘Plateau’, aired 27 June 1987.
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269 Jo Sohet, ‘Avec vous: Vingt-cinq ans…et trios mois après’, L’Algérianiste, 39 (September 1987),
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regional minority. The timing of this demonstration of the vibrancy of the cultural side of the
pied-noir identity was highly significant, coming at a point when the satisfaction of the
community’s material demands through the impending indemnification law threatened to
sweep them from the public’s gaze.270
Inscribing the past in stone:
Although valuable in their own right, rassemblements, whatever their size, are only able to
embody memory in social spaces for a fixed period of time; the past fragments and ebbs away
as the participants return to their individual lives. Seeking more permanent historical markers
and tapping into a wider French tradition, pied-noir associations have erected numerous
monuments to their past. One of the most recent examples is the Cercle Algérianiste’s ‘mur
des disparus’ which was inaugurated on 25 November 2007 in Perpignan, its 55,000 euro cost
covered primarily by donations from pied-noir associations. These edifices not only provide a
focal point for gatherings, but also express the community’s desire to see themselves and their
history anchored in French soil and, by implication, the national historical narrative.
Demand for such structures from the pied-noir community has remained constant
since the erection of the first Mémorial des Rapatriés in Nice in 1973.271 However, these
initiatives have not always been favourably received as the convoluted gestation of the
proposed Mémorial national de la France d’Outre-Mer in Marseille illustrates. The monument
was first proposed in 1996, but has yet to see the light of day because although most pieds-
noirs regard it as a fitting tribute to ‘la gloire de la France colonisatrice et de sa mission
civilisatrice’, others have opposed it as an unnecessary historical provocation.272 The more
conspiracy minded members of the pied-noir community read into the memorial’s non-
appearance further proof of official determination to erase their past so as to avoid
embarrassment. More generally there is a deep sense of disappointment across the
community. ‘Nous regrettons’, explained Yves Sainsot of ANFANOMA, ‘les multiples
ralentissements et obstacles auxquels s’est heurté le projet de Mémorial (qui semblait au point
mort hier encore). Son rôle aurait été essentiel s’il n’avait pas été dévié en dépit de toutes nos
interventions et mises en garde’.273 What made the Marseille monument particularly
important was not just the historical significance of its location, but also the potential national
resonance of its message. The majority of rapatrié monuments are locally based and
addressed to a specific constituency, in contrast, commemorating la France d’Outre-Mer
270 Esclangon-Morin, Rapatriés, p.350.
271 For a detailed analysis of the layers of memory inscribed onto this simple structure see Branche, La
guerre d’Algérie, p.25.
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would have given legitimacy not only to French Algeria, but to the whole French colonial
past thus placing the pied-noir community within a positive national historical narrative.
‘Une ville pas comme les autres’
Combining the social and the physical dimensions of pied-noir collective memory is the
southern town of Carnoux-en-Provence. Described by its Deputy Mayor, Melchior Calandra,
in 2000 as ‘une ville pas comme les autres’, Carnoux is indeed a unique place.274 Founded in
the mid-1950s by rapatriés from the newly independent Morocco who envisaged creating ‘a
small lot’ where they could enjoy a peaceful retirement, the nine original inhabitants quickly
found themselves overwhelmed by an influx of pieds-noirs in 1962.275 The number of
residents climbed sharply that year to 242, but two years later had leapt even more
dramatically to 2000.276 Under the dominant influence of the pieds-noirs, Carnoux was
transformed into a sizeable town, receiving official recognition from the local municipality in
1966. But perhaps more importantly it was also transformed into a living museum dedicated
to the preservation of the memory and culture of French Algeria. Assiduously perpetuating
rituals, recipes, music, and even accents, provided a way for the past to go on living in the
present and thus helped the pieds-noirs assuage the pain of having lost their actual homeland.
Nostalgia and selective remembering were given free reign in this physical and historical re-
presentation of an idealised Algeria that also provided a sanctuary where pieds-noirs could
take refuge from a métropole they felt had consistently failed to understand them and their
past.
Although described as ‘le symbol de l’Afrique perdu’, Carnoux is far more than a
mere symbol.277 ‘L’Afrique du Nord reconstruit’ is perhaps a more accurate classification
given that the key architectural features of the town were deliberately designed to mirror
those of French Algeria. In particular, Carnoux boasts an exact replica of the famous Algiers
basilica that not only shares the same name, Notre Dame d’Afrique, but also includes original
clocks transported from the former colony. French Algeria is further recalled in the daily
activities of Carnusiens who, after a hard day’s work, can wander down to their local café in
the evening to enjoy an apéro of anisette with a side of merguez, indulge in some tchatcha
with their neighbours, or simply share memories of their former lives while listening to songs
mourning their exile. As one resident proudly proclaimed, ‘on a gardé nos habitudes, on a
274 ‘La cité des pieds-noirs’, La cinquième rencontre, aired 6 June 2000 (La cinquième).
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gardé la manière de vivre’.278 Key to the importance of Carnoux is its permanence, which
enables it to function as a kind of continual rassemblement that allows residents and visitors
to immerse themselves in the ambiance of là-bas simply by stepping out of their front door.279
Carnoux thus offers a unique form of physical and social familiarity that has been of great
comfort to the pieds-noirs, particularly in light of the trauma and chaos associated with their
exile.
While it is possible to argue that this has been beneficial to the pieds-noirs of
Carnoux, enabling them to ‘faire le deuil de son univers quotidien’ in a more supportive
environment than that enjoyed by many of their compatriots, the obvious counter argument is
that living somewhere where you are constantly surrounded by an imitation of your former
life actually impedes the grieving process and has prevented Carnusien pieds-noirs from
moving on, leaving them instead stranded in a artificial past.280 Because of course the North
Africa that exists in Carnoux is not a reflection of life as it really was in French Algeria, but
an idealised re-creation based firmly on the pre-war era. Echoing the rhetoric of associations,
the convivial culture of a distinctive but inclusive population that Carnoux promotes is a
historical simplification that sanitises the complex social and political structure of colonial
Algeria.
Carnoux has been described as a ‘véritable sanctuaire’ for the pied-noir community
on account of its potent combination of stability, familiarity and fraternity.281 This was
particularly important in the years immediately following 1962 since, having placed their
motherland on a pedestal and prided themselves on their francité when in Algeria, many
pieds-noirs were disheartened upon arrival in France to be confronted with what Calandra has
called ‘un espace de rejet’ and to be left feeling ‘étrangers parmi les leurs’.282 This initial
sense of ostracism has never fully dissipated and remains a source of considerable bitterness,
even today. In contrast to this stood Carnoux, a place that self-consciously billed itself as
somewhere pieds-noirs could feel chez soi. Here, new arrivals could relax knowing that they
would be ‘accueilli par des amis et compris par des gens qui avaient faire face aux mêmes
difficultés’.283 Carnusien pieds-noirs were thus able to turn their sense of rejection and
exclusion into a virtue as indicated by the local motto ‘une minorité à toujours besoin de se
retrouver majoritaire en quelque part’.284
278 ‘La cité’, aired 6 June 2000.
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However, Carnoux is not simply a refuge from the real world. ‘L’acte de foi des
pieds-noirs en l’avenir’ was how PNM described it and this is certainly how Carnusiens prefer
to view their town, with one resident proudly declaring: ‘Nous avons rebâti une cité, rebâti
une vie avec nos souvenirs’.285 Carnoux is furthermore marketed as a space that owes nothing
to France and the French, thus proving the pied-noir community’s independence and self-
sufficiency. ‘Notre histoire n’est pas vieille’, explained one Carnusien, ‘mais quelle fierté de
pouvoir dire: une ville créée par les rapatriés pour les rapatriés. C’est nous qui l’avons faite,
c’est nous qui l’avons bâtie, c’est nous qui l’avons écrite’.286 Carnoux therefore represents
success on the pieds-noirs’ own terms, without compromising or diluting the distinctiveness
of the identity and culture which have become such important touchstones over the years. All
of which helps to explain why the annual pilgrimage to the cathedral in Carnoux on August
15 (Assumption) has remained so popular when attendance at the majority of similar events
has declined significantly since the end of the 1970s.287
Yet, as the voiceover on Naissance d’un village, a 1966 documentary devoted to
Carnoux, intones dramatically, ‘Inévitablement il y a des ombres’.288 One of these shadows
pertains to how a town founded by European settlers from Morocco seeking a quiet retirement
spot was transformed into what Jean-Jacques Jordi has called ‘le fief de la communauté pied-
noir’.289 Although the idea that this was not an entirely peaceful and good-natured transition is
dismissed by the Deputy Mayor, small asides made by residents of Carnoux not of Algerian
origin indicate tensions between the various repatriate communities who live there and a
certain degree of resentment towards the dominance of the pied-noir element. A more
obvious shadow, brought out in both the 1966 documentary and a follow-up filmed in 2000,
is the fact that Carnoux, supposed bastion of pied-noir hard work in rebuilding their lives,
was not in fact built by the pieds-noirs, but by Algerian immigrant labourers. In 1966, the
camera pans across North African labourers constructing new and modern houses for the
pieds-noirs, to the insalubrious bidonvilles on the outskirts of Carnoux in which these workers
and their families were forced to live. ‘On a parfois l’impression qu’on n’a franchi ni les
années, ni la méditerranée’ remarks the presenter.290 Today the slums have vanished, along, it
would seem, with ethnic diversity. Carnoux in 1966, but even more so in 2000, is
285 Jean Chaland, ‘Carnoux: l’acte de foi des pieds-noirs en l’avenir’, PNM, 92 (July-August 1998) 11;
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287 Jean-Jacques Jordi, ‘Les pieds noirs: constructions identitaires et réinvention des origines’, H&M,
1236 (March-April 2002), 21. Today Nîmes is the only comparable event in terms of the size of the
crowd it attracts.
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overwhelmingly white; white buildings in which white inhabitants with white hair live.
Critics of the town use this as evidence that Carnoux represents exactly what the pieds-noirs
have always sought: Algeria without the Algerians. Cited in support of this theory is the fact
that Carnoux has been a Front National stronghold in the past with 30 per cent of the vote
going to Le Pen’s party in 1988 on a 68 per cent turnout. Since then the FN have campaigned
hard in Carnoux and their ‘public reunions’ attract sizeable crowds. It would furthermore
seem that support for the far right is a longstanding tradition in Carnoux with Calandra
boasting that in 1965 Carnoux was ‘la seule ville de France’ in which Tixier-Vignancour
obtained an absolute majority, securing 77 per cent of the vote.291
This makes Carnoux a fascinating case study regarding the preservation and
transmission of the colonial past in a post-colonial context. However, there is a twist in the
tale that adds an intriguing extra dimension. Despite living in a town dedicated to
perpetuating the mores and mentalities of French Algeria, in 1984 and again in 1999,
Carnusien pieds-noirs created associations for the same purpose. The first of these, Carnoux-
Racines, was formed in 1984 by the indefatigable Calandra who has been active in the
community since its inception and has for an objective the ‘Recherche, reconnaissance et
défense de l’identité pied-noire’.292 The association currently boasts 2600 members and
organises a range of activities including the annual 15 August fete, historical conferences, and
campaigns against commemorating 19 March.293 In contrast, Racine Pieds-Noirs, founded in
1999, is smaller with around 200 members and has a slightly more historical agenda,
producing a glossy brochure in 2003 entitled Les grandes dates de la mémoire ‘Pieds-Noirs’
to coincide with ‘l’année de l’Algérie en France’.294 However, its mission statement is very
similar to that of Carnoux-Racines, focusing on the defence and promotion of the pied-noir
identity, both to the next generation and to the wider French population.
The overlap between the agendas of both groups and that of the town itself is
therefore considerable. Indeed, Calandra acknowledges the apparent paradox of needing an
association somewhere like Carnoux, but rationalises it as a more personal extension of the
sanctuary aspect of the town. ‘Depuis sa création’ he explains, ‘nombre de nos compatriots
venaient à Carnoux remplis d’illusions. Ils tournaient en rond ne sachant où aller, ne
trouvaient personne pour les accueillir, pour les renseigner, et finalement repartaient
déçus’.295 Carnoux-Racines is therefore presented as outward looking; a kind of tourist
291 ‘La cité’, aired 6 June 2000; Calandra, Melchior, ‘Carnoux-Racines pour vous servir’, PNM, 92
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information formed more for the benefit of those who do not have the luxury of living in
Carnoux than the inhabitants themselves.
However, other comments from Calandra suggest that there may be motivations
behind these associations that pertain not to the outside world, but to the anxieties and needs
of the Carnusien pieds-noirs themselves. In particular, Calandra makes reference to the fact
that the local municipalities have tended ‘à faire disparaître la connotation pieds-noirs que
nous étions évertués à imprimer’.296 Indeed, there is a noticeable co-incidence in timing
between the founding of Carnoux-Racines and a decision by the local authority to change
some of the street names in Carnoux to make them more evocative of a rural province than a
pied-noir enclave. For despite what the Carnusien pieds-noirs like to claim, in reality
Carnoux has never been an exclusively pied-noir preserve. Indeed, Carnoux has been able to
grow to its present day size of approximately 7000 inhabitants primarily because of its
success in attracting non-pieds-noirs with the requisite skills and capital. Not all of the
original residents have approved of such developments, fearing that they are threatening to
overwhelm the town’s distinctive identity. Carnoux-Racines can thus be conceived of as a
strategy to both protect Carnoux’s Algérie française attributes and to avoid the risk of
commemorative complacency by fostering an active and engaged relationship with the town’s
pied-noir heritage amongst residents.
In spite of the similarities in their agendas, the timing of the creation of Racine Pieds-
Noirs points to yet another impetus and set of pied-noir anxieties. In the fifteen years between
the founding of the two associations, the historical and commemorative climate in France
with respect to the Algerian War altered considerably. As already outlined, the majority of
these evolutions took place in the 1990s, culminating in the present memory wars
phenomenon; a combat that the pied-noir community has not been slow to enter into.
Emerging at the height of these battles in 1999, the year parliament classified the ‘events’ in
Algeria as a ‘war’, Racine Pieds-Noirs reflects this altered context, particularly through their
insistence on ‘Informer sans passion’. According to their literature this involves ‘Permettre
une information lucide et rationnelle sur les réalités historiques et sociologiques de cette
communauté’ to counter ‘la désinformation dont elle [la communauté] fait encore parfois
l’objet’.297 In practice this is tantamount to sending their own, ‘correct’, history into battle
against the ‘false’ representations being offered by other memory carriers.
In the decades since Carnoux was founded, the rules and the stakes of the
commemorative game with respect to the War of Independence have changed considerably
and in order to survive the pied-noir community has had to adapt. The same is true of
Carnoux, for while the town has always been unique, it has never been isolated from wider
296 Ibid. 12.
297 www.racinepiedsnoirs.com/mission.html [28 December 2008]
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currents within both the pied-noir community and French society. Consequently, in the
present memory wars climate it is no longer enough to seek to preserve and protect the
essence of l’Algérie française in a small corner of southern France, the battle to defend the
pied-noir past and identity needs to be waged beyond the walls of the town and, it seems,
through the medium of associations such as Racine Pieds-Noirs. Thus rather than the paradox
that it first appears to be, the development of associations in Carnoux is both a logical
complement to and a necessary evolution of the historical and memorial functions served by
the town; all designed to ensure that having succeeded in re-creating a little slice of Algeria in
France, the pieds-noirs’ hard work doesn’t fall to ruins. The example of Carnoux thus
demonstrates that while the substance of the pied-noir worldview has not altered, the ways in
which this patrimony is mobilised and targeted has changed in line with the broader cultural
and historical context.
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3. Evolutions in Activism: Guerres de mémoire, 1991-2007
External Manifestations
Having outlined the process by which the pied-noir lexicon was established, the focus now
turns to analysing how this patrimony has been mobilised and disseminated. The period of
greatest relevance is the 1990s onwards when the wider context with respect to the War of
Independence underwent the most sustained and significant changes. Adapting to these
circumstances has brought pied-noir associations into greater contact with other memory
carriers and conduits. Although the community has never been completely isolated, their
activism was largely internally directed until the memory wars phenomenon introduced an
element of competition for control over the past and compelled them to begin projecting their
historical understanding outwards to a greater extent. Raphaëlle Branche has compared the
current situation to that of a disorganised orchestra in which ‘chaque instrument joue sa
partition sans se préoccuper du voisin autrement peut-être qu’avec le souci de se faire
entendre mieux que lui’.298 Applying this metaphor to the pieds-noirs, although they have
carried on playing the same tune, during the 1990s their audience expanded greatly as the
War of Independence re-emerged into public consciousness. However, simultaneously the
orchestra also grew as more and more memory carriers entered the public arena. Because
these new sections are not necessarily in harmony with the pieds-noirs, the result is that the
community feel that they have to play louder, more insistently, and in a more diverse array of
settings in order to ensure that their interpretation is the one conveyed to the listeners.
One manifestation of this trend has been the emergence of a new breed of pied-noir
associations in the mid to late 1990s, epitomised by Véritas. Created in March 1996 by
former Mayor of Algiers, Joseph Hattab Pacha, and his sister, Anne Cazal, the association and
its journal La lettre de Véritas are notable for their stark views, intemperate polemic and
graphic images (see Appendix H). What makes this organisation particularly interesting is
that rather than simply a radical fringe element, Véritas appears to represent the extreme edge
of a more general hardening of attitudes across pied-noir associations, with numerous
association journals regularly giving column inches and advertising space to Véritas. Perhaps
the most welcoming publication has been PNM, probably due to their contemporaneous
status, both having been founded in the mid-1990s, and similar political orientations.
However, even the selective GNPI included Véritas in issues 144 and 147 of its bulletin,
which implies an at least tacit endorsement of the opinions and tactics promoted by Véritas
among other pied-noir associations and their adherents.
298 Raphaëlle Branche, La guerre d’Algérie: une histoire apaisée? (Paris, 2005), p.7.
67
The founding of Véritas also highlights the impact of the changing political landscape
in France during the 1990s and 2000s on the pied-noir community. The most obvious
development during this period has been the rise of the far right, particularly the Front
National (FN) which went from garnering 10.95 per cent of the vote in 1984, to securing a
place in the second round of the 2002 presidential election. While it is not the case that all
pied-noirs are FN voters, there is a connection between elements of the community and the
far right.299 The strong pro-Le Pen sentiment that exists in certain quarters has its roots in
their memory of the fact that Le Pen resigned his seat as a deputy in 1958 in order to enrol in
the parachute regiment and fight to keep Algeria French. This fidelity to the Algérie française
cause, combined with Le Pen’s views on empire and immigration, and the FN’s tendency to
present themselves as martyrs in defence of truths that other political parties are too afraid to
acknowledge and discuss, has helped forge and maintain links between the two.300 Le Pen
has always been open about the fact that he regards the pieds-noirs as his natural constituents
and has actively courted this vote throughout his political career.
However, even given the party’s recent electoral gains, the FN remains a marginal
political force and one that the majority of pied-noir associations remain reluctant to identify
themselves with, at least publicly. What has therefore been more important in terms of the
context in which the War of Independence has been debated was the presence, until 2007, in
the Elysée Palace of Jacques Chirac who was felt by the pieds-noirs and others to be
sympathetic to their cause in spite of his Gaullist roots.301 Beginning with his support for the
1987 indemnification law while Prime Minister, Chirac went on to advocate numerous
measures that benefited the rapatrié community, including the harkis, showing himself to be
sensitive to their historical sensibilities, without ever actively endorsing their perspective. His
election as President in 1995 represented a crucial turning point, prompting Algérie française
nostalgics, according to Stora, to ‘wake up’.302 Subsequent years have witnessed the political
and cultural ascent of the pro-colonial lobby as they have successfully built upon these more
favourable conditions. Although difficult to demonstrate concretely, it is probable that the
more strident expression of the pied-noir lexicon embodied in associations like Véritas on
some level reflects the greater degree of confidence felt by pieds-noirs because of the
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perceived endorsement and thus legitimation of their views at the highest levels. The impact
of these developments during the 1990s upon the strategies employed by pied-noir
associations to promote and defend their worldview will be analysed through a consideration
of their interactions with key vectors of memory, in particular the media, academia, the
judiciary and the Algerian immigrant community in France.
Faussaires de l’Histoire
Over the years, pied-noir associations have identified and pursued many enemies. While
anyone who does not subscribe fully to their interpretation of the past is a legitimate target,
these attacks are really aimed at a larger and more nebulous enemy: désinformation.
Désinformation is defined as a deliberate and pernicious campaign of falsification designed to
distort or occult the truth about French Algeria and the War of Independence. According to
Pierre Dimech, the Cercle Algéraniste’s resident expert on the subject, désinformation against
the pieds-noirs entered a particularly virulent phase during the 1990s, having lain more or less
dormant for the preceding three decades.303 ‘[E]n véhiculant des clichés réducteurs, quand ils
ne sont pas entièrement faux’, the forms that désinformation can take are multiple, as are its
sources.304 What is, however, clear is that its principal conduit is the media. Although
‘apparement plurielle’, the written press is in reality, according to pieds-noirs, ‘aux mains des
groupes ayant des intérêts convergents, et une même source d’inspiration’, while television is
described as ‘le plat pays où souffle en force, pour ne pas dire en tempête, un vent
unidirectionnel’ emanating ultimately from the ‘lobby politico-médaitque de l’Anti-
France’.305 Faced with this conspiracy to pervert the course of history, pied-noir associations
have mobilised to counter this false propaganda. The Cercle Algérianiste has a ‘Comité de
vigilance et riposte’, while PNM was founded ‘car il fallait absolument rétablir la verité
historique à travers un média propre, et non celui des autres qui travestit toujours tout…’306
Véritas, whose full title is ‘Comité pour le rétablissement de la vérité historique sur l’Algérie
française’, is similarly dedicated to correcting misperceptions, proclaiming:
Nous nous attaquons à un mythe solidement implanté dans l’Histoire et dans la
mémoire collective de nos compatriotes métropolitains à force d’images artificielles
et d’images inconsistants créés à grand renfort de slogans, de fausses analogies et
303 Pierre Dimech, La désinformation autour de la culture des pieds-noirs, (Paris, 2006), p.9.
304 Ibid, p.19.
305 Ibid. pp.23, 32, 34; Jose Castano, ‘Le lobby politico-médaitque de l’Anti-France’, EO, 193
(November-December 1987), 4.
306 Jean-Marc Lopez cited in Danielle Michel-Chich, Déracinés: les pieds-noirs aujourd’hui, (Paris,
2000), p.170.
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distorsions historiques et surtout, à notre encontre, d’accusations calomnieuses ayant
entraîne le silence médiatique que nous accable et nous baîllane.307
One of the most common tactics employed by these associations in combating désinformation
is to sign petitions or write letters of complaint to various bodies and individuals highlighting
the inaccuracies in their presentation of the pied-noir community and their history. This trend
has become increasingly prominent across the full spectrum of pied-noir associations in the
past two decades with no one, from the President of the Republic down, deemed either too
great or too small to spill ink over. Although it is often the case that the désinformation itself
matters less than the opportunity it provides to publicly reiterate the central tenets of the
lexicon, this correspondence is also important because it signifies the growth of this more
active form of memorial participation befitting the more dynamic commemorative context.
The range of competing historical narratives that had emerged by the 1990s meant that it was
no longer sufficient for members to simply read and reminisce about past glories, this history
now has to be actively defended by each and every reader against the increasingly visible
alternative interpretations. In contrast to bulletin-induced passivity, letter writing offers a way
to perpetuate a sense of engagement and of belonging to a community after the last page of
the journal is turned. It requires effort, demonstrates investment, and will hopefully galvanise
others. Even a lack of a response to correspondence can potentially be turned into a
motivational tool, indicating weakness in the position of the opposition. It is also the case that
as an aging population, many of whom are now retired, the pied-noir community are ideally
placed to exercise the necessary vigilance against désinformation.
Although very little escapes the notice of activists, there is a proportionate
relationship between the profile of the programme/article in question and the reaction it
arouses. The multi-part documentary series La guerre d’Algérie (1990) and Les années
algériennes (1991) by Peter Batty and Benjamin Stora were therefore exceptional, not only in
the comprehensiveness of their treatments of the War of Independence, still a relatively under
explored subject at that time, but for the level of commentary they provoked within the pied-
noir community.308 Batty’s documentary was labelled ‘la plus violente aggression
médiatique’ directed at the community since the exodus of 1962, and deemed so offensive
that the Cercle Algérianiste felt compelled to establish a committee of opposition which they
called ‘Interdit aux chiens et aux pieds-noirs’ in reference to the assertion of one interviewee
307 Joseph Hattab Pacha, ‘L’affaire de tous’, LV, 46 (October 2000), 2.
308 These levels of criticism were not to be repeated until Patrick Rotman’s L’ennemi intime in 2002.
Although in this instance the recent Le Monde torture controversy and its sequels undoubtedly
exacerbated reactions amongst the pied-noir community.
70
that neither Arabs nor dogs were allowed onto certain beaches during French rule.309 Such
criticism paled, however, in comparison to the opprobrium directed at the ‘très subversives’
Les années algériennes, the Constantinois origin of its director adding an extra edge to the
accusations levelled in the pied-noir press.310 Envisaged as a corrective to patchy
historiography that had failed to situate the war ‘dans sa richesse’, Stora hoped that by
showing ‘une guerre réelle’ in its full context and through a very public medium he would
contribute to ‘exorciser’ the conflict to some degree.311 This was not however, how Les
années algériennes was received within the pied-noir community. L’Algérianiste subjected it
to a twenty-three-page autopsy before concluding that rather than a historical endeavour, the
documentary represented ‘une subjectivité sans contrôle’.312 The journal found particularly
offensive the caricatured portrait of the community: ‘Rien n’y manqué: la gifle, le verre d’eau
vendu, le serviteur exploité, l’enfant battu, le mépris et sa dangereuse contagion, l’absence de
conscience politique, la grossièreté du colon’.313
Ultimately, what the pieds-noirs objected to in both documentaries, and more
generally with respect to désinformation, is what they regarded as an unbalanced content that
favours the FLN and their supporters while ignoring their suffering. Yet in truth the broad
focus of la guerre d’Algérie and Les années algériennes inherently dictated that less attention
would be focused specifically on the experiences of the settlers because both documentaries
placed these within the chronology of the entire war, rather than simply concentrating on the
final few months. In the interests of enhancing historical knowledge, these projects also
deliberately sought to highlight aspects of the war that pied-noir presentations prefer to omit
or downplay, such as the inequalities of the colonial system, the practice of torture by the
French army, the violence of the OAS, and 17 October 1961. It was furthermore the case that
Les années algériennes ushered in a new era in terms of the way in which the conflict was
discussed on camera. The studio debate following the final instalment of the series was
heralded by host Daniel Bilalian as the first time protagonists from all sides of the conflict
had been assembled together on French television. Contributions thus came from diverse
figures including Bernard Tricot, one of the negotiators of the Evian Accords, Henri
Martinez, an ex-OAS commando, harki Rachid Mimouni, as well as former FLN militants
Yacef Saadi and Mohammed Harbi.314 Such occasions were bound to be more acrimonious
309 ‘Histoire Actualité’, L’Algérianiste, 51 (September 1990), 3; Georges Bosc, ‘Interdit aux chiens et
aux pieds-noirs’, L’Algérianiste, 51 (September 1990), i.
310 ‘Réflexion: Décolonisations bâclées: Histoire ou actualité?’, PNM, 22 (January 1992), 26.
311 Bertrand le Gendre and Benjamin Stora, ‘Une guerre qui ne voulait pas dire son nom’, Le Monde,
23 September 1991, p.16.
312 ‘Les années algériennes’, L’Algérianiste, 56 (December 1991), 2.
313 Ibid. 2.
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than when participants were more ideologically homogenous, although conflict has also
frequently been a feature of exclusively rapatrié debates.
Prior to the 1990s, debates and documentaries on the war were generally infrequent,
French-orientated, and dealt largely with a single subject, event or group. Within this
restricted canon, the pieds-noirs and their views were generally well represented with at least
one community spokesperson present, very often Jacques Roseau. There were also several
occasions when they constituted the majority of participants, or were the sole focus of
programmes including Pour ceux d’Algérie, que reste-t-il du passé? (1983), Droit de réponse
aux pieds-noirs (1986), and Rapatriés: 25 ans de nostalgie (1987).315 Yet the right to express
their opinions is not something that the pied-noir community feel the French media accords
them as the ‘Interdit aux chiens et aux pieds-noirs’ manifesto made clear in its call ‘Pour
l’abolition de l’ “apartheid politico-médiatique”’.316 Even when invited to participate in
televised debates, pieds-noirs still often feel that they are not given the opportunity to speak
freely. Michel Lagrot told L’Algérianiste that he felt unable to comment openly during Ça se
discute due to the ‘pensée unique obligé’ and the fact that ‘le terrorisme intellectuel est
parfois obligé de recourir au terrorisme physique et l’on n’était peut-être pas tout à fait sûr de
l’assistance’.317
This begs the question: how would the pieds-noirs like to be presented by the media?
Exergue by Catherine Jeannin, broadcast in the summer of 1992, offers one answer. AOCAZ
president, Geneviève de Ternant, described it as ‘une émission qui m’a fait chaud au coeur’
because it had enabled her to retrieve ‘le vrai visage de notre Algérie fraternelle et
dynamique, le vrai visage des Pieds-Noirs “devorés de nostalgie”’.318 This ‘vrai visage’
included all the key elements of the historical lexicon from the humble and hard-working
settler, through the multicultural harmony of the colony, to the creation of the pied-noir ‘sans
terre mais non sans culture’.319 Particularly revealing was de Ternant’s concluding remark:
‘Pour une fois la parole n’a pas été donnée aux porteurs de valises ni au FLN’.320 Returning
to Branche’s orchestra metaphor, this reiterates the idea that for the pieds-noirs history can
have only one true tune, the one on their music sheet. It also underlines Stora’s observation
that each group connected to the war patronises only those media that affirm their own
315 ‘Pour ceux d’Algérie, que reste-t-il du passé?’, Les dossiers de l’écran, aired 5 April 1983 (Channel
2); Droit de réponse aux pieds-noirs, aired 8 November 1986 (Channel 1); ‘Rapatriés: 25 ans de
nostalgie’, Camera 2, aired 22 June 1987 (Channel 2).
316 Bosc, ‘Interdit aux chiens’, ii.
317 ‘Ça se discute!’, L’Algérianiste, 90 (June 2000), 2.
318 Geneviève de Ternant, ‘Editorial’, EO, 221 (July-August 1992), 1.
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worldview, confirming désinformation and the bid to combat it as a perfect example of
cloistered remembering in action.321
Of course it is also the case that within the pied-noir associational milieu there are
groups who define their agenda in more open terms, such as Mémoire d’Afrique du Nord who
believe that ‘la mémoire n’est pas une, elle est complexe, multiple, elle appartient à tous, elle
est plurielle’.322 However, behind the rhetoric, the association’s journal offers a very
conventional pied-noir reading of themes including the positive role played by France in
Algeria and the patriotic status of the OAS. It therefore seems less the case that they support
the idea of multiple memories, and more that they avoid the starker presentations of Véritas.
In contrast, Coup de Soleil, founded with the intention to ‘lutter contre l’ignorance et
l’incompréhension’ and seeking to ‘[r]éunir des Maghrébins et des Pieds-noirs, des
“immigrés” et des “rapatriés”’, is more committed to a pluralistic understanding of the past.323
Although the organisation has failed to attract members or press coverage equivalent to
groups such as ANFANOMA or the Cercle Algérianiste, it is this and similar groups that
Buono probably had in mind when she detected the emergence of a new category of pied-noir
activist in the 1990s. Labelling them ‘reconstructeurs modernes’, she defined this cohort as
the opposite of ‘nostalgiques’ because they sought to celebrate their heritage, while
simultaneously avoid enclosing themselves in nostalgia and negative clichés such as
‘“L’Algérie de papa”, l’OAS, les souvenirs victimisant…’324 While not denying the existence
of this strand within the pied-noir associational movement, the evidence suggests that they
were never a dominant element. More significant during the 1990s, especially given the larger
commemorative context, was the birth of organisations such as Véritas who indicate not a
break with previous positions, but rather more radical incarnations of long-standing attitudes
and tendencies. This is something that Buono implicitly acknowledges when she admits that
the ‘modernes’ have failed because when ‘confrontés à l’incroyable difficulté de leur tâche’
they have ‘préféré se replier sur le discours “nostalgiques”’.325 Over the years there has thus
been both a quantitative and qualitative shift in the nature of mobilisations within the pied-
noir associational community as methods have become more sophisticated but, more
importantly, the stakes have been raised. This is particularly apparent when the relationship
between the pied-noir community and academia are considered.
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‘Nous sommes des témoins’
The importance attached to history by pied-noir associations means that a commensurate
degree of significance is accorded to the activities of professional historians. Several scholars
have been warmly welcomed by the pieds-noirs including Rosemary Averell Manes, who was
favourably received by the Cercle Algérianiste on account of her stated appreciation of the
persistent prejudice she felt the community suffered from, and Andrea L. Smith, who noted
that her dissertation project gave ‘a renewed sense of pride’ to her interviewees because it
‘validated, in their view, the importance of their own history’.326 Historians who advance
broadly favourable or sympathetic readings of this past are in turn themselves favourably
regarded by associations, as the repeated invitations issued by the Cercle Algérianiste to Jean
Jacques Jordi and the conservative Guy Pervillé demonstrate. The logical corollary is that
academics who have adopted a more critical stance have both their work and themselves
regularly denounced. This treatment has been meted out to an illustrious roster of names
including Charles Robert Ageron, Jean-Luc Einaudi, Raphaëlle Branche, Sylvie Thénault,
Claude Liauzu and Claire Mauss-Copeaux whose book, Appelés en Algérie: la parole
confisquée, Véritas judged had ‘probablement sorti tout droit d’une imagination fallacieuse
mais fertile’.327 One historian stands out however, as attracting the bulk of pied-noir
opprobrium: Benjamin Stora. Although an eminent scholar in the eyes of most people, to the
pieds-noirs Stora is a ‘pseudo-intellectuel qui déforme à plaisir la vérité historique à travers le
prisme de sa mauvaise foi’.328 As a fellow son of Algeria, pied-noir activists had high
expectations that Stora would prove a valuable ally in their quest to legitimate their particular
reading of the French presence in Algeria.329 However, these hopes have gone unfulfilled, as
Stora has instead taken into account of a range of perspectives in order to create a nuanced
historical picture. Stora’s Algerian roots and high media profile make him an obvious target
for pied-noir associations, but beyond these elements, pied-noir objections to Stora are
grounded more generally in the collision of two very different phenomena: history and
memory. This has a wider significance because it is precisely the competing claims of these
forms of knowledge that the state must attempt to reconcile when deciding how to understand
and commemorate France’s colonial past.
326 Georges Bosc, ‘Une Américaine à Narbonne’, L’Algérianiste, 46 (June 1989), 129; Andrea L.
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As far as Stora is concerned, a historian is someone who ‘cherche à expliquer
l’événement’ and who ‘se situe dans une logique de rationalité, de distance critique’.330
Although he is aware that the historian ‘n’est pas au-dessus de la mêlée’ and has never denied
his own engagé status, Stora nonetheless understands the historian’s role as ‘entendre la
parole des autres’, engaging in research and dialogue in order to restore the past in its full
complexity.331 When asked how criticisms from the pieds-noirs, including branding him a
‘spécialiste trotskyste de la désinformation’, affect him, Stora replied: ‘Cela m’affecte
d’autant plus que je m’efforce de restituer l’histoire avec rigeur et honnêté intellectuelle, sans
céder sur des principes non négociables comme la défense des Droits de l’homme ou la
condemnation du système colonial’.332 Historical knowledge for Stora is not only something
he values highly, but also something that exists on a clearly defined plane, separate from his
personal recollections of Algeria and the war. From his childhood Stora remembers being
fearful of Algerians, but only actually discovering them ‘bien plus tard’ because during the
conflict his quartier was surrounded by barbed wire and closed off. He has also spoken of his
‘anguish’ when the moment came to leave Algeria.333 However, such comments are confined
to non-academic forums, while during historically orientated appearances and interventions,
Stora is always keen to stress that he is present as a professional historian, a detached
commentator, not a personally involved historical actor.
In contrast to Stora, pieds-noirs often find it difficult to distinguish between history
and memory. The description provided by Anne Cazal of her book, Ravin rouge, offers a case
in point. Classifying it as a ‘roman historique’ she goes on to specify ‘Le fondement de mon
ouvrage est, rigoureusement, historique…C’est un témoignage authentique…pour contribuer,
en toute modestie, à sauver une mémoire que l’on dit, à bien juste titre, en péril…’334 Rather
than rigorous intellectual interrogation from a critical distance, pieds-noirs tend to understand
history as experience-based recollection in which authenticity is automatically accorded to
witness testimony. Whereas Stora argues that ‘la mémoire constitute l’objet d’étude sur lequel
porte la réfléxion historique’, pieds-noirs take the opposite view that memory is the source of
all history. They therefore place a greater store in personal accounts than in archives,
believing that ‘ceux qui n’ont pas vécu cette Algérie complexe ne peuvent se la repésenter
vraiment’.335 This is not merely the sign of a healthy degree of scepticism towards archives,
since if an official source can be found that supports a pied-noir reading of an event then this
is held to be sacrosanct and no alternative piece of evidence, whatever its origin, is considered
330 ‘Désinformation’, PNM, 66 (March 1996), 8; Stora and Leclère, La guerre, pp.89-91.
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sufficiently compelling to undermine this.336 The pied-noir community have also established
pseudo-historical institutes specifically to challenge professional academic accounts and
institutions, notably the Centre des etudes pied-noir (CEPN) in Nice and the Centre de
documentation historique sur l’Algérie (CDHA) in Aix-en-Provence, which is also the home
of the Centre des archives d’Outre-Mer (CAOM). Outlining its raison d’être, the CDHA
noted that ‘L’histoire n’est pas écrite par les vaincus…il ne faut certes pas compter sur
d’autres que nous pour reconstituer ce climat [de l’Algérie française]’.337
When academics, or indeed anyone, cites material in support of an alternative
interpretation of the past, this is regarded by pied-noirs not as part of the natural process of
advancing historical knowledge, but a personally motivated attack on them and their
memories. The obituary for Claude Liauzu offered by the Cercle Algérianiste, for example,
described him as the ‘Adversaire acharné de toute expression de la mémoire et des
souffrances des pieds-noirs’.338 Such comments stem from the feeling that academic discourse
constitutes a form of violation because it strips the pied-noir experience of ‘sa singularité
emotionelle’ by reducing deolonisation to a subject like any other. As Stora rightly concludes,
pieds-noirs ‘ne veulent pas que les souffrances soient noyées dans un ocean de notes en bas
de pages’.339
It is not the case that Stora, or indeed any historian of this period, is seeking to deny a
place to the pieds-noirs’ memories, but rather to stress that this place is as one source among
many that need to be consulted in order to reconstruct a fuller picture of the past. However,
the idea that memory is not equivalent to history is anathema to many pied-noir associations
who have based much of their lexicon on precisely such an equation. This conflation of
history and memory is indicative of a wider trend that has seen the status of testimony
elevated from being ‘un pis-aller à départ d’archives’, to a source ‘à part entière’.340 First
hand accounts are increasingly seen as a vital component of contemporary history, offering
insights into aspects of the past that would otherwise remain unknown. This heightened
respect for bearing witness, which has its antecedents in the legacy of the Second World War
and the Holocaust, has been given a further impetus by the growth in popularity of oral
history. Together these have produced a greater willingness amongst people to divulge their
experiences to historians, helping to create a virtuous circle of testimony. These paroles,
particularly when disseminated through the mass media, also appeal because they appear to
democratise and enhance the accessibility of the past; the words of an anonymous bystander
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used in this manner as will be discussed in Chapter 7.
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being regarded as equally valuable as those of a statesman. All these developments have
enriched and broadened history immensely. However, in the hands of certain pied-noir
groups, being an eyewitness has become the ultimate, and indeed only, criteria of historical
authenticity. As such, it is less a tool through which to explore the past and more a weapon
used to exclude alternative sources and interpretations:
Nous sommes des témoins. Des témoins vivants, bien souvent oculaires, et à ce titre,
nous représentons une source d’information autrement plus importante pour ceux qui
veulent objectivement écrire l’Histoire que les Archives qu’ils sont, de plus en plus
autorisés à compulser. Archives biases, tronquées, faussées par leurs propres auteurs
pour mieux dissimuler leurs crimes!341
In light of such attitudes, it is difficult to support Joëlle Hureau’s contention that the pieds-
noirs want to avoid over-simplifying their history, preferring a version that is ‘ni coupable, ni
innocent, ni odieuse, ni parfaite’.342 Instead, what appears to be happening is closer to the
analysis offered by Antoine Prost whereby ‘Victims are victims only when being in no sense
guilty of complicity in their suffering. Suffering and losses are necessary but not sufficient
conditions for victimhood. Innocence is needed too’.343 This is echoed in Stora’s observation
that ‘la bonne conscience est complète, c’est-à-dire que les pieds-noirs ont le sentiment de
n’avoir rien fait du particulier, de ne pas être responsables pour le particulier’.344 As has
already been mentioned, this may reflect the fact that the community feels forced by what
they see as the entirely black picture painted of them by others to render themselves
completely white in response. When asked how the pieds-noirs and their associations were
perceived by French society, Gérard Rosenzweg of the Cercle Algérianiste replied: ‘Pas
toujours d’une façon très positive – car nous refusons le rôle de “bouc-émissaire” que la
France veut nous faire porter. Nous refusons d’être coupable de tout’.345 The end result is an
increasingly aggressive stance whereby other memory carriers are not engaged with in any
meaningful way, but simply used to strengthen the pied-noir conviction that they are the real
victims.
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‘Faire des procès’
Over the past few decades, pied-noir groups have paid close attention to the evolution of
public discussions and commemoration of the Vichy period, appearing to regard this as a
model in terms of both strategy and end result. This is especially apparent in the recent drive
by associations to attain judicial legitimation for their interpretation of the past. Oliver Lalieu
traces this back to the 1987 trial of Klaus Barbie, which revealed ‘la légitimité plusieurs
années après les faits invoqués d’en demander réparation et d’en tirer les leçons’; what today
we would classify as a devoir de mémoire.346 Although existing legislation relating to crimes
contre l‘humanité and crimes de guerre was formulated precisely so that events in Algeria
could not be brought under the legal spotlight at a later date, not least because of the series of
amnesty laws passed during the 1960s and 1970s, this has not deterred the pieds-noirs, nor
indeed other groups connected to the war.347 In 1997, for example, Véritas spearheaded a suit
against General Joseph Katz accusing him of crimes against humanity for his role on 5 July
1962 in Oran. While calls for this kind of legal action to be undertaken were not new, the
commemorative climate in France at this time was influential in solidifying general demands
into concrete action. As Véritas’ chief lawyer, René Blanchot, explained: ‘A l’heure où l’on
parle de plus en plus de la Mémoire et de l’Histoire de l’oeuvre française en Algérie qu’il faut
réhabiliter, comment ne pas remplir ce devoir de vérité que nous devons assurer devant
l’Eternel et pour l’honneur de la France?’348 Véritas was clearly inspired by the Papon trial
that was unfolding concurrently and numerous references were made in subsequent coverage
of the ongoing legal process. In particular, the success of that trial in obtaining a conviction
against the former Bordeaux préfet was regarded as a positive omen.349
Unfortunately for Véritas, on 21 January 2000 a judge ruled that the deaths in Oran
came under the rubric of ‘arrestations illégales suivies de tortures et d’assassinats’ and were
thus subject to the statute of limitations which had expired. Véritas launched an appeal, but
Katz died before this could be heard; he was ninety-three. ‘Nous ne pouvons que regretter’
wrote Hattan Pacha, ‘qu’il n’ait pas vécu centenaire pour faire face aux familles des
victimes’, although AOCAZ’s president seemed satisfied that ‘Sans doute a-t-il été accueilli
en enfer par de Gaulle et grillent-ils ensemble pour expier leurs crimes’.350 Hattab Pacha
subtitled his editorial ‘Le boucher d’Oran devant la tribunale divan mais l’action civile n’est
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93.
347 The use of the judicial system by harki activists will be analysed in Chapter 6.
348 René Blanchot, ‘Le crime de genocide commis par Joseph Katz, le boucher d’Oran’, LV, 16
(October 1997), 10.
349 René Blanchot, ‘Katz, le boucher d’Oran’, LV, 22 (April 1998), 6.
350 Joseph Hattab Pacha, ‘Le mot du Président’, LV, 51 (March 2001), 2; Geneviève de Ternant,
‘Tolérance zéro’, EO, 274 (May-June 2001), 1.
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pas éteinte’, suggesting that further lawsuits would follow. This reflects a broader mentality
whereby pied-noir associations and their members feel entitled to the same judicial
recognition and legitimation that they perceive the Jewish population have obtained with
respect to Vichy:
Le sang d’un Français d’Algérie compte autant que le sang d’un Français de
métropole d’origine israélite. Le drame de la Shoah fut épouvantable et nous
bouleverse profondément mais dans l’Histoire, avec le sang de nos compatriots, il est
écrit d’autres crimes contre l’humanité qui ne peuvent ni ne doivent être occultés ou
oubliés.351
Branche and Savarese both regard this development as connected to the wider problem of
linking knowledge with recognition, which causes truth and justice to become intertwined and
all roads to lead to the courtroom.352 Attempting to formulate a historical narrative through
the statute books is the ultimate expression of the omnipresent pied-noir desire to establish
one definitive version of the past, theirs. Regarding the national historical narrative as either
too rigid, or too fragile to support multiple, potentially discordant representations,
associations have adopted a series of strategies to drown out competing voices. However,
none of these offer the finality that a judicial ruling in their favour augurs. As Savarese has
highlighted, such a situation would mean that ‘Quand il y aura des mensonges qui mettent en
cause la communauté, on pourra faire des procès’.353 Hence the future, as predicted by
Véritas, is likely to include many further lawsuits similar to that launched against Katz,
despite the fact that the outcome of the Papon trial, in historical terms, has not brought to
fruition the conclusive univocal inscription of the Vichy years that the pieds-noirs so ardently
seek for themselves and their history.
On 23 February 2005, however, an unparalleled opportunity to give legal sanctity to a
positive evaluation of France’s colonial past presented itself with the passing of Loi 2005-
158. In addition to expressing the recognition of the nation to those men and women ‘qui ont
participé à l’oeuvre accomplie par la France’ in her former colonies and providing further
indemnification allocations for pieds-noirs and harkis, Article 4 of the law stipulated that
school curricula ‘reconnaissent en particulier le rôle positif de la presence française outre-
351 Anne Cazal, ‘Dernier munite: Procès Katz’, LV, 40 (February 2000), 11.
352 Branche, La guerre d’Algérie, p.13; Éric Savarese, Algérie, la guerre des mémoires, (Paris, 2007),
p.147.
353 Savarese, Algérie, p.147.
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mer, notamment en Afrique du Nord’.354 This single clause not only encapsulated the ethos of
the pied-noir lexicon but promised to promote it across the education system, the jewel in the
crown as far as associations were concerned in their battle to secure influence over the official
historical narrative. Even though many felt it could have gone further in areas such as
financial provision and the assignation of responsibility for the ‘mistakes’ committed during
the War of Independence, the law was nonetheless welcomed by associations as ‘une étape
importante’.355 In contrast to the current situation where children were taught a distorted
version of history through ‘une mainmise d’appareils qu’on peut qualifier de “proche du
marxisme-léninisme”’ by teachers who were ‘eux-mêmes imprégnés de ces théories’, pieds-
noirs hoped that the record would now be set straight.356
Unfortunately, what the pieds-noirs regarded as a long-overdue correction was
perceived by others as the unacceptable imposition of a unilateral official history and an
affront to the neutrality of the educational establishment. A range of groups, comprising
scholars, schoolteachers, trade unionists, politicians, and representatives from various
‘immigrant’ communities, mobilised to protest against this particular clause. However, having
lobbied hard to get the measure onto the statute books, pieds-noirs and their allies were
equally determined to protect Article 4.357 In the ensuing months, bitter words were
exchanged between supporters of the law, or ‘groupes de pression nostalgiques du
colonialisme et revanchards’, and opponents, or ‘des gaullo-gauchstes’ and ‘des négationistes
repentants’, until Chirac took the unusual step in January 2006 of using his presidential veto
to rescind Article 4 in order, he stated, to ‘apaiser les esprits’.358 The pieds-noirs interpreted
his decision not as an attempt to achieve national reconciliation, but as another example of the
discrimination to which they and their history were regularly subjected. Defending Article 4,
an ANFANOMA representative wrote, ‘Précisions que, dans notre esprit, il n’est nullement
question de revanche mesquine, mais simplement de justice et d’équité’.359 Extending this
position, associations made the argument that Article 4 did not represent the infliction of a
unilateral interpretation of history on the grounds that ‘Absolument rien dans la loi
354 For the full text of the law see
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000444898&dateTexte [18
December 2008]
355 Yves Sainsot, ‘Une loi en demi-teinte’, FH, 458-459 (February 2005), 1.
356 Dimech, La désinformation, p.27.
357 Proposed by right-wing deputy Christian Vanneste, the law was lobbied for by 57 deputies from
various parties who collectively constituted the Groupe d’Etudes sur les Rapatriés. For further details
on the law and the profile of its advocates see Peter Dunwoodie, ‘Postface: History, Memory and
Identity – Today’s Crisis, Yesterday’s Issue’, French History, 20.3 (September 2006), 319.
358 www.ldh-toulon.net/spip.php?article1058 [18 December 2008]; Jean-Yves Faberon, ‘La loi du 23
février 2005’, L’Algérianiste, 112 (December 2005), 13; Pierre Cattin, ‘Le pesanteur de la
désinformation’, LV, 96 (October 2005), 4.
359 Nicole Ferrandis-Delvarre, ‘Demande à l’abrogation de l’alinéa 2 de la loi Taubira’, FH, 469-470
(April-May 2006), 16.
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n’empêche les chercheurs d’étudier tous les aspects de la présence française outre-mer’, it
would simply ‘rétablir l’équilibre’.360 Therefore, in the eyes of the pieds-noirs it was those
who opposed the law that threatened intellectual neutrality and liberty. Associations thus
denounced those who ‘par dogmatisme, refusent l’oeuvre positive de la France en Algérie
alors que les preuves abondent’ and the hypocrisy of historians who ‘ont imposé leur propre
loi, non écrite celle-là, ainsi qu’une vision hémiplégique de l’histoire qui consiste à ne
présenter colonisation que comme une succession d’abominations’.361
Loi 2005-158 brought the pieds-noirs closer than ever before to obtaining national
legitimation for their historical understanding. Although their aspirations were ultimately
frustrated, producing great bitterness directed at multiple familiar sources from Stora to
Bouteflika, the whole process seems to have galvanised and further radicalised the
community.362 This is evident in the formation of the Coordination nationale des Français
d’Algérie (CNFA), a new pied-noir attempt at federation, and in the increased attention this
body, but also existing associations, have been directing at the twin themes of immigration
and Islam. The 2005 banlieue riots, the Mohammed cartoon affair, and even the film
Indigènes have all garnered substantial column inches and invective largely revolving around
the favourable treatment pieds-noirs see being accorded to the minorities in question, in
contrast to what they regard as their own recent rejection by the French nation and its
leaders.363
‘Touristes ingrats’
Many of the trends outlined above find expression in the evolving presentation of Algeria and
Algerians offered through pied-noir associations. It therefore seems appropriate to conclude
this chapter with a case-study examination of the relationship between these two groups,
especially given that a similar analysis will be provided concerning the harki community and
360 Faberon, ‘La loi’, 6; ‘As before’, FH, 460-461 (April 2005), 4. Although it is notable that what
these negative attributes might be is never specified in contrast to the detailed expositions of the
positive contributions made by France.
361 ‘Colonisation’, PNM 137 (January 2006), 12. Stora’s opposition to loi 2005-158 earned him
condemnation on similar grounds from the pied-noir community who deemed him the epitome of ‘une
pensée historique à sens unique’, a slur that prompted Stora to take the unusual step of defending his
reputation in print, writing in Le Monde: ‘Professeur des universitaires depuis de longues années en
France et à l’étranger, j’ai toujours travaillé dans un souci de rigeur scientifique…’. Benjamin Stora,
‘Au courier des lecteurs: Souci de rigeur’, Le Monde, 3 February 2006
362 Bouteflika’s denunciations of the law, in combination with his comments regarding Sétif and gas
ovens, colonialism and genocide, harkis and collaboration, made him the focus of much pied-noir
anger, especially after January 2006. Véritas was not the only association to ascribe Chirac’s veto to
pressure from Algeria, although they were unique in demanding that the ‘dictature chiraquienne’ acting
‘aux ordres du FLN’ be indicted for treason on this basis. Joseph Hattab-Pacha, ‘Démocratie
adieu…Dictature bonjour!’, LV, 100 (February 2006), 2
363 For a flavour of these polemics see issues 128, 138, 141, 142 and 144 of PNM.
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their interaction with the pied-noir population. It would seem that in 1962, new borders were
drawn not only on maps, but also between peoples. Thus in contrast to the harmonious pre-
war melting pot of religions, ethnicities, and cultures, contemporary Algeria and its
inhabitants are viewed by pieds-noirs as irrevocably ‘Other’ and depicted in overwhelmingly
negative terms.364 Whereas harkis are classed as patriots and fellow rapatriés who represent
the true soul of French Algeria, Algerians are equated to terrorists who irrevocably damaged
France by waging a seditious guerrilla war that resulted in the amputation of these precious
départements. Nowhere is the legitimacy of the Algerian people’s desire for independence
acknowledged. Instead, the pied-noir focus remains resolutely on what they regard as acts of
unprovoked violence perpetrated against them during the war.
Symptomatic of this is their reading of events in Paris on 17 October 1961. The
official silence in the wake of this massacre, combined with an acceleration of violence,
particularly in France, as the war drew to a close, including the death of nine Communists
during an anti-OAS protest at the Charonne métro station on 8 February 1962, meant that 17
October 1961 largely disappeared from French public consciousness until the late 1990s. Its
return to prominence has been largely due to the various unresolved controversies
surrounding the night that continue to generate considerable and often acrimonious debate,
including where responsibility for the violence lay and the exact numbers killed.365 Now a
commemorative touchstone for the France-based Algerian community that attracts significant
media coverage, this night has also been the subject of a range of gestes officiels from the
French state, including a plaque dedicated ‘à la mémoire de nombreux Algériens tués lors de
la sanglante répression de la manifestation pacifique du 17 octobre 1961’ unveiled on the
Pont Saint Michel to mark the thirtieth anniversary.366 For pied-noir associations however,
such attention represents a commemorative imbalance indicative of a wider pattern whereby
the French government falls over itself to recognise the loss of life of subversive militants,
while deliberately ignoring the deaths of thousands of patriotic Frenchmen and women in
Algeria, including harkis. The argument of groups such as Véritas is that those who marched
364 The irony being that it was precisely the refusal to admit that Algeria was different to France that
lay at the root of the repeated attempts to deny Algerian independence.
365 For further information on both the demonstration and its legacies see Jim House and Neil
MacMaster, Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror and Memory, (Oxford, 2006); Jean-Luc Einaudi, La
bataille de Paris: 17 octobre 1961, (Paris, 1991); Jean-Paul Brunet, Police contre le FLN: le drame
d’octobre 1961, (Paris, 1999); Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, Le 17 octobre 1961 - Un crime d’État à
Paris, (Paris, 2001).
366 However, even this very public gesture has it limits, particularly in the positioning of the plaque
relative to the police headquarters and the lack of historical context and responsibility indicated by the
wording. For further discussion of commemoration of 17 October 1961 see Joshua Cole,
‘Remembering the Battle of Paris: 17 October 1961 in French and Algerian Memory’, French Politics,
Culture and Society, 21.3 (2003), 21-31; Brigitte Gaïti, ‘Les ratés de l’histoire: une manifestation sans
suites: le 17 octobre 1961 à Paris’, Sociétés Contemporaines, 20 (December 1994), 11-37; Brigitte
Jelen, ’17 October 1961 – 17 Ocotber 2001 Une commemoration ambigue’, French Politics, Culture
and Society, 20.1 (2002), 30-45.
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into the centre of Paris on 17 October were not peaceful civilians, but armed and dangerous
enemies of the state. Therefore, not only was the actual loss of life far below what Jean Luc
Einaudi claimed in his ‘livre marxiste’, but those deaths were entirely justified as part of a
necessary law and order exercise against the FLN, a ‘groupuscule terroriste en guerre contre
la France’.367 Victim status is thus denied to the Algerians on the basis of their assumed
political sympathies and is instead transferred to the harkis of Papon’s FPA who, it is
claimed, were fired upon first and who only at that point responded by bravely defending the
nation’s capital, indeed their nation’s capital, as they had done in preceding weeks and
months. Rallying against the practice of ‘canaliser les terroristes’, a counter-demonstration
was thus organised by pied-noir associations to coincide with the unveiling of the Pont Saint
Michel memorial. Singing ‘C’est nous les Africains’ and shouting slogans such as ‘FLN
assassins’ and ‘Où sont nos disparus?’, pied-noir protestors demanded recognition for all
FLN victims in France. To this end an alternative plaque was proposed:
À la mémoire des victimes françaises du FLN
De 1956 à 1962 en métropole
112 civils européens tués
597 civils européens blessés
50 policiers et militaires tués
396 policiers et militaires blessés.368
The similarities between 17 October 1961 and 26 March 1962 are striking: a
peaceful, unarmed crowd protesting against the imposition of harsh restrictions on their
movements is greeted with a disproportionate show of force by the French state and, as a
result, many innocent civilians lose their lives. The event is then deliberately hushed up from
on high creating a devoir de mémoire incumbent upon those who survived to make the truth
about what happened known. Apart from the time of day, the following passage could equally
have come from an account of the Battle of Paris: ‘En ce beau lundi ensoleillé, une foule
calme, digne où l’on sent passer le frisson de l’émotion, descend drapeaux en tête…Personne
n’est armé, sinon de grebes des fleurs et de drapeaux’.369 Yet as far as pied-noir associations
are concerned the different status of the ‘victims’ imbues the two occasions with entirely
opposite meanings.
367 As with most declared pied-noir enemies, Einaudi is tarred with the brush of left-wing leanings. His
character is further tainted by his association with Pierre Vidal Naquet, François Maspéro, Marcel Péju
and ‘toute l’équipe marxiste du Paris intellectuel’. Pierre Catin, ‘Le prétendu ‘massacre’ des Algériens
à Paris, le 17 octobre 1961’, LV, 106 (October 2006), 4.
368 Nicole Ferrandis-Delaurre, ‘Le 17 octobre dernier à Paris’, FH, 425-6 (September-October 2001),
10
369 ‘La tragédie du 26 mars 1962. La rue d’Isly’, PNM, 13 (March 1991), 26.
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In addition to events during the war itself, the troubled state of independent Algeria is
used by pieds-noirs to further justify their opposition to the end of the French empire. The
argument that decolonisation has been, on balance, a complete failure, has been advanced
consistently since 1962 in a range of guises. With respect to Algeria specifically, the rise of
the Front islamique du salut (FIS), the extreme instability of the late 1990s and the large
numbers of Algerians who continue to cross the Mediterranean in search of better prospects
have only increased the pieds-noirs’ certainty that their beloved country should never have
been delivered into the incompetent and extremist hands of the FLN.370 In light of this, the
fact that Algerians are welcomed onto French soil when the terre of the pieds-noirs is
forbidden to them rankles greatly. If the pieds-noirs can no longer live in Algeria, then they
see no reason why Algerians, these ‘touristes ingrats’, should be allowed to live in France,
especially when the ‘parasitic’ nature of this immigrant presence is contrasted to the way in
which the pied-noir community re-established themselves in the 1960s through their own
hard work and in spite of a lack of governmental support.371 As Francette Mendosa
indignantly reminded her readers:
Sommes-nous devenus pour cela des déliquants? Non.
Avons-nous eu des associations carriatives pour nous épauler? Non
Avons-nous créé des marchés souterrains pour survivre? Non
Avons-nous brulé des voitures?
Avons-nous attaqué la police? NON
Nous avons retroussé nos manches dans le but de nous en sortir, face à une partie de
la population hostile à notre égard.372
These comments also highlight how developments such as the rise of the far right and the
anti-racism movement of the 1980s have filtered into the rhetoric of pied-noir associations,
producing an argument whereby the real victims of racism are identified not as immigrants
and their descendants, but the pieds-noirs. ‘Effectivement, le RACISME a commencé en
1962’ noted Mendosa, but this passed unnoticed because such discrimination is ‘une priorité
frénétique’ except when ‘les victimes sont des Chrétiens et des Blancs’.373
370 Among the innumerable articles advancing this view, a particularly good example is Michel
Sanchez, ‘Refléxion: Décolonisations bâclées: Histoire ou actualité?’, PNM, 22 (January 1992), 26.
This is however not an argument confined to either the pied-noir community, or to Algeria. As Flood
and Frey point out, those with far right leanings have frequently assuaged their bitterness over the loss
of the French Empire by deriving a perverse gratification from the decline in fortunes suffered by the
independent territories, seeing in this vindication of their original stance. Flood and Frey, ‘Defending
the Empire’, p.204.
371 Francette Mendosa, ‘Editorial’, EA, 72 (March 2001), 3.
372 Francette Mendosa, ‘Editorial’, EA, 91 (December 2003), 3. Emphasis in the original.
373 Francette Mendosa, ‘Le mot de la Présidente’, EA, 44 (December 1993), 3.
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Although Mendosa is correct in seeing 1962 as an important turning point regarding
the importation of new strands of racism into France, she incorrectly identifies the targets and
the carriers. When discussing the pre-war era, associations are always quick to bring up
personal anecdotes of interaction and friendship with specific Algerians as proof of l’Algérie
fraternelle. However, these images co-exist with essentialist and highly stereotyped collective
depictions of ‘Arabs’. Éric Savarese describes it as ‘le tragique d’une situation où les Arabes
constituent, comme communauté, une menace contre la paix civile, tandis qu’individuelement
ils sont insérés au quotidian chaleureux de chaque français d’Algérie’.374 In commentary on
the post-war period the position of the ‘bons Arabes’ is filled by the harkis, leaving all other
Algerians, indeed ‘Arabs’ in general, as part of the ‘sale race’.375 What all these designations
attest to is the persistence of a particular mentality that was transported from the colony to the
mainland with the pieds-noirs. The development of anti-Maghrebin racism in France in the
post-colonial period can therefore be viewed as an extension of colonial racism and thus as a
‘sequel’ to the wars of decolonisation, offering ‘nostalgiques’ the opportunity to ‘reproduire
le combat pour la même cause dans d’autres circonstances’.376 Bitterness over the outcome of
the war is thus redirected, manifesting itself as hostility towards North Africans in France.
The presence of immigrants in France fills these people with a ‘nostalgic hate’ writes Tahar
Ben Jelloun, ‘For them, attacking an Arabe is an indirect expression of the unassuaged grief
they feel for the loss of “l’Algerie française”’.377 Evidence to support this contention is not
hard to find with columns in PNM decrying the situation in France whereby ‘la nation arabe
revendique et obtient une justice à son goût: polygamie, abbatage rituel, groupes islamistes se
developpent au rythme de la forte nationalité dans des communautés’.378 Some associations
even go so far as to claim that the change in migratory patterns, from temporary stints
completed by single men on a rotational basis to permanent family-based settlement,
represents ‘colonisation à rebours’; that is, a deliberate attempt to culturally overwhelm
France in revenge for the past.379 Véritas certainly perceives the continued arrival of
Algerians as an ‘envahissement’ by ‘une immigration nuisible qui croit que tout lui est dû
ici’.380
374 Savarese, La guerre, p.119.
375 This has been particularly the case in the post 9/11 period when the ‘War on Terror’ has caused
‘Arabs’ to mutate into ‘Islamists’ in many pied-noir associations and journals. The content of PNM,
especially once it resumed publication in 2003 after a hiatus of several years, explicitly reflects this
trend, a fuller discussion of which is unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis.
376 Yvan Gastaut, ‘Le racisme anti-maghrébin et les séquelles de la guerre d’Algérie’, H&M, 1174
(March 1991), 35.
377 Tahar Ben Jelloun, French Hospitality: Racism and North African Immigrants, (New York, 1999),
p.45.
378 Jacky Pons, ‘Tribune libre: La France prise en otage’, PNM, 54 (February 1995), 6.
379 Flood and Frey, ‘Defending the Empire’, p.205.
380 Joseph Hattab Pacha, ‘Le mot du Président’, LV, 7 (November 1996), 2.
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Nurtured in the supportive environment of the associational milieu, these beliefs have
remained insulated from evolutions in intellectual and popular debates concerning the French
empire. Essentially having never been decolonised, the pieds-noirs remain wedded to a
perception of French Algeria that owes more to Fourth Republic propaganda than to reality.
They are thus trapped in what Bancel, Blanchard, and Vergès identify as the ‘consensus
colonial’ established in the inter-war period, which they claim was based upon ‘une
déréalisation presque complete de l’acte [de colonisation] et la pratique’. This ‘fiction’ was
especially powerful because it functioned as ‘le miroir d’une situation désirée pour la
métropole elle-même’.381 The contemporary end result is that the pied-noir community are
increasingly at odds with mainstream sensibilities. This is evident not only in the continued
promotion by associations of the benefits of the French presence overseas, but also in their
dismissal of current attitudes to colonisation as overly determined by a false sense of guilt
stemming from what they regard as the dominance of left-wing political correctness. The
suppression of Article 4 was thus framed as an example of the ‘mea culpa pérpetuel’ and
‘l’autoflagellation permanente’.382 Indeed, the Cercle Algérianiste found it ‘idiot’ that French
schools were inculcating ‘le sentiment de culpabilité’ in children by depicting ‘leur pays
commes systématiquement responsable de spoliation, de torture et d’humiliation en Algérie’,
while at the same time allowing ‘jeunes immigrés’ to acquire ‘la conviction qu’ils avaient une
revanche à prendre sur la France pour ce qu’elle avait fait endurer à leurs parents’.383
As in all instances where pied-noir associations feel themselves and their history to
be under attack, their response to the repentance debate has been to defend more rigorously
their own position, which in reality means denying in more absolute terms all contrary
viewpoints. To this end, during the 2003 ‘année de l’Algérie en France’, a petition signed by
all the major pied-noir associations including the Cercle Algérianiste, ANFANOMA,
RECOURS and Véritas, stated that while in principle the signatories ‘ne sont pas hostiles à
l’établissement de relations apaisées avec l’Algérie’, in practice certain conditions first
needed to be met; namely free circulation for harkis and acknowledgement by the FLN of
their responsibility for the ‘masscares’ after 19 March 1962. Yet the associations were
adamant in their ‘opposition la plus ferme à toute forme d’expression d’une quelconque
repentance au nom de la France’ on the grounds that France had nothing to apologise for,
having brought only beneficial change to Algeria.384 Such intractability can only serve to
exacerbate the gap between the pieds-noirs and the rest of French society. Indeed, Stora has
381 Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard and Françoise Vèrges, La République coloniale: essai sur une
utopie, (Paris, 2003), p.110.
382 Jean-Marc Lopez, ‘Qu-est-ce-que la vérité historique?’, PNM, 137 (January 2006), 11;
‘Colonisation’, PNM 137 (January 2006), 12.
383 Évelyne Joyaux, ‘Des jeux mortels’, L’Algérianiste, 113 (March 2006), 6.
384 ‘Cette amitie qui resemble à la haine’, FH, 466-467 (November-December 2005), 9.
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noted that theirs ‘is a memory which is hardening because it is disappearing and is no longer
shared by the population as a whole’, which risks leaving the community increasingly isolated
within a historical orbit with fewer and fewer points of anchorage in the national historical
narrative.385 Given that this is clearly where pieds-noirs would like to see their past inscribed,
the conclusion seems unavoidable that although they have modified their tactics in light of the
memory wars climate, this has not ultimately brought them any closer to victory. However,
this situation is not attributable to external factors alone, internal characteristics specific to the




In contrast to the view of Rosemary Averell Manes that ‘each Pieds-Noirs association
operates as a largely autonomous entity’, the evidence presented thus far suggests that
although each association has its own unique constituency, they do not operate in isolation.386
Instead, they form a dense network whose relations, so their spokespeople claim, are
characterised by principles of mutual assistance and support that replicate the close communal
ties of French Algeria. Advertising space is thus regularly devoted to other groups and events,
while cross-fertilisation is further indicated through joint ventures, such as rassemblements,
and by the existence of a common pool of contributors and contributions. Beyond the
tendency to quote from the same canon of writers and their works, including Robert Randau,
Jean Brune, and Albert Camus, one finds prominent activists like Jo Sohet, Pierre Goinard,
Geneviève de Ternant, and Anne Cazal moving between publications, often having the same
articles printed in a range of journals. Finally, skimming the ‘Générqiue’ section of the
production notes for pied-noir dedicated debates reveals a consistent core cast including
Jacques Roseau of RECOURS, Bernard Coll of Jeune pied-noir (JPN) and Christian
Schembre originally of the Mouvement pied-noir deuxième génération and today leader of the
Parti pied-noir (PPN). This interconnectedness is not a mere coincidence, but rather
something that has been actively promoted from the outset. The first edition of L’Algérianiste
opened with the declaration: ‘Nous voulons affirmer notre identité, vivre comme nous
l’entendons, fiers de notre passé et forts de nos liens fraternelles’, while an early issue of
385 Le Monde, 6 July 2005, cited in Dunwoodie, ‘Postface’, 322.
386 Rosemary Averell Manes, The Pieds-Noirs 1960-2000: A Case Study in the Persistence of
Subcultural Distinctiveness, (Bethesda, MD, 2005), p.111.
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L’écho d’Oran placed a similar stress on the twin themes of ‘solidarité’ and ‘amitié’,
reminding readers of the proverb:
Un pays battu, s’il se divise, est un pays qui meurt.
Un pays battu, s’il sait s’unir, est un pays qui renaît.387
Constant vigilance was deemed necessary since there were plenty of people outside the
community who would seek to sow disunity for their own gains. Putting minor disagreements
over race, religion, or ideology aside for the greater good of the community was presented as
the only way to guarantee that the population would manage to survive as a collective entity
and give their demands for recognition and recompense the best chance of obtaining
satisfaction. When faced with a perceived external enemy, pieds-noirs seem naturally to
adhere to this precept, instinctively banding together to defend themselves and their
patrimony. For example, in spite of the tensions between their associations and styles of
activism, Roseau and Bernard Coll joined forces to defend Roland Di Constanzo of the Union
syndicale de défense des intérêts français repliés d’Algérie (USDIFRA), a group neither was
well-disposed to, after he embarked upon an offensive and highly embarrassing denunciation
of all pied-noir associations other than his own during an episode of the discussion show Ciel
mon mardi.388 An on-camera defence of Di Constanzo was offered by Roseau and Coll who
justified his anger as an inevitable consequence of the lack of opportunities afforded to pieds-
noirs by the media to present their case. This was followed by a double-page autopsy
conducted by PNM in which Roseau and Coll reiterated their support for ‘notre ami’ Roland
whose ‘émouvante and puissante intervention’ had enabled the pied-noir community to
‘donner une image plus forte, plus solidaire et encore plus puissante de celle-ci’.389 Such
displays of solidarity are regarded as particularly important given the désinformation to which
pieds-noirs are regularly subjected. Irreproachability is similarly valued with Maurice
Calmein stressing that ‘Notre comportement doit être aussi digne que ferme et prouver que,
pour nous, des valeurs morales comme le sens de l’honneur, de la fraternité demeurent
primordiales’.390 Acknowledging, however, that no community is perfect, strategies were
proposed for dealing with the occasional ‘brebis galeuses’ whose behaviour risked ‘de porter
atteinte à l’ensemble des siens’.391 Self-policing was thus advocated to bring any rogue
elements back into line before they could tarnish the image projected to the outside world.
387 Maurice Calmein, ‘L’Algérianisme an V’, L’Algérianiste, 1, (15 December 1977), 3; ‘Éditorial’,
EO, 10 (May 1965), 1.
388 ‘Arlette Laguiller’, Ciel mon mardi, 4 June 1991 (Channel 3).
389 Ibid; ‘Les pieds-noirs Dechavanne sur TF1’, PNM, 17 (July-August 1991), 46.
390 Maurice Calmein, ‘Éditorial: L’union avant tout’, L’Algérianiste, 12 (15 December 1980), 5.
391 Ibid. 3.
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Beyond the ‘band of brothers’ rhetoric, however, unity has proven elusive, certainly
in terms of creating a single organisation accepted as representing the entire community.
Although pieds-noirs recognise that they would be more powerful if combined into a single
block, to date all unifying initiatives have failed. As one association president wrote, ‘Il y’a
bien longtemps que les trop nombreux capitaines de nos innombrable navires ont cessé
d’avoir une quelconque influence sur ce qui aurait pourtant pu être une puissante armada!’392
This lack of success can largely be attributed to the internal rivalries that have plagued the
pied-noir community since 1962. For behind the image of harmonious co-existence, a series
of acrimonious conflicts have taken place over the past, the present, and the future. Although
these pre-date the broader phenomenon of memory wars, the issues and the stakes are
remarkably similar. Pied-noir associations battle both internal and external enemies in order
to secure the right to speak on behalf of the Franco-Algerian past, and to be the only group to
whom that right is accorded. It is believed that attaining such a position will allow them to
ensure that it is their own version of the past which is to the fore and which will ultimately
influence the national historical narrative in their favour. The internal wars concern a much
smaller constituency, the pied-noir population as opposed to the entire French nation, but it is
a more immediate and tangible collective, one whose commitment is overtly demonstrated
through association adherence, journal subscriptions, and attendance at annual gatherings.
Obtaining the allegiance of, or at least the microphone on behalf of, this community is often
seen as the first step in the larger quest to see their historical interpretation prevail nationally.
And, while not explicitly stated, it is also seen as a more realistic goal, at least in the short
term. Although widely acknowledged among pieds-noirs, the French public were unaware of
the tensions simmering beneath the apparently calm and unified surface of this community
until 5 March 1993. On this date, Jacques Roseau of RECOURS was shot and killed by
Gérard Huntz, Jean Claude Lozano and Marcel Navarro, three pied-noirs in their sixties who
were all members of USDIFRA. When initially questioned by police, Huntz proudly situated
his actions as the logical continuation of his former adherence to the OAS stating: ‘je suis un
ancien de l’OAS et je le serais jusqu’à ma mort’. He went on to describe the attack in detail:
‘A hauteur de la vitre du conducteur, j’ai tiré coups de feu rapides. Cela avait une
signification: trois coups de feu comme les trois lettres OAS. J’ai visé la tête’.393 His words
were seized upon by the press who presented them as emblematic of a case that proved what
many had long suspected, for certain people the Algerian War had never ended. The murder
investigation and subsequent trial exposed the pied-noir community to national scrutiny,
publicly highlighting for the first time the deep-seated rivalries embedded in the associational
392 Maurice Calmein, ‘La trève de mars’, L’Algérianiste, 41 (March 1988), 2.
393 Transcript of Huntz’s confession, cited in Emilien Jubineau, L’enigme Roseau: La parole pied-noir
assassinée, (St Georges d’Orques:, 1997), pp.127-130.
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movement. The assassination of Roseau thus serves as a useful prism through which to
explore the internal dynamic of pied-noir activism and the implications of this in terms of the
mobilisation and transmission of the past by associations.
‘L’ultime recours’
Roseau began his activist career during the war mobilising students in defence of French
Algeria. Following brief stints in both the army and the OAS, he was ‘repatriated’ in 1962
where he continued to agitate, now on behalf of the newly exiled settlers, as part of various
groups.394 By 1976, after more than a decade with little in the way of tangible gains to show
for his efforts, Roseau came to the conclusion that the only way to make real progress was to
form a pressure group to lobby at the highest political levels; the Rassemblement et
coordination unitaires des rapatriés et spoilés (RECOURS) was born.395 The association’s
strategy consisted of mobilising pieds-noirs to vote tactically in areas where they were
numerically significant in order to pressure incumbent governments into acceding to their
demands. This concept of the ‘elastic line’ was first put into practice in the 1977 municipal
elections and produced several shock results in the form of majority candidates in the south
losing their seats to the left. Continuing this practice for the next decade and at both ends of
the political spectrum, by the 1986 legislative elections the association had lined up behind
the RPR candidate for Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac. Following Chirac’s election to power,
they were rewarded with a range of favourable measures including the 1987 indemnification
law.396
Achievements such as these greatly raised the profile of Roseau and RECOURS,
leading the press to bestow upon them the accolade ‘voice of the pieds-noirs’.397 Roseau had
managed to make his organisation and himself the point of reference as far as those in power
were concerned. The tributes paid across the political spectrum, from the head of the French
Communist Party to Giscard d’Estaing, in the wake of his assassination testament to the fact
that Roseau enjoyed contacts and influence at the highest levels. Even Chirac commented:
‘J’apprends avec une grande émotion la tragique disparition de Jacques Roseau. Cette
personalité genereuse, profondément dévoué à la cause des rapatriés et des harkis, avait
beaucoup contribué à leur intégration au sein de notre communauté nationale’.398
394 Alongside campaigning, Roseau recounted his family’s history in two books: Le 13e convoi, (Paris,
1987) and Le 113e été, (Paris, 1991).
395 Roseau, Jacques, ‘Interview: J. Roseau L’enfant terrible de la communauté’, PNM, 16 (June 1991),
40.
396 Alain Rollat, ‘La preparation des élections législatives’, Le Monde, 12 February 1993, p.8;
Esclangon-Morin, Les rapatriés, pp.294-302.
397 Droit de réponse, aired 8 November 1986; Rollat, ‘La préparation’, p.8.
398 ‘Assassinat Roseau’, IT1 20 heures, aired 5 March 1993 (Channel 1).
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Although the potential of this kind of selective block voting had long been
recognised, RECOURS were the first to successfully capitalise on it. At first, many within the
pied-noir community welcomed the new organisation, particularly following their early
achievements ‘Je garde la conviction et je ne suis pas le seul si j’en crois les lettres que je
reçois’, wrote one pied-noir activist, ‘que le peu de Justice qu’apporte la loi d’indemnisation
[de 1987], c’est au RECOURS qu’on le doit’.399 This early enthusiasm soon gave way to an
inverse relationship between the profile of RECOURS and its popularity within the pied-noir
community, with Roseau described as someone whose ‘omnipresence médiatique irrite ou
séduit, mais ne laisse pas indifférent’.400 Michel Pittard, one of the original founders of
RECOURS, complained in an open letter to Roseau:
Vous presentez le RECOURS comme la plus importante association de Rapatriés,
Laissez moi en douter! Vous prétendez d’autre part, que le RECOURS est le porte-
parole de la communauté Rapatrié. C’est un abus de confiance! que vous pourriez au
nom de votre association et de vos adhérents, c’est votre droit le plus absolu, mais
vous n’avez aucune autorité pour parler au nom de l’ensemble des Rapatriés.401
Tied into these criticisms were often accusations that RECOURS had become elitist and out
of touch, simply a ‘personal tribune’ for Roseau.402 In proving that it was possible for the
pieds-noirs to have an influential voice and by embodying that voice in themselves,
RECOURS attained a status that many other groups coveted for themselves and resented
anyone else possessing.
‘La porte-serviette de Chirac’
However, it was not just RECOURS’ status that aroused anger, but also their policies. The
association’s most contentious measure was supporting Chirac given his Gaullist associations.
When PNM grilled Roseau on this new political position, he defended it on pragmatic
grounds arguing: ‘Je suis pas du tout gaulliste. Je suis foncièrement anti-gaulliste. …nous
soutenons des candidats ayant le label “ami des rapatriés” et les plus à même d’aider les
399 Marcel Bellier, ‘Deux mois après’, EO, 136 (May 1978), 1.
400 Roseau, ‘Interview’, 40.
401 Michel Pittard, ‘Lettre ouverte à M. Jacques Roseau’, EO, 205 (November-December 1989), 4.
402 René Blanchot, ‘CNSR: L’après Roseau’, PNM, 36 (June-July 1993), 43. Such criticisms were not
confined to the pied-noir community with harki activist Boussad Azni accusing RECOURS of
exploiting the harkis for their own gains. See, Harkis, crime d’État: Généalogie d’un abandon, (Paris,
2002), p.129.
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rapatriés sur le plan parliamentaire ou local…C’était un appel à voter utile’.403 Yet for many
this was an unacceptable ideological compromise and a betrayal of the past, irrespective of
the material benefits it might bring. Denounced for similar historical reasons was Roseau’s
advocacy of co-operation between the pied-noir community and the FLN-dominated Algerian
government in order to aid development and combat the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. For
Roseau, defending the interests of the displaced settlers did not entail renouncing his
attachment to the land from which they had been exiled, nor his desire to see an independent
Algeria prosper; as he told one interviewer, ‘L’amour emporte toujours sur la haine’.404 Such
opinions were not widely shared within the pied-noir community, as Lozano’s comments
indicate: ‘Nous reprochions à Roseau son rapprochement avec l’Algérie et le gouvernement
du FLN, quand je dis ‘nous’, cela veut dire 85% des rapatriés’.405 In sum therefore Roseau
was charged with betraying the pieds-noirs by ‘forgetting’ the past too quickly. As Huntz told
police, ‘Il voulait effacer l’histoire algérienne. Je ne pouvais l’accepter’.406
One of Roseau’s most implacable critics was Eugène Ibagnes of USDIFRA, an
association long noted for its radical views, strong-arm tactics, and murky connections to the
far right. This dislike was, however, mutual with Roseau frequently denouncing the
extremism he believed organisations such as USDIFRA were engendering amongst the pieds-
noirs. The situation of open warfare between the two groups only intensified following the
public début of the Conseil national supérieur des rapatriés (CNSR) in July 1991. Also
headed by Ibagnes, this new attempt to unify the disparate pied-noir associations was
dismissed by Roseau as inconsequential, to which Ibagnes responded that Roseau was simply
‘La porte-serviette de Chirac’.407
In light of this acrimonious history, members of the RECOURS entourage were quick
to point the finger at USDIFRA in 1993, citing in particular Ibagnes’ openly stated ambitions
to become pied-noir spokesperson. However, beyond the membership of the three assassins,
no concrete link was ever proven between USDIFRA and Roseau’s death. The connection
between USDIFRA and the far right proved equally difficult to pin down in any legal sense,
although Ibagnes notoriously welcomed Jean-Marie Le Pen onto his property for a méchoui in
support of the three incarcerated suspects on 23 November 1993. Yet for many commentators
both organisations had Roseau’s blood on their hands; the coincidence of timing between the
403 Roseau, ‘Interview’, 40. In 1993, Roseau turned down an offer to stand as RPR candidate for the
Hérault region on the grounds that he preferred to maintain his autonomy, although there were rumours
at the time of his death that he had accepted an advisory post within Chirac’s government.
404 Interview with Roseau in Maurice Peyrot, ‘Trois anciens de l’OAS comparaissent devant la cour
d’assises de l’Hérault pour le meurtre de Jacques Roseau’, Le Monde, 10 December 1996, p.10.
405 Lozano cited in Jubineau, L’enigme Roseau, p.142.
406 Huntz cited in Ibid. p.127.
407 This exchange was recalled by Ibagnes in the course of his police interview following the
assassination, cited in Ibid, p.89.
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National Front’s first electoral successes in the South and the launch of USDIFRA’s offensive
against Roseau being too striking for commentators to ignore.408
Roseau was very much a thorn in Le Pen’s side due to his consistent public
opposition to the FN, with one journalist describing him as ‘l’obstacle numéro un à la
stratégie du FN vis-à-vis des pieds-noirs’.409 According to former USDIFRA lawyer René
Blanchot the fractures within the pied-noir community developed in tandem with the rise of
the FN. When the FN was weak the pieds-noirs largely ignored Le Pen, preferring to give
their votes to more powerful and established parties, however, as the FN grew in strength they
appeared increasingly attractive to the pieds-noirs.410 In fighting for the attention of the
rapatrié community, Le Pen considered Roseau to be his rival and enemy. Upon hearing of
his death, Le Pen remarked that ‘un crime est un crime et doit être puni mais je n’avais pas
d’estime pour Jacques Roseau’.411 The flip side of the coin was that the growing influence of
the FN threatened to undermine RECOURS’ claim to represent the entire pied-noir
community. In the ensuing battles for the loyalty of the pieds-noirs, the past increasingly
encroached upon the present, re-igniting the embers of bitterness that had continued to
smoulder within certain segments of the community since 1962. Thus for journalist Philippe
Bernard, ‘c’est avec la montée du Front national…que les fantômes de l’OAS et de ses
“soldats perdus” refont véritablement leur apparition dans la vie de Jacques Roseau’.412
‘La dernière victime de la guerre d’Algérie’?
Does this make Roseau, as the press were quick to claim, ‘la dernière victime de la guerre
d’Algérie’?413 Much of the commentary in this vein stemmed from Huntz’s initial confession
which concluded with the defiant assertion: ‘Je tiens à préciser que c’est un acte politique. Je
souhaite que l’OAS continue à vivre pour faire un barrage efficace à l’intégrisme qui menace
la France et ses enfants. Vive la France et l’OAS’.414 Such comments led many to ask why,
thirty years on, ‘la guerre d’Algérie continue dans l’esprit de certains pieds-noirs, nourissant
une haine capable d’abattre un homme?’415 One answer relates to the sudden and traumatic
manner in which Algeria became independent. The settlers believed so absolutely that Algeria
was part of France and were so confident that the might of the French army would prevail
408 Ibid. p.300.
409 Alain Rollat interviewed by Jubineau. Ibid. p.301.
410 Ibid. p.227.
411 ‘Factuel Roseau’, IT1 13 heures, aired 6 March 1993 (Channel 1).
412 Philippe Bernard, ‘Jacques Roseau, de l’OAS à l’OAS’, Le Monde, 9 April 1993, p.1.
413 This was the headline in Le Figaro the day after the announcement that the Roseau case would go to
trial.
414 ‘Procès verbal no. 93/129, 7 avril 1993’ cited in Jubineau, L’enigme Roseau, p.130.
415 Bernard, ‘Jacques Roseau’, p.1.
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over a small band of poorly armed rebels that they simply could not comprehend the eventual
outcome of the war. This, in conjunction with the terror and violence of the final few months
and the subsequent trauma of the exodus, had an immensely destabilising effect upon the
pieds-noirs and their worldview; a shock from which some never recovered. However, others
ascribed more personal motivations to the assassins, suggesting that all three were seeking to
become, in the eyes of their community, the heroes they had failed to be when members of
the OAS.416 All commentaries, however, concurred that here were three individuals whose
lives had stopped in 1962 and never recommenced. Haunted and obsessed by the past, unable
to move forward and look to the future, for these men the Algerian War had never really
ended. Huntz’s daughter described her father as a man imbued to the point of paralysis with
nostalgia, stating that conversations ‘reveinnent toujours sur ce pays. Il a ressenti le
rapatriement comme un trahison, la perte d’une identité’, while Lozano told the police, ‘nous
avons tout perdu, notre terre, la mer, le soleil, notre patrie, c’est pour ça qu’il n’y aura jamais
d’oubli’.417
Consequently, by the time the court case opened in December 1996, it was being
hyped as the ‘the last trial of French Algeria’. Confirming the trend towards the increasing
judicialisation of history, people were keen to see this not as a simple murder trial, but as an
opportunity to render judgement on the history of French Algeria and the War of
Independence in much the same vein as was hoped for with the concurrently unfolding Papon
trial. As one commentator remarked:
L’assassinat de Jacques Roseau? Le jugement des trois hommes? le procès ne doit
pas ce limiter à cela. C’est l’histoire de l’Algérie qu’ils attendent voir
comparaître…Pour eux, rien d’autre n’est expiatoire. Si justice il y a, elle doit être
rendue sur cette sale guerre d’Algérie, sur ses acteurs et ses auteurs.418
Ibagnes also sought, with significantly less eloquence, to turn the trial into a wider
condemnation of French actions in Algeria, telling the press outside the court: ‘Les
responsables, les bâtards, n’ont qu’à payer. Ce ne sont pas ces trois individus, victimes d’un
coup de folie. C’est le procès de la France qu’on va faire. On va remonter à la Seconde
Guerre mondiale!’419
It was always optimistic to think that seventy-six hours of debate could erase thirty
four years of bitterness, eight years of war, and one hundred and thirty years of colonisation,
416 Jubineau, L’enigme Roseau, pp.235, 318.
417 Ibid. pp.281, 184.
418 Jubineau, L’enigme Roseau, p.277.
419 Ibagnes cited in Jacqueline Remy, ‘Le dernier procès de l’Algérie française’, L’Express, 5
December 1996, p.47.
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but trial observers were to be further disappointed by the fact that Huntz, Lozano and Navarro
proved completely unequal to the task of historically redeeming the Algérie française
cause.420 The three men who entered the dock in 1996 were a far cry from the defiant orators
of April 1993, their infirmities underlined by a particularly sharp-tongued journalist who
wrote of Lozano, Huntz, and Navarro respectively: ‘Le premier est à demi aveugle, le second
perclus d’arthrose, et troisième n’a pas beaucoup de cervelle: c’est le procès de trois papys
qui se sont pris pour Zorro’.421 Retracting their initial confessions, all three men were now
arguing that far from a deliberate political statement on behalf of an ever-vigilant OAS, the
assassination had been an ‘une malencontreuse bavure’.422 Therefore, instead of the grand
historical justifications they were expecting, trial observers were greeted with three virtually
silent defendants whose ‘ideology’, it quickly became apparent, was limited to the rote
repetition of a formula of second hand accusations, causing Le Point to write that Roseau had
done more to defend the three men in the course of his activism than they did for themselves
in court.423 Huntz, Lozano, and Navarro were thus transformed from fanatical combatants in
an unfinished war, to three old fools blinded by petty jealousies and frustration at their own
failures in life who had submerged themselves in bitter nostalgia to the point of committing
an absurd crime.
It would therefore seem that rather than the last victim of the Algerian War, Roseau
was the first high profile victim of the memory of the conflict. He was essentially killed for
his ideas and because those ideas were increasingly at odds with the dominant interpretation
of the past espoused by the pied-noir community, particularly amidst the heightened
commemorative climate of the 1990s. Contrary to the criticisms of USDIFRA et al, it was
never true that Roseau had ‘forgotten’ the Algerian War, for if he had surely he would not
still have been campaigning on behalf of his compatriots. He furthermore always used the
public platforms he was given to highlight issues close to pied-noir hearts such as refuting the
stereotype of the gros colon, stressing the fraternal nature of colonial Algeria, and criticising
the lack of governmental attention paid to the rapatrié community.424 In many ways Roseau
epitomised pied-noiritude, giving it an articulate, well-connected, and charismatic persona.
420 Jubineau, L’enigme Roseau, p.345.
421 Remy, ‘Le dernier procès’, p.47.
422 All three stated that they had planned to approach Roseau on 5 March 1993 only ‘de lui mettre une
correction, une bonne raclée’. They were armed, they claimed, only because they believed that Roseau
carried a gun. Trial transcripts for Huntz cited in Jubineau, L’engime Roseau, p.174.
423 ‘Le procès de l’absurde’, Le Point, 21 December 1996, p.21.
424 See, for example, his comments during Droit de réponse, aired 8 November 1986; ‘Spécial guerre
d’Algérie’, aired 8 October 1991; ‘Algérie: mémoires d’une guerre’, Caractères, aired 22 November
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Upon being asked what he would like to drink during an interview, he quipped that he would
like a mineral water, although ‘Pas d’Evian, s’il vous plait!’425
The fundamental problem was that Roseau sought to combine his activism with a
desire to move on and look to the future. In contrast to his killers’ obsession with the past,
Roseau, in one of the last interviews he gave, stated ‘Il faut savoir tourner la page sans la
déchirer’. He went on to speak of his ‘bitterness’ over the conclusion of the war, but also his
determination to ‘ne pas vivre sur une éternelle colère’.426 He thus sought to preserve the past
without becoming trapped by it. By this point, Roseau had proven himself possessed of a
nuanced historical sensibility that enabled him to acknowledge the achievements, but also the
flaws, of colonial Algeria. He was furthermore willing to engage in dialogue with those
traditionally classed as ‘enemies’ and, as the consummate politician, knew when principles
should give way to pragmatism, something epitomised by his recognition that it was
counterproductive to refuse to co-operate with Chirac’s administration on the basis of a
historical grudge when there were real gains to be made.
This practical attitude was, however, increasingly at odds with the static black and
white worldview of many pieds-noirs. For such people, Roseau’s words and deeds violated
sacred historical principles, while his personal prominence and the influence this afforded
him at the highest levels rubbed further salt into the community’s unhealed wounds. The
tragic result was, as one historian put it, ‘Il n’incarnait pas leur vision de l’Algérie française et
il en est mort’.427 Even before his assassination, the pied-noir community had begun to
respond to these perceived betrayals by turning its back on Roseau and RECOURS. This is
evident from the growing frequency with which criticisms were voiced in pied-noir journals
such as France-Horizon which ran a piece five months before Roseau’s death criticising him
for ‘Prétendant encore représenter une communauté qu’il a renié dans son ensemble’.428
Roseau, branded as a rogue element and a traitor to the values and history of the pieds-noirs,
was therefore reprimanded, firstly in print and finally physically.429
425 Philippe Bernard, ‘Après la mort du porte-parole du RECOURS-France’, Le Monde, 9 March 1993,
p.15.
426 Ibid. p.15.
427 Valérie Esclangon-Morin, Les rapatriés d’Afrique du Nord de 1956 à nos jours, (Paris, 2007),
p.364.
428 Yves Sainsot, ‘Gardons-nous des panurge…’, FH, 336 (November 1992), 24.
429 Jean-Marc Lopez, ‘Le Recours-France vient de perdre son porte-parole’, PNM, 35 (April 1993), 13.
In light of this it is interesting that Roseau’s death received very little commentary from pied-noir
associations themselves, possibly demonstrating their self-policing ethos in practice. The exception to
this was PNM where the reprimands of Roseau continued posthumously.
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‘Le désert’
The assassination of Jacques Roseau demonstrates that memory wars are an internally as well
as externally directed trend within the pied-noir community. The importance of the past to
individual pieds-noirs, not least because of what it said about them in the present, made it of
importance to those seeking to represent them at the highest levels. Fidelity to both history
and memory was perceived as vital for legitimating claims to incarnate the image and values
of the community. As a consequence, associations such as USDIFRA extensively exploited
the past in order to gain adherents and discredit rivals. The irony is that despite these high
stakes and the ambitions of the actors involved the position of pied-noir spokesperson has
remained vacant since Roseau’s death. In fact, the evidence suggests that rather than a
divisive figure, Roseau was ‘une source de reference dans une communauté en proie à
d’infinies “chicayas”’.430 As his cousin Gilbert confessed, ‘Derrière Roseau, soyons honnête,
c’est le désert’.431
The disparate nature of the pied-noir population meant that unity was always going to
be difficult to attain and maintain. In the absence of an illusionist of Roseau’s skill, the
natural tendency towards heterogeneity has accelerated. The memory wars of the late 1990s
might have produced greater harmony in terms of historical discourses as attitudes have
hardened across associations, but this has rarely been translated into collective practical
action and never into a single cross-association leader.432 Although rhetorically it is still the
pieds-noirs as a whole who are addressed by associations in their literature, in truth they
really only speak to a dwindling core of their own particular supporters. USDIFRA has been
unable to shake off its extremist label and remains confined to the margins of the pied-noir
community, while the circulation figures for PNM dropped so low that they were forced to
suspend publication between September 2000 and November 2003. Even RECOURS has
struggled without Roseau, their membership figures down from a peak of 60,000 in the 1980s
to less than 10,000 in the mid 1990s. Only Le Pen has continued to go from strength to
strength, but that is the result of factors far beyond Roseau and the scope of this discussion. In
terms of the wider significance of Roseau’s death, even though it happened fifteen years ago,
the issues surrounding it have lived on and are today playing a major role in contemporary
France. What pied-noir associations were arguing over, and indeed continue to argue over,
430 Rollat, ‘Jacques Roseau’, p.8.
431 Gilbert Roseau cited in Jubineau, L’enigme Roseau. p.19.
432 Efforts have however continued in this vein, most recently in the form of the CNFA created in the
wake of the abrogation of the 23 February 2005 law. Supported by the Cercle Algérianiste and PNM
amongst others, its stated objective is ‘la mise en commun de nos moyens respectifs, afin d’opposer à
nos détractors en tout genre la réplique qui convient, avec toute la riueur dont notre communauté est
capable si elle s’organise et se rassemble’. Jean-Marc Lopez,’11 février une date à retenir’, PNM 138
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mirrors what is being fought over nationally in the current guerres de mémoire. It is about
who has the authority to interpret the past and thus the power to influence its commemoration
at the highest levels. In the absence of a broad and sustained consensus on this issue, the pied-
noir community, while still able to unify in opposition to external events such as loi 2005-
185, seem destined to remain deeply fractured internally as illustrated by the bitter inter-
association squabbles over the recently inaugurated mur des disaprus in Perpignan.
On 18 December 1996, Gérard Huntz and Jean Claude Lozano were condemned to
twenty years in prison; Marcel Navarro received a slightly reduced sentence of fifteen years.
Given their advanced age and poor health, all three are likely to die in prison. Two years
previously, on 5 March 1994, the first anniversary of his death, Roseau was immortalised in
stone in Montpellier. A three hundred strong crowd gathered to witness the inauguration of a
memorial inscribed with the words of another famous Algerian son, Camus: ‘Je comprends ici
ce que l’on appelle gloire, le droit d’aimer sans mesure’.433 Yet although Roseau’s legacy
seems assured, that of the community he campaigned tirelessly on behalf of remains far less
certain.
433 Philippe Bernard and Jacques Monin, ‘ Le 5 mars 1993: Trois pieds-noirs sous influence pour un
crime mal éclairci’, Le Monde, 8 March 1994, p.11.
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4. Transmission: The Next Generation
‘Demain, nous en serons les hériters’
‘Que serait un homme sans mémoire? Que serait un pays sans mémoire? ... C’est la mémoire
vivante qui fait le présent et le présent porte en lui l’avenir’.434 This philosophy, outlined by
Hélie de Saint Marc, lies at the heart of pied-noir associations. In addition to the past and the
present, the future has long been a pied-noir preoccupation. Underpinned by their fear of
forgetting and thus of being forgotten, the subject is most frequently discussed under the
rubric of ‘transmission’; the need to pass the patrimonial torch to the next generation. As
early as 1977, the newly-created Cercle Algérianiste was exhorting its adherents to
remember: ‘Notre action présente et notre passé ne doivent pas disparaître avec les
générations actuelles. Nous devons donc en laisser des traces visibles mais également
préparer nos enfants à prendre la relève’.435 Today, association responses to the question
‘Qu’est-ce que vous pensez et espérez que l’avenir tiendra pour vôtre association?’ frequently
refer to the hope that their activities will be carried on by ‘nos enfants, voire petits enfants’.436
‘Les générations à venir ne doivent pas l’oublier’ General Jouhaud explained, ‘Il ne faut pas
qu’ils ignorent le drame de leurs parents, comme ne doit pas leur échapper le sens de notre
combat’.437 This imperative is given a particular sense of urgency by the knowledge that the
more time passes, the more the troops of the first generation diminish - Jouhaud himself died
in 1995 - and the greater the need becomes to replenish the ranks of active combatants with
fresh recruits. Failure to successfully transmit the past would have serious consequences for
the pied-noir community as Jean-Luc Morin highlighted when he asked: ‘Demain, nous en
serons les hériters. Faudra-t-il nous contenter de jouer les exécuteurs testamentaires?’438
In response to this perceived danger, some associations established explicit structures
to safeguard the community’s heritage such as the Cercle Algérianiste’s Mouvement jeunesse
Algérianiste (MJA), founded in 1979, which proudly declared ‘Algériens français nous serons
désormais’.439 It is also common to find associations using the highly potent devoir de
mémoire to elicit an ongoing commitment to preserving the past. In practical terms Maurice
Calmein outlined what fulfilling this duty would entail for future activists:
434 Cited in Peter Batty, La guerre d’Algérie, (Paris, 1989), p.164.
435 Maurice Calmein, ‘Appellation contrôlée’, L’Algérianiste, (1977), 10.
436 Jean Scotto, Cercle Algérianiste des Pyrénées Orientales, questionnaire response.
437 Général Edmond Jouhaud, ‘Congrès de Tours’, L’Algérianiste, 5.2 (15 March 1978), 44.
438 Jean-Luc Morin, ‘Lettre ouverte aux jeunes pieds-noirs’, L’Algérianiste, 22 (15 June 1983), iii.
439 Marc Ribes-Rotage, ‘Mouvement jeunesse Algérianiste’, L’Algérianiste, 8 (15 December 1979), 51.
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Il faut leur entretenir la flamme et conserver tout ce qui peut être de ce passé qui est
celui de leurs familles mais aussi de la nation française. Il leur faut entretenir les
traditions, les fêtes, le langage, le folklore, mais aussi le souvenir des dates
symboliques de cette histoire belle et tragique.440
Through these activities, the intention is to transmit a positively evaluated historical legacy so
that those born after the war and in France can ‘dire sans honte ou sans le cacher: “Je suis un
descendant de Pieds-Noirs, de pionniers bâtisseurs d’un pays”’.441 By creating a sense of
pride regarding the past it is hoped that subsequent generations will be motivated to actively
defend and perpetuate this patrimony. According to this logic any disjuncture between
generations can be overcome by the notion of an emotional and historical continuum that
creates a single, unbroken lineage from the first settlers, whose roots were firmly planted in
the soil of French Algeria, to the present day diaspora community. For the Jeunes
Algérianistes, their place in the pied-noir genealogy and the responsibilities this involved
were clear:
Nous sommes les enfants de l’exode…
Nous sommes pourtant pieds-noirs…
Nous sommes dépositaires devant l’avenir…
Nous sommes, nous aussi, les descendants sprituels…
Nous nous reclamons de l’Algérianisme.442 .
Alongside the Jeunes Algérianistes, several other pied-noir descendants have shown
themselves keen to take up their communal obligations with respect to the past. In an
impassioned article, Anne-Véronique Mendosa reassured her ancestors that ‘je suis fière de
votre histoire, de mon histoire, pour ne pas l’oublier, je l’ai gravée dans ma mémoire’.443
However, Mendosa’s devotion to the pied-noir cause needs to be placed in the context of her
status as the daughter of the president of the Amicale des Enfants de l’Algérois, and as
someone who grew up immersed in her parents’ past: ‘Je vivais avec eux leur vie “là-bas”,
j’apprenais à connaître à travers leurs paroles mes Anciens, je refaisais avec eux la traversée
tragique de la Mediterranée…’444 However, in a questionnaire circulated by the Cercle
Algérianiste in 1984 designed to gauge the relationship between ‘la jeunesse’ and the wider
440 Maurice Calmein, Dis, c’était comment, l’Algérie française? 20 questions et réponses à l’intention
des jeunes Pieds Noirs, (Friedberg/Bayern, 2002), p.71.
441 ‘Edito: Le défi médiatique’, PNM 12 (February 1991), 5.
442 ‘Manifesto des jeunes Algérianistes’, L’Algérianiste, 28 (15 December 1984), ii.
443 Anne-Véronique Mendosa, ‘L’Age de l’indépendance’, EA, 10 (November 1984), 4.
444 Ibid. 2.
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pied-noir community, the inclusion of negative options such as ‘Tu regrettes toute discussion
sur un sujet [la guerre] qui t’ennuie, parce que tu ne te sens pas concerné’, implies that there
was a fear that not all jeunes were committed activists in the Mendosa mould. Indeed,
respondants could assert that they felt they had nothing in common with other young pieds-
noirs beyond ‘un hazard historique dépasse par l’histoire elle même’.445
Of course there has already been one successful inter-generational transfer of
memory, since today’s spokespeople are generally of a different generation to the men and
women who led associations in the immediate aftermath of the war.446 Not only is this
understandable given that it is now more than forty-five years since the war ended, it also
helps to explain the change in focus from material to commemorative concerns which
paralleled the emergence of these new activists. Furthermore, this was not experienced as a
dramatic rupture because both cohorts possessed the common denominators of having lived in
French Algeria and lived through the identity-forming exodus of 1962. In fact so smooth has
this transfer of power been that it has almost gone unnoticed. ‘Disons que les liens entre la
première et la seconde génération était encore fort (sic)’ writes Jean Scotto, ‘la transmission
s’est bien effectuée’. When it came to the third generation however, relations were more
‘distendués’ rendering the transition problematic.447 This group is more ambiguous as a
potential repository of the pied-noir past for several reasons, the most important of which is
that they were born after 1962 and therefore never knew French Algeria. As the second
generation fades into the background and the task falls to the next generation to succeed them
at the head of associations, the awkward issue arises of how to legitimate these people as
carriers of a memory that is not their own and which pertains to a past that they have no direct
experience of.
In one sense, the pieds-noirs are victims of their own success. In spite of their
protests to the contrary, empirically the community has completely integrated into French
society meaning that whether measured in terms of physical appearance, cultural practices or
socio-economic status, pied-noir children are not visibly distinguishable from other French
children.448 Given the centrality of distinctiveness to the pied-noir discourse, this naturally has
consequences in terms of the depth of attachment the third generation feel to a temporally and
culturally distanced era and its survivors, as opposed to the land where they have grown up.
445 ‘Un appel du Secrétariat national à la jeunesse’, L’Algérianiste, 27 (September 1984), xv. The
results of the survey were not reported in subsequent issues.
446 There are some exceptions to this such as Francette Mendosa who has led the Amicale des Enfants
de l’Algérois since its inception in 1980, or Joseph Hattab Pacha of Véritas who, despite only founding
the association in 1996, is a former Mayor of the Algiers Casbah.
447 Jean Scotto, Cercle Algérianiste des Pyrénées Orientales, questionnaire response.
448 For a more detailed discussion of this see Clarisse Buono, ‘Les Pieds Noirs et leurs descendants:
Les difficultés de transmission d’une identité collective singulière’ in La différence culturelle: Une
reformulation des débats, ed. by Michel Wieviorka and Jocelyn Ohana, (Paris, 2001), p.282.
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However, far more significant than the practical aspects of integration are the actions
of the community itself, particularly the paradigms upon which the second generation have
built their collective memorial heritage. The past is a commodity that the pied-noir
community guards jealously and exclusively:
Tant comme les Français d’Algérie avaient eu l’illusion que le pays colonise était leur
propriété, et ressentaient les interventions de la France comme un intrusion, les pieds-
noirs semblent estimer que la France ne peut écrire l’Histoire de l’Algérie puisque
eux seuls l’a (sic) connaissent et l’ont vécu.449
Unfortunately, by virtue of the tactics associations have employed, the category of ‘la France’
has inadvertently come to include their own descendants. The problem, as outlined by Buono,
is that ‘les nostalgiques’ have ‘confié leurs souvenirs – et non la mémoire – à leurs
enfants’.450 This has been exacerbated by the increasing importance placed on witness
testimony as the best weapon through which to combat competing interpretations as part of
the current memory wars. By making lived experience the touchstone of authenticity pied-
noir associations have effectively created a transmission cul-de-sac, leaving themselves
vulnerable to the collective memory curse of the shelf-life first outlined by Maurice
Halbwachs. This risks a scenario in which ‘le dernier ‘Européen’ né en Algérie à la vielle de
l’indépendance sera aussi le dernier pied-noir’.451
As far as most pied-noir associations are concerned, the blame for the present
situation lies firmly with an uninterested third generation who have neglected their devoir de
mémoire. ‘Difficiles les liens avec les générations suivantes’ wrote one association, ‘Ils ont
d’autres centres d’intérêt, d’autres chats à fouetter’.452 Buono’s interviews with current
community leaders revealed similar sentiments, yet when she questioned members of the
third generation she found that there was interest in their parents’ past and a desire to
participate in its preservation. However, this desire was frequently frustrated by the stringent
conditions of belonging established by associations.453 The third generation are thus placed in
the unenviable position of being exhorted to fulfil their commemorative duty, while
simultaneously being denied full access to the very organisations that would enable them to
do so because they lack the ‘open sesame’ of having lived through the war and exile. Rather
than a deliberate policy, this exclusion is more an unappreciated by-product of the way in
449 Clarisse Buono, Pieds-noirs de père en fils, (Paris, 2004), p.75.
450 Ibid. p.158. For Buono’s full typology of ‘nostalgiques’ see pp.101-104.
451 Michèle Baussant, ‘Identité passagère: Pied-noir, une figure de l’exil’, in La guerre d’Algerie dans
la mémoire et l’imaginaire,ed. by Anny Dayan Rosenmann and Lucette Valensi, (Paris, 2004), 116.
452 Marie-Claire Micouleau-Sicault, Mémoire d’Afrique du Nord, questionnaire response.
453 Buono, Pieds-noirs, pp.96-97.
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which the expression of pied-noir collective memory has evolved. The end result, however, is
the same: deprived of the credentials of lived experience, ‘Ils seront algérianistes qu’à un
degré moindre’.454
The pieds-noirs have always maintained that transmitting the past is not simply about
conveying facts; it is about breathing life into them and thus making history meaningful to the
next generation. This is the only way to ensure a commitment to its perpetuation and to avoid
ossification of the kind foretold by Louis Grossard when he asks: ‘L’Algérianisme, ne sera-t-
il plus qu’un musée poussiéreux, l’histoire d’un intermède pittoresque et touchant et, pour
d’autres, agaçant?’455 Although this is a problem faced by all memory-carriers, it is rendered
particularly acute for pied-noir by their insistence on tying legitimacy and authority to first
hand experience. As awareness of this problem has grown, various solutions have been
advanced premised on an accommodation of different forms of remembering according to
generation. ANFANOMA, for example, proposed the idea of mutually compatible rather than
mutually exclusive notions of belonging whereby the third generation ‘peut être considérée
comme fondue dans la société métropolitaine tout en gardant une attaché forte à ce que nous
représentons’.456 This approach was supported by Yves Clement who argued that ‘être pied-
noir ne dépend pas d’un lieu de naissance, mais du devoir de revendiquer un héritage de
pionnier, de respecter le labour de ses aïeux et de défendre la vérité’.457 Whether this new
form of identification with the past can be put into practice is another matter. On the one
hand, the pieds-noirs have survived one generational transfer and a re-orientation of priorities
from the material to the moral. On the other hand, particularly in recent years, the flexibility
and willingness to adapt seems to be diminishing as the escalating memory wars not only
rigidifies the community and its adherents, but increasingly isolates them within a historical
and memorial discourse divorced from mainstream attitudes and understandings. The
progressive disappearance of those with direct experience does not automatically mean the
extinction of their memories. It will, however, mean a change, although the exact form that
this takes remains to be seen.
454 Louis Grossard, ‘Vingt ans après’, L’Algérianiste, 17 (March 1982), 4.
455 Ibid. 4.
456 Yves Sainsot, ANFANOMA, questionnaire response.
457 Yves Clement, ‘Pied-Noir, une affaire d’âge’ PNM, 14 (April 1991), 7.
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The Harki Community
5. Breaking the Silence: The activism of the fils de harkis, 1962-1991
On 7 May 1975, the normally peaceful town of Sainte Livrade to the east of Bordeaux was
wracked by violence as youths from the nearby Bias camp embarked upon a series of
destructive riots. As the unrest rapidly spread, the profile of the orchestrators rose in tandem
with the media coverage they attracted. This was how many people came to learn of the
harkis and also of their impoverished and marginalised status in contemporary France.
Hidden from view and effectively imprisoned, often behind barbed wire, in camps or forestry
hamlets situated in remote rural areas, the historical trajectory of the harkis was encapsulated
by the prominent protest slogan ‘After betrayal, abandonment; after abandonment, exile; after
exile, oblivion’.458 By 1975, conditions in these camps, which were only ever designed to be
temporary but had now been in use for over a decade, had deteriorated. This, in combination
with the continued harsh discipline and lack of freedom to which residents were subjected,
had begun to generate significant frustrations particularly among the descendants of the
harkis, many of whom were now entering adulthood.459 When these simmering tensions
boiled over during the summer of 1975, they were framed by demands for the practical
amelioration of the situation of the harkis and their families, but also for a revalorisation of
their history. Tired of being les oubliés de l’histoire, the fils de harkis were determined to
gain recognition on behalf of their parents for the sacrifices they had made for France and the
suffering they had endured as a consequence.460
However, the fils de harkis were not alone in this desire and in fact were relative
latecomers to the harki activist scene. The thirteen years since the Algerian War ended had
witnessed a range of representations offered by a series of self-appointed spokespeople who,
in the absence of direct testimony from within the harki community and often in the service
of their own objectives, took it upon themselves to speak on behalf of the harkis. Collective
discourses were constructed by external groups from the Algerian and French governments
who proposed reductive characterisations of the harkis as either traitors or loyal patriots in
accordance with their respective national historical narratives, to sub-state groups such as the
458 Mohand Hamoumou, with Abderahmen Moumen, ‘L’histoire des harkis et Français musulmans: la
fin d’un tabou?’, in La Guerre d’Algérie 1954-2004: la fin de l’ amnésie, ed. by Mohammed Harbi and
Benjamin Stora (Paris, 2004), p.339.
459 Michel Roux estimated that two thirds of those who took part in the 1975 protests were under
twenty. Les harkis: les oubliés de l’histoire 1954-1991, (Paris, 1991), p.325.
460 The gendered term fils de harkis has been deliberately used here to reflect the fact that activism in
the period under discussion was an overwhelmingly male dominated and directed endeavour. While the
wives and widows of harkis were often a consideration for these activists and some women did
participate in the protests, it was not until the post-2000 period that female spokespeople from within
the harki community assumed a prominent role. Although the gender differential at work within the
harki community is a fascinating and understudied topic, unfortunately a detailed consideration is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
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former Muslim elite of colonial Algeria, French ex-army personnel, and the pied-noir
community all of whom felt a connection to, and sense of responsibility for, the harkis.
Enjoying material and cultural advantages not available to the majority of ancien supplétifs or
their descendants, these actors were able to dominate the portrayal of the harkis in the years
immediately following Algerian independence. It was not until the 1970s that their
presentations began to be challenged by an emerging core of activists from within the harki
community, and not until 1991 that these activists could classify themselves as an organised
and mature collective memory carrier with their own distinctive voice.
Having already examined the events that brought the harkis and their families to
France and the provisions put in place to accommodate these new arrivals, this chapter will
begin by focusing on the impact these experiences had on the harkis. This is intended to
suggest the reasons underlying the reluctance of harkis to speak of their past, which in turn
provides the context for the ability of external commentators to initially dominate
representations of the community. It also explains why the internal reappropriation of the past
was an endeavour undertaken primarily by the second generation as opposed to the harkis
themselves.461 The images presented by groups outside of the harki community and the
motivations behind them will then be examined, juxtaposed with the portraits of the harki
community disseminated through the French media. Finally, the chapter will trace the ways
these representations were variously accepted or rejected by the fils de harkis before being
mixed with their own memories and experiences to produce a composite version of the past
around which to base their activism. The year 1991 provides a natural end point, signifying
both the attainment of the status of a coherent and independent memory carrier by the fils de
harkis, as well as a turning point in the commemoration and discussion of the War of
Independence generally in France.
‘Mon père ne nous en a jamais parlé’
The most widely attested to characteristic of the harkis, by both family members and
academics, is their recalcitrance when it comes to discussing the past. There were many
reasons underpinning the silence of harkis. In the first instance, harkis faced a range of
linguistic, cultural, and economic barriers that inhibited the transmission of history and
memory at a very practical level. Those who arrived in France at the end of the war were
overwhelmingly of rural origin, unskilled and illiterate, many not even able to speak French.
461 The terms ‘first generation’ and ‘second generation’ are not meant to suggest that there is a second
generation of harkis, nor to deny the French nationality of descendants of the harkis. Rather, the term is
used to convey the idea of there being a memory pertaining specifically to those who lived through the
years 1954 to 1962, the first generation, which is distinct from, but nonetheless intimately connected
to, the history and identity of their descendants, that is to say to the second generation.
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Thrown into a completely alien world, simply adjusting to their new situation was a full-time
occupation for most harkis and their wives. Even those harkis who possessed the relative
advantage of being able to read, write and speak French quickly discovered that finding
people willing to listen when you are part of a marginalised, socially disempowered minority
was no easy task. This situation was compounded by the physical isolation of the harkis.
Whatever form of centre d’accueil they were housed in, the fact remains that the harkis were
mis à l’écart and denied contact with the wider populace. The only autochthonous French
people they interacted with were the militaires and pieds-noirs in charge of the camps, or the
members of the Croix Rouge who came periodically to donate clothes and make inspections.
This segregation left the harkis unable to ‘faire l’apprentissage de la France’ and exacerbated
their sentiment of being a population with neither nationality nor territory.462 The harki Saïd
Ferdi closed his 1981 memoir with the observation: ‘je peux affirmer que ce furent celles de
centaines de milliers de gens restés vingt ans sans patrie. Pour eux, comme moi, il n’y a ni
terre natale, ni frontiers. Nous ne reconnaissons dans aucun pays…’463 Furthermore, many
families spent time in several of these locations before finally achieving permanent
settlement, a disruptive and distressing process that appeared to operate at random as far as
the harkis were concerned. Given the importance of group and spatial stability for the
construction of social frameworks of memory, it is easy to see why the insecure situations
into which the harkis were placed militated against the transmission of memories.464
On both the physical and mental periphery of France, the harkis reacted to their
marginalisation by turning in on themselves.465 Although the harki community was not a
natural phenomenon and the camps were a mix of tribes, regions, dialects, and religions, the
shared experiences of loss, isolation, and deprivation forged a powerful sense of unity and an
ethos of mutual aid. It was also the case that certain customs and practices common to life in
Algeria transcended these divisions providing a point of anchorage for dislocated individuals.
While taking mint tea with a harki, the interviewer for the 1977 documentary Harkis asked if
maintaining traditions such as this acted as a barrier to integration in France. His host replied
that continuing to do as they did in Algeria was simply an expression of nostalgia for a
country they were forbidden from returning to.466 Certain traditions however, while they
might not have prevented integration, did inhibit the transmission of the past. Silence in this
462 Mohand Hamoumou, ‘Les harkis, un trou de mémoire franco-algérien’, Esprit, 161 (May 1990), 39.
463 Saïd Ferdi, Un enfant dans la guerre, (Paris, 1981), p.206.
464 This observation has also been made by Jim House with respect to the Algerian immigrant
population in France who suffered similarly precarious living condition in bidonvilles and foyers. Jim
House and Neil MacMaster, Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror and Memory, (Oxford, 2006), p.266.
465 Although a defensive response prompted by their own sense of rejection, this was often mistaken for
a refusal to integrate. Mohand Hamoumou, ‘Révoltes des enfants d’anciens harkis: quelques clés pour
comprendre’, Esprit, 174 (September 1991), 113.
466 ‘Harki’, Les dossiers de l’écran, aired 17 May 1977 (Channel 2).
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context was linked to the culture of paternal deference and respect. Family hierarchies were
extremely important to harkis who considered it the man’s job to provide for and rule over his
spouse and children in order to ensure that family honour was maintained. This role did not
include being emotionally open or demonstrative. As one fille de harki explained, ‘dans notre
culture…les enfants ne posent pas de question aux parents. Encore moins les filles à leurs
pères. Alors, j’ai grandi avec ces questions sans réponses’.467 More persistently inquisitive
children were often rebuffed with the Kabyle maxim ‘li fat met’, the past is dead. This
emotional distance was frequently compounded by the physical absence of fathers who, if
they were able to find work, worked long hours and six days a week. However, the
emasculated environment in which the majority of harkis were forced to live undermined this
authoritative ideal often leading to a loss of self-respect. Constrained and dictated to by forces
beyond their control, rendered passive and dependent outside their homes, many unable to
find work and thus provide for their families or even to occupy themselves during the long
days, these déraciné men suffered ‘un véritable tremblement de terre psychologique’ which
naturally affected their relationships within the family circle.468 References to alcoholism and
domestic violence are quite frequent. In the Bias bar, Boussad Azni described the atmosphere
of despair where:
[L]es harkis traînaient toute la journée…Ils buvaient, ils jouaient aux cartes, ils se
disputaient, ils se bagarraient. Toute cette violence en eux l’écho des violences qu’ils
avaient subis, se retournait contre eux-mêmes. C’était une manière de suicide
lent…Mon père y passait ses journées, et rentrait soûl, le soir.469
These accounts suggest a process of retreat as traumatised individuals attempted to
come to terms with their past and present. As much as there were practical obstacles to the
organisation and transmission of memory, there was an even more potent lack of will to carry
out such tasks on the part of the harkis themselves. One of the principal reasons behind this
behaviour was the fear that pervaded the harki community. The zones à forte concentration
essentially exported and replicated the mentality and power structures of colonial Algeria
with all the attendant exploitation and mistreatment, especially as the oversight of these
camps tended to be entrusted to pieds-noirs or military personnel who had spent part of their
career in North Africa. This rendered the harkis dependent upon them to meet their most
467 Quoted in Jean-Jacques Jordi and Mohand Hamoumou, Les harkis, une mémoire enfouie, (Paris,
1999), p.121.
468 Abd-el-Aziz Méliani, Le drame des harkis, (Paris, 2001), p.196.
469 Boussad Azni, Harkis, crime d’État: Généalogie d’un abandon, (Paris, 2002), p.119.
107
basic needs and thus almost completely at their mercy.470 Insults, arbitrary discipline, and
deprivations were consequently suffered in silence because there was no other option, no
external recourse. A doctor who had been assigned to Bias for three months at the age of
twenty-five, but who had ended up staying for thirty years provided the following damming
assessment of the mentality that reigned in the camps:
Ils ont recrée l’Algérie de papa, avec l’anisette, la kémia et tous les poncifs de là-bas.
Les pieds-noirs traitaient les harkis comme des indigènes: ils les dépréciaient, les
manipulaient, les humiliaient. Ils étaient ravis d’avoir ramené un morceau d’Algérie
coloniale avec eux, d’avoir rapatrié leurs fellahs. Les uns dominaient les autres,
c’était la logique du système.471
In these self-enclosed environments with their vastly unequal power structures, the threat of
punishment was powerful and used regularly to keep the harkis ‘in line’. Punishments ranged
from being deprived of food, money, or privileges, to expulsion from the camp, being sent to
the infamous ‘Centre’ (in fact three disciplinary youth centres located in Pau, Moumar, and
Gelos), or being sent to Candélie, the harki psychiatric hospital. This latter fate befell
Boussad Anzi’s father who was forcibly removed and ‘hospitalised’ following an altercation
with the head of the camp.472 The ultimate disciplinary threat, however, was being sent back
to Algeria. Upon discovering the terrible living conditions at Rivesaltes, Kerchouche’s
parents dared not complain because they were ‘terrifiés à l’idée que les soldats ne les
renvoient en Algérie’.473 These fears persisted beyond the walls of the camps. After a decade
spent in various locations, Kerchouche’s parents eventually succeeded in purchasing a small
home of their own. Yet when Kerchouche told her mother of her intention to write a book
tracing their family history almost thirty years later, she was surprised by her reaction:
‘Quand j’ai parlé à ma mère de mon projet…elle m’a dit, craintive: “Et s’ils nous le
reprochent?” Moi, scandalisé: “Si quelqu’un a des reproches à faire, c’est toi, pas eux”’.474 It
is only as Kerchouche learns about her parents’ history that she begins to understand the
source of their ongoing anxieties and comes to appreciate that it is ‘Par peur de recevoir des
470 Tom Charbit, ‘Un petit monde colonial en métropole: Le camps de harkis de Saint-Maurice-
l’Ardoise (1962-1976)’, Politix, 76 (2006), 45. This policy has also been noted by Choukri Hmed in
relation to Algerian immigrants who lived in SONACOTRA foyers during the 1960s and 1970s. See
‘“Tenir ses hommes”: La gestion des étrangers “isolés” dans les foyers SONACOTRA après la guerre
d’Algérie’, Politix, 76 (2006), 11-30.
471 Dalila Kerchouche, Mon père, ce harki, (Paris, 2003), p.148.
472 Anzi, Harkis, p.121
473 Kerchouche, Mon père, p.57.
474 Ibid. p.15.
108
coups, craignent le jugement de l’Histoire, les harkis hesitant à parler. Comme si parler et
écrire, était trahir encore…’475
These fears existed alongside the trauma of the exceptionally violent end of French
Algeria which left both physical and mental scars. The majority of harkis fled their homeland
fearing, with great justification, for their lives. ‘Malgré les soucis nous étions contents d’avoir
trouvé d’asile’ explained one, ‘Chaque fois que nous entendions raconter ce qu’il s’était passé
au bled, nous disions merci à Dieu. Merci, d’avoir survécu, parce que ça n’avait pas été le cas
de tout le monde’.476 Yet even though they knew they were the lucky ones, no harki survived
unscathed; many had lost members of their families, or had witnessed scenes of atrocity and
some had themselves been the victims of torture. This was in addition to the trauma of having
to leave their homes, belongings and in many cases members of their family behind with little
or no forewarning and frequently at great personal risk. In a state of shock, ‘la population se
replié sur elle-même, passé ses blessures, tente d’oublier le cauchemar’ with the result that
during the early decades of their lives in France, ‘un véritable “travail de deuil” s’est effectué
en silence’.477 Boussad Azni described the camps he grew up in as being full of people
‘emprisonnés dans leurs pensées plus sûrement encore que derrière les barbelés’.478
These silences did not imply that the harkis had forgotten, not least because in the
case of those who had been injured, or captured and tortured, they bore physical reminders of
their ordeals. ‘Je garde présents à la mémoire d’affreux souvenirs’, wrote Saïd Ferdi, ‘et, si
j’essaie de les oublier, les traces physiques que je porte aujourd’hui me rapellent à chaque
instant les heures douloureuse de mon passé’.479 Instead, silence was often used as a coping
mechanism. A former teacher who worked with the harkis in Manosque felt that the past was
just ‘trop dur à porter et même à expliquer’.480 His assessment alludes to the factor that
provided the final nail in this coffin of silence: the difficulty of explaining the ‘choice’ the
harkis had made which, according to the dominant contemporary narratives, was to be either
Algerian traitors or French patriots, depending which side of the Mediterranean you were on.
Of course the reality of the situation was infinitely more complex and the notion of ‘choice’
distinctly problematic but, whatever the nuances of individual histories, the years 1954-1962
were, for the majority of harkis, a past that was difficult for them to understand and assume
themselves, let alone to communicate and justify to others. Upon reaching thirty, one fils de
harki asked his father to tell him a little about what had happened in Algeria. His father
475 Ibid, p.15.
476 Cited in Bernard Derrieu et al., La Cité de Tapis: une communauté de rapatriés d’Algérie, (Pézenas,
1997), p.14.
477 Mohand Hamoumou, Et ils sont devenu harkis, (Paris, 1993), pp.295-297.
478 Azni, Harkis, p.117.
479 Ferdi, Un enfant, p.205.
480 Saïd Bouamama, Jeunes Manosquins issus de l’immigration algérienne, (Manosque, 2003), p.43.
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replied: ‘‘Qu’est ce que tu veux que je t' en raconte? Je ne sais pas moi-même ce qui s’est
passé alors veux-tu que je te raconte à toi?’481
The diverse reasons which underpinned engagement with the French and the fact that
the decision was often not a choice over which the harki was master, left harkis with the
conundrum of how to criticise the French state for treating them little better than animals
from the shaky platform of having sided with the French sometimes as a last resort,
sometimes against their will, and almost always with less patriotic fervour and commitment
than the pro-Algérie-française lobby would have people believe. On a more personal level,
the harkis faced the problem of conveying the situation in which their ‘choices’ were made to
children who were either too young to appreciate such things, or who had been born after
1962. It was even more difficult to contextualise and rationalise such decisions when the
practical results had been so overwhelmingly negative, for all concerned. Many harkis were
afraid to even attempt to justify themselves to their children who had to live with the
consequences of their actions.
A further complication lay in the label of ‘traitor’ that was originally attached to the
harkis by the Algerian government, but which quickly radiated outwards. An opinion poll
published in Le Monde on 27 February 1992, revealed that the FLN’s struggle during the War
of Independence was understood by the French to be analogous to the actions of the
Résistance during the Second World War. In such a schema, the harkis were assimilated to
‘collabos’.482 Enclosed in silence by the combined weight of the factors discussed above,
many harkis appear to have adopted externally generated epithets, leading them to make
confession such as ‘Parfois, je me sens en colère contre la France. Mais je me dis aussi que
c’est moi qui l’ai choisi. Alors je l’assume.483 Essentially they became prisoners of official
representations, coming to see themselves as the traitors that others accused them of being.
The consequences of such internalisation could be serious. Fatima related how her husband
suffered from very bad health after arriving in France. Although he ostensibly blamed this on
the climate, Fatima reached a different conclusion: ‘Il était surtout malade d’être mal
considéré en Algérie comme en France’.484 The potency of this stigmatisation led many
fathers to attempt to protect their children from guilt by association by surrounding them with
a ‘halo de silence’ with respect to the past.485
481 Ibid. p.40.
482 Jean Michel Dumay, ‘Un enseignement en sourdine’, Le Monde, 27 February, 1992.
483 Hocine, cited in Stéphan Gladieu and Dalila Kerchouche, Destins de harkis: Aux racines d’un exil,
(Paris, 2003), p.96.
484 Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, Nos mères: paroles blessées: Une autre histoire de harkis, (Léchelle,
2006), p.75.
485 Emmanuel Brillet, ‘La contingence et la geste: le harki, l’indicible du “mouvement de l’histoire”’,
in L’époque de la disparition: Politique et asthétique, ed. by Alain Brossat and Jean-Louis Déotte,
(Paris, 2000), p.144.
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‘Patriots’ or ‘traitors’: Official representations of the harkis
Although the factors discussed above came together in a range of different combinations, the
collective end result was the same: a silence surrounding the past so complete that one fille de
harki wondered ‘si nos parents n’avaient pas perdu la mémoire?’ ‘Ils nous manquait à nous
les enfants les morceaux de notre histoire’ she explained.486 Therefore, in contrast to groups
like the pieds-noirs, there was no initial outpouring of memoirs, nor any politicised collective
mobilisation from the harki population. Instead, it took over a decade and the emergence of a
new generation for this silence to be definitively broken. The organised, public presence of
the harkis dates from the early to mid-1970s, with the Mouvement d’assistance et de défense
des rapatriés d’Afrique du Nord (MADRAN), formed in August 1971 by Ahmed Kaberseli,
widely regarded as the first harki-led association.487 Although there were only 40 such
associations in 1973, by 1991 up to 400 were believed to exist.488 This newfound visibility
has been an overwhelmingly second generation inspired and led endeavour. Crucial in
stimulating this activism were the two ‘hot’ summers of 1975 and 1991, as well as the lack of
government action in the intervening years to improve the lives of the harki community.489
Although 1991 was not simply a repeat of 1975, the dual platform of demands advanced
remained consistent. First, practical measures to ameliorate the situation of both generations
were sought; second, calls for the recognition and rehabilitation of the history of the harkis
were prominent on both occasions. The need for moral as well as material reparation for the
treatment of the harkis at the end of the war and beyond was thus important in framing and
legitimating the more practical facets of the 1975 and 1991 campaigns, as well as the wider
activism they inspired.
The problem with this latter ambition was that with their access to the past effectively
blocked off by a wall of parental silence, the increasingly mobilised second generation were
forced to look outside their community for the answers to their many questions about their
history and identity. Yet the most obvious starting points in their quest yielded little, with
neither the Algerian nor the French governments offering what could be regarded as
486 Cited in Jordi and Hamoumou, Les harkis, p.123.
487 Stéphanie Abrial, Les enfants de harkis de la révolte à l’intégration, (Paris, 2001), p.48.
488 Hamoumou, ‘Les harkis’, p. 40; Hamoumou, ‘L’histoire des harkis’, p. 341.
489 Other factors that may have contributed to the timing of the emergence of this activism include the
better economic situation enjoyed by some harki families which gave them greater means and an
incentive to help those less fortunate; the decline in interest of many associations that had previously
campaigned on behalf of the harkis; the post-68 climate in which the idea of minority identities and
rights was gaining acceptance in French society; finally, in July 1970 the government passed an
indemnisation law which promised 9.3 million francs to European rapatriés but made no provisions for
the harkis. For further details on the two summers see Roux, Les harkis, pp.345-349; Hamoumou, Et
ils sont devenus harkis, p.299.
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supportive cadres sociaux through which the fils de harkis could assemble and articulate a
version of their community’s past. On the Algerian side, the harkis faced the hegemonic
narrative of the FLN-dominated government which sought to legitimate itself by propagating
the myth of an entire nation united in a nationalist struggle for independence. The logic of
their mantra ‘un seul héros, le peuple’ dictated the denial of any internal divisions or any
substantial pro-French element, relegating the harkis to the role of ‘traitor’. More recently,
events like ‘Black October’ and the violence of the 1990s have been used by some to advance
the argument that rather than a mauvais choix, the decision of the harkis to support France
was judicious and far-sighted. However, this has had little impact in Algeria where school
textbooks continue to teach that the harkis were groups of people who ‘ont préféré se vendre
à l’ennemi et combattre leurs propres frères…en échange d’argent, de biens, de titres’.490 As
current president Abdelaziz Bouteflika made clear during his state visit to France in 2000, ‘le
temps n’est pas encore venu pour des visites des harkis, c’est exactement si on demandait à
un français de la Résistance de toucher la main à un collabo’.491
On the opposite side of the Mediterranean, the harkis faced ‘a complicit silence’ as a
Gaullist vision of decolonisation took root that presented the process as a historical
inevitability that allowed France to relieve herself of her burdensome colonial commitments
and focus on modernisation.492 Turning the page on this inglorious and embarrassing past was
made a priority and the harkis were the principal casualties of a state-sponsored effacement.
Beginning with de Gaulle, this attitude extended into the presidency of Giscard d’Estaing and,
while things did begin to change under Mitterrand, it was not until Chirac took power that the
prevailing orthodoxy was significantly challenged. Yet paradoxically this commemorative
absence was accompanied by an almost excessive practical preoccupation with the harkis. Far
from having forgotten the community, successive governments paid great attention to their
material conditions, providing housing, education and financial benefits. Unfortunately, these
measures seem to have succeeded only in keeping the harki community together and to the
edges of French society.493 Housing policies have produced and reproduced ghettos, while the
administration of the community stands accused of having fostered a culture of dependence
and passivity that spans generations. The silence emanating from the French state was further
490 Benjamin Stora and Thierry Leclère, La guerre des mémoires: La France face à son passé colonial,
(Paris, 2007), p.59.
491 ‘Duplex Bouteflika’, JA2 20 heures, aired 16 June 2000 (Antenne 2). For further analysis of
Algerian politics in the post-war period see Martin Evans and John Phillips, Algeria: Anger of the
Dispossessed, (New Haven; London, 2007).
492 Maurice Faivre, ‘Les Français-Musulmans dans la guerre d’Algérie: Les représailles et l’oubli de la
France’, Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, 180 (October 1995), 164.
493 Other academics have taken issue with the idea of the French state having ‘forgotten’ the harkis,
notably Jordi and Hamoumou who have argued that it is more accurate to speak of ‘une véritable chape
de silence’. The testimony of fils de harki M.K. is cited in support of this: ‘Moi, j’aurais bien voulu
qu’on m’oublie, qu’on oublie mon père, que la France et l’Algérie nous oublient. Au moins on aurait
pu faire comme les pieds-noirs. On serait partie sans problèmes…’ Les harkis, p.55.
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compounded by the fact that many harki children who grew up in the camps in the 1960s and
1970s also received their education there, being denied access to the schools of the Republic.
But even those who did receive a mainstream education would still not have gleaned much
about their family history since the War of Independence was not introduced into the
Troisième until 1980 and the Terminale until 1983. Even then, textbooks either omitted the
harkis altogether, or mentioned them only briefly, usually as an appendix to the pied-noir
exodus of 1962.
‘Frères par le sang versé’
Moving beyond official historical interpretations to sub-state memory carriers who concerned
themselves with the harkis, the most famous champion of the harki cause in the immediate
post-war years was the Bachaga Saïd Boualam. The Bachaga was born in 1906 into a family
of Muslim notables with a long history of co-operation with the French. In 1946, after a
twenty-year career, the Bachaga left the French army in order to administer his family’s vast
estate. He entered the Assemblée nationale in 1958 as a deputy, rising to the position of vice-
president, which he held until 1962. During the War of Independence he was an ardent
supporter of the French cause and in July 1956 was placed in charge of the harka for his
region. At the end of the war, the French government evacuated the Bachaga and his sizable
entourage of approximately sixty people, installing them on an estate in the south of France
which rapidly became a focal point for the local harki and pied-noir populations. Widely
regarded as the emblematic personality of the harki community, the Bachaga was charismatic,
articulate, and politically savvy. This self-appointed spokesman used his considerable
reputation and means to campaign on behalf of ‘his’ harkis whom he considered to have been
cruelly betrayed in 1962. 494
The Bachaga, along with the majority of indigenous elites, viewed the harkis as the
logical continuation of a long tradition of French military service which had taken their
fathers to Monte Cassino and their grandfathers to Verdun. The harkis were therefore
considered to be indisputably French having acquired this right through le sang versé.
Addressing the French people, the Bachaga stated his case unequivocally: ‘Le sang des vôtres
et des miens s’est mêlé pour défendre cette terre de France…Des Boualams, il en est mort aux
quatre coins du monde pour y défendre la France et après ça on ose dire que nous ne sommes
494 ‘Récits d’atrocités’, Libération, 30 August 2001, p. 1. The Bachaga also penned three books in as
many years, all in defence of the harkis. Mon pays, (Paris, 1962); Les harkis au service de la France,
(Paris, 1963); L’Algérie sans la France, (Paris, 1964).
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pas Français?’495 This is also the source of the debt the Bachaga believed France did not
honour at the close of the conflict when the army failed to protect its auxiliaries.
In general, indigenous notables such as the Bachaga benefited from, and thus
supported, the presence of the French in Algeria. In terms remarkably similar to those of the
pieds-noirs, they evoke a pre-war atmosphere of harmonious inter-ethnic co-existence in
which ‘les Européens étaient nos amis; enfants, nous jouions ensemble. Il n’y avait aucune
friction entre les communautés’.496 Algeria, according to this interpretation, was a country
that would have been nothing without French impetus, but which was collectively constructed
amidst an atmosphere of fraternal co-operation for the benefit of all. Although mistakes were
acknowledged, particularly not integrating the native inhabitants into the administrative
structures of their own country, these were attributed to out of touch politicians in Paris, thus
conveniently exculpating the pieds-noirs and notables such as the Bachaga.497 Out of this
perception came the argument that the people of Algeria did not want independence, merely
more autonomy and equality within the framework of continued affiliation with France. ‘J’ai
longtemps rêvé d’une décolonisation qui ne soit pas une déchirure mais une alliance’, claimed
another prominent elite figure, the Algeria-born, Saint Cyr educated Colonel Abd-el-Aziz
Méliani.498
Enrolling on the French side when the war broke out was considered to be the natural
course of action by elites like the Bachaga who presented the decision of the harkis as a freely
made choice. This allowed the war to be cast as ‘d’abord un soulèvement contre les égorgeurs
et les pillards et une fraternisation totale des musulmans et des Français contre ce
déchaînement de haine’.499 Given the apparent strength of this pro-French sentiment,
combined with the vastly superior resources at France’s disposal, the eventual loss of the war
could only be explained by weak-willed government in the capital. This sets up a convenient
opposition between the treachery of France in her short-term political incarnation and la
France profonde to which the harkis and the Muslim elite remained loyal. ‘Nous ne
confondus pas la France véritable avec celle qui nous a trahis’, explained the Bachaga, a
distinction that allowed him to decry the abandonment of the harkis without jeopardising his
argument that they had been right to choose France and deserved to be compensated for their
sacrifices.500
495 Boualam, Mon pays, pp.14, 47.
496 Brahim F. cited in Francis Mauro and Bathoche Mahious, Compiègne, terre d’accueil pour les
harkis: Témoignages, (Agincourt, 2004), p.49.
497 Boualam, Mon pays, p.34.
498 Aziz Méliani and Daniel Bernard, ‘“J’ai choisi la France”: Entretien avec le Colonel Aziz Méliani’,
in L’Algérie des Français, p.292.
499 Boualam, Mon pays, p.31.
500 Ibid. p.92.
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As part of an educated and privileged elite, the Bachaga was in no way representative
of the mass of ancien supplétifs on whose behalf he spoke, but he was their public face until
the mid-1970s when ill health forced him to retire. The Bachaga was also something of an
anomaly within his own community of notables since early harki-orientated activism was
characterised by a lack of elite participation in spite of their material and cultural advantages.
In 1975, MADRAN president Ahmed Kaberseli sent 130 letters to prominent figures like the
Bachaga asking if they would be willing to assist the harki population; he received only two
affirmative replies.501 Not only were elites reluctant to get their hands dirty with the practical
aspects of campaigning, they appear to have preferred not to be associated with the harki
population at all. Mohand Hamoumou’s contention that these men feared that they would in
some way devalue themselves by rubbing shoulders with former auxiliaries is born out by the
reaction of Colonel Méliani upon being referred to as a harki in the course of an interview:
‘Pardon’ he pointedly interrupts the host, ‘je ne suis pas harki, je suis Saint-Cyrien’.502
‘Frères d’armes’ and ‘frères de repatriement’
In spite of his isolation within the elite milieu, the Bachaga’s presentation of the harkis and
their history remained potent because it closely corresponded with that of two other groups
who also campaigned on behalf of the harkis during this period: ex-militaires and the pieds-
noirs. Frenchmen who had served in Algeria were quick to concern themselves with the
harkis on the basis of their status as frères d’armes and their concomitant right to pensions
and other ancien combattant benefits. Prior to MADRAN, the Comité Parodi, created on the
initiative of young officers who had served in Algeria and headed by the Vice President of the
Conseil d’État Alexandre Parodi, was the primary defender of the harki cause. Although the
Comité Parodi occupied itself specifically with the harkis, the community were also given
consideration within the remit of broader veterans groups. In addition to assisting the harkis
materially with housing and jobs, these associations also advanced a particular historical
interpretation which cast the harkis as loyal soldiers who chose to fight for France because
they wished to remain French and who were then betrayed at the end of the war by the
politicians, bringing shame and dishonour to the army.
The desire to alleviate this sense of shame by emphasising a personal commitment to
‘their’ harkis, both in 1962 and subsequently, appears to lie behind the activism of many. The
dedication in Georges Fleury’s book, Le combat des harkis, read: ‘À tous les musulmans qui
501 Hamoumou, Et ils sont devenus harkis, p.39.
502 ‘Algérie: de la France à la guerre civile des blessures toujours à vif’, Ex libris, aired 21 September
1995 (Channel 1). The irony is that Méliani is one of a handful of elites who have opted to speak on
behalf of the harkis, albeit from a clearly established position of superiority.
115
nous sont demeurés fidèles…malgré tout!’; an attitude also evident in the collection of
memoirs from the higher ranks of the army.503 The experience of fighting alongside the harkis
was deemed to have given these men a privileged insight into the ‘true’ sentiments and
motivation of the supplétif, which they then sought to share with the wider French public.
Like the Bachaga, these men felt the need to assume a paternalistic responsibility for ‘their’
harkis; speaking on behalf of those they deemed incapable of speaking for themselves. The
wartime mentality of the bled was thus in many ways transported back to the mainland along
with the troops. Yet just as the harkis were only part of the French forces during the conflict,
after the war they formed only a fraction of the agenda of the main veterans’ associations.
Attention was directed towards them only sporadically, and then always as a special category
of troops, veterans entierèment à part rather than à part entière. Even the existence of
specifically dedicated associations and the support of high-profile figures such as Maurice
Faivre and Bernard Moinet produced few tangible gains for the harkis in the years leading up
to 1991.504
In conjunction with the Bachaga and veterans, pied-noir activists focused attention on
the harkis because they shared the experience of having been proud French citizens who were
deliberately deceived by de Gaulle and then forced to flee their homeland in fear of their lives
as a consequence of independence. The harkis therefore had the same right to recognition and
recompense from the French nation that the pieds-noirs so vehemently agitated for. As Jo
Sohet declared passionately in L’Algérianiste, ‘Rompre le silence, complice du mensonge,
apporter une pierre à l’édifice de vérité, rendre hommage et surtout rendre justice aux harkis,
frères et compagnons d’armes par libre choix, des soldats de France, voilà ma volonté, mon
ambition’.505 Yet as Joëlle Hureau has pointed out, pied-noir support was by no means
disinterested. Whatever the pieds-noirs had suffered - exile, déracinement, discrimination,
deprivation - the harkis’ experience had been, and continued to be, much worse.
Consequently, for pied-noir associations the situation of the harkis functioned as ‘une
amplification de la leur’, underscoring their case for the terrible and unnecessary suffering
caused by the end of French Algeria.506 The harkis also provided a perfect alibi against
charges of racism and exploitation that were regularly levelled at pieds-noirs with the
decision of over 200,000 Algerians to risk their lives in order to defend French Algeria
503 Georges Fleury, Le combat des Harkis, (Versailles, 1989). See also Bernard Moinet, Journal d’une
agonie, (Paris, 1965, reprinted 1999); Maurice Faivre, Un village de harkis des Babors au pays
drouais, (Paris, 1994); François Meyer, Pour l’honneur avec les harkis: de 1958 à nos jours, (Tours,
2005).
504 For a comprehensive list of measures in favour of the harkis see William B. Cohen, ‘The Harkis:
History and Memory’ in Algeria and France 1800-2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia, ed. by Patricia
M.E. Lorcin, (New York, 2006), p.176.
505 Jo Sohet, ‘Les Harkis, ces oubliés de l’histoire 1962-1978’, L’Algérianiste, 5 (15 March 1979), 27.
506 Joëlle Hureau, La Mémoire des pieds-noirs de 1830 à nos jours, (Paris, 2001), p.174.
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proving the fraternité réelle of colonial Algeria. The Bachaga was particularly valuable in this
regard, his wealth and status invoked frequently to refute suggestions that indigenous
Algerians were treated as second-class subjects, rather than as fully equal citizens. ‘Vous êtes
dans la mort comme jadis dans la vie, le symbole de la fraternité entre les populations
d’Algérie’, read one of the many pied-noir tributes at the Bacahaga’s funeral in 1982.507
Therefore, although the pieds-noirs set themselves up in contrast to the government
and political parties who were only interested in the harkis when it served their own ends,
such as during elections, in truth their representations were equally self-serving.508 Even
campaigns such as ‘Hommage aux harkis’, launched in 1987 by Jeune pied-noir (JPN), failed
to ‘honour’ the harkis on their own complex terms. The association instead presented them as
inextricably linked to the history of the pied-noir community by playing down issues such as
the pressures that lay behind enrolment, in favour of a narrative stressing the harkis
ideological commitment to keeping Algeria French.509 This is just one example of the fact that
the pied-noir population acts first and foremost as its own memory carrier, evoking the harkis
only if, and when, they are useful to their own cause. Interaction and cooperation between the
Muslim elites, veterans, and pieds-noirs is a long-standing phenomenon. The connections
between the three are multiple and over the years have enabled them to create a dense
network through which to propagate their mutually reaffirming discourses about the harkis.
Although they enjoyed nothing like the power of the state in terms of disseminating their
historical interpretations, in terms of the impact of their narratives upon the harkis and their
descendants, it is worth noting that these were generally the people with whom the harki
community had the most contact.
Outside of representations offered by those with a vested interest in the harki
community, another vector of transmission was the French media. Coverage in the televised
news and the press tended to revolve around moments of crisis such as the ‘hot’ summers of
1975 and 1991, as well as various hunger strikes held in between designed to highlight the
community’s ongoing plight.510 These features generally provided short, factual summaries of
the latest developments and lacked all but the briefest historical context. In the opinion of
Stéphanie Abrial, they were also alarmist in tone, presenting a negative collective image of
507 ‘Un grand Français nous a quitté’, EA, 4 (May 1982), p. 10.
508 The majority of harkis possess French nationality and can therefore vote, something that has
traditionally distinguished them from the Algerian immigrant population. Consequently, there have
been attempts to present the harkis as possessing block-vote potential in a bid to enhance their
bargaining position vis-à-vis the government. However, in truth the community is too heterogeneous to
deliver a substantial vote for any one party or individual upon command. The evidence also indicates
that the main political parties, with the exception of Front National, have never regarded the harkis as a
significant electoral force since they have done little to actively court their votes.
509 For further details on this campaign see Taouès Titraoui and Bernard Coll, Le livre des harkis,
(Bièvres, 1991), pp.252-254.
510 See, amongst others, Grève des harkis, aired 20 February 1987 (Channel 1); Santini chez les harkis,
aired 16 April 1987 (Channel 1); Drame harkis, aired 25 December 1988 (Channel 1).
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the harki community as ‘tous profondément touchés par le malaise des banlieues, ils sont tous
revoltés, ils sont tous en situation d’échec’.511 The small number of harki-dedicated
documentaries broadcast prior to 1991 were little different, focusing on the arrival,
installation, and adaptation of the harkis, rather than the reasons behind their presence in
France. C’étaient les harkis, which aired in 1963, presented a series of newly arrived harkis
who, after passing before ‘Monsieur le Juge’ in order to obtain French nationality, nervously
described themselves to the camera as French and professed loyalty to their new homeland,
albeit in broken French.512 The state was depicted as facilitating their integration through
education and training initiatives, while the closing shots lingered on a harki family whose
children had been given French prénoms, implying that the seeds of successful assimilation
had been sown.513 However, the picture painted in 1977 by Dossiers de l’écran was less
positive, stressing the harkis’ ongoing financial and social difficulties. The majority of the
community were described as ‘sans travail, sans famille, sans logement…pas de justice’,
although the producers did try to balance this negative image with harki success stories, such
as the butcher and teacher who had purchased a house in a ‘French’ neighbourhood.514 More
attention was devoted to the many reasons behind enrolment, although most commonly cited
was Abdallah’s motivation: ‘j’ai engagé pour gagner le pain pour mes enfants’.515 Unusually,
the programme was followed by a studio debate featuring prominent figures within the
embryonic harki associational movement, including Kaberseli and M’hamed Larradji,
president of the Comité des français musulmans rapatriés d’Afrique du Nord et leurs amis
(CFMRAA). This deviated from the usual pattern of inviting pieds-noirs to discuss the harkis
as a brief segment within programmes dedicated to their own community.516 What all these
representations have in common is that they offered a simplified and selective picture of the
harkis in accordance with the priorities of the group responsible for them. In assessing the
process through which the hegemony of these interpretations was eventually challenged it is
instructive to look closely at which components of these narratives were accepted and which
were rejected as the fils de harkis sought to reconstruct the history of their parents for
themselves.
511 Abrial, Les enfants, p.53.
512 Particularly notable in these sequences is the fact that in recognition of the high illiteracy rates
among harkis a signature was not required on the nationality documents, a cross was deemed
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From ‘denunciation’ to ‘enunciation’
At the height of the 1991 protests, journalist Philippe Bernard observed with respect to the
harki community that ‘les enfants ont soudain soif de cette histoire occultée qui est aussi la
leur’.517 The source of this thirst lies in the problem of how someone roots themselves in a
society when they do not know where they come from and when ‘personne ne semble capable
de reconnaître l’histoire des pères et la qualité de nationaux de toute une population en
manque de mémoire’.518 With such a vital imperative driving them, it is tempting to argue that
the fils de harkis simply collected fragments relating to their parents’ past, wherever
available, and fitted them together as best they could to form a picture that was at least
comprehensible. In support of this contention it is possible to cite the strong similarities
between the vocabulary used by the fils de harkis in their early campaigns and that used by
commentators external to the community. The most striking examples revolve around the
image of the harkis as ‘français par le sang versé’, a placard slogan seen repeatedly during the
1991 protests. There were also numerous references to the long history of military
engagements for France, such as Boussad Azni’s assertion that ‘Nos parents étaient fidèle à
leur engagement et jusqu’au bout’.519 Another dominant theme centres on the argument that
the French army disarmed and then abandoned the harkis following the signature of the Evian
Accords, leaving thousands to be massacred by a vengeful FLN and marsien Algerians.520
MADRAN’s campaigns, for example, were particularly focused on what Benjamin Stora calls
the ‘martyrology’ of the harki community, with the association arguing consistently that the
harkis were ‘les musulmans fidèles qu’ont été abandonnés sans défense, et cela dans les
conditions les plus ignomineuses’.521 Indeed, one of the components most strongly
internalised by the second generation is a sense of collective suffering and injustice, a feeling
only heightened, in the opinion of Abrial, by parental silence which was construed as
covering unimaginable trauma and grief.522 This view of their parents, but also of themselves,
as victims was further reinforced by the objective conditions of their daily lives. Finally, there
517 Philippe Bernard, ‘Harkis: au nom des pères les enfants des anciens supplétifs dénoncent l’injustice
dont ils sont victimes’, Le Monde, 10 July 1991, p.1.
518 Abrial, Les enfants, p.22.
519 Harkis: Le crime, aired 12 February 2002 (ARTE).
520 ‘Marsien’ is the term used to refer to those Algerians who remained on the fence until the outcome
of the war was certain, at which point they came forward claiming a long-standing allegiance to the
FLN. They are often identified as having engaged in the most ferocious acts of violence against the
harkis in an attempt to prove their pro-FLN credentials.
521 Ahmed Kaberseli, Le chagrin sans la pitié, (Paris, 1988), pp.44, 94; Benjamin Stora, La gangrène et
l’oubli: la mémoire de la guerre d’Algérie, (Paris, 1991), p.208.
522 Abrial, Les enfants, p.201.
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is the recurrent image of the harkis as caught between a rock and a hard place in terms of
official narratives with their history ‘niée par l’Algérie et refoulée par la France’.523
For the sociologist Emmanuel Brillet this phenomenon of incorporation can be
explained by the absence of an internally generated collective memory. This exposed the
children of the harkis to a ‘situation of loss of inherited identity’, which in turn made them
vulnerable to externally imposed definitions.524 While there is undoubtedly some truth in this,
as an over-arching explanation it oversimplifies the complicated process of memory
recuperation and reconstruction. The discourses of others have not simply been passively
absorbed and regurgitated; instead, there has been a clearly articulated desire on the part of
the fils de harkis from the outset to write their own history and thus to take back control of
their community’s identity and destiny. As Akim, one of the 1991 demonstrators, complained,
‘On nous a volé notre passé et notre mémoire, la France a fait de nous des bâtards de
l’histoire’.525
Reappropriating the past was thus seen as a way for the fils de harkis to obtain
retrospective historical justice, but also to better situate their own identity in the present. As
the prominent activist Hacène Arfi explained: ‘J’avais vraiment besoin de reconstruire ce
passé pour envisager l’avenir’.526 This impulse to décoloniser l’histoire which had for so long
simply been written about, rather than by, them was by no means unique to the fils de harkis,
it is common to all those who have been denied the right to speak for themselves. That it took
a generation from 1962 for the harki community to reach this stage is explicable primarily by
the institutionalised environments they lived in which meant that, unlike the homeland they
left behind, the harkis themselves were never decolonised. In particular, their day-to-day
treatment in places such as Saint-Maurice-l’Ardoise, which Tom Charbit aptly labels ‘un petit
monde colonial dans la métropole’, gave the distinct impression that they remained subjects
rather than citizens.527
Although the process of reappropriation began earlier, 1991 is regarded as the key
turning point, signalling ‘la fin de l’objectivation et le passage de la dénunciation à celui
d’énonciation’.528 However, untangling themselves from more established groups with an
interest in their cause was not a simple process as illustrated by M’hamed Larradji, a protest
523 Hamoumou, Et ils sont devenus harkis, p.293. However, it should also be noted that despite this
awareness of the ideological trap of the dominant state narratives, it was several years before the
nuances of there having been many reasons behind the enrolment of harkis became a prominent aspect
of fils de harkis campaigning.
524 Emmanuel Brillet, ‘A Remarkable Heritage: The ‘Daily Round’ of the Children of the Harkis,
between Merger and Villification’, Immigrants and Minorities, 22.2-3 (July-November 2003), 340.
525 Méliani, Le drame, p.193
526 Laurent Muller, Le silence des harkis, (Paris, 1999), p.53.
527 Chabrit, ‘Un petit monde colonial’, 33.
528 Géraldine Enjelvin, ‘Les Harkis en France: carte d’identité française, identité harkie à la carte?’,
MCF, 11.2 (May 2003), 169.
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instigator at Bias in 1975 who became the symbolic figure of the harki community during that
summer. While he demanded justice for the harkis and their families, Larradji came from an
elite background and seemed quite happy to ally with the pied-noir community both during
and after 1975.529 This decision distanced him from many of those he claimed to be
representing, particularly the younger elements who were highly critical of him. This was
especially the case after the revolt’s visibility and momentum were effectively co-opted by
certain pieds-noirs and used to pressure the government over the issue of indemnification for
their own community, eventually securing new measures which failed to make any provision
for the harkis.530 Yet despite these limitations, Larradji was important as a figurehead who
galvanised many within a previously apathetic community. ‘Il est le premier harki qui ose
braver publiquement les autorités’, explained Kerchouche when recounting Larradji’s impact
upon the harkis in the camp where her family were living in 1975. She therefore concluded
that for all his shortcomings, he did at least shatter the image of harkis as ‘l’éternel supplétif
soumis, docile et fidèle’.531 Lessons were learned from 1975, which came to be known as
‘l’été des dupes’ and in the years following there was a concerted effort by the fils de harkis
to stand alone with harki journals such as le Rappel full of warnings about the dangers of
external manipulation.
These examples are illustrative of the broader process whereby the fils de harkis
began taking back control of the presentation of their own past by contesting and rejecting
interpretations advanced by others. Chief among these was the notion that their fathers were
traitors who betrayed their Algerian brothers. Interviewed for the aptly-titled documentary,
Harki: un traître mot, Abdelkrim Klech, who has achieved iconic status among the harkis
through his frequent and lengthy hunger-strikes, deemed the transference of guilt from father
to son to be inevitable given that the notion of culpability was simply stated as fact in various
media for many years.532 This ‘definitive sentence’, as Klech calls it, was reinforced by the
environments in which his generation grew up. The experience of camps like Rivesaltes
prompted Besnaci-Lancou to feel that ‘Nous n’étions plus qu’un héritage encombrant pour la
France’, a sentiment which then led her to wonder ‘Si nous étions indésirables, presque
parias, étions-nous donc si coupables?’533 She went on in her autobiography to speak of the
way in which her community internalised the shame they perceived the outside world
attached to them: ‘La plupart d’entre nous ont intériorisé la honte infréquentable par les
529 Larradji’s father was close to the Bachaga Boualam and indeed both men were honorary presidents
of Larradji’s association, the CFMRAA.
530 Michel Roux, ‘À propos des événements de l’été 1991: le “casse tête” Harki’, Migrations société,
20.4 (March-April 1992),, 22.
531 Kerchouche, Mon père, p.181.
532 Harki: un traître mot, aired 29 April 2002 (France 5).
533 Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki: Le bouleversant témoignage d’une enfant de la guerre
d’Algérie, with Marie-Christine Ray, (Paris, 2005), p.75.
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opinions publiques de nos deux pays…La stigmatisation…nous a enfermés dans la culpabilité
comme dans une carapace’.534 Growing up with such a sense of stigma explains why, when
these activists did find their voice, rejecting the notion of treachery and calling for a
revalorisation of the history of their parents were so prominent on their agendas.
In addition to accepted or rejected images from external narratives, the interpretations
advanced by the fils de harkis also included internally generated components. Firstly, despite
protestations that ‘Le passé, nos parents n’en parlaient pas’, those who have spent time
collecting second generation testimonies note a surprising amount of factual and anecdotal
knowledge about the past.535 Laurent Muller rationalises this apparent paradox by suggesting
that harki family histories are ‘surdéterminée par une sorte de secrète dont personne ne parle,
mais que tout le monde connaît’.536 The most convincing hypothesis for how fragments of the
past trickled down from parents to children seems to be analogous to how familial memories
more broadly are transmitted. As David Lepoutre has claimed, family memory ‘ne se
transmet pas comme un savoir constitué, ni dans des modalités de communication
spécifiques, mais qu’elle s’acquiert comme une connaissance ordinaire, dans le cours
quotidien des interactions au sein de la famille’.537 Therefore anecdotes related by mothers to
their children concerning life là-bas, outbursts of paternal anger or emotion following
Algeria-related news items, parental conversations overheard and relayed by the oldest
sibling, all these scenarios suggest ways in which morsels of the past could have been
received, consciously or not, by children while growing up.
However, perhaps more significant than these quotidian scraps is the fact that the
second generation, particularly the older members, have shared many of their parents’
experiences. As Boussad Azni put it, ‘nous avons tous, peu ou prou vécu les mêmes
déchirements, les mêmes ébahissements’.538 In articulating the history of their parents, the
personal experiences of activists therefore featured strongly. These memories tend to revolve
around three pivotal events: the war, departure from Algeria, and arrival in France. Hacène
Arfi thus relates how his family fled Algeria after his father was stabbed four times in the
throat by the FLN, walking through the night in order to reach the port of Algiers. Once
safely on a boat bound for France, Arfi described the atmosphere as one of oppressive silence,
broken only by the subdued weeping of the women.539 This is echoed by Besnaci-Lancou’s
own memory of boarding a boat for France: ‘Nous montâmes à bord comme on entre dans
une cathédrale’, she recalled before going on to describe her first night in the Rivesaltes camp
534 Ibid, p.18.
535 Derrieu, La Cité de Tapis, p.36.
536 Muller, Le silence, p.95.
537 David Lepoutre with Isabelle Cannoodt, Souvenirs de familles immigrés, (Paris, 2005), p.290.
538 Azni, Harkis, p.100.
539 ‘Harkis: des français entièrement à part?’, Contre courant, aired 25 April 2003 (France 2).
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where everything was ‘si iréel’ she felt as if she had ‘quitté le monde humain’.540 The
majority of memories however, relate to time spent in the various centres d’accueil. Initial
perceptions remain vivid even many years later with Larbi Bouzaboun, upon returning to Bias
in 2006, stating: ‘des images qui défilent dans la tête sont vraiment atroce…c’est
l‘humiliation, l’oppression…un camp de concentration. Voilà, les remerciements de la
France, vis-à-vis nos parents qui ont combattu pour eux, qui ont donné leur vie pour elle’.541
According to Géraldine Enjelvin, all constructions of identity require a spatial point of
reference; the camps, as a veritable passage oblige where the harkis and their children spent
months, if not years, and from which they were often unable to come and go freely, filled this
role perfectly, fostering a sense of historical continuity between generations.542 It is therefore
understandable that internally generated elements formed a significant aspect of the historical
interpretations championed by the fils de harkis during the early stages of their activism.
The version of the past articulated by the fils de harkis on behalf of their parents was
thus very much a composite entity, constructed from a combination of internal and external
narratives available in the post-war decades. The years leading up to 1991, but particularly
from 1975 onwards, were crucial in its gestation, representing a period of not only mounting
tension and frustration, but also a gradual gaining in confidence among the fils de harkis
which ultimately enabled them to assert their own understanding of their community’s
history, instead of allowing the field to continue to be dominated by outside commentators.
Within this evolution, the existence of externally generated elite discourses about the harkis
was crucial, giving the fils something to both borrow from and react against. The content of
these external narratives is valuable not only as a point of comparison to the version of the
past proposed by the fils de harkis, but also because of what it reveals about the agendas and
self-conceptions of those providing the commentaries, many of whom, particularly
indigenous notables such as the Bachaga, continue to lack serious and sustained scholarly
treatments. Furthermore, the very existence of such discourses challenges the persistent image
of the Algerian War as the ‘war without a name’ by demonstrating that the conflict and those
who participated in it had always been a preoccupation for various groups, even if their
narratives often remained under the radar of the general French population because not
enshrined in public commemorative rituals. Yet if 1991 was a turning point for the fils de
harkis as a memory carrier in their own right, it was also a key year for the portrayal of the
Algerian War of Independence in France. This was the moment at which the ‘silence’
perceived as shrouding the conflict was definitively broken, a process that naturally had
implications for the evolution of the activism of the fils.
540 Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki, pp.62, 67.
541 ‘Amère patrie’, Documents x3, aired 13 October 2006 (France 5).
542 Enjelvin, ‘Les Harkis en France’, 164.
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6. The Evolution of Activism, 1991-2007
Associations and the Media
It took almost two decades for the fils de harkis to emerge as a mature and organised memory
carrier, a process that, as the previous chapter demonstrated, was by no means simple and
straightforward. The same is true of the years since 1991, which have seen significant
changes both within the activist segment of the community and more broadly with respect to
the place of the Algerian War of Independence within French history and collective
remembrance. As associations run by and for the harki community grew in numbers and
confidence, the very term ‘harki’ lost its pejorative connotations and was instead reclaimed as
an affirmation of a historically unique identity. These years also saw the French media
increasingly turn its spotlight on the harkis, resulting in a substantial multiplication in
documentaries and discussion panels devoted to this previously neglected population. This
heightened media profile coincided with, and indeed facilitated, the emergence of a group of
prominent individuals who were increasingly presented as emblematic spokespeople for their
community. Garnering the lion’s share of the new media attention, this cohort was novel in
many respects, not least because it included filles as well as fils de harkis. Although they
shared many characteristics, these men and women emerged into the public eye at different
points over a period of more than fifteen years. Each person’s moment in the spotlight was
due to certain unique attributes and the resonance of these at particular moments with the
wider public mood, while the transition in prominence from one individual to another was
indicative of changing contexts and commemorative needs. It is therefore important to
understand the background, motivations, and style of activism pursued by these men and
women and why these struck a chord more broadly when they did.543 Finally, the 1990s also
witnessed ‘une prise en compte officielle’ by ‘les pouvoirs publics plus visibles’ in response
to the raised profile of the community and of the war in general, leading many to speak of ‘la
fin d’un tabou’ by the dawn of the new millennium.544 This in turn impacted upon the
strategies adopted by harki activists and associations, something most clearly indicated by the
increasing recourse to the judicial system to obtain a satisfactory level of practical assistance
and official recognition. This chapter seeks to explore each of these major evolutions in turn,
while simultaneously highlighting the causality and connections between them so as to
543 It should be noted that this transition has not been a simple linear progression. There has been a
considerable degree of overlap throughout and none of the individuals discussed have really
‘disappeared’ from the activist scene, even though the media’s attention may have moved on.
544 Mohand Hamoumou, with Abderahmen Moumen, ‘L’histoire des harkis et Français musulmans: la
fin d’un tabou?’, in La Guerre d’Algérie 1954-2004: la fin de l’ amnésie, ed. by Mohammed Harbi and
Benjamin Stora (Paris, 2004), pp.339, 341.
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produce a coherent history of the next phase of the activism undertaken by descendants of the
harkis.
Characteristics of grassroots activism
‘Dès qu’un harki sait lire et écrire, il crée une association’, the Libération reporter Nicolas
Beau was told by the president of one such association.545 This remark is borne out by the
statistics which show that by 2001 more than five hundred harki associations existed.546 Amid
this flourishing grassroots activism, the dual demands for practical assistance and recognition
which dominated early organisations have endured, albeit now in a more formally organised
context. In principle, association formation represents ‘le moyen le plus efficace’ for the
descendants of harkis, as for other minority groups, enabling them to combine forces in order
to make their voices heard, as well as to confront and surmount common difficulties in a spirit
of solidarity.547 Yet theory has not translated into practice and assessments of the progress
made by these five hundred plus associations have been highly negative. Criticised for,
amongst other things, their ‘immaturité et inefficacité politiques’, the difference between the
status of the harki and pieds-noirs communities as collective memory carriers is marked, with
the former lacking the coherence, inter-associational networks, established calendar of events,
and the regular communications that characterise the latter group.548 Journalist Alain Rollat
was particularly forthright when he wrote: ‘Elle [la communauté] en a pâti et elle continue
d’en pâtir. Sa triste histoire est émaillée, depuis 1962, de grèves de la faim, de marches de
protestation, de faits divers oubliés, de mille révoltes individuelles dont l’impact a toujours
été limité’.549 For Abrial, the weaknesses inherent in these associations are a reflection of the
difficulties harki descendants have experienced finding their place in French society.550 ‘Nous
sommes les enfants illégitimes de deux histories illégitimes’ explained one, or, as Abrial put
it, ‘La France est à la fois leur pays d’origine et leur pays d’accueil mais ils ne partagent pas
les fondements culturels. L’Algérie n’est ni leur pays ni leur patrie mais ils sont attachés par
des liens familiaux, traditionnels et religieux’.551 The result was a late developing
associational movement characterised by a destabilising combination of influences and
allegiances.
545 Michel Roux, Les harkis: les oubliés de l’histoire 1954-1991, (Paris, 1991), p.377.
546 Mohand Hamoumou cited in ‘Plus de 500 associations représentent les harkis’, AFP Infos
Françaises, 23 September 2001.
547 Nordine Boulhaïs,, Histoire des harkis du Nord de la France, (Paris, 2005), p.213.
548 Abderahmen Moumen, ‘Les associations harkis: de la revendication sociale au combat pour la
reconnaissance’, Guerre d’Algérie Magazine, 4 (July-August 2002), 40.
549 Cited in Patrick Eveno and Jean Planchais (eds.), La guerre d’Algérie, (Paris, 1989), p.366.
550 Abrial, Stéphanie, Les enfants de harkis de la révolte à l’intégration, (Paris, 2001) pp.23.
551 Salem Kacet cited in Yvan Gastaut, ‘Le racisme anti-maghrébin et les séquelles de la guerre
d’Algérie’, H&M, 1174 (March 1991), 41; Abrial, Les enfants, pp.66.
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Other academics, however, have cited the predominantly local and specific
orientation of harki associations as the principal problem, with insular concerns preventing
wider connections being made across groups, thus calling into question any claim to broad
representation. Another obstacle to the development of a strong and cohesive associational
movement is the ongoing use of violence. The recurrence in 1993 and 1994 of the extreme
style of protests of the ‘hot’ summers divided the harki community. On the one hand, there
were those who argued this violence was qualitatively different to the violence of banlieue
riots because it was anchored in the defence of a precise historical cause and that it was
furthermore justified given the injustices endured since 1962. On the other hand, there were
many who felt the recourse to violence undermined the legitimacy of the demands presented
and did more harm than good to the harki cause.552
However, the principal root of the failures of the harki associational movement is
generally deemed to be the heterogeneity of the community. For all that the media tend to
present the harkis as a block, in truth, as already discussed, it is a case of ‘un milieu plutôt
qu’une communauté’.553 What unity does exist is largely due to the shared trauma of exile
from Algeria and marginalisation in France. Beneath this lies a myriad of intersecting and
overlapping divisions that have impeded attempts to collectivise the harki community into a
powerful and effective group. Some of these divisions are longstanding such as those
pertaining to tribe, region, and religion, as well as the linguistic split between Arabic and
Berber.554 Further fissures have emerged since 1962, such as a socio-economic generation gap
with those born later tending to be better educated and better off. These divisions are
manifested in the different approaches pursued by various associations. Most notable in this
respect is the Convention nationale des Français Musulmans (CNFM). Although formed in
1979 as part of an attempt to federate the diverse harki groups and despite boasting forty-six
member associations in 1988, the association has remained aloof from, and inaccessible to,
most harkis. Hamoumou’s rather scathing assessment of the organisation’s bi-monthly
journal, Le Rappel, was that it contained ‘peu d’informations’, was ‘rarement polémique ou
incisif’ and existed primarily to demonstrate to politicians that there were ‘des Français
musulmans rapatriés “bon chic, bon genre” susceptibles de faire partie des états-majors
politiques sans détonner’.555 Out of touch with the grievances and needs of those they claimed
552 Abrial, Les enfants, pp.178-184.
553 Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, ‘Harkis: le paradoxe identitaire’, Regards sur l’actualité, 175
(November 1991), 43.
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Association des Français Musulmans rapatriés de l’Avesnois (AFMRA) had proved so successful was
that the majority of its members originated from the Chaoui tribe. In his eyes, this fact noticeably
reduced ‘les excès d’individualisme’ in comparison to other associations. Boulhaïs, Histoire des harkis,
p.222.
555 Mohand Hamoumou, Et ils sont devenu harkis, (Paris, 1993), p.309.
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to speak on behalf of, the CNFM ultimately failed in its federative endeavour. Subsequent
efforts to follow in their footsteps such as the États généraux of 24 and 25 March 1990 that
sought to unite 350 harki associations, also stumbled. According to Boulhaïs, this was ‘un
décevant échec’ which suggested that the barriers to unity were insurmountable.556
Beyond differences in origin, age, and agenda, the harki community has also had to
contend with diverse political allegiances as several fils and filles have eschewed harki-
orientated activism in favour of broader organisations such as SOS Racisme and Sans
Frontière which reached their apogees in the mid to late 1980s, while a minority even turned
to the Front National.557 The politics of others have also impacted negatively upon the
associational movement, namely the government’s policy of financial support to associations,
which has encouraged a proliferation of small groups and prevented the emergence of a
single, powerful and representative spokesperson to act as an intermediary between the
community and the state. The overall effect of the lack of complementarity between
allegiances, agendas, and structures has been that harki associations have struggled to find
common platforms.558 In essence, proliferation has not been accompanied by depth or
durability; out of over five hundred associations, it is estimated that less than 10 per cent are
actually active.559 This had led to a pattern developing whereby frustrations build up within
the most marginalised sections of the community and boil over into violent protest. However,
momentum and visibility cannot be sustained long enough for significant gains to be made
because there is no strong and united grassroots base to support the surface peak. The result is
that ‘Chaque fois la chape d’oubli est retombée très vite. Plus lourde’.560
Rise of Media Profile
What is particularly unfortunate is that this endemic weakness within the associational
movement has prevented the harki community capitalising on the more favourable cadres
sociaux of the 1990s, in particular the growth of media interest in them. Although never
completely absent from the French media, one of the most notable features of the post-1991
period has been the sharp increase in the number of televised documentaries and debates
556 Yet interestingly Boulhaïs goes on to note that in contrast to trends in the south of France, the north
has seen a decline in the overall number of associations which he attributes partly to an increase
federation among smaller associations. Boulhaïs, Histoire des harkis, pp.235, 213-216.
557 For further information on this see Martin Evans, ‘The Harkis: the Experience and Memory of
France’s Muslim Auxillary’, in The Algerian War and the French Army 1954-1962: Experiences,
Images, Testimonies, ed. by Martin S. Alexander, Martin Evans, and J.F.V. Keiger, (Basingstoke,
2002), p.130.
558 Even at the height of the 1991 protests, the delegation of harki representatives invited to talks with
the government was riven by factionalism to the point that a joint appeal for calm had to be made by
Hacène Arfi and Hamlaoui Mekachera. Le Monde, 6 August 1991, p.6.
559 Jean-Jacques Jordi, and Mohand Hamoumou, Les harkis, une mémoire enfouie, (Paris, 1999), p.41.
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devoted to the harkis and their descendants. In the 1960s and 1970s, the small number of
harki-specific programmes were overwhelmingly focused on la vie quotidienne of the new
arrivals. When documentaries tackling the War of Independence in its entirety began to
emerge, the harkis were usually featured as brief and stand alone segments. In such
programmes their story was generally narrated by a French ex-militaire with the emphasis
consequently placed upon the shame of abandonment in 1962 and the narrator’s personal
regret over the fate of his brave and loyal men. Yvon Durand, a former SAS officer, was one
such figure; his disgust over the ‘hypocrise’ and ‘lâcheté’ of his civilian and military
superiors with respect to the harkis compelling him to resign at the end of the war.561 In these
programmes commentary from within the harki community was almost always provided by
fils and usually centred on their struggles to adapt and to be treated like the French citizens
their identity cards proclaimed them to be. ‘On vivait en double exil’, Mohammed told the
camera in 1982, ‘exil de fait d’avoir changer de pays d’une manière aussi tragique et puis exil
aussi de la vie même de cette accueil en France’.562 Studio debates during this time were still
largely the territory of the pieds-noirs and prominent military personnel like Bigeard or
Méliani who spoke on behalf of the harkis.
In the 1990s the tone changed with the broadcasting of Les années algériennes and
La guerre d’Algérie. After this, treatments of the war in general, but also of the harkis
became far more common, enabling the community to benefit from a numerical increase in
emissions devoted solely to them and from more sustained consideration within programmes
with broader scopes. Particularly notable in this respect was Les années algériennes, which
drew heavily on interviews with Saïd Ferdi who was arrested by the French army aged just 13
and forced to enrol as a harki.563 At the end of the conflict he was evacuated to France by the
army where he attempted to come to terms with all he had experienced and to start a new life,
although he found it impossible to forget the old one, writing, ‘je constate avec force qu’il me
manquera toujours les plus belles années de ma vie, volées par les hommes’.564 Through his
willingness to publicly recount his experiences, Ferdi thus became one of the first and the
most prominent eyewitnesses to emerge from the harki community. By calling into question
the idea that harkis chose, of their own volition, to fight with the French, his narrative broke
with the Manichean division between traitors and patriots, exposing instead the more complex
reality. Ferdi was also notable because his testimony was not mediated through a third party.
He thus became something of a poster boy for the harkis, a status which unfortunately
561 ‘Guerre d’Algérie, Mémoire enfouie d’une génération: 3. Déchirements et fidelités’, Moeurs en
direct, aired 21 November 1982 (Channel 2).
562 Ibid.
563 Although he had previously been featured in a 1981 Apostrophes debate, Ferdi’s contribution to
Stora’s documentary was lengthier and more detailed. ‘La guerre d’Algérie’, Apostrophes, aired 11
September 1981 (Channel 2); ‘Les tricheurs’, Les années algériennes, aired 30 September 1991 (A2).
564 Saïd Ferdi, Un enfant dans la guerre, (Paris, 1981), p.198.
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resulted in many of the nuances of his account being lost as the media and public
concentrated on the most shocking elements at the expense of the implications of his account
for the way the war was being represented and commemorated in France and in Algeria at this
time.
Another key media moment occurred when Planète Chaude broadcast a three-part
documentary exclusively concerning the harkis.565 Moving from ‘l’enrôlement’ through
‘l’abandon’ to ‘les fils de l’oubli’, a thorough chronological explanation of the harkis was
offered, supported by interviews with both harkis and their children, representing the most in-
depth consideration of the subject to-date. Coming two years after Les années and the 1991
demonstrations, and mere months after another summer of protest by the fils in the south, Les
harkis stood at a crossroads. Casting the harkis as ‘ni patriotes, ni traîtres, mais simplement
des victimes’, the programme sought to continue in Stora’s tradition of adding nuance while
also breaking new ground by highlighting previously neglected aspects of this still relatively
unknown period of French history.566 Consequently, the different roles undertaken by the
harkis were stressed, particularly the fact that by no means all harkis were engaged in active
combat. The documentary also did not shy away from evoking the violent nature of the harki
experience, whether as victims or perpetrators. Tales of FLN atrocities, especially in the
closing stages of the war, were told, accompanied by montages of massacred harkis and
abandoned villages. These were, however, juxtaposed with testimony from men like Yahia
Zaid who confessed that he would never forget the treatment of the ‘suspects’ who passed
through the hands of his Commando.567 This is also one of the few harki-orientated television
emissions, indeed treatments of the harkis in any media, to dwell at length on the role of the
harkis on 17 October 1961 as part of Papon’s FPA. The ‘impressionante’ record of the FPA
in breaking FLN cells in Paris is related by a former FPA commander Pierre de Roujoux and
supported by photos of large caches of weapons recovered from the FLN and a series of
headlines from the time with captions such as ‘La Goutte d’Or, quand les harkis passent les
rues se vident’.568
However, although innovative in certain respects, other aspects of Les harkis
conformed very much to traditional patterns of representation. While space was reserved for
direct testimony from harkis and their children, the majority of commentary was provided by
people external to the community. Whether from a military, administrative, or personal
perspective, all spoke on behalf of the harkis they had been in charge of. In the mouths of
these men, the harkis lost much of their agency, while the complexities of their various
565 ‘Les harkis’, Planète chaude (3 episodes), aired 12 December 1993 to 8 November 1994, (Channel
3).
566 ‘Les harkis: 1. L’enrôlement’, aired 12 December 1993.
567 Ibid.
568 ‘Les harkis: 2. L’abandon’, aired 19 December 1993.
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combatant statuses were erased, replaced with a monolithic image of a community of victims
betrayed French politicians. The documentary therefore comprises two separate narrative
strands that run parallel to each other, in many ways mirroring the confusion within the harki
associational movement as it continued to struggle to disentangle its own voice from those of
more established narratives and spokespeople.
By 2000, the harkis were receiving regular media coverage, a trend that has
accelerated even more in the wake of high profile events such as Bouteflika’s state visit, the
establishment of a Journée nationale d’hommage aux harkis, and the controversy surrounding
Loi 2005-158. Again, this coverage combined new and old formats, tropes, and participants.
One significant contemporary development has been the appearance of programmes made by
fils and filles de harkis, such as Le mouchoir de mon père in which Farid Haroud traced the
history of his father and the harkis more generally using the leitmotif of a handkerchief on
which his illiterate parent had sewn pictures expressing his experiences and feelings
throughout the war.569 While the old guard of spokespeople from the pied-noir and military
milieu are still present and still reiterating the same version of harki history, the balance of
representation has tipped in favour of testimony from the harki community itself, with fils and
filles assuming greater prominence. When external commentary is sought, the first point of
call is increasingly academics such as Benjamin Stora, Mohand Hamoumou, and Giles
Manceron.
What has not changed is the absence of the harkis themselves. When they do feature
it is almost always in the context of news reports relating to nationally significant events such
as the Journée nationale. Those interviewed are almost always in situ, offering sound bite
comments from the now abandoned centres d’accueil, or the very few camps that remain
inhabited. Given the rarity and brevity of these opportunities, the picture presented is highly
selective with contributions gravitating around the themes of previous loyal service to France,
the lack of choice when enrolling, betrayal at the end of the war and suffering since 1962.570
‘Alors je viens souffrir ici à cause de la France’ one harki told the camera, ‘J’ai perdu une
jambe, un bras. J’ai fait deux guerres…la Tunisie et l’Algérie…Et après je suis venu là,
comme un clochard’.571 Harkis are never seen inside television studios or in any formal
setting. In 1999, Place de la République dedicated an episode to the three-month long
‘marche contre l’oubli’ from Amiens to Paris that had been undertaken, somewhat unusually,
by a contingent of harkis under their own initiative. Footage from the march itself included
emotional testimonies from the marchers explaining how they had ‘suivi le drapeau de France
jusqu’au bout’. Yet when it came to the studio portion of the programme assessing the impact
569 ‘Le mouchoir de mon père’, La case de l’oncle doc, aired 21 September 2002 (Channel 3).
570 See, for example, ‘La mémoire des harkis’, Édition national, aired 30 August 2001 (Fr3).
571 La guerre d’Algérie: malentendu ou absurdité?, aired 9 September 1990 (Channel 3).
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of the march, these men were nowhere to be seen and were instead represented by their
children with the thrust of the discussion centred around whether the children had fully
‘assumed’ the ‘choice’ of their fathers.572 Even programmes that deliberately sought to give
the microphone to the actors themselves, such as Harkis: des français entièrement à part?,
end up with more testimony from the second than the first generation, thus attesting to the
ongoing difficulty of accessing unmediated harki recollections, despite the more conducive
climate of recent years.573
The Prominence of Individuals
As already highlighted, the heterogeneity of their associational movement meant that the
harkis were not able to benefit from a single, pre-eminent figurehead capable of uniting the
community and acting as a mediator. It was particularly unfortunate that this situation
coincided with the heightened media profile of the community, which demanded just such a
personality to embody the collective experiences of the harkis and capitalise on the
unprecedented level of interest being shown towards them. Yet rather than a continuation of
the pre-1990 trend whereby those external to the community assumed the role of harki
ambassador, this combination of factors instead produced a new phenomenon whereby a
succession of figures from within the harki community attracted the attention of the media
who hastened to cast them as representative symbols of the harki population. However, as the
following discussion will show, these men and women were in fact more representative of
current and changing attitudes to the war and its legacies.
The Old School of Hacène Arfi and Abdelkrim Klech
The first people to obtain notoriety in this manner were fils de harkis, Hacène Arfi and
Abdelkrim Klech. Both are of what could be termed the ‘old school’ of harki activism,
despite the apparent irony of the phrase given the relative youth of the phenomenon.
Obtaining their formative protest experiences in the summer of 1991, both men have
remained within this action-orientated, grassroots tradition. At the older end of the second
generation spectrum, they remain strongly rooted in their community and have not enjoyed,
despite their public profiles, the sort of socio-economic advancement that many younger fils
de harkis have been able to benefit from. Their trajectories and circumstances are therefore
similar to those of the men and women on whose behalf they speak. Emerging during the
early stages of the ‘médiatisation’ of the harkis, their celebrity was an unexpected by-product
572 Place de la République, aired 26 January 1999 (Fr2).
573 ‘Harkis: des français entièrement à part?’, Contre courant, aired 25 April 2003 (Fr2).
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and never the primary intention behind their activism. Despite not seeking the fame they
acquired, both men were quick to appreciate its benefits in terms raising the profile of their
cause. They thus accepted the mantle of harki spokesperson and have proven tireless and
eloquent advocates for their parents and their contemporaries. Along with Ferdi, they were
the dominant ‘faces’ of the harki community and the outside world’s link to this group during
the 1990s
Born in 1957, Hacène Arfi’s family fled Algeria in 1962 after his father was attacked
by the FLN. Passing briefly through Rivesaltes before ending up in the Saint Maurice
l’Ardoise camp, the young Hacène witnessed scenes that he later described as ‘atroce’.574 His
own experiences of camp life were little better causing him, aged eleven, to slip under the
barbed wire and run away for three days. ‘Quand je suis rentré’ he told L’Express in 1997, ‘je
croyais être allé en Belgique. En fait, j’avais dormi à 100 mètres du camp’.575 Like many of
his generational cohort, Arfi grew into a bored and frustrated adolescent who, unable to find
work, ‘boit et se bat du matin au soir dans les bars’.576 It was only upon finding employment
in the forestry service at the age of twenty-two that his sense of injustice was ignited. He
initially tried writing a book about his family’s trajectory, but found that the more he wrote
the more he was opening old wounds and so abandoned the project in favour of taking
practical action. This included occupying the prefecture of Marseille armed with three fake
grenades upon learning that the army planned to sell the land on which Saint Maurice
l’Ardoise had stood to the French government for a single symbolic franc.577
However, it was his role during the 1991 protests that really catapulted Arfi into the
national media spotlight as he was broadcast nightly across French news leading bands of fils
as they vented their frustrations following decades of neglect and broken promises. Arfi
subsequently stated that his actions were motivated by the desire to give ‘un coup de pied
dans la fourmilière des associations’ in a bid to bring forth new leaders from the younger
generation and to achieve coordination between groups.578 The first of his wishes was
certainly granted as Arfi quickly became ‘une personnalité avec laquelle il faut savoir
compter et même négocier’, evidenced by his invitation to join the delegation assembled by
the government to discuss measures to address the plight of the harkis. Yet unlike Larradji in
1975, Arfi also managed to continue to enjoy widespread support from within his own
community, becoming, in the opinion of Laurent Muller, ‘l’un des rares porte-parole
574 Laurent Muller, Le silence des harkis, (Paris, 1999), p.53.
575 Dalila Kerchouche, ‘Hacène Arfi, fils de harki blessé à vie’, L’Express, 15 May 1997, p.136.
576 Ibid. p.136.
577 Ibid. p.136. There is some debate about the status of the grenades and also the root cause of his
occupation with Laurent Muller recording that the grenades were genuine ones left over from the
Second World War that Arfi discovered accidentally and that it was jury service in Aix which
prompted his actions in Marseille. Muller, Le silence, p.54.
578 Cited in Hamoumou and Jordi, Harkis, p.41.
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véritablement reconnus et appréciés d’un grand nombre de harkis de la première comme la
seconde génération’.579 This is possibly because Arfi’s ‘fame’ did not alter his material
conditions. He continues to live a stone’s throw from the former site of Saint Maurice
l’Ardoise in the community of Saint Laurent des Arbres, alongside many other harki families
from the camp. The extreme edge of his activism has mellowed over time, but he remains
firmly committed to the harki cause and has coordinated several commemorative endeavours
including organising his own ‘hommage aux harkis’ ceremony in 1992, which saw a
commemorative plaque erected on the former site of the Saint Maurice l’Ardoise camp. The
plaque contains the phrase ‘Rappelez-vous de ces hommes. Ils n’étaient pas un mythe’,
evoking a devoir de mémoire that Arfi feels compelled to ensure is honoured in his own
lifetime as well as by future generations.580
This desire is one that he shares with fellow activist Abdelkrim Klech, frequently
described as an ‘icon’ of the harki community for the longevity and the commitment of his
campaigning. Klech, whose modus operandi of choice is the hunger strike, has commented
with respect to his activism that: ‘Je ferai en sorte que la mémoire reste, que mes enfants
sachent.…’581 Born in 1953, Klech’s childhood parallels Arfi’s in many respects, although for
him the humiliation and suffering of ‘repatriation’ crystallised around the experience of
witnessing his father beaten and insulted as a ‘traitor’ in the street at the age of eleven.
‘C’était la première fois que j’ai vu mon père pleurer, il a tombé des larmes’ he later
recalled.582 Determined to restore the dignity of men like his father, Klech went on to
combine sporadic employment with protest, including blockading the Marignane airport over
the sacking of two harki employees in 1981 and spending two months obstructing the A96 as
part of the 1991 protests.583 However, it is the multiple hunger strikes that Klech has
conducted that have brought him the most attention. Over two decades he has organised ten
such strikes, the last being in 2006 in response to Georges Frêche’s categorisation of the
harkis as ‘sous-hommes’. His goal is to obtain justice, both material and moral, for all
generations and to gain recognition of the fact that men such as his father were ‘ni collabo, ni
autre…il s’est battu à côté de la France pour défendre la salle de lui’.584 His commitment to
his cause has resulted in his hospitalisation on numerous occasions, but he has vowed that he
579 Muller, Le silence, p.50.
580 Ibid. p.226.
581 Ibid. p.92.
582 Harki: un traître mot, aired 29 April 2002 (Fr5).
583 Cédric Alviani, ‘Harki solitaire face au dôme des Invalides’, Libération, 1 January 1998, p.18.
584 Klech’s relationship with his father is a complex one. Although stating that he ‘approved’ of his
father’s decision to fight with the French to defend his home and family and having acknowledged that
his father was not opposed to independence, Klech went on to say that he personally would have opted
to fight with the FLN, albeit in a ‘clean’ manner. Harki: un traître mot, aired 29 April 2002.
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will carry on ‘jusqu’au bout’, insisting that ‘Je suis prêt à mourir pour que le problème soit
définitivement réglé’.585
New Faces: Dalila Kerchouche and Fatima Besnaci-Lancou
In the early 2000s, two new harki activists who were unusual in terms of background,
trajectory, and style of activism eclipsed Arfi and Klech. Their appearance on the media’s
radar coincided with the peak of attention devoted to the harkis, which in turn created a new
set of circumstances, demands, and expectations on all sides. Emerging almost
simultaneously, Dalila Kerchouche and Fatima Besnaci-Lancou presented a very different
face of the harki community, not least because they were filles de harkis rather than fils. Yet
it was more than just their gender that distinguished them from previous spokespeople.
Highly educated and socio-economically successful, both women have placed their activism
within the remit of media-based advocacy rather than practical action. In choosing dialogue
over demonstration, they have taken the links established by Arfi and Klech between their
community and French society and built them into a veritable bridge. Indeed, passerelle is an
apt term for Kerchouche and Besnaci-Lancou who seem able to cross over between these
different groups with ease. Both their personalities and their style of activism suit the highly
mediatised climate in which the War of Independence is now discussed, a happy coincidence
which has rendered their message accessible to an unprecedented portion of the French public
they were seeking to connect with and inform.
The younger of the two women, Dalila Kerchouche, was born in 1973 in the Bias
camp, although her family were to live there for only one more year before moving into their
own house twelve years after first arriving in France. Benefiting from a more integrated
childhood and a mainstream education, something denied to both Arfi and Klech who were
educated inside the camps, Kerchouche went on to attend university and become a journalist
for L’Express where she was tasked, among other topics, with covering the harki community.
However, it was with the publication in 2003 of her memoir-cum-history, Mon père, ce harki,
that she achieved greatest prominence. Kerchouche conceived of her book as a way to
understand and thus reconnect with her father, a man she had worshipped as a child but who
had become a virtual stranger to her as an adult on account of what she termed ‘ce passé
trouble’.586 Her family history was also framed as a personal quest to discover and accept her
own identity as a fille de harki, a label she was often assigned but never knew how to react to.
Over the course of the book she moves from defining herself as ‘une fille de harkis…avec un
585 Sylvia Zappi, ‘Grève de faim de deux fils de harkis pour que la France reconnaisse “ses fautes” ‘, Le
Monde, 10 April 2000, p.10.
586 Dalila Kerchouche, Mon père, ce harki, (Paris, 2003), p.32.
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petit “h” comme honte’, to the point where she is able to lay claim to the identity ‘fille de
Harkis’, with ‘Un grand H, comme Honneur’.587
In spite of the intimate nature of much of the book, Kerchouche’s journalistic training
is evident enabling Mon père also to serve as an informative history of the harki community.
As Kerchouche herself wrote, ‘Alors qu’au départ je me pensais écrire qu’un histoire
individuelle, je me rends compte que ce récit ressemble au parcours de milliers
d’anonymes’.588 This productive duality has been maintained in her subsequent projects,
including a novel and a television screenplay, which have targeted both academic and
populist audiences in a bid to increase awareness and understanding of the harkis.589 All have
proved popular with French audiences, a fact undoubtedly aided by Kerchouche’s numerous
television appearances where she comes across as committed but also charming, lacking the
aggression of harki spokespeople like Boussad Azni. Kerchouche is thus ideally placed to
exploit the current media and public interest in the War of Independence in order to further
her rehabilitation-through-education agenda.
Despite their different ages and approaches, Kerchouche shares with Arfi and Klech
the determination to obtain recognition for her community. The death of her grandfather
bringing her to the realisation that ‘Voilà ce qui attend les harkis: la mort et l’oubli si nous,
les enfants, ne témoignons pas, si nous les laissons partir sans les écouter, sans leur parler,
sans essayer de les comprendre.590 All three also developed their consciousness of the need to
take action at roughly the same stage in their lives, early adulthood. However, this was not the
case for Fatima Besnaci-Lancou. Born in 1954, Besnaci-Lancou falls within the same age and
experience bracket as Arfi and Klech, being just old enough to remember the suffering
imposed by the war, as well as her family’s flight from Algeria. Once in France, Besnaci-
Lancou spent her childhood in various camps, including Rivesaltes but, unlike Arfi and
Klech, attained a high level of education and established her own small publishing house;
embodying, in many respects, the ideal of successful integration so vaunted by the Republic.
Also unlike Arfi and Klech, who have always strongly identified themselves with the
preceding generation, Besnaci-Lancou deliberately chose not to allow her parents’ past to
define her identity. ‘Jusqu’ici, je ne m’étais intéressée qu’épisodiquement à ma communauté’,
she wrote in 2003. ‘Je ne voulais pas rester prisonnière d’une identité cloisonnée…Être harki,
ce n’est pas héréditaire…Je ne veux pas que mon fils soit “petit-fils de harkis” avec tout le
587 Ibid. pp.13, 195, 257.
588 Ibid. p.173.
589 For Kerchouche’s subsequent projects see Destins de harkis: Aux racines d’un exil, with Stéphan
Gladieu (Paris, 2003); Leïla: avoir dix-sept ans dan un camp de harkis, (Paris, 2006); Harkis, aired 13
October 2006 (Fr2); ‘Amère patrie’, Documents x3, 13 October 2006 (Fr5).
590 Kerchouche, Mon père, p.53.
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désespoir qui s’y attache’.591 This changed, however, on 16 June 2000 when President
Bouteflika infamously assimilated the status of the harkis in Algeria to that of ‘collabos’. His
remarks so offended Besnaci-Lancou that she immediately sat down and, ‘presque d’un seul
jet’, wrote down her recollections of ‘cette guerre sans nom, si longtemps refoulés (sic)’.592
Although writing for her children in order to ‘effacer l’honte et faire barrage à la haine’,
Besnaci-Lancou, like Kerchouche, quickly realised that her story had a far wider resonance.
Acknowledging that hunger strikes, demonstrations, and even lawsuits are ‘necessary’,
Besnaci-Lancou went on to specify that ‘ce n’est pas ma démarche’.593 Instead, she like
Kerchouche, has chosen to operate primarily through the medium of the written and spoken
word.594 She has thus embraced, in her own way, the role of community representative
assigned to her by the media.
Aside from her relative socio-economic prosperity and late-developing communal
identification, Besnaci-Lancou stands apart from her generational cohort in another key
respect: her relationship to Algeria. Besnaci-Lancou’s discourse is broadly one of
reconciliation towards her former homeland, professing early on in her memoir that ‘Mon
coeur a toujours battu au rythme de l’Algérie…Si j’avais milité, cela aurait été en faveur de
l’émergence de la démocratie en Algérie’.595 Although highly critical of the FLN regime, both
for its actions in 1962 and for its ongoing mistreatment of harkis, Besnaci-Lancou
nonetheless concludes Fille de harki with the statement: ‘Mon rêve le plus cher serait un
rapprochement avec l’Algérie’.596 Besnaci-Lancou has also demonstrated her commitment to
dialogue with Algeria and Algerians by participating in a commemoration of 17 October 1961
in the hope that both Algerians and harkis could ‘assumer leur heritage dans la dignité et la
fraternité’ as part of a wider initiative ‘pour la réappropriation des mémoires confisquées’.597
Another way in which Besnaci-Lancou has attempted to reach out and connect the
harkis cause to other sectors of French society is through the association Harkis et Droits de
591 Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki: Le bouleversant témoignage d’une enfant de la guerre
d’Algérie, with Marie-Christine Ray, (Paris, 2005), p.17.
592 Ibid. p.83. Besnaci-Lancou thus conforms to the reaction noted by Laurent Muller whereby when
racism strikes ‘l’un des leurs’ the sense of belonging of those who normally distance themselves from
the harki community comes to the fore. Laurent Muller, ‘Les enfants de harkis et leurs parents: entre
distance et proximité’, Cultures et Sociétés, 4 (Winter 1994), 10.
593 Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki, p.119.
594 Besnaci-Lancou went on to produce two collections of testimony, Treize chibanis harkis, (Paris,
2006) and Nos mères: paroles blessées: Une autre histoire de harkis, (Léchelle, 2006); as well as a
history of the harkis in collaboration with Gilles Manceron entitled Les harkis dans la colonisation et
ses suites, (Paris, 2008).
595 Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki, p.17.
596 Ibid. p.119.
597 ‘Des enfants de harkis et d’immigrés commémorant samedi le 17 octobre 1961’, AFP Infos
Françaises, 13 October 2004. Her stance was not, however, appreciated by all with one 1961
demonstrator, Mohamed Barka, telling reporters ‘Les harkis n’ont pas leur place ici. Je serais fils de
harki, j’aurais honte d’être venu’. ‘Commémoration du 17 octobre 1961’, AFP Infos Françaises, 16
October 2004.
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l’Homme of which she is the president. Orientated very much toward the dissemination of
information, the group aims to ‘mettre en oeuvre tout travail d’histoire et de mémoire, sous
l’ongle des droits de l’homme, pour faire connaître l’histoire des harkis’.598 Close
collaboration with the Ligue des droits de l’Homme gives Besnaci-Lancou’s organisation an
anchor in communities outside of the harkis and also epitomises her passerelle status, an
attribute Kerchouche also possesses. With a foot in each camp as it were, both women are
able to move, apparently seamlessly, between their own communities and wider French
society. Indeed, both have openly expressed their attachment to France without denying their
origins, something that Arfi and Klech have never done. This has enabled them to make the
harkis seem less ‘other’, an ability enhanced by the narratives they present which, although
emblematic of wider collective experiences, are based very much at the level of the individual
and the human.
Interestingly, the most distinctive attribute of Kerchouche and Besnaci-Lancou, their
gender, is actually the least commented upon, although it is noticeable that they have done
more than any other activists to open up space to allow the wives and widows of harkis to tell
their stories. While Arfi has made reference to females as a neglected group in the harki
narrative, remarking ‘ce serait bien qu’il n’y ait pas qu’un soldat’, no one prior to Besnaci-
Lancou had taken the next logical step and actively sought out their memories.599 Nos mères
is a conscious corrective to this historical imbalance prompted by the reaction to her first
book after which many women came up to her to say: ‘Tu vois ma fille, moi si je savais écrire
mille pages ne suffiraient pas à raconter toutes les misères que j’ai subies depuis la guerre
d’Algérie jusqu’au maintenant’.600 Kerchouche clearly shares her sentiments, for despite the
title Mon père, her mother plays an equally central role in the tale. Kerchouche also used
Destins de harkis to make the point that ‘Si le drame des harkis commence à sortir de l’ombre
depuis quelques années, le drame de leurs épouses indiffère. Si les hommes ont été bafoués,
leurs femmes l’ont été encore plus’.601 Both women have used their priviledged insider
positions to access testimony that has eluded other researchers and present it to the general
public in the hope that it will not only raise awareness of the complexity of the harki
experience, but also help ‘les autres femmes issues “des guerres” ou “de l’exil” à deposer un
jour leur fardeau’.602
598 www.harki.net [2 August 2008]
599 Muller, Le silence, p.227. The exception to this is Farida Hamak’s Ma mère: histoire d’une
immigration, (Paris, 2004). However, the reader does not learn that the family in question are harkis
until late in the narrative and the book is presented as a story of immigration, rather than as a history of
the harki community.
600 Besnaci-Lancou, Nos mères, p.19.
601 Gladieu and Kerchouche, Destins de harkis, p.91.
602 Besnaci-Lancou, Nos mères, p.20.
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A further under-explored aspect of the harki experience raised by Kerchouche in
particular is the question of generation. Although the basic distinction between a first and a
second generation remains valid, certainly with respect to activism, the coherence of the so-
called ‘second generation’ may need to be reconfigured. For example, although Kerchouche
is technically, and indeed defines herself as, a fille de harki, the fact that she was born over a
decade after the end of the war and was the only one of her nine siblings to grow up outside
of the camps sets her apart: ‘Amers et moquers, mes frères et soeurs plus âgés traitent souvent
de ‘privilégiée’. Eux ont connu les ‘camps’. Pas moi. Eux ont souffert. Pas moi. Cette
existence très leur a trempé le caractère. J’en ai été preservée’. 603 Mon père is in part her
response to this sense of exclusion: ‘J’aimerais pourtant, à travers ce livre, abolir cette
frontière avec les miens, toucher du doigt ce passé que je n’ai pas vécu. Pour me sentir, enfin,
membre de ma famille à part entière’.604
The Kerchouche family therefore arguably functions as a microcosm of the various
factors, including age, experiences, relative degrees of success, and integration that have
prevented harki activists developing a cohesive and united front at the associational level. It
also gives Kerchouche’s passerelle status an internal as well as external significance since she
stands at the crossroads, not only between her community and the rest of French society, but
also between the second and third generations. What she represents is the emergence of an
issue that the pied-noir community have increasingly been forced to face: how to transmit
history and memory to those who have no direct experience of the events in question? The
role of the camps and forestry hamlet as symbolic collective experiences helped mute the
division between fils and filles born in France and those born in Algeria, thus maintaining a
sense of generation cohesion. Additionally, although there remains much to do to fully
integrate the harki community, significant advances have been made since the 1960s, which
raises the question of how to ensure an ongoing activist commitment from the petit fils and
filles de harkis, especially if there is little in their material condition that connects them to
their parents’ and grandparents past? More mediators like Kerchouche who are
simultaneously inside and outside the community they speak on behalf of therefore seems
inevitable even though it represents a further step away from the voices of the first generation.
Boussad Azni and the judicial turn
Eclipsing these relatively subtle evolutions in the activism of the fils and filles de harkis is the
controversial strategy of pursing recognition and recompense through the courts, a move
spearheaded by Boussad Azni through the Comité national de liaison des harkis (CNLH).
603 Kerchouche, Mon père, p.25.
604 Ibid. p.25.
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Although Azni shares with his fellow activists the desire to restore dignity to their parents by
making their history more widely known and understood, believing that ‘un peuple n’est rien
s’il n’a pas de mémoire’, the primary focus of his activism has been the judicial system.605 To
this end, on 30 August 2001 his association registered a lawsuit against X for crimes against
humanity with respect to the treatment of the harkis at the end of the war.606 All involved are
keen to stress that it is not a case of obtaining ‘condemnation’, but rather gaining recognition
of the fact that ‘à un certain moment de son histoire, la cinquième République a forfait à
l’honneur, au courage, et à l’humanité. Et que l’Algérie moderne, née de la guerre, s’est
baptisée avec le sang des harkis’.607 The content of the lawsuit thus concentrates primarily on
the atrocities committed in the summer of 1962 and the lasting suffering they produced. It
also emphasises the patriotism of the harkis, making frequent reference to the ‘dette de sang’
in order to place the harkis within an ancien combattant continuum with the logical corollary
that the harkis were entitled to the same protection and rights as veterans of previous
conflicts.608 The main thrust of the plainte is therefore the failure of France to honour this
duty of care, which allows the crime against humanity charge to be levelled at France on the
basis of non-assistance to people in danger.
‘Crime contre l’humanité vous semble exagéré?’ Azni asks towards the end of his
book. ‘Mais comment appeler autrement le massacre concerté, réalisé à grand échelle, d’une
population déterminée sur des critères précis d’appartenance à un corps constitué ou
d’opinion?’609 Beyond convincing his readers of the validity of defining these acts as crimes
against humanity, Azni faces the more difficult challenge of convincing the courts that this is
also the case. The spate of trials of former Vichy officials in the 1980s and 1990s prompted
the definition of a crime against humanity to be amended in 1985, 1992, 1995, and 1997.
These modifications were arguably designed to confine its application to the Second World
War and prevent this charge, the only one to benefit from the status of imprescriptibility,
being brought with respect to the War of Independence, especially after Maître Vergès’
defence of Klaus Barbie.610 Azni is aware that he faces an uphill struggle because of what he
regards as the ‘interprétation très restrictive’ currently in place. He nonetheless remains
605 Boussad Azni, Harkis, crime d’État: Généalogie d’un abandon, (Paris, 2002), p.39
606 In many respects Azni’s book, which appeared the following year, can be read as an extended
presentation of the case he and his lawyer put to the court. In particular there are approximately twenty
pages of eyewitness testimony and a lengthy evidential appendix consisting of reproductions of official
documents. Even the title, Harkis, crime d’État, has a legalistic resonance.
607 Ibid, pp.8, 25.
608 Ibid. p.25.
609 Ibid. pp.147-148. Although not an official part of the suit, Azni believes that the charge is equally
applicable to way the French state treated the harkis in France, viewing the Bias camp where he grew
up as part of a deliberate government plan to eradicate the harkis because they were living reminders of
France’s humiliation and shame in Algeria. See Ibid. pp.103-119.
610 Vergès’ strategy involved trying to turn the focus away from Barbie’s crimes and onto ‘war crimes’
committed by France in her colonies after 1945, especially in Algeria.
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confident that his evidence fulfils the criteria of the ‘pratique massive et systématique
d’exécutions, tortures, ou enlèvements’, as part of the enactment of ‘un plan concerté’.611 This
will only be sufficient if he can also prove that these actions were carried out ‘au nom d’un
État pratiquant une politique d’hégémoine idélogique’, the crucial additional stipulation in
French law.612
It is possible to argue that the symbolic value of the plainte is more important than
the actual outcome. Azni’s actions have garnered an enormous amount of media coverage for
the harki community, including an extended treatment in the documentary Harkis; le crime.613
It is also true that the morally and historically loaded phrase ‘crime contre l’humanité’,
especially in a post-Pinochet, post-Milosevic world makes for a potent emblem and
mobilisation tool. This is augmented by Azni’s evocations of the ‘devoir de mémoire’,
another increasingly loaded term in contemporary France, represented by the suit. Between
médiatisation, moralisation, and mobilisation, the harki cause in Azni’s hands has reached
new heights of notoriety, regardless of the eventual decision.614.
Biographically, Azni has most in common with Arfi and Klech having experienced
camp life, struggled with his identity, and fallen briefly into delinquency before discovering
activism. Yet although he departs from his generational cohort in his style of activism, by
focusing on the judicial system as the best means of obtaining recognition for the history of
the harkis Azni joins a rapidly growing trend with respect not only to the Algerian War, but
history and memory more generally in France. The idea of employing the legal system in the
quest for recognition and recompense appears to have first been mooted within the harki
community in the early 1990s with Le Monde reporting that the ‘nouveau combat’ of Arfi
following the summer of 1991 had been to engage the lawyer Maître Gilbert Collard to look
into the possibility of bringing a case against the French and Algerian authorities for crimes
against humanity, although even then it was appreciated that ‘Ce sera dur’.615 This tactic has
however, also been utilised by numerous other memory carriers connected to the war. In
addition Vértias’ legal pursuit of General Katz, the Mouvement contre le racisme et pour
611 Azni, Harkis, p.155.
612 For further information on the evolution of the law see Raphaëlle Branche, La guerre d’Algérie: une
histoire apaisée? (Paris, 2005), pp.111-114. Azni can perhaps draw succour from parliament’s decision
in 2001 to accord the treatment of black slaves the label ‘crime contre l’humanité’. See
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000405369&dateTexte=. [3
August 2008].
613 Harkis: le crime, aired 12 February 2002.
614 In 2003 a new suit was lodged by a select group of harkis under the direction of Azni and the CNLH
against Pierre Messmer, Minister of the Armies during the war. This tactic also appears not to have
harmed Azni’s career prospects as he was named Conseiller pour le Monde Combattant, les Harkis et
la Citoyenneté by the Secretary of State for Veterans in 2007.
615 François Xavier Reymond, ‘Un an après la révolte des enfants de harkis. Le nouveau combat de
Hacène’, Le Monde, 25 July 1992, p 7. No reference to the outcome of Maître Collard’s actions could
be found.
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l'amitié entre les peuples (MRAP) supported Louisette Ighilahriz in her suit relating to the
torture to which she was subjected to at the hands of the French army, while the children of
Larbi Ben M’hidi, the FLN leader tortured to death by paratroopers in 1957, have made a
similar representation to the courts. Finally, another ‘plainte contre X’ has been lodged
regarding the French state’s role in the events of 17 October 1961. This ever lengthening list
has prompted Branche to observe that the French courts are rapidly becoming the privileged
site for discussions of this particular aspect of France’s past’.616 For Rousso, this trend is a
clear offshoot of Annette Wieviorka’s ‘ère de témoin’, particularly the ascendancy of
victimhood as a valued status:
La figure du héros s’estompe peu à peu au profit de celle de la victime, et
l’affrontement entre anciens adversaries ne porte plus sur la question de savoir
jusqu’à quel point les uns et les autres menaient une guerre aux fins ‘justes’ - avec
des moyens et des conséquences, à qui le furent rarement - mais sur leur capacité à se
présenter comme des victimes.617
Indeed, the preface to Harkis, crime d’État defines the goal of both the book and the lawsuit
as ‘Leur rendre leur identité, expliquer les circonstances de leur mort, c’était le moyen de leur
attribuer leur veritable statut, celui de victimes’.618
When tracing the origins of this changed mentality most academics point to the
impact of the Vichy syndrome, particularly its judicial dimension. The trials of Barbie,
Touvier, and Papon are deemed to have led many within the harki community to hope for a
similar remedy for their own grievances, namely judgement rendered on those they regard as
to blame for their situation combined with an official state apology to redress the historical
record.619 This was particularly true of the Papon case where the two wars were conflated
within a single individual, validating the idea that these two unique periods in history were
somehow comparable.620 It is certainly a connection made frequently by the media, the
voiceover to Harkis: le crime concluding, ‘Ce que les juifs ont demandé, les harkis, comme
d’autres victimes de l’histoire le demande aujourd’hui’.621 Furthermore, Azni’s rhetoric not
616 Branche, La guerre d’Algérie, p.111.
617 Henry Rousso, ‘La guerre d’Algérie et la culture de la mémoire’, Le Monde, 5 April 2002.
618 Azni, Harkis, p.8. Although recourse to the courts can be construed as an example of the harkis
reclaiming agency by taking their own destiny in hand, in another sense it risks ghettoising the
community by assigning them the legally enshrined, blanket status of victims. In light of the efforts and
time taken to escape from the ‘carcan idéologique’ of being either traitors or patriots, to return to an
all-encompassing communal definition seems a reductive backwards step.
619 William B. Cohen, ‘The Harkis: History and Memory’ in Algeria and France 1800-2000: Identity,
Memory, Nostalgia, ed. by Patricia M.E. Lorcin, (New York, 2006), p.178.
620 The problems with such a comparison are outlined by Branche in La guerre d’Algérie, p.95.
621 Harkis: le crime, aired 12 February 2002.
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only makes direct reference to the precedent set by Vichy, but does so in language framed
around the concepts of persecution and genocide that is strongly reminiscent of that which
accompanied the reawakening of Jewish memory in the 1970s.622 Remarking on the
employment offered by the government to the harkis while they were in the camps, Azni
states, ‘Comment disaient les Allemands? “Arbeit macht frei”, le travail rend libre, c’était
écrit au-dessus de la porte d’entrée, à Buchenwald’.623 The contemporary international
situation has also clearly influenced the way in which this courtroom-based quest is
conceived of and justified, with the vice-president of Justice pour les harkis explaining to
reporters on the day Azni lodged his suit, ‘Quand on voit Pinochet bloqué en Angleterre,
Ariel Sharon poursuivi par une Palestinienne en Belgique, Milosevic à La Haye, nous, les
harkis, on est en plein dedans’.624 However, although international precedents are important, it
seems that their principal role has been to add further weight and wider contemporary
resonance to a pre-existing vocabulary that was developed as a result of the Vichy trials
which remain the main reference point in terms of the practical result that is being sought by
activists like Azni.
More than obtaining the condemnation of one party or another, Branche views these
legal processes as ‘plus radicalement et plus simplement’ about getting a certain aspect of the
past recognized officially ‘comme ayant été’.625 Yet despite the coincidence between this and
Azni’s ostensible protestations, it is evident that more than mere recognition is at stake here.
‘Car nous visons’, Azni’s plainte reads, ‘à démontrer la collusion de la France gaulliste et de
l’Algérie benbelliste, au nom des intérêts économiques et stratégiques particuliers, ont
délibérément sacrifié une population entière’.626 That is to say, as well as recognition, they
want responsibility to be assigned and for that assignation to be given a legal stamp of
legitimacy so that the final word falls in their favour. This impetus is something that Branche
herself implicitly recognizes when she later quotes Resistance specialist Robert Berlot’s
observation that:
Le recours au procès est devenu, dans la perception collective, le moyen naturel
d’écrire l’histoire de nos événements douloureux, parce qu’on imagine qu’il sera ainsi
possible d’objectiver et de figer cette écriture dans une ultime sentence insusceptible
d’aucun recours, ce qui apaisera d’un coup nos questionnements et nos inquiétudes.627
622 Harkis: le crime, aired 12 February 2002; Cohen, ‘The Harkis’, pp.176-177. Although Cohen’s
observation referred to the harki community in general, it seems particularly appropriate to Azni.
623 Azni, Harkis, p.79.
624 Cited in Michel Henry, ‘Les fils de harkis s’interrogent’, Libération, 30 August 2001, p.4.
625 Branche, La guerre d’Algérie, p.99.
626 Azni, Harkis, p.147.
627 Robert Berlot, ‘Préface’ in Francis Jeanson, Notre guerre, (Paris, 2001), p.9. Also cited in Branche,
La guerre d’Algérie, p.138.
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This was also what was expected of the Vichy trials and the same thorny issues pertaining to
the vast differences between the disciplines of history and the law that plagued those trials
will also arise if Azni’s case ever reaches a courtroom.628
However, even before his plainte makes it that far, it has already affected the history
and memory of the harki community in several important ways. In the first instance, the mere
act of collating evidence to form a suit alters the historical record by restructuring the
testimony of which it is composed, imposing neat divisions and categories onto the past in
order to support a particular narrative structure. This inevitably happens with all accounts, but
the very specific end to which this particular re-telling is directed and the potential for the
interpretation it presents to become enshrined in law magnifies both the distortions and their
ramifications. Conforming to the restrictive format of the legal process which aims essentially
to render one of two possible verdicts, the story presented by Azni is by necessity less
nuanced than that articulated in the works of Kerchouche and Besnaci-Lancou. Instead of the
complicated allegiances of Kerchouche’s father who aided the FLN while also serving as an
auxiliary, in Azni’s rendering ‘la France était tout’ for the harkis.629 In contrast to the
complex past evoked by Kerchouche, the divisions between heroes and villains, perpetrators
and victims, have to be drawn more clearly by Azni because this is the intended end result of
the lawsuit. The danger is clearly that diversity and detail will be sacrificed as evidence is
marshaled in the service of a master narrative that has to appear both coherent and definitive
in order to succeed in its objectives. Indeed, this can already be seen in some of the objections
that have been raised to the legalistic strategy on the basis that it is too blunt an instrument to
do justice to the intricate history of the harkis. ‘[L]a question harki a surtout besoin de
nuances’, one fils de harki told reporters when asked his opinion of Azni’s actions.630 He went
on to argue, as others have done, that pointing the finger solely at France, because it is not
possible to point it at Algeria through the French courts, risks confusing the issue; after all it
was the FLN who ultimately carried out the 1962 massacres, not the French army.631 The
historical record is thus artificially distorted by the removal of important context in order to
fit the strictures of the French legal system.
A related issue is the manner in which evidence was gathered to support the charges
being brought. Although the veracity of the testimony of the various plaintiffs is not being
questioned, the environment in which these accounts were collected was very different to the
628 Perhaps the most succinct summary of the difference is Branche’s definition of justice as ‘figée,
definitive, simplifiée’ compared to history which she views as ‘évaluative, revisable, complexe’.
Branche, La guerre d’Algérie, p.138.
629 Kerchouche, Mon père, p.254; Azni, Harkis, p.154.
630 Farid Haroud cited in Henry, ‘Les fils de harkis’, p.4.
631 Ibid. p.4.
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way one imagines Besnaci-Lancou approached contributors to Nos mères. Particularly
interesting in this regard is a section of Harkis: le crime that shows Azni holding a public
meeting in the Bias camp to address those who were part of the original suit. Standing on
stage, Azni acknowledges that many in the audience have never previously spoken of their
experiences. He then turns to the harki standing next to him and says: ‘Je crois c’est ton
devoir, Badji, de dire ici, publiquement les tortures et comment tu as été torturé’. Badji
haltingly does as he is told, recalling with great emotion how ‘Ils m’ont passé une broche ici,
jusqu’à l’os, elle est sortie dans la bouche…Les doigts coupés, la tête tendue, l’épaule cassée,
les tortures sans cesse…’ As Badji is escorted off the stage at the end of his testimony he is
trembling and crying while the audience applauds.632 The subtext of this exchange is that it is
a duty incumbent upon the individual to make public their private memories for the
communal good, regardless of the personal trauma involved. The inclusion of an element of
compulsion represents a clear evolution of the oft-invoked notion of a devoir de mémoire that
the pied-noir community uses to legitimate much of its activism. Instead of simply a potent
rhetorical framing device, the above example suggests the potential for imbuing the sense of
obligation inherent in the phrase with a practical, performative dimension, making the ‘duty’
something that can be imposed upon someone in a tangible sense. Such a development may
indeed result in access to previously unspoken testimony, such as that provided by Badji, but
at what price to history and memory, not to mention to the individuals in question? It also
raises the uncomfortable question of manipulation. Azni clearly has an agenda that he
believes all harkis do, or should, subscribe to and he is using his authority as a spokesperson
to obtain a hearing for that agenda at the highest levels. But to what extent do the harkis who
are participating in his lawsuit share his vision of their past and the ends to which he is
seeking to direct it?
Azni has defended his combative style of activism, claiming ‘Nous sommes, pour
nous, encore en guerre’.633 This formulation, which is strongly reminiscent of that employed
by pied-noir associations, especially from the late 1990s onwards, has drawn criticism, most
notably from Benjamin Stora. Azni and Stora, two men endowed with strong personalities,
clashed over precisely this issue during an emission of C dans l’air dedicated to the war.634
While discussing the importance of not replicating animosities from a war that ended four
decades ago, Stora made reference to Azni’s ‘combat’ for recognition of the ‘tragedy’ of the
harkis. Although Stora described Azni’s efforts as ‘admirable’, he went on to argue that the
central issue was to move beyond ‘perpetual accusations’ so as to illuminate the past without
moralising it, or casting it as a continual battle out of which can emerge only one victor;
632 Harkis: le crime, aired 12 Fenruary 2002.
633 Ibid.
634 ‘Les cicatrices françaises’, C dans l’air, aired 12 March 2002 (Fr5).
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essentially making the case he has made elsewhere for a progression from memory into
history to be undertaken by all sides. Azni countered that he saw ‘history’ as gaining
recognition of the fact that his father, and by implication Azni as well, were not traitors and
that the ‘real’ traitors were those in power on the other side of the Mediterranean; a tellingly
black and white response to the shades of grey being advocated by Stora.635
Combining Activism and Academia: Mohand Hamoumou
However, not all harki spokespeople have such rigid stances. An interesting case in point is
Mohand Hamoumou. Having both authored a thesis and founded a harki association,
Hamoumou appears to bridge the gap between activism and academia that divides Azni from
Stora. Although this duality is one Hamoumou has sought to exploit productively by
capitalising on the unique status and opportunities it affords him, his position is not always a
comfortable one.
Born in 1956 in Sétif into a family which, like many at the time, contained both
harkis and FLN militants, Hamoumou’s harki father was killed the same year. Repatriated
with the remainder of his family to France, Hamoumou shared the experience of growing up
in various camps with his fellow activists, later remarking, ‘Quand j’étais petit, j’ai connu les
joies du camping dans le Larzac’.636 Yet unlike Arfi, Klech, and Azni, Hamoumou attended
university where he submitted a thesis in 1989, later published as the widely acclaimed Et ils
sont devenus harkis. His ‘ascension remarquable’ made him the epitome for the ideal model
of harki integration and success, although he is only one of several fils de harkis who have
emerged from higher education as analysts of their own communities, other notable examples
being Nordine Boulhaïs and Saliha Abdellatif.637 Yet Hamoumou has also chosen to combine
the critical distance of academia with the engagement of practical activism. He thus created
Association, Justice, Information, Réparation (AJIR) in 1998 by federating three pre-existing
harki groups.638 The goal of AJIR is to ‘faire connaître l’histoire des Harkis et convaincre les
décideurs politiques de passer de l’assistanat à la réparation matérielle et morale puis à la
pleine intégration politique’.639 Their gaze is also future orientated as indicated by their
635 Ibid.
636 Cited in Céline Guiral, ‘Une mémoire à fleur de peau’, Le Progrès, 24 June 2005, p.21,
637 The phrase is taken from a biography provided by Maurice Faivre in Un village de harkis, p.133. It
is indicative of the high regard in which both veterans and pieds-noirs hold Hamoumou upon whom
they lavish praise. Interestingly, while there are plenty of women who study the harkis, there has yet to
be a fille de harki who has chosen this path and attained the same degree of success as the above
mentioned scholars.
638 www.harkis.com [28 June 2008].
639 www.harkis.com/article.php3?id_article=41 [28 June 2008].
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commitment to developing ‘un esprit de solidarité et fraternité’ within the harki community in
the hope of fostering dialogue and thus ‘encourager la transmission de la mémoire’.640
Hamoumou’s academic background has bolstered his credentials as an activist,
certainly in the eyes of those beyond the harki community. Operating in several spheres
simultaneously has also afforded Hamoumou a passerelle function similar to that enjoyed by
Kerchouche and Besnaci-Lancou, although his influence extends further than theirs in that he
also serves as a privileged interlocutor between the harkis community and the French state. In
language highly reminiscent of the attributes accorded to Jacques Roseau, Le Progrès offered
the following description of him: ‘Médiatique, charismatique, Mohand Hamoumou apparaît
aujourd’hui comme l’homme de la situation pour porter ce combat [des harkis] au plus prés
des instances politiques’.641
Yet Hamoumou’s academic-activist status is not without its problems. As a scholar of
the harki community, Hamoumou is dedicated to breaking with the simplified myths of
previous eras. ‘Il est temps’, he informed readers of Le Figaro, ‘de refuser mythes et
mystifications et de reconnaître la complexité d’une guerre civile enracinée dans l’histoire
coloniale pour comprendre qui étaient les harkis, et ce que fut leur calvaire’.642 Yet as an
activist, he is motivated by a sense of personal commitment to obtain justice for his
community. These two facets of his personality do not always sit comfortably together. For
example, although Hamoumou supports Azni’s lawsuit as a necessary ‘nouveau moyen
d’action’ since demonstrations and hunger strikes ‘n’ont pas suffi à obtenir juste réparation’,
he is wary of the danger of making ‘généralisations hâtives et abusives’, such as targeting the
French state when ‘Ce n’est pas la France qui a commis ces massacres, mais le pouvoir
algérien de l’époque’.643 Although he admits ‘Il est malheureux que nous soyons réduits à
utiliser les tribunaux comme tribunes’, Hamoumou has yet to fully distance himself from this
course of action because of its negative implications for historical understanding in the
manner that Stora has publicly done. Hamoumou is thus indicative of only one of the many
tensions and contradictions that have emerged as harki activism has evolved since 1991.
640 http://www.harkis.com/article.php3?id_article=42 [28 June 2008].
641 Guiral, ‘Une mémoire’, p.21. In another interesting parallel with Roseau, there is definitely a degree
of tension between Hamoumou and Azni, possibly attributable, beyond simple difference of opinion
over strategy, to Azni’s desire to be the community spokesperson through which the government
negotiates. Given Azni’s recent appointment as Conseiller pour les Harkis, it will be interesting to see
how their relationship evolves.
642 Mohand Hamoumou, ‘Les harkis, un trou de mémoire franco-algérien’, Esprit, 161 (May 1990), 32.
643 Cited in Henry, ‘Les fils de harkis’, p.4.
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Commemoration and the State
Waiting for a ‘geste officielle’
In spite of differences in age, background and approach, all the aforementioned spokespeople
are united in their belief that the moral and material recognition they demand on behalf of the
harki community needs to be accompanied by some kind of official gesture. Besnaci-Lancou
has spoken of the need for ‘une geste plus forte…comme pour la communauté juive’, while
Hamoumou has publicly called for ‘une loi par laquelle la République, une et indivisible,
assumerait, d’une part, la responsabilité de l’État de 1962… [et] d’autre part, s’engagerait à
évaluer et à réparer les préjudices subis, tant matériels que moraux’.644 The model is clearly
Chirac’s speech of 16 July 1995 commemorating the Vel d’Hiv rafles in which he directly
acknowledged the role played by the French state in the deportation of tens of thousands of
Jews during the Second World War with the words ‘Oui, la folie criminelle de l'occupant a
été secondée par des Français, par l'Etat français’.645
Key to this is the notion of responsibility since acknowledgement from Chirac that
the harkis served France loyally and were thus owed a ‘dette d’honneur’ has not proven
sufficient to satisfy activists. Rather than simply a passive acceptance that these events
occurred, they continue to demand affirmation of the active role played by the French state in
these acts. Although different to Azni’s quest, both calls stem from the same concern to
obtain some form of official, and thus nationally legitimated, support for a particular reading
of the past. This is reflective of a wider evolution within French commemorative culture
whereby the perception has grown that only concrete gestures made at the highest levels are
capable of ‘panser les plaies toujours ouvertes d’une société française malade de sa guerre
d’Algérie’, in the same way that such a belief became anchored with respect to the Vichy
period.646 Robert Berlot, although giving this phenomenon a much wider application,
nonetheless argues that citizens traditionally feel that ‘l’État doit déplorer, dénoncer et
énoncer le bien et le mal, le vrai et le faux, le commémorable et le non-commémorable’.647
The last phrase, which refers to the power of the state to arbitrate ‘le commémorable et le
non-commémorable’, is particularly relevant to the Algerian War, both in terms of the
previous lack of commemoration and today’s ‘hypermnésie’.
644 Interview with Adrien Hervais, aired 26 September 2005 (Radio HDR); Mohand Hamoumou, ‘Pour
les harkis, dépasser le stade de la compassion’, Le Monde, 10 February 2005, p. 15.
645http://elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/interventions/discours_et_declarations/1995/juillet/allocutio
n_de_m_jacques_chirac_president_de_la_republique_prononcee_lors_des_ceremonies_commemorant
_la_grande_rafle_des_16_et_17_juillet_1942-paris.2503.html [28 June 2008].
646 Branche, La guerre d’Algérie, p.98.
647 Berlot, ‘Préface’, p.8.
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If such a gesture has not been forthcoming towards the harkis, what exactly has the
state done to recognise the community and their history since 1991? The answer appears to be
taking a series of incremental steps that build on the foundations laid prior to the 1990s.
Giscard’s 1974 declaration that ‘les Français musulmans ont les droits éminents à la
reconnaissance nationale’ was echoed by Jospin in 1981 in his capacity as leader of the PS.648
However, it took until 11 June 1994 for these words to be translated into a concrete proposal
in the form of a law adopted unanimously by parliament expressing the gratitude of the
Republic towards its anciens supplétifs.649 As the war grew in visibility during the 1990s so
the pace of recognition for the harkis picked up with, among other initiatives, the unveiling of
a monument in 1996 dedicated to the civilian and military victims who fell in North Africa
between 1952 and 1962. By the time parliament classified the ‘events’ in Algeria as a ‘war’,
6.8 billion francs of aid had also been distributed via various government programmes to the
harki community.650 However, the most significant act of official recognition took place on
25 September 2001 with the inaugural Journée nationale d’hommage aux harkis. Chirac took
this opportunity not only to reiterate the gratitude of previous presidents towards the harkis,
but crucially went on to state:
Les anciens des forces supplétives, les Harkis et leurs familles, ont été les victimes
d'une terrible tragédie. Les massacres commis en 1962, frappant les militaires
comme les civils, les femmes comme les enfants, laisseront pour toujours l'empreinte
irréparable de la barbarie. Ils doivent être reconnus.
La France, en quittant le sol algérien, n'a pas su les empêcher. Elle n'a pas su sauver
ses enfants.
Les Harkis ne sauraient demeurer les oubliés d'une histoire enfouié. Ils doivent
désormais prendre toute leur place dans notre mémoire.651
This was the closest the French government had ever come to admitting culpability over
the massacres in 1962. That such a concession was made in the context of a specific day
of commemoration devoted solely to the harkis greatly enhanced the symbolic weight
attached to Chirac’s words, as did his own ancien combattant status. Reactions to his
declaration were however mixed. Within the academic community it was noted that not
only had Chirac gone further than any of his predecessors in acknowledging
648 Raymond Courrière, Vaincre l’oubli, (Carcassone, 1984), p.4.
649 Muller, Le silence, p.226; Cohen ‘The Harkis’, p.176.
650 Cohen ‘The Harkis’, p.176.
651http://elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais_archives/interventions/discours_et_declarations/2001/septe
mbre/discours_du_president_de_la_republique_a_l_occasion_de_la_journee_d_hommage_national_au
x_harkis.2027.html [28 June 2008]. It is also notable that the language and imagery of the speech
parallels that used by the fils de harkis in their campaigns.
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responsibility, but he also appeared to endorse a move away from the traditional
presentation of the harkis as having fought loyally for France, implying a mix of
motivations underlying engagement with the line ‘ils sont plus de 200 000 à avoir pris les
armes pour la République et pour la France, pour défendre leurs terres et pour protéger
leurs familles’.652 Others, such as Géraldine Enjelvin, disagreed, viewing the text as an
exercise in symbolic power through which the state appropriated the communal history
of the harkis, previously located in individuals, and imposed in its place an official
version of the past that ‘bore little resemblance’ to what those who experienced the war
remembered.653 Enjelvin accepted that 25 September represented a more inclusive public
narrative of the Algerian War by officially incorporating different combat experiences
within its remit, calling it ‘an official mechanism of societal involvement – the
enlargement of the “us”’. However, she went on to ask whether by re-writing the ‘master
narrative’ to include the harkis the state was not in fact engineering a ‘delegitimation’ of
the harki identity by once again seeking to speak for the community in a language that
reflected its own priorities? This is the act of ‘symbolic violence’ alluded to in the title of
her article.654 Far more consensual was the reaction in Algeria where the Journée
nationale was denounced as an attempt to falsify history and a bid by the French state to
jettison their responsibilities onto the FLN. The argument was also made, with reference
to the recent actions of Azni, that seeking legal recourse against the French state for their
betrayal of the harkis in 1962 was akin to the children of World War II collaborators
trying to file suit against General de Gaulle. In the same vein, it was further pointed out
that the citizens of Algeria had had no opportunity to bring cases for crimes against
humanity against figures such as Bigeard or Massu.655
Within the harki community itself the general attitude was that while the Journée
d’hommage marked an important step forward, plenty more remained to be done.
Mohand Hamoumou perhaps summed it up best:
La communauté harkie a donc accueilli l’annonce de cette journée avec
satisfaction…mais l’attend avec vigilance: il faut que la montagne n’accouche
pas d’une souris. Car la reconnaissance due aux anciens harkis et autres ‘Français
musulmans’ n’est pas une reconnaissance charitable pour les souffrances endurés
mais, d’abord, la reconnaissance des torts des gouvernants de l’époque…656
652 Ibid.
653 Géraldine Enjelvin, ‘The Harki Identity: A Product of Marginalisation and Resistance to Symbolic
Violence?’, National Identities, 8.2 (June 2006), 114-115.
654 Ibid. 123-124.
655 Harkis: le crime, aired 12 February 2002.
656 Mohand Hamoumou, ‘Les harkis ont soif de vérité’, La Croix, 20 September 2001, p.27.
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That is to say, admitting fault was a welcome start, but what the harkis were really
holding out for was acceptance of responsibility. ‘Nous voulons que le gouvernement et
l’Assemblée nationale aient enfin le courage de débattre du problème harki en
commençant par reconnaître la responsabilité de la France’, Klech asserted. ‘On l’a fait
pour les Arméniens, dont on a reconnu le génocide , pourqoui pas nous?’ he continued,
touching at the heart of the issue: What is so different about the Algerian War that
prevents France from repeating gestures it has already made with respect to other
conflicts?657
An additional reason for the ongoing dissatisfaction of the harki community with the
now numerous measures and gestures that have emanated from the political sphere has been
highlighted by Branche who argues that the stance of the state towards all memory carriers
connected to the war has been reactive as opposed to proactive. According to her,
governments have only adopted positions or made concessions relative to the war because
they have felt obliged to do so by the pressure placed upon them by the community in
question. The examples she cites to support her contention with respect to the harkis include
the law of 14 June 1994 which she regards as a response to the events of 1991, and the
Journée nationale which she connects to Azni’s deposition to the courts.658 Branche is
essentially arguing that piecemeal gestures made as and when the need arises are no substitute
for a deliberate long-term strategy vis-à-vis the harki population, indeed vis-à-vis all groups
connected to the war. This is particularly important given the current ‘memory wars’ climate
which increases the risk of producing an ad hoc commemorative strategy that oscillates
between whichever particular pressure group has the upper hand at any given moment. While
this is an interesting contention, it possibly ascribes too much influence to these pressure
groups which do, after all, represent minority populations. The French government’s reactive
stance may be more of an indirect response to the moods of a general public today more
sensitised to the war and its legacies than previous electorates, than to the power of specific
memory carriers such as the harki community. It remains to be seen whether the exit of
Chirac and the arrival of Sarkozy who has no direct connection to the war, will lead to the
state taking the initiative on this issue and developing a more active and concrete
commemorative policy.
657 Guillaume Bonnet, ‘La France rend mercredi un nouvel hommage national aux harkis’, AFP Infos
Françaises, 23 September 2002.
658 For the full list see Branche, La guerre d’Algérie, pp.100-101.
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‘Protestataires’ versus ‘Porte-paroles’
This chapter has charted the evolution of the activism of the fils, and now filles, de harkis
since 1991. The principal axes of development during this period have been the failure of
the newly formed associational movement to exploit its potential and become a powerful,
collective advocate of the harki cause, which in turn facilitated the emergence of a series
of prominent individuals who were cast by an increasingly interested media as
spokespeople of the harki community. Yet paradoxically, despite owing their status
largely to the weaknesses of associational mobilisation, all of the spokespeople in
question, apart from Dalila Kerchouche, have opted to place their activism under the
auspices of an association of their own creation. As already noted, Besnaci-Lancou is
president of L’association Harkis et droits de l’Homme, while Mohand Hamoumou
founded AJIR and Azni, despite being openly critical of what he perceives as the self-
serving nature of the majority of harki associations, created AFRA in 1986 and today
runs the CNLH.659 Even Arfi and Klech, perhaps the least likely candidates given the
practical orientation of their campaigning, head respectively Coordination Harka and
Justice pour les Harkis.660 All these associations post-date their founders’ move into
activism and all are eclipsed by the status of the individuals at their helm. It seems that in
spite of their flaws, associations are still regarded as the pre-eminent vehicle through
which to pursue the harki cause.661
The apparent paradox of a continued reliance on associations by figures who rose
to prominence precisely because of the inadequacies of that mobilisation format is
indicative of the harki community’s defiance of simple categorisation. Another binary
opposition that this chapter has also revealed to be false is that originally proposed by
Abrial whereby harki activists were neatly divided into ‘protestataires’ and ‘porte-
paroles’. Abrial defines ‘protestataires’ as those children of harkis unable to make the
distinction between different generations and experiences, they thus ‘vivent encore avec
les souvenirs d’un passé qui ne leur appartient pas mais qu’ils se sont reappropriés’.662 In
contrast to ‘protestataires’ stand ‘porte-paroles’, men and women possessing a greater
659 Further information on the aims and activities of these associations can be found at the following
URLs: www.harki.net/article.php; www.harkis.com/; www.blogg.org/blog-54218.html [2 August
2008].
660 Coordination Harka was formed by Arfi in 1991. With its headquarters in his hometown of Saint
Laurent des Arbres and claiming only 216 adherents in the mid-1990s, the organisation has always
been small and locally focused. Justice pour les Harkis was created in response to the police violence
that accompanied the end of one of Klech’s longest hunger strikes (August 1997 to April 1998). As a
federative collective boasting fifty members, it offers an exception to the previous rule of the failure of
attempts at federation by harki activists. www.chez.com/justiceharkis [4 August 2008].
661 Possible reasons for this include the desire to broaden their support base or to emulate the
established and effective strategy of the pied-noir community.
662 Abrial, Les enfants, p.213.
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emotional distance from the cause they support and who consequently ‘ne se sentent pas
personnellement atteints par le passé car ils établissent une frontière stricte entre ce qu’ils
vivent, eux, et ce qu’à dû endurer la première génération’.663 As a static dichotomy the
model has little value beyond the descriptive, however, as a prism through which to
evaluate the changing nature of harki activism in the 1990s it may have more utility,
suggesting not a clear-cut split, but rather a beginning and end point. The growth in
experience and thus in sophistication of the harki cause and its spokespeople has
produced historical narratives that draw a clearer separation between the experiences of
their parents and their own traumas, while still maintaining a clear causality from one to
the other. This development has probably been aided by the general movement away
from demonstrative activism towards verbal and written advocacy, as evidenced by
Arfi’s evolution from violent demonstrator to association administrator. In this light,
Azni’s plainte, which mixes the testimonies and grievances of both generations, can be
regarded as something of a step backwards.664
Although discussed separately here, the individuals in question do not operate in
isolation. Their respective high profiles mean that they are aware of each other and
indeed often share the same spotlight on television and in the pages of the press.665 What
they also share, above and beyond differences of opinion or of approach, is a basic
agreement on the key features of the harki history they are all seeking to promote. Less
rigid and codified than the narratives of the pied-noir associations, there is nonetheless a
central core of experiences and images around which their representations gravitate.
Thus, perhaps unintentionally, they have succeeded where the broader associational
movement has failed, creating a highly public, mutually reaffirming discourse with
respect to the harki community. Pluralistic in terms of the motivations for becoming and
experiences of being a harki, their narratives are nonetheless univocal in their
denunciation of the binary traitor/patriot paradigm and in their evocation of a triptych of
victimisation comprising: betrayal and abandonment in 1962, mistreatment and
marginalisation in France, and finally institutional forgetting, which have yet to be
satisfactorily acknowledged and rectified.
But does this necessarily mean that theirs is a representative discourse? In many
respects this is difficult to ascertain, not least because of the ongoing paucity of first-
generation testimony with which to compare the accounts proposed by these
663 Abrial, Les enfants, p.215.
664 Laurent Chabrun et al, ‘La plainte des harkis est-elle justifiée?’, L’Express, 30 August 2001, p.22.
665 Kerchouche appeared alongside Arfi on the programme ‘Harkis: la mémoire sacrifiée?’, Ripostes,
aired 7 December 2003 (Fr5); while Besnaci-Lancou and Hamoumou shared the floor during the harki-
dedicated emission of Merci pour l’info, aired 7 November 2003 (Canal+).
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spokespeople.666 It is also the case that their status was assigned to them by the French
media and public who appointed them symbols for a wider population who had struggled
for many years without a voice. Consequently, regardless of the humbleness of their
origins, today all are elites. Their trajectory has been compared to that of the descendants
of Algerian immigrants in that greater material advantages, not least educationally, have
enabled them to undertake the task of rehabilitating the image of their parents.667 Yet
within the group there are differing degrees of socio-economic and cultural capital which
further complicates the issue of how representative each is. On the one hand, all their
backgrounds lie in the camps - albeit only for one year in Kerchouche’s case - creating a
common denominator between them and the rest of the harki population. On the other
hand, Kerchouche, Besnaci-Lancou, and Hamoumou have all enjoyed subsequent
educational and career successes, independent of their activism, which potentially
implies a distance between them and the most vulnerable segments of their community,
precisely the elements they agitate on behalf of, that doesn’t exist for Arfi, Klech and
Azni.668 However, this apparent gap and the potential within it for a disconnect between
representatives and represented, as happened with Larradji in 1975, seems ultimately to
be over-ridden by the fils or fille de harki identity actively proclaimed by all and by their
ongoing commitment to their community and its past.
666 Although the fact that Kerchouche, Besnaci-Lancou and Azni have all succeeded in gathering first-
hand accounts suggests some level of acceptance and approval from the wider community.
667 Fatima Besnaci-Lancou and Claude Liauzu, ‘Les harkis, prisonniers de mémoire’, Libération, 2
August 2005, p.25.
668 A perception that is unconsciously reinforced by media coverage which almost never features the
former trio at the sites of the former camps, while the latter three are often filmed and interviewed
there, interacting with the minority of harkis who remain or who live nearby.
153
7. Pieds-noirs and Harkis: The Evolution of a Relationship 1991-2007
The emergence of the descendants of the harkis as a memory carrier in their own right did not
mean that other groups who had previously sought to speak on behalf of the community
simply fell silent. As the previous chapter discussed, interactions between the French
government, the media, and the harki community continued, although they did undergo
significant evolutions in the years following 1991. In contrast, the Algerian government
maintained its rigid stance that the harkis were traitors who were not welcome to visit their
country of birth. But what of the relationship between the harkis and sub-national collectives,
in particular the pieds-noirs who had been so vocal in the pre-1991 era? In line with their oft-
professed deep commitment to their ‘frères musulmans’, pied-noir associations carried on
campaigning for recognition to be accorded to the harki community throughout this period.
Arguably, they also became the dominant source of external sub-state representations of the
harkis as elite activism essentially died with the Bachaga in 1982, while veterans such as
Generals Faivre and Meyer increasingly came to express their opinions on the harkis through
the medium of pied-noir associations.669 This further deepening of the already longstanding
connections between pied-noir associations and ex-militaires benefited the former because of
the authenticity that could be attributed to accounts coming from men with first-hand
experience of fighting alongside the harkis and, in the case of Faivre, the legitimacy that
could be derived from his academic qualifications.670 With respect to men like Meyer, or
Colonel Moinet, collaboration with pied-noir organisations gave them an established platform
from which to disseminate their message and the guarantee of a positive reception from a
like-minded audience of a good size. In light of the altered context of the post-1991 period
this chapter will assess to what extent and how representations of the harkis presented by and
through pied-noir associations evolved in response to this new environment.
Jeune Pied-Noir and the harkis
A particularly interesting association in this respect is Jeune Pied-Noir (JPN), formed in 1981
by husband and wife team Bernard Coll and Taouès Titraoui. Although JPN’s goals were
similar to those of other pied-noir associations created around that time, being more
concerned with the moral than with the material problems facing the pied-noir community,
where they differed was in the consistently pre-eminent place they accorded to the
669 After the Bachaga’s death, people looked to his son, Ali Boualam, to take up the harki cause. As
vice-president of ANFANOMA, Ali offered the potential for potent alliance to be established between
the two communities. However, this potential was never fully realised as Ali died in 1991.
670 Faivre holds a doctorate having submitted a thesis to the Sorbonne in 1986 on the evolution of the
armed forces.
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‘réhabilitation de la communauté harkie’, largely because of the fille de harki status of
Titraoui.671 Although Coll is very much the public face of JPN, Titraoui nonetheless makes an
invaluable contribution simply through her fille de harki identity which is used to legitimate
JPN’s claim to speak for the harki community, perhaps explaining why so many pied-noir
associations regularly turn to the organisation for commentary on this subject. Furthermore,
the union between Tirtaoui and Coll, a pied-noir, also gives implicit credence to the pied-noir
assertion that French Algeria was characterised by close and harmonious relations between
the indigenous and settler communities.
On a practical level ‘rehabilitating’ the harkis is regarded as a three-stage process
involving housing for the first generation, jobs for the second generation, and education for
subsequent generations.672 At the commemorative level, JPN is committed to the search for
‘la vérité historique’ and to enshrining that truth in the public’s consciousness through
endeavours such as a memorial to ‘l’Harki inconnu’ and the dedication of street names to the
community.673 In 1991, JPN produced Le livre des harkis which combined history and
testimony with graphic photos in order to shed light on ‘cette partie douloureuse de notre
histoire’.674 Although acknowledging prior publications by figures such as the Bachaga,
Faivre, and Camille Brière, JPN nonetheless marketed their contribution as the first to
‘donner la parole aux harkis et à ceux qui les ont aidés’.675 Yet despite the size of its
ambitions, Le livre des harkis enjoyed only a limited print run and is today difficult to find.676
However, this was to a large degree offset by the prolific nature of JPN’s contributions to a
range of pied-noir journals, most notably PNM for whom they seem to be the de facto harki
reporters, which helped to ensure that the association enjoyed widespread publicity, certainly
within the pied-noir milieu. Coll was also a regular guest on pied-noir dedicated shows
during the early 1990s where he repeatedly sought to remind French audiences of the ongoing
plight of the harkis. Additionally, the association has run numerous campaigns on behalf of
the harkis which have, again, benefited from the space accorded to their promotion in various
pied-noir journals. The most successful of these was ‘Hommage aux harkis’ which began in
1985 with the intention of ‘briser le silence des médias’ and culminated in 1989 with the issue
of a commemorative stamp paying homage to France’s auxiliary soldiers, a measure the JPN
campaign had been key in securing (see Appendix I). In the intervening years, a series of
671 Titraoui’s family had a rather unusual trajectory which encompassed working for Prince Philippe de
Mérode as well as time in the Jouques Camp in the south of France. For further details of her life story
see Dominique Fargues, Mémoires de pieds-noirs, (Paris, 2008), pp.165, 208, 248.
672 Taouès Titraoui and Bernard Coll, Le livre des harkis, (Bièvres, 1991), p.255.
673 Ibid. p.255.
674 Ibid. p.10.
675 Bernard Coll, ‘Le livre de harkis: Les harkis témoignent’, PNM, 22 (January 1992), 22.
676 The association financed the publication of their own book, producing 500 copies for people who
had reserved in advance and a further 2000 copies for general distribution. My thanks to Regis and
Constanze at Cedpederf Books for this information.
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twenty-five ceremonies were held across France which awarded bronze ‘Hommage aux
harkis’ medals, to harkis and a ‘diplôme de la solidarité française’ to those, mainly pieds-
noirs, who had aided the community. These occasions were often sponsored by associations
like ANFANOMA and the Cercle Algérianiste and occasionally attended by sympathetic
local mayors.677.
Continuity of content
While they may be unusual in the amount of attention they devote to the harkis, what JPN
actually has to say about the community has a lot in common with the discourses of other
pied-noir associations. Examining the changes in this content and its functions since 1991
therefore allows the evolution of the relationship between the pied-noir and harki
communities to be traced. One of the most obvious developments in the post-1991 period is
the expansion of the reasons for donning a French uniform attributed to the harkis by pied-
noir associations. Thus beyond simple patriotism, L’Algérianiste explained that harkis
enrolled because ‘ils avaient le sentiment de défendre leur famille, de l’avoir soustraite au
racket de l'impôt révolutionnaire et à la terreur que le FLN faisait régner’.678 However, this
apparent progression is more circumscribed than it first appears because although a greater
number of motivations for engagement are acknowledged, all are presented as the outcome of
acts of free will with any notion of compulsion, or of the ‘choice’ being a desperate last resort
absent.679 The lines of loyalty thus remain clear and there is never any hint of the ambiguous
position of someone like Kerchouche’s father. Therefore the widening of the field of
motivations in no way disturbed the legitimacy of the argument that the harkis were
unanimously ‘persuadés d’avoir fait le bon choix’ and were engaged ‘fermement pour la
France’.680 This stance was supported by the unwavering pied-noir insistence that the harkis
were French, a right indisputably earned and repeatedly proven through le sang versé for the
motherland. ‘La présence fidèle et souvent héroïque de Musulmans algériens dans les armées
et sous le drapeau de la France ne date pas d’hier’ JPN reminded its readers, urging them not
677 Titraoui and Coll, Le livre, pp.252-254.
678 Roger Fiorio, ‘Hommage aux Harkis, mes compagnons, mes frères’, L’Algérianiste, 97 (March
2002), 4.
679 This would explain why pied-noir associations heavily promoted Brahim Sadouni’s autobiography
as the first ‘complete’ testimony from a harki when in fact Saïd Ferdi’s Un enfant dans la guerre pre-
dated it by several years. The difference between the two accounts being Sadouni’s assertion to JPN
that ‘Nous avons loyalement servi la France, et nous ne le regretterons jamais’ versus Ferdi’s forced
conscription. However, in the book itself Sadouni presents his engagement as something of an
accident, claiming he became a mechanic for the French army because he could not find any other jobs
and had no idea that fixing their vehicles would mean being classed as a harki. Titraoui and Coll, Le
livre, p.251; Brahim Sadouni, Français sans patrie: La Reconnaissance, (Rouen, 1985), p.82.
680 Fiorio, ‘Hommage aux Harkis’, 4.
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to forget the contribution made by colonial troops in the two World Wars.681 It was this
history of loyal service which led the Cercle Algérianiste to conclude that what the harkis
represented was ‘une belle, émouvante, merveilleuse histoire’ of brave patriots who ‘portaient
fièrement le drapeau français à bout de bras …Et dans leur coeur’.682
Outside of the battlefield, another reason the harkis felt themselves to be so
intimately French, according to pied-noir associations, was the status of French Algeria as a
harmonious multi-ethnic family. Even in 2008, Coll could be found boasting ‘On parle
beaucoup de “multiculturalisme” aujourd’hui, mais là-bas c’était très brassé, quelque chose
très original était née’.683 Every pied-noir it seems can cite an example to illustrate the close
communal ties of their homeland and few, furthermore, seem capable of accepting that one
example does not equate to conclusive proof for an entire country. For example, Jacques
Roseau claimed that in his home village of Novi ‘nous avions une vie très très réellement
familiale avec les gens là…tous les villages étaient comme ça’.684 The only admissible
deviation from this image appears to be the acknowledgement that relationships were often
closer in rural areas where agricultors tended to live in greater proximity to their workers and
generally spoke Arabic. On the rare occasions when distance between the various
communities is recognised, it is usually justified as having been benign, natural, and mutual;
that is communities choosing to live side-by-side rather than together, but without friction in
all cases. Coll, for example, stressed that all the schools were mixed and therefore the
opportunities for integration existed, it was just that neither side chose to pursue them.685 This
reflects the ongoing unwillingness among pieds-noirs to admit to any negativity when it
comes to French Algeria, as if one single instance of acrimony could erase all the positive
examples. On the harki side, accounts of co-existence are far more nuanced and complex,
such as Besnaci-Lancou’s evocation of the reaction in her grandmother’s village when the
settlers departed at the end of the war: ‘même si la cohabitation n’avait pas été toujours
ideale, certains villageois s’étaient cachés pour pleurer en voyant partir le convoi de ceux qui
avaient été leurs compagnons depuis plus d’un siècle’.686
With respect to the war and its aftermath, pied-noir associations have remained
consistent in their depiction of the harkis as having been betrayed when France disarmed and
then abandoned them to the vengeful FLN. Those lucky enough to escape the ‘genocide’, the
681 Titraoui and Coll, Le livre, p.8.
682 Pierre Gazel, ‘Le drapeau’, L’Algérianiste, 59 (September 1992), 2.
683 Bernard Coll cited in Fargues, Mémoires des pieds-noirs, p.55. Coll’s comment represents an
increasing trend among pied-noir associations of trying to give their colonial experience a
contemporary relevance by tying it into issues like multiculturalism that have been prominent on
France’s political and social agenda in recent years.
684 ‘Algérie: mémoires d’une guerre’, Caractères, 22 November 1991 (Channel 3).
685 Coll cited in Fargues, Les mémoires de pieds-noirs, pp.55, 57.
686 Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki: Le bouleversant témoignage d’une enfant de la guerre
d’Algérie, with Marie-Christine Ray, (Paris, 2005), pp.22-36.
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magnitude of which has continued to be estimated at between 100,000 and 150,000 victims,
despite academic evidence congregating around the lower figure of 65,000, were then
‘rewarded’ for their service by being parked in camps and forgotten about.687 Indeed, the
pieds-noirs maintain that the entire history of the harki community, both the positive pre-war
and tragic post-war aspects, has been at least ignored, if not actively occulted, by everyone
except them.
Continuity of function
In light of the continuity in representations of the harkis presented by pied-noir associations,
it is unsurprising that the functions these narratives serve have remained equally static. It
remains the case that recitations of the history of the harkis serve primarily to prove claims
made by pied-noir activists about their own community and history. For example, solidarity
with ‘nos frères’ is still used to refute the accusation that colonial Algeria was an unequal and
unjust society. As William Cohen bluntly put it:
By championing the case of the harkis as ‘good Arabs’ - those loyal to France - the
pieds-noirs are proving to themselves and the nation that they are capable of
Arabophilia…Solidarity now suggests the solidarity of population groups in the days
of Algérie française.688
This solidarity is also used to support the pied-noir contention that the FLN were an
unrepresentative minority. ‘Comment peut on alors vouloir faire croire qu’il y avait un fossé
entre les deux communautés’ asked Yvan Santini in PNM, ‘alors que le FLN avait tué
beaucoup plus de musulmans que d’européens!’689 JPN offered more precise statistical
evidence when they made the same point:
Au total le nombre de ces auxiliaries de l’armée français atteignait 200,000 en 1962,
alors qu’à la même époque, selon Ahmed BEN BELLA, les wilayas FLN exsangues
étaient réduites à 10,000 combattants. Autrement dit, les musulmans engagés pour la
France représentaient vingt fois autant que les rebelles.690
687 See, for example, Bernard Coll, ‘Qui sont les harkis’, PNM, 3 (April 1990), 24.
688 William B. Cohen, ‘Pied-Noir Memory, History and the Algerian War’, in Europe’s Invisible
Migrants, ed. by Andrea L. Smith, (Amsterdam, 2003), p.133.
689 Yvan Santini, ‘Tribune libre’, PNM, 22 (January 1992), 7.
690 Titraoui and Coll, Le livre, p.8.
158
What has changed, however, in the post-1991 period, especially since 2000, is the invocation
of the harkis as an indirect refutation of accusations of wrongdoing by the French army
during the war. Prior to this, allegations of misconduct were generally simply dismissed by
pied-noir associations. However, following the storm created by Louisette Ighilahriz’s claims
in Le Monde in 2001 that she had been tortured while being interrogated by French
paratroopers, outright denial ceased to be a plausible recourse.691 Instead, pied-noir
associations sought to shift the focus away from the French army and onto atrocities
committed by the FLN, which, they argued, were of a far greater magnitude. Crucial to this
argument were the harkis; 150,000 deaths being a powerful statistic to wield, as are the
graphic images supplied by Véritas of ‘hommes, femmes et enfants, coupés en morceaux,
écorchés vifs, dépecés, ébouillantés, au delà des limites de la barbarie’.692 The purpose of
such examples is to magnify the suffering of the pieds-noirs, merging it with that experienced
by the harkis. This is achieved by stressing the shared nature of the experiences of the two
groups, including terror at the hands of the FLN, exile, an ignominious welcome in France, as
well as years of marginalisation and silence. In this context, Thierry Rolando of the Cercle
algérianiste spoke of ‘les mémoires parallèles et entremêlées de nos deux communautés’,
while Yves Sainsot of ANFANOMA wrote during Klech’s 1997 hunger strike:
Cette communauté est aussi la nôtre. Qui mieux que nous est à même de comprendre
la souffrance, la désespérance de nos frères de lutte? Ils ont connu toutes les
difficultés que nous mêmes traversions, même au delà l’incompréhension, le racisme
des Français de métropole…’693
This suffering is often conflated statistically with L’écho de l’Oranie adding the estimated
25,000 settlers who ‘disappeared’ to 150,000 harki to give a figure of 175,000 ‘victims’ that
France ‘n’a su ensevelir dans le grand drap noir de l’oubli’.694 Amalgamations such as this
erase the different magnitudes of loss, as well as the different contexts for the deaths,
replacing them with a single, more dramatic image of collective suffering that the pieds-noirs
can inscribe themselves within. This can be most clearly seen during the Journée nationale
when virtually every pied-noir journal stressed the longstanding and intimate connections
between themselves and the harkis:
691 Ighilahriz’s revelations first appeared in Florence Beaugé, ‘Torturée par l’armée française en
Algérie, “Lila” recherché l’homme qui l’a sauvée’, Le Monde, 20 June 2000.
692 Albertelli, Louis, Amar Boumaraf and Anne Cazal, ‘Bouteflikabulations’, LV, 45 (September 2000),
7.
693 Rolando, Thierry, ‘Mémoire d’avenir’, L’algérianiste, 99 (September 2002), p. 3; Yves Sainsot,
‘Grève de faim des enfants des harkis’, FH, 384-385 (July-August 1997), 12.
694 Georges Emile Paul, ‘Vers une journée nationale d’hommage aux Harkis’, EO 275 (July-August
2001), 9.
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Nous, Français d’Algérie d’origine européenne, nous qui avons été leurs [les harkis]
frères de coeur avant d’être leurs frères d’armes, nous avons le sentiment profound,
dont nous souffrons, avec eux et comme eux, d’une injustice flagrante à leur
encontre.695
The harkis thus offered pied-noir associations an ideal issue on which to focus; one that was
close to their hearts, that was enjoying an unprecedented amount of media attention, and that
they could exploit to advance their own historical arguments. Consequently, a reference to the
harki community became a virtual passage oblige for all pied-noir associations.
Unfortunately, the harkis became the ideal new crusade for the pieds-noirs at
precisely the moment that the history and contemporary situation of the ancien supplétifs
began to gain some of the recognition they had sought for so long. Greater public awareness,
serious academic attention, and a series of governmental measures, all indicated that progress
was being made, albeit more slowly than many would have liked. But the more progress was
made, the less injustice remained for pied-noir associations to tie their own suffering into and
to mobilise against. Thus paradoxically the very factors that made the harkis appealing to
pied-noir associations were the same features that would also ultimately erode their utility.
Rather like the shark that needs to keep swimming in order to survive, the pied-noir
community, particularly at the level of associations, needs outstanding grievances to
campaign on behalf of in order to maintain its vitality. As a collective they also find it
difficult to change direction; once they have decided on a stance they stick to it, irrespective
of where the weight of evidence actually lies. They consequently refused to acknowledge that
the harkis were no longer ‘les oubliés de l’histoire’ because to do so would involve giving up
their position that they, like the harkis, constitute a neglected, misunderstood, and unjustly
maligned community of victims. Hence on the eve of the first Journée nationale, the Cercle
Algérianiste could be found arguing:
Il est grand temps, en effet, que le silence concernant l’abandon et le massacre de
ceux qui ont servi avec fidélité la France, soit rompu et que notre pays reconnaisse
enfin cette tache noir dans son histoire.696
695 Georges Emile Paul, ‘Vous avez bien dit: Journée Nationale d’Hommage aux harkis?’, LV, 54 (June
2001), 9.
696 Rolando, Theirry, ‘Le temps de la justice et la vérité est-il enfin venu?’, L’Algérianiste, 95
Supplement, (September 2001), 1.
160
This statement is virtually identical in tone and vocabulary to Jo Sohet’s 1979 article for the
Cercle Algérianiste which spoke of the need to ‘[r]ompre le silence’ surrounding the harkis,
epitomising the pied-noir tendency to continue to place the harkis in an economic and cultural
context more akin to the 1960s than the new millenium.697 While the fils and filles de harkis
characterised the Journée nationale as merely a step principally to indicate forward movement
in an ongoing journey, pied-noir associations used the same phrase, ‘seulement une étape’, in
order to place the emphasis on the stationary and the idea that ‘L’heure de la repentance n’a
pas encore sonné’, thus enabling them to perpetuate their discourse of unresolved injustice.698
Questions of agency and authority
The harki community may now be a must-mention for pied-noir associations as they seek to
cash in on their increasingly prominent public profile, but what is interesting is how little
agency is ascribed to the harki community itself for this development. Instead, any attention
devoted to the harkis is generally attributed to the tireless campaigning on their behalf by the
pieds-noirs and, as discussed above, still placed within a paradigm of continuing general
ignorance. Clarisse Buono found that even the Journée nationale was framed by her pied-noir
interviewees as the result of their indefatigable campaigning which was now being rewarded
by this national day of recognition. The activism of the children of the harkis was never
mentioned, ‘comme si la communauté pied-noir était seul responsable de l’attention attirée
sur la situation des supplétifs’.699 Within journals, the norm is still for articles pertaining to
the harkis to be written by those who knew and/or commanded them during the war, as
indicated by the regularity with which Maurice Faivre’s byline appears. Furthermore, the
reaction from the pied-noir community to slights against the harkis such as Bouteflika’s
‘collabo’ remark, or General Meyer’s lawsuit against Marcel Péju for defamation after he
made a similar equation in 2001, are all framed by the logic that the pieds-noirs need to step
up and defend the harkis because no one else will, including the harkis themselves. As Meyer
wrote: ‘Il m’est arrivé de nombreuses reprises, et il m’arrive toujours de réagir avec vigueur
pour défendre leur mémoire injustement salie...’ 700 More recently, when PS deputy Georges
Frêche referred to the harkis as ‘sous hommes’, the pied-noir community again mobilised
697 Jo Sohet, ‘Les Harkis, ces oubliés de l’histoire 1962-1978’, L’Algérianiste, 5 (15 March 1979), 27.
698 ’25 septembre 2001: Une étape importante pour les Harkis, seulement une étape’, FH, 424-425
(September-October 2001), 12.
699 Clarisse Buono, Pieds-noirs de père en fils, (Paris, 2004), p.131.
700 For further details on Meyer’s suit, which he eventually won, see François Meyer, Pour
l’honneur…avec les harkis de 1958 à nos jours, (Tours, 2005), pp.9, 11-14, 20, 54.
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despite the fact that a well organised, publicised, and supported series of protests had been
undertaken independently by harki activists, including a hunger strike by Klech.701
It is furthermore the case that although a greater place may be afforded to the harkis
by associations, their history and current situation continue to be very much a sub-section of
the wider pied-noir narrative as proven by the relatively small amount of time and space
devoted to them. In Gilles Perez’s three-part documentary, Les pieds-noirs: Histoire d’une
blessure, for example, the harkis feature only very briefly at the end of part two, Les années
dramatiques, which evokes the war, after lengthy treatments of Isly, Oran, and the kidnapping
of Europeans following the Evian Accords. Although Domique Fargues’ book, Mémoires des
pieds-noirs, features the harkis more consistently, it is notable that there are only three
contributors from the harki community itself, one of whom is Titraoui, and by far the largest
segment in which they appear is that entitled ‘Les relations entre Européens et musulmans’
where the majority of testimony comes from pieds-noirs such as Coll.702
Not only do pied-noir associations still treat the harki community as needing them to
speak and act for them, but they further implicitly replicate colonial relationships by seeking
to control what harkis say about them. Although it is relatively unusual for harki activists to
mention the pied-noir community, some of the ‘media stars’ have ventured opinions and
when what they say does not fit with the pied-noir worldview, associations are quick to react.
Dalila Kerchouche and Fatima Besnaci-Lancou have both fallen foul of the pied-noir milieu
for precisely this reason, their relatively high public profiles undoubtedly contributing to the
strength of the indignation their comments aroused. The Cercle Algérianiste, for example,
were dissatisfied with Kerchouche’s characterisation of the chef de camp in Harkis as a cruel
and sadistic bully. This portrait was denounced by Faivre as wholly inaccurate on the basis
that ‘aucun chantier forestier n’a été dirigé par un officier; le chef de chantier était
généralement un sous-officier retraité…’703 By focusing on this minor point of fact, Faivre
thus entirely avoided dealing with the substance of Kerchouche’s claim regarding the
treatment meted out to the harkis by those placed in charge of them, irrespective of their
military rank. He went on to explain that her mistakes clearly stemmed from the fact that she
had no direct experience of camp life and was thus basing her interpretation on the testimony
of others received forty years later, appealing to the familiar pied-noir belief that only those
who have lived through events have the right to speak of them. Instead, Faivre suggested she
should have relied on the evidence contained within official archives, as he does, rather than
701 For coverage of these protests in the national media see Julien Martin, ‘Des militants de la cause des
harkis occupent le siege du PS’, Libération, 18 February 2006, p.14; Benoît Hopquin, ‘A Paris, les
harkis manifestent pour retrouver une dignité bafouée’, Le Monde, 28 March 2006, p.14.
702 ‘Les années dramatiques’, Les pieds-noirs: Histoires d’une blessure, aired 31 March 2007 (Fr3);
Fargues, Mémoires des pieds-noirs, pp.53-72, 161-170, 203-210, 243-252.
703 Faivre, ‘Désinformation’, 5.
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on ‘des jugements négatifs de ceux qui ont raté leur intégration’.704 Véritas also dismissed
Kerchouche’s portrayal arguing that because it was courtesy of the actions of some French
officers that certain harkis were able to escape from Algeria, no officer could then have
treated them badly once they were in France.705 Both associations agreed however, that at the
root of Kerchouche’s unjust portrayal was ideological bias. ‘[E]lle ne cite que des
témoignages qui vont dans le sens de sa thèse’ complained Faivre, a flaw that Véritas
attributed to her indoctrination by the French education system: ‘L’auteur poursuit la
récitation fidèle au catéchisme universel anti-pieds-noirs qu’on lui enseigne!’706 This was also
deemed to be the source of the ‘interprétations discutables’ advanced by Besnaci-Lancou,
which, along with the interpretations of Ageron, Thénault, Branche, and Vidal Naquet,
compared unfavourably against the scholarship of Jordi, Hamoumou, and Faivre.707
The contemporary reality is that the pieds-noirs are no longer in a position to
dominate representations of the harkis. Although they may have taken the lead in the 1960s
and 1970s, subsequent developments have conspired to deprive pied-noir associations of the
initiative. In contrast, descendants of the harkis have thrown off the shackles of external
narratives to take control of their own historical discourse and today are driving the
commemorative agenda for their community. In the process, the balance of power has shifted
between the two communities creating a situation whereby the pieds-noirs need the harkis
more than the harkis need them, even if the pieds-noirs have yet to acknowledge this fact.
This is certainly one way to read the support amongst pied-noir associations for Boussad
Azni’s plainte.708 The hope seems to be that Azni will succeed where their previous attempts,
such as against General Katz, have failed, thus setting a legal precedent that the pied-noir
community can then benefit from.
But if harki activists have now stepped out of the shadows of the pieds-noirs, does
this then mean that they have cut all ties with the community? The short answer is no, at least
not at an associational level. While individual activists such as Kerchouche and Besnaci-
Lancou keep their distance, and although there has been a noticeable reconfiguration of the
relationship between the two groups, there is still a relationship to speak of. The status of this
new partnership is perhaps best illustrated by Mohand Hamoumou who, primarily through his
704 Ibid. 5. Contrary to a certain section of opinion, the difference between Faivre and a historian like
Raphaëlle Branche is not amateurism versus professionalism but rather their attitude to archives as
repositories of historical evidence. Faivre places absolute faith in what the archives contain which
explains why much of his work takes the form of stating a ‘truth’ and providing details of the archive
that ‘proves’ it. In contrast, Branche, like most historians, displays a healthy scepticism towards such
official material and is well aware of what is not contained in such archives.
705 Pierre Cattin, ‘Un crime sans assassins’, LV, 90 (February 2005), 4.
706 Faivre, ‘Désinformation’, 5; Cattin, ‘Un crime’, 4.
707 Maurice Faivre, ‘Les Harkis: une identité fondée sur l’Histoire’, L’Algérianiste, 114 (June 2006),
113.
708 ‘Pre-congrès du Comité nationale de liaison des Harkis à Bias’, L’Algérianiste, 96 (December
2001), 5.
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leadership of AJIR, has made common cause with the pieds-noirs when such links serve the
interests of his own association and community. AJIR is thus an established contributor to
PNM, which provides a forum in which to advertise their endeavours and disseminate their
opinions. The association has also penned articles for Véritas, one of which called explicitly
for the pieds-noirs to provide practical proof of their rhetorical commitment to the harkis by
supporting the re-launch of the campaign ‘Justice pour les Harkis’ which sought to obtain
150,000 signatures on a petition demand hommage be paid to the 150,000 victims of the post-
war massacres. ‘On parle souvent de solidarité envers les Harkis’, Hamoumou boldly stated,
‘Voici une occasion concrète de le prouver. Chiche?’709 In return, AJIR’s website promotes
past and present pied-noir lawsuits and includes a section in which the association renders
‘Hommage aux justes’, such as François Meyer. Hamoumou has also appeared at pied-noir
events, sharing platforms with the likes of Véritas’ Anne Cazal. Finally, when seeking to
mobilise opposition to the proposed ‘traité d’amitié’ between France and Algeria, AJIR went
so far as to argue that the harkis and pieds-noirs formed a single ‘communauté de destin
tragique’ who paid the price in 1962 for their ‘double attachement à la France et à la terre
d’Algérie’.710 Recognising that to ignore the pied-noir community would be akin to cutting
off his nose to spite his face, Hamoumou has instead opted for a calculated alliance which
allows him to benefit from the resources of the cohesive and well-established pied-noir
associational network without compromising the agenda of his own cause and community.
The situation today is therefore almost the exact opposite of what it was in the 1960s and
1970s, testament to the progress made by harki activism and the community behind it.
709 Mohand Hamoumou, ‘AJIR Pour les Harkis’, LV, 54 (June 2001), 11.
710 AJIR, ‘Point de vue: Un traité d’amitié Franco-Algérien’, PNM, 135 (November 2005), 12.
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8. Transmission: First Generation Memories
The complexity of the Franco-Algerian past and the unique ways this has unfolded within the
harki community, both during and after the war, means that the transmission of history and
memory has followed neither a chronological nor a linear trajectory. The absence of the past
within harki families pushed an increasingly militant second generation to look outside of
their community for information concerning their history, a quest which brought them into
contact with a range of pre-existing external groups that sought to speak on behalf of their
parents. Over the following decades the complicated relationship between these various actors
played itself out, culminating in the reclamation by the fils and filles de harkis of their own
voice and the extrication of their history from the tangled web of other people’s narratives.
Now firmly in control of the historical and commemorative agenda for their own community,
what is interesting about this second generation activism is the impact it has had upon the first
generation, namely the way in which it has fostered a greater willingness among harkis and
their spouses to speak publicly of their own experiences. This is certainly the case for
Zoulikha who explains: ‘Aujourd’hui, je suis très fière que nos enfants se battent pour
l’honneur de leurs pères. Je suis aussi très contente de témoigner pour laisser une trace à nos
arrière-arrière-petits-enfants afin qu’ils aient un peu d’information sur notre grande
aventure’.711
The activism of their descendants has not only raised the profile of the harki
community by sensitising the French public to the complexity of their history but, by
breaking with ideologically driven interpretations, has also created more space for
experiences that fall outside of these narrow explanatory frameworks. This development has
been further nurtured by the co-incidence of the new found desire to ‘laisser une trace’ with
an increasingly concerted effort by activists and academics to seek out and disseminate these
memories resulting in a growing body of testimony. Although there are criticisms that can be
levelled against this process, without such undertakings our knowledge of the harki
experience would be immeasurably poorer. In addition to possessing resources not easily
available to harkis, mediation through a third party can also provide crucial legitimacy and a
sense of worth, especially when dealing with traumatic or occulted events. It is furthermore
the case that the reawakened interest in the War of Independence, which shows no sign of
abating, has helped ensure an audience for these accounts. With the passing of time and
changing social and political contexts it has become easier for the harkis to articulate their
experiences, not least because after more than forty years living in France, most harkis now
speak the language and often live amongst the mainstream population. Finally, the first
711 Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, Nos mères: paroles blessées: Une autre histoire de harkis, (Léchelle,
2006), p.112.
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generation are entering the later stages of their lives when reflection is commonplace.
Articulating the combined result of these elements, Djida, the wife of a harki, stated ‘Je n’ai
jamais raconté ce qui nous est arrivé…mais maintenant, c’est différent’.712
The gestation of testimonies like Djida’s has thus been shaped by such a wide array
of factors and has taken place over such a long time span that the existence of a ‘pure’,
unmediated first generation memory is highly doubtful. This does not mean that questions
such as who is speaking for whom, to whom, and why become moot, but rather that
discourses should not be automatically discounted simply because they do not come to us
directly from the mouths of the actors themselves. Analysing the processes through which
these narratives and their carriers have gone is what enables the resultant composite picture of
the past to be properly contextualised and thus understood. It is this bricolage past that will
now be outlined in order to put the flesh of human experience onto the factual bones of the
harki trajectory outlined in the introduction and to highlight the current state of historical
understanding of this community. The structure will reflect the key stages of the harki
experience, moving from engagement, through exile, to life in France, but will also consider
the importance of less tangible issues such as choice, betrayal, regret, and nostalgia before
concluding with an analysis of the gaps that still remain in our knowledge of this rich and
diverse population.
‘Ils s’étaient engagés avec la France et non pour la France’
The lowest common denominator with respect to the harkis is that they all served under the
French flag during the War of Independence. This is however, where the similarities end. In
contrast to external actors who sought to group the harkis under a cohesive master narrative,
the testimonies of those who actually fought reveal a much messier reality. What is most
obvious is the rejection of the idea that theirs was a ‘choice’, in the sense of a voluntary
decision made with a full awareness of the implications of their actions. Jordi’s description of
Khélifa Haroud as ‘un homme qui a été plus victime des circonstances qu’acteur de sa propre
vie’ appears to be emblematic of the group as a whole, calling into question the ideological
connotations often attached to the service of the harkis, a point underscored by Besnaci-
Lancou’s remark that the harkis ‘s’étaient engagés avec la France et non pour la France’.713
Further undermining ideological justifications is the fact that siding with the French
was not at the time perceived to be the betrayal that it later came to be portrayed as. The
712 Jean-Jacques Jordi, ‘Khélifa Haroud: harki 1957-1967’, in Des hommes et des femmes en guerre
d’Algérie, ed. by Jean-Charles Jauffret, (Paris, 2003), p.370.
713 Ibid. p.360; Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki: Le bouleversant témoignage d’une enfant de la
guerre d’Algérie, with Marie-Christine Ray, (Paris, 2005), p.71.
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French had been in Algeria for more than a century and during that time had fought numerous
wars with the assistance of colonial troops. Many harkis had fathers and grandfathers who
had served in the French army during two World Wars. These men were justifiably proud of
their service records and their children were raised on their war stories. Brahmin Sadouni’s
father, injured by a shell while serving as an artilleryman in the Second World War, would
say of his scars: ‘Tu vois mon fils, ces petites choses, je les ai gagnées avec mon sang et grâce
à mon courage’.714 Even those without connections to the harkis, such as Zorah, an Algerian
living in Paris were still able to appreciate the importance of this legacy of combat, remarking
‘l’Algérie à l’époque, c’était comme qui dirait un département, comme le 75
aujourd’hui…Alors, faire la guerre à côté des Français, c’était normal’.715
This is linked to the broader question of whether we can speak of the Algerian
population being nationalist. Benjamin Stora has argued that the extent of French penetration
and domination, combined with their strategy of political, cultural, and ideological
depersonalisation meant that the FLN found themselves in the minority and having to ‘se
battre contre des gens qui n’auraient plus de conscience d’appartenance nationale’.716 In
support of this contention, Stora recounts an interview conducted in 1975 by the journalist
Guy Sitbon with Ali, a harki. When asked about having fought ‘contre ton peuple’, Ali
replied:
On parlait pas de peuple à La Chiffa, à La Chiffa on parlait de La Chiffa, c’est tout. Il
n’y avait pas de journaux, il n’y avait pas de radio. On savait rien à La Chiffa. On
savait seulement qu’il y avait la guerre.717
The majority of harkis were from rural areas far from the political decision-making centres
and knew little of what was happening beyond their immediate environs, especially given the
extremely high rates of illiteracy. In these circumstances it was not really possible to betray
one’s brothers because harkis did not conceive of the war in such politicised terms.
‘L’histoire, nous la subissions’’ argued one supplétif, casting himself and his fellow harkis as
pawns in a game whose wider context they were almost entirely ignorant of.718 These
comments are echoed in Kerchouche’s description of her father’s enrolment: ‘Il ne sait pas,
au moment où il appose une croix en guise de paraphe, au bas de son contrat, qu’il devient un
714 Brahim Sadouni, Français sans patrie: La Reconnaissance, (Rouen, 1985), p.33.
715 Yamina Benguigui, Mémoires d’immigrés: L’héritage Maghrébin, (Paris, 1997), p.93.
716 Benjamin Stora and Dimitri Nicolaïdis, ‘Cicatriser l’Algérie: Entretien avec Benjamin Stora’, in
Oublier nos crimes: L’amnésie nationale, une spécialité française?, ed. by Dimitri Nicolaïdis, (Paris,
2002), p.206.
717 Ibid. p.206.
718 Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki, p.57.
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‘harki’, un traître à une cause qu’il ne connaît pas et qui le dépasse’.719 This adds great
poignancy to his confession: ‘Moi, je n’ai jamais choisi la France, je me suis toujours
considéré comme algérien’.720
However, feeling oneself to be Algerian did not automatically equate to enrolling in
the FLN, not least because actually joining was no easy matter. The nature of the guerrilla
war being waged forced the FLN to operate restrictive selection procedures. Much is made of
French troops not knowing whom they could trust, but the FLN were in a similar position,
especially once the French actively started recruiting the indigenous population. On a
practical level, the FLN were simply not able to equip, arm, and feed a large force, while
ancestral and personal rivalries further limited intake. Finally, in the later stages of the war
when victory was regarded as imminent, many within the FLN became anxious about
potentially having to share their spoils with a slew of last-minute recruits.721 Not only was a
positive choice to side with the FLN problematic, many Algerians were repulsed by the
conduct of the FLN, in particular their brutality, which was often indiscriminate. ‘Nous
aurions pu être fier d’aider nos frères’ testified one harki spouse, ‘s’ils n’avaient pas été si
violents et autoritaires’.722 Chafing under demands for food and money as well as arbitrary
rules such as the prohibition on smoking, the fact that many FLN soldiers ‘ne se comportaient
pas en hommes d’honneur’ in a society where honour was extremely highly valued, was the
last straw.723 Furthermore, the general atmosphere of suspicion that reigned during the war
meant that many harkis had family members killed by the FLN in the course of collective
reprisals, cases of mistaken identity, or simply because they were rumoured to harbour pro-
French sympathies. This pushed some, if not directly into the arms of the French, then
certainly away from the militant cause.724 No one could have predicted the outcome of the
conflict, but this in itself was a further factor that drew the harkis into the French camp. The
French had been such a dominant fact of life for so long that for many it was inconceivable
that they would eventually be vanquished by ‘une poignée de révolutionnaires mal armés’,
especially given France’s track-record at subduing rebellions in Algeria.725 To men like Ali
Tayeb, France seemed ‘invincible’ and consequently ‘nous n’imaginions pas un autre
destin’.726 However, if the logic of obeying the ‘maître de l’heure’ was not sufficiently
719 Dalila Kerchouche, Mon père, ce harki, (Paris, 2003), p.228.
720 Ibid, p.254.
721 Mohand Hamoumou, ‘Comment pouvait-on être harki?’ Migrations études, 23 (December 1991), 2.
722 Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki, p.43.
723 Sabrina Kassa, Nos ancêtres les Chibanis! Portrait d’Algériens arrivés en France pendant les
Trente Glorieuses, (Paris, 2006), p.116.
724 The same was of course true of the French and their behaviour undoubtedly influenced many
Algerians to actively side with the nationalists.
725 Saïd Ferdi, Un enfant dans la guerre, (Paris, 1981) p.21.
726 Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, Treize chibanis harkis, (Paris, 2006), p.60.
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persuasive, the French were not above playing dirty in order to recruit, as Said Ferdi’s
experience illustrates.
In all of this, protection was paramount. Most harkis desired nothing more than to
stay out of the conflict. However, the first FLN tract of the war clearly stated that neutrality
was not an option since ‘se désintéreser de la lutte est une trahison’.727 Algerians may have
had very little in terms of material possessions, but what they did have was very precious to
them and they sought above all to protect that, along with their families and themselves as
best they could. Subjected to intimidation and exaction by both the FLN and the French, often
the choice of side came down to the simple fact of who was the more willing to provide a
rifle. This was the case for Ali:
Moi, je voulais un fusil. Quand il y a la guerre, pour vivre tranquille, il faut avoir un
fusil…Mes trois cousins, ils étaient montés dans la montagne avec le FLN pour avoir
un fusil. Mon frère et moi, on a manqué l’occasion…Alors quand l’officier français
nous a dit qu’il allait nous donner un fusil, on n’a pas voulu manquer une autre
occasion…728
However, the French were able to offer other, equally powerful, incentives, principally la
solde. The war all but destroyed rural economies, leaving families destitute and many,
including Kerchouche’s father, eventually opted to enrol as harkis because they could see no
other way to provide for their families. Assigned to the Groupe mobile de police rurale
(GMPR) Kerchouche’s father received a monthly wage of 250 francs; a relative fortune at the
time for such families.729 Yet it was also not uncommon for one member of a family to
become a harki and use his wages to support the entire family, while his other male relatives
fought for the less financially remunerative FLN.
Such divisions do not appear to have engendered great bitterness or animosity
possibly because of the long history of engagement alongside the French and lack of political
investment in the conflict which led many harkis to regard their actions as ‘un travail comme
un autre’.730 The idea of being employed to protect their own people is also a feature of
numerous testimonies. Eric Taleb for example was asked by an illiterate harki to write a letter
to his son explaining that his job was not to fight those who sought independence, but simply
to guard the various farms in the region which would constitute the future wealth of a
727 Hamoumou, ‘Comment pouvait-on être harki?’, 7.
728 Benjamin Stora, Ils venaient d’Algérie: L’immigration algérienne en France 1912-1992, (Paris,
1992), p.403.
729 Kerchouche, Mon père, p.228.
730 Ibid. p.228.
169
sovereign Algeria.731 There is also an insistence on their lack of active combat with harkis
specifically stating that neither they, nor those in their units, ever actually killed Algerians.
‘J’ai fait mal à personne,’ Ali insisted, ‘Jamais j’ai tiré avec mon fusil, sauf deux ou trois fois
à l’instruction. Je savais pas tirer’.732
Ultimately, becoming a harki was less a choice and more of a practical necessity, or a
last resort. ‘Enfin voilà, je pense que 95% des supplétifs ne se sont pas engagés pour le
plaisir’ asserts Ali Tebib, an assessment that chimes with Homer Sutton’s description of the
harkis as ‘neither heroes nor traitors’ but rather ‘exemplary victims of a colonial system
which confiscated their choices’.733 What comes across most strongly from the available
testimonies is that there was no grand patriotic narrative, or indeed any overarching rationale,
simply a collection of individuals forced to respond to the particular and extreme situations
they found themselves in. These accounts reflect a desire on the part of harkis to evoke the
context in which their actions were taken and, in light of this, to justify decisions that
retrospectively seemed incomprehensible to many external observers.
Exile: ‘Pour moi, une autre guerre commençait’
In July 1962 independence was celebrated throughout Algeria. However, for those who had
been engaged on the losing side this was less a new dawn than the beginning of a nightmare:
‘Pour moi’ Khélifa Haroud stated, ‘une autre guerre commençait’.734 Regarding the terrible
violence that swept Algeria that summer, the harkis remain largely silent. When the
massacres are mentioned it is either in general terms to evoke the climate of terror which
reigned at the time, or specific events are described in the context of this being the particular
point at which they realised they had to leave Algeria in order to save their own lives. For
Brahim Sadouni’s uncle, this moment came when he witnessed the beating to death of a
nineteen year old auxillary by the FLN while the French army stood by: ‘J’étais boulversé.
Comment pouvait-on faire prevue de tant de violence contre un adolescent? La France qui
l’avait enrôlé, avait permis qu’il soit lynché sans le moindre simulacre de justice’.735
The actual moment of departure tended to be sudden. Often the French would simply
arrive without warning to evacuate the luckier harkis. ‘Un depart complètement improvisé!’
is how one fils de harkis described it. ‘Personne n’avait été averti…Nous sommes partis les
mains vides…Tout s’est arrêté d’un coup, figé d’un coup, comme s’il y avait eu une éruption
731 Éric Taleb, La fin des harkis, (Paris, 1972), p.175.
732 Stora, Ils venaient, p.404.
733 Cited in Kassa, Nos ancêtres, p.122; Homer B. Sutton, ‘Postcolonial Voices: Vindicating the
Harkis’, Contemporary French Civilization, 20 (1996), 238.
734 Cited in Jordi, ‘Khélifa Haroud’, p.365.
735 Sadouni, Français sans patrie, p.19. In contrast to these personal testimonies, narratives offered on
behalf of the harkis often dwell at length and in vivid detail on violence committed by the FLN.
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volcanique. C’était la panique…’736 For those who were forced to make their own way, either
to the nearest French barracks or port, the need to conceal their intentions for fear of being
stopped and captured by the FLN again meant travelling light. Even once passage to France
had been secured, feelings appear to have been very mixed. Relief, regret, sadness, anxiety
over the uncertainty of what awaited them on the other side of the Mediterranean, all these
emotions are attested to in the sources. The most common references are to the tears of the
woman as the boats pulled out of the port. For Khélifa Haroud’s wife ‘c’était dur…j’étais
contente, mon mari était bien vivant, mes enfants étaient là. Dieu merci, mais j’ai pleuré’.737
Others may have kept their grief to themselves, but they felt the loss of their homeland just as
acutely. For Ali, there was a sharp contrast between the happiness of the returning French
conscripts and the despair of auxiliaries such as himself. ‘Quand la sirène du bateau a retenti,
ce fut un déchirement. Nous regardions s’éloigner notre pays’.738 There is a clear sense that
these men and their families were aware of the permanence of the rupture they were
experiencing in a way that was perhaps not true for some of the pieds-noirs also aboard.
Arrival in France: ‘C’est l’un des plus mauvais souvenirs que je garde’.
The next point of anchorage for the memories of the harkis were the camps through which the
majority passed upon their arrival in France. In contrast to the brevity of accounts of their
departure, much more testimony is available concerning this period in their lives. The other
noticeable difference is a shift away from the predominantly masculine narratives through
which histories of the war are largely articulated. In recollections of the centres d’accueil,
where the daily, the domestic, and the private spheres assumed greater importance, the voices
of women are more present. What characterises these accounts are evocations of atrocious
accommodation situations where ‘rien n’avait été prévu, ni sanitaires, ni eau’.739 Arrival was
particularly traumatic because these men and woman of the bled arrived in France with
literally the clothes on their backs at the beginning of what was to become the coldest winter
on record only to find themselves living in canvas military tents. ‘Tout le monde, ou presque,
était en djellaba et pieds nus et il a fallu passer l’hiver dans cette terre et dans la neige’
remembered one, while for Khélifa Haroud ‘Il y a bien un poêle mais il n’y a pas de bois
disponible!’.740 There was, furthermore, insufficient space to house all the harkis, especially
given the large average family size. Overcrowding and the consequent enforced proximity
736 Jacques Delarue, ‘La malediction des enfants de harkis’, Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps,
26 (January-March 1992), 30
737 Jordi, ‘Khélifa Haroud’, p.365.
738 Besnaci-Lancou, Treize chibanis, p.54.
739 Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki, p.67.
740 Delarue, ‘La malédiction’, 31; Jordi, ‘Khélifa Haroud’, p.370.
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rendered privacy impossible and conflict inevitable, prompting harkis to ask: ‘Pourquoi nous
met-on en prison? Quel crime a-t-on commis?’741
Out of this misery however, emerged a strong sense of community and an awareness
of the importance of mutual support in the absence of external sources. Quotidian difficulties
served to erase the distance between people with the result that ‘nous avons établi une
fraternité, même si c’était une fraternité du malheur’.742 This community and way of life
remained deliberately traditional. Many accounts speak of having recreated a little piece of
Algeria in France in the sense of living close to neighbours, continuing to speak Arabic or
Berber, eating traditionally prepared food, maintaining customary styles of dress, and
struggling over the right to give their children Algerian names instead of the French prénoms
the social workers tried to force upon them, a practice begun in 1965 and abandoned only in
1975. As one fils de harki put it, ‘j’ai grandi comme si j’avais grandi en Algérie’743
However, while this fidelity to traditions undoubtedly provided a reassuring sense of
contunuity for this deraciné group, it also had negative consequences, retarding their
integration and thus reinforcing their isolation, as Besnaci-Lancou observed, ‘Ils sont restés
figés dans l’Algérie de 1962’.744 As far as the harkis themselves were concerned, they simply
viewed the perpetuations of their traditions as a way to ‘rester entre soi, pour demeurer soi’ in
the midst of an alien and unstable world.745 ‘Dans leur tête, ils n’ont jamais renouncé à leur
pays’ Kerchouche says of her parents, ‘le foulard de ma mère teint bon sur ses cheveux, elle
s’achète des kilos de figues de Barabrie – sa Madeleine à elle. Mon père, lui, porte toujours sa
djellaba et son turban de montagnard’.746 These practical manifestations of nostalgia are
echoed in wistful references to an Algeria to which there was officially no option of return to,
not even to visit family or their graves. Understandably, in contrast to the insalubrious and
oppressive nature of institutional life, Algeria was often presented as ‘une terre de lait et
miel’, even though the reality of the lives that these people left behind was the hard one of
poverty and subsistence living. It is less the material conditions that are missed than the
general ambiance, in particular the freedom to live their lives as they wished, a freedom that
was taken from them when the war broke out. Unlike pied-noir memories, nostalgia is not
something this generation seek to mobilise towards a particular end, it is therefore not
collectivised, but rather a personal part of their everyday lives. Forgetting your country of
birth is no easy matter as Ali discovered: ‘J’ai décidé de partir pour oublier. Mais apparement,
741 Kerchouche, Mon père, p.56.
742 Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki, p.81.
743 Saïd Bouamama, Jeunes Manosquins issus de l’immigration algérienne: Héritiers involontaires de
la guerre d’Algérie, (Manosque, 2003), p.17
744 Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki, p.79.
745 Saliha Abdellatif, ‘Les Français-musulmans ou le poids de l’histoire à travers la communauté
Picarde’, Les Temps Modernes, 452-453-454 (March-April-May 1984), 1838
746 Kerchouche, Mon père, p.187.
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c’est le contraire qui s’est produit. Depuis que je suis parti, le manque d’Algérie est devenu
intense, 24h sur 24’.747 Indeed the evidence suggests that the closer these individuals get to
the end of their lives, the more acute their homesickness becomes. ‘Maintenant que je suis
très vieux, je repense tous les jours à mon pays’, Lakhdar tells Besnaci-Lancou, ‘tout me
manque. Même mon âme de l’époque me manque’.748
‘Un peu de colère contre la France’?
‘Je suis algérien avant d’être français, ça, personne ne peut l’effacer’, Ali Tebib defiantly
states when explaining his refusal to give his children French names.749 His words reflect the
stronger sense of an Algerian identity that emerges from these personal testimonies than is
often found in the pronouncements of the associations and spokespeople that constitute the
community’s public face. This is in all probability due to the combination of the leadership of
these organisations resting in the hands of the second generation for whom France is their
actual homeland, even if they nonetheless retain a strong sense of their Algerian heritage, and
the practical necessity of stressing the ties that bind the harkis to France as part of demands
put to the state for recognition and recompense. It is also the case that the majority of harkis
are French according to their identity papers, thus adding legal confirmation to an identity
long assumed for the community by veterans, pieds-noirs, and even certain Algerians.750 But
behind these cartes d’identité lies a complicated relationship to France that is many things but
never indifferent.
For Kerchouche, becoming French did not lead to any tangible improvement in the
situation of her parents. As she sarcastically observed, ‘La carte d’identité ne les réchauffe
pas, ne nourrit pas leurs enfants et ne change rien à leurs conditions de vie’.751 Given all that
she learns of their treatment at the hands of the French, Kerchouche finds it difficult to
understand why her parents do not display even ‘un peu de colère’ towards France. Her
mother’s response is: ‘Non…La France nous a sauvé la vie. Que veux-tu qu’on demande de
747 Cited in Kassa, Nos ancêtres, p.117.
748 Besnaci-Lancou, Treize chibanis, p.13.
749 Cited in Kassa, Nos ancêtres, p.120.
750 Under French rule the majority of Algerians possessed only the statut civil de droit local. Upon
independence, all indigenous inhabitants, including harkis, became Algerians. Thus once they arrived
in France it was necessary for them to obtain a ‘déclaration recognitive de la nationalité française’ by
appearing before a judge. Closing in January 1963, the window of opportunity for this conversion was
narrow. Although not all harkis wished to renounce their Algerian identity, many were simply not
given a choice in the matter. For further details see Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, pp.231-
242.
751 Kerchouche, Mon père, p.62.
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plus?’752 Others are however, less stoical about their experiences as the following passage
from Brahim Sadouni’s autobiography demonstrates:
ABANDONNÉS, oui, ils viennent de les abadonner, sans armes, privés de tous
moyens d’existence, devant leur sort…Était-ce vraiment possible que la France
puisse abandonner de façon si légère et aussi rapide, ceux qui avaient toujours cru en
elle? La déception se lisait sur tous les visages désillusionés.753
One recurrent theme is that France broke her promise to the harkis. Even if they were not
ideologically committed to the French cause, the harkis did their job and were loyal, as Malek
emphasises, ‘jusqu au bout’. ‘J’ai rempli ma part au contrat avec l’État français’, he
concludes, ‘J’attends toujours qu’il remplisse sa part de contrat’.754 Beyond betrayal and
abandonment at the close of the war, subsequent marginalisation in France further fuelled
bitterness among certain harkis. ‘J’étais complètement anéanti,’ Besnaci-Lancou’s uncle tells
her, ‘quelques semaines auparavant j’étais militaire d’une grande nation démocratique et à
présent, je devais me cacher comme un rat, de surcroît en France’.755
In spite of this, expressions of regret are less common than one would expect.
Sadouni’s uncle claims to see this feeling etched ‘sur tous les visages des harkis que je
croisais’, but if he is correct then it seems to be a deeply internalised emotion rather than
something that is regularly articulated.756 More common are stoical demeanours from men
who seem resigned to their fate, men like Lounes who states ‘Moi, je suis fataliste. Je me dis
que Dieu avait déjà tracé ma vie et que c’était comme ça’.757 However, it is possible that the
more active mobilisation of these recollections by spokespeople and associations will return a
sharp edge to the sense of injustice that is clearly present within these men and women, but
has been vocalised principally by their children. Collectivising the past, particularly when, as
with the work of Azni, this is directed towards legalistic ends, may well reignite the latent
anger contained within the community, especially given the heightened commemorative
climate surrounding the war in general. On the other hand, with the French state continuing to
take steps forward in terms of according recognition to the harkis, through the Journée
nationale d’hommage, this agitation may be counteracted.
752 Ibid, p.16.
753 Sadouni, Français sans patrie, pp.140-141.
754 Besnaci-Lancou, Treize chibanis, p.18.
755 Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki, p.96.
756 Sadouni, Français sans patrie, p.7.
757 Cited in Besnaci-Lancou, Treize chibanis, p.46.
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Missing Elements
As more testimony comes to light, an increasingly rich and nuanced history is being built up
that incorporates the experiences of the harkis and of their families. There remains, however,
one significant lacuna in that has already been briefly mentioned but merits a more detailed
consideration: active combat. The growing body of information concerning the war focuses
overwhelmingly on enrolment and abandonment, both events that tend to reinforce the notion
of the harkis as powerless victims responding as best they could to circumstances beyond
their control. There are very few references to what harkis did as harkis, while those who do
mention this aspect are keen to place their duties under the remit of ‘protecting’ civilians as
opposed to fighting enemies. There is a marked reluctance among harkis to place themselves
definitively on one side as opposed to the other, preferring to cast themselves as an
intermediary force. Extending the problematisation of the idea of choice, these are also deeply
passive accounts that downplay, if not deny altogether, agency on the part of the auxillaires.
Within this gap there is a further blank space regarding those harkis who were
employed in the FPA, which was created in 1959 by Michel Debré but is most closely
associated with Maurice Papon who commanded the Paris-based units. Not only is no
reference made to these harkis from within the community itself, this aspect of history is also
notable by its absence from academic works. Discussion of FPA harkis is therefore mainly
provided in works dealing with the repression conducted against the Algerian community in
France during the war. It is however, also possible to find references made to the FPA by
those who have traditionally sought to speak on behalf of the harki community. ‘Le bilan de
leur action est éloquent’ judged the Bachaga, while for Georges Fleury, ‘leurs méthodes font
à nouveau merveille’.758 Both men thus deliberately place the FPA harkis within the same
ideological context as themselves, casting them as committed defenders of the Algérie-
française cause.
In contrast to these self-interested renderings, several reasons can be advanced for the
silence among harkis themselves. First, in practical terms, those who served as part of the
FPA were already in France at the end of the war. They therefore would have been better
placed to avoid the centres d’accueil and disperse into the general population, especially after
being made titular gardiens de la paix by Papon on 1 July 1962. Second, in common with the
other harkis, supportive cadres sociaux were absent in the years initially following 1962.
However, unlike the harkis who spent the war in Algeria, no such frameworks have
subsequently emerged which would facilitate the articulation of these memories. In fact, with
the increasing amount of attention devoted to 17 October 1961, from the perspective of
758 Bachaga Saïd Boualam, Les harkis au service de la France, (Paris, 1963), p.220; Georges Fleury,
Le combat des harkis, (Versailles, 1989), p.120
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exposing the scale and wider context in which this brutal act of repression was committed and
then covered up, the conditions in which these harkis might be encouraged to speak out are
rapidly deteriorating. Finally, to return to the issues of agency and victimhood, the highly
specialised nature of the FPA’s work leaves little room for the fluidity and ambiguity that
features in other accounts of harki duties. This is important in several respects, not least
because it raises the question of who or what lies behind the imperative to divest the role of
harki of any combative element, and why? Is it those offering the information or those asking
the questions who are responsible for this decontextualising silence?
The answer is inevitably both and neither. Both because of the advantages of a
largely depoliticised reading of the harki experience that exist for both parties; and neither
because of the wider frameworks in which the war has been represented in France which
established parameters and conventions that placed restrictions, explicit and implicit, upon the
narratives that could be articulated. However, with the passage of time and evolutions in the
political and social environment, the edges of this silence are beginning to fray. Again this is
a development that seems to be driven simultaneously by the individuals involved and the
contexts in which they have found themselves. Advances in knowledge about the war have
produced greater acceptance of the complexity of these eight years and a greater willingness
to examine the more uncomfortable and controversial elements. This is demonstrated by a
growing advocacy among association leaders such as Besnaci-Lancou of the need for the past
to be assumed in its entirety. ‘Il n’est alors pas question, pour nous’ she writes, ‘de glorifier
cette histoire, voire de la mystifier ou, dans certains cas extrêmes, de la refouler’; a stance
notably not shared by Azni.759 It is also reflected in the nature of the testimonies being
disseminated that support the wider perception that this was a war from which no one
emerged unsullied. As Moussa openly admits, ‘personne n’est sorti tout blanc de cette
histoire’.760 Finally, increasingly sophisticated treatments of phenomena such as responsibility
and culpability appear to be fostering a willingness to speak about previously taboo, or
certainly stigmatised aspects of the harki past. Thus while the practice of torture within the
French army has been discussed by harkis since Les années algériennes, today these acts are
being given a much more specific historical grounding. They are also notably becoming acts
over which direct ownership is being taken and accounts in which agency is being reclaimed.
In Treize chibanis harkis, for example, Malek shows off his teeth which are all false on
account of ‘Un homme très sadique’ who ‘s’amusait à nous les casser’, but this is juxtaposed
with the contrition of Tayeb who regrets the war because ‘elle a été violente et que j’ai assisté
à toutes sortes d’horreurs’.761 Although it is currently more the exception than the rule,
759 Besnaci-Lancou, Treize chibanis, p.85.
760 Ibid. p.78.
761 Ibid. pp.18, 61.
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Besnaci-Lancou’s book, which builds on the generally bi-partisan ethos of her activism,
suggests that in some cases the exhortations of academics such as Stora to move beyond
accusation, moralisation, and memory, into more distanced, critical, and historicised
understandings of the war and its participants is beginning to filter downwards. As Besnaci-





‘Although memory sustains hegemony, it also subverts it through its capacity to recollect and
restore alternative discourses the dominant world would simply bleach out and forget’.763
Using the case study of the Algerian War of Independence, this thesis has focused on two
particular alternative collective discourses and the groups that have been the vehicles for
them; the pieds-noirs and the harkis. Exploring their activities since 1962 has complicated the
conventional narrative and periodisation of the development of the memory of the war,
replacing the perception of a stark dichotomy between absence prior to the 1990s and
presence after this point with a more nuanced reality. Although pieds-noirs and harkis have
shared the common goal of legitimating their interpretation of the past within the national
historical narrative, which has created numerous points of interaction and exchange,
fundamentally their collective memories have evolved according to distinct trajectories.
With respect to the pieds-noirs, to speak of a community of interconnected
individuals is not simply convenient shorthand, but a valid description of the reality as
perceived by those both within and without the group. As Yves Monier told PNM readers,
‘J’ai parlé plus haut de l’importance des filiations. Dans la vie pied-noire, c’est un dogme’.764
Enshrining this commitment within the formal structure of an associational nexus has
arguably been the defining evolution that the pieds-noirs have undergone since arriving in
France, enabling them to progress from a collection of disparate individuals to an organised
and mobilised memory carrier. Averell Manes speaks of the ‘cluster’ nature of the population,
arguing that the pied-noirs make up for what they lack in terms of national resonance through
the vibrancy of their local activities which are predominantly concentrated in the south.
However, issues such as indemnification and individuals such as Jacques Roseau demonstrate
that such provincialism can be overcome. Furthermore, associations such as the Cercle
Algérianiste have branches across France and PNM is not a region-specific publication, while
unity beyond the local level is evidenced through the pied-noir lexicon, which was centralised
and codified in tandem with the development of the associational movement.
In spite of certain basic similarities to other memory carriers, the pied-noir
community represents a unique way of ‘doing’ memory work in France that can be
summarised as the duality of a static content deployed within an evolving context. With the
rudiments of their lexicon established very quickly in individual memoirs, the rise of
associations as the primary vehicles for collective memory enabled the elements of this
763 Richard Terdiman cited in Jim House and Neil MacMaster, ‘“Une journée portée disparue”: The
Paris Massacre of 1961 and Memory’, in Crisis and Renewal in France 1918-1962, ed. by Kenneth
Moore and Martin S. Alexander, (New York, 2002), p.285.
764 Yves Monier, ‘Comment devenir Pieds-Noirs’, PNM, 71 (September 1996), 23.
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patrimony to be codified and then effectively mobilised in a range of situations and against an
array of targets. The application of this well-established and widely-adhered to lexicon to the
changing situation in France with respect to the War of Independence, and indeed discussions
of the nation’s imperial past in general, characterises the pieds-noirs as a textbook example of
‘cloistered remembering’ taken to extremes. This has become particularly true in the course
of the last two decades, which have seen the community and its leaders turning inwards and
moving further from the orbit of conventional historical and commemorative discourse.
Although the pieds-noirs are not immune from social, cultural and economic developments,
theirs is an increasingly enclosed world whose links to the mainstream are becoming
progressively more tenuous and strained. This, in combination with a lexicon that has evolved
to such a stage that it is akin to a weapon on permanent standby, instinctively deployed at the
slightest perceived provocation, means that associations tend to simply react to events without
actually engaging with them. Again, this is intimately connected to the fact that history and
memory are, for many pied-noir associations, not things they wish to investigate in order to
understand, but rather factual givens that everyone else needs to accept.
The persistence of colonial images, attitudes, and arguments within pied-noir
publications makes it hard to avoid the conclusion that the pied-noir community have not
been decolonised. When they arrived in France in 1962, pied-noir perspectives regarding the
French empire coincided with those of many within the Hexagon. Since then the debate has
moved on and this aspect of France’s past is evaluated in very different terms. The pied-noir
community, however, has not moved on, causing their imperial hangover to become more
pronounced with the passing of time. As the lobby in favour of Article 4 of Loi 2005-158
indicated, the pieds-noirs are not entirely isolated.765 But even within this milieu, they stand
apart in the degree to which they subscribe to a wholly positive view of colonisation, certainly
in Algeria, rather than simply accepting certain beneficial elements. This standpoint is
informed by the underlying belief that consistency and absolutism are indicators of veracity
and that acknowledging any merit in competing interpretations is tantamount to undermining
the entire pied-noir edifice, something illustrated by the community’s relationship with
Jacques Roseau. As General Jouhaud told the annual congress of the Cercle Algérianiste in
1978, ‘Un combat désespéré n’est jamais perdu si ceux qui l’ont mené restent fidèles aux
sentiments nobles qui l’ont commandé’.766
765 A survey conducted by CSA and Le Figaro reported that 64 per cent of the population were
favourable to the law of which 15 per cent were ‘tout à fait favorable’ and 49 per cent ‘plutôt
favourable’. For the full breakdown of opinions see: www.csa-
tmo.fr/dataset/data2005/opi20051130a.htm [14 February 2009] Also cited in Dunwoodie, ‘Postface’,
324.
766 Général Edmond Jouhaud, ‘Congrès de Tours’, L’Algérianiste, 5.2 (15 March 1978), 51.
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These traits are not, however, simply pied-noir hallmarks, but also survival
mechanisms, particularly when combined with their innate sense of victimisation. In 1999,
Annette Wieviorka argued that ‘la mémoire n’existe que si elle est présente dans l’espace
public de façon quasi-permanente par une agitation et des conflicts, et qu’une mémoire qui
n’est plus conflcituelle est une mémoire qui finalement n’a plus de vitalité’.767 This
description is particularly apt with respect to the pieds-noirs whose conflictual relationships
with the media, academics, and Algerians, as well as with members of their own community,
represents the continuation of the War of Independence through alternative means.
Ultimately, what the pied-noir community are searching for is recognition on their own terms.
Their quest is however, dependent upon the perception of the continuing indifference and
hostility of the French, an impression formulated at the point of arrival and nurtured by
associations and individuals ever since, as indicated by Pierre Dimech’s concluding remarks
on désinformation:
Contre cet monde aux mille réseaux, au financement illimité, aux appuis et complices
en embuscade aux postes stratégiques de notre société, nous nous battons et
continuons à nous battre à mains nues. Jusqu’à notre dernier soufflé. Et même au-
delà.768
If the pied-noir community ever received what they demand from the French nation, they
would have nothing to define themselves against and thus their specificity and collective
identity would disappear. However, the uncompromising and radical nature of their agenda
means that it is unlikely to ever be fulfilled, or certainly not in a way that satisfies the
majority of associations. As proof, one can look to the recent steps that have been taken
towards recognising the pieds-noirs within wider official commemorative gestures, especially
during Chirac’s presidency. These have done little to heal the wounds of the community and
have generally been dismissed as insufficient or compromised by similar initiatives with
respect to the Algerian community in France.
In contrast to the early mobilisation of the pied-noir community, but in line with the dominant
explanatory paradigm concerning the memory of the war, absence was the situation that
initially prevailed among the harki population. Far from indicating forgetting, a range of
powerful economic, social, and cultural factors combined to inhibit the transmission of the
recent past, even within family circles. This left harki descendants with many questions but
767 Annette Wieviorka, ‘Le Vel d’Hiv: histoire d’une commémoration’, in Travail de mémoire 1914-
1998. Une nécessité dans un siècle de violence’, (Paris, 1999), p.165.
768 Pierre Dimech, La désinformation autour de la culture des pieds-noirs, (Paris, 2006), p.93.
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nowhere to look for answers other than to external memory carriers who had been
constructing and disseminating narratives on behalf of their silent parents since the end of the
war. Whether offered by the French and Algerian governments, Muslim elites, veterans, or
pieds-noirs, all these representations sought to speak for the harkis in ways that served their
own ideological and commemorative agendas. In the process of defining their own
interpretation, the newly mobilised fils de harkis necessarily had recourse to these pre-
existing tropes and, on certain occasions, to the actors behind them. However, they also
quickly recognised that these were instrumentalised readings of the past and were therefore
conscious of the importance of maintaining their independence as a collective, something that
was often easier in theory than in practice. Formulated via a complex process of interchange
and contestation, as well as incorporating their own experiences and memories, by 1991 the
fils de harkis had confirmed themselves as a memory carrier with a unique voice directed
towards obtaining recognition of the sacrifices made by their parents for France in order to
rehabilitate them in the eyes of the nation.
Their timing was fortuitous because the increased public attention being devoted to
the War of Independence and the concurrent escalation of competition amongst porteurs de
mémoire to gain the ear of this newly attentive audience greatly heightened the importance of
collective mobilisation. However, the medium through which the fils de harkis had chosen to
pursue their demands, associations, proved incapable of withstanding these new pressures.
Beneath a numerically healthy surface lay a diverse and highly fragmented movement
incapable of surmounting these divisions in order to unify, except for brief periods of time.
Breadth thus came at the expense of depth, although this was somewhat offset by the
emergence of a series of prominent individuals whom the media latched onto as
representative emblems for their community. From the practical grassroots militancy of
Hacène Arfi and Abdelkrim Klech, to the media-savvy advocacy of Dalila Kerchouche and
Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, via the judicially-orientated campaigns of Boussad Azni and the
academic-activist bridge formed by Mohand Hamoumou, each was thrust into the public
spotlight because something in their particular strategy resonated with the wider national
mood concerning the war. However, in attempting to capitalise on this attention in order to
promote the cause of their community, all except Kerchouche chose to place their actions
under the rubric of associations of their own creation suggesting that with certain
modifications this structure could be revitalised as an effective framework and vehicle for
collective memories.
The by-product of the emergence of these ‘media stars’, but also of the diversity of
their approaches to the protection and promotion of their communal history has been a
growing willingness among the harkis to break their silence and offer testimony, not only to
their engagé offspring, but to French society in general, finally deeming their experiences to
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be both legitimate and valuable. Although more circuitous in its emergence, as well as less
cohesive and combative than that of the pied-noir community, the collective memory being
articulated by the harki community today seems better placed to stake a substantive and
sustainable claim on the national memory. Having originally taken the lead, pied-noir
associations have now lost the initiative with respect not only to their relationship with the
harki community, but also more generally with respect to the commemorative agenda of the
War of Independence. Yet in spite of this noticeable role reversal, there remains overlap in
the activism of both communities that suggests certain common future orientations, albeit not
similar successes. Key to this appears to be the evolving attitude of the state. Although this
dissertation deliberately adopted a bottom-up exploration of collective memories, the state has
been present throughout in various guises and relationships to the pied-noir and harki
populations. Indeed, for Philip Dine it was the lack of a ‘properly consensual history’
emanating from above that led to memories of the war being cloistered within groups ‘with a
case to plead or an axe to grind’.769 The increased willingness of the government to engage
with and speak about the war since the 1990s has not altered this situation. In fact this greater
involvement has, if anything, made things worse, causing the various private memory bearers
to compete more ardently and more openly for the attention and favour of the state in order to
get their particular take on the past adopted as part of the reconfigured official historical
narrative. The 1990s are therefore a pivotal decade because they witnessed the resurrection of
the state as an active and evolving collective memory carrier, which in turn catalysed and
radicalised pre-existing sub-state processes of memory construction and articulation, bringing
them to public attention on a national stage. Just as the impact of drawing a veil of silence
over the Algerian episode in 1962 filtered downwards, obscuring and cloistering the
recollections of the actors involved, when the government began to lift that veil, the
ramifications of re-exposing these memories, which had previously been growing largely in
the dark, travelled upwards.
In light of this, it is unsurprising that both pieds-noirs and harkis should have
responded to this new context by re-orientating their activism more firmly towards official
channels and institutions. With Vichy serving as their model, both communities are
increasingly focusing their efforts on creating a compelling discourse of victimisation that
they wish to see made sacrosanct, either by the French state or the French courts. For
example, with the arrival on the scene of the Parti Pied-Noir (PPN) under the leadership of
Christian Schembre, the pied-noir battle is being taken directly to the state in a manner that
echoes RECOURS and Roseau, although the party has yet to enjoy successes on a
769 Philip Dine, Images of the Algerian War: French Fiction and Film, 1954-1992, (Oxford, 1994),
p.236.
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comparable scale.770 Furthermore, although the judicial endeavours of Véritas and Boussad
Azni are perceived to offer a potentially fruitful strategy given the precedent established by
the Vichy trials - despite some major obstacles, not least the amnesties laws - this is not, as
the Vichy experience also illustrates, a method that will necessarily bring closure in the form
of definitive verdicts on history. In the interim, pursuing history through the courts is likely
only to further exacerbate memory wars by providing another arena in which to compete.
Embodying the past in an inviolable public site such as the statute books does, however, offer
a way to ensure transmission beyond the lifespan of living witnesses. It therefore provides
one answer to the question of how to legitimate leaders without direct experience of the
collective memories they are charged with carrying by giving them a widely recognised
source external to their own communities from which to draw their authority.
Both these avenues essentially rely on the groups in question establishing themselves
as victims. This is part of what Stora sees as a dangerous recent trend on a wider scale: ‘Alors
qu’entre 1950 et 1980, des groupes sociaux…se positionnaient activement dans une critique
de l’État, aujourd’hui ils se présentent essentiellement comme des victimes et veulent que
l’État reconnaisse leur douleur’.771 Victimisation was always a crucial part of the pied-noir
lexicon that has only become more pronounced over time. For the harkis however, the irony
is that while their actions have changed them from victims of the constructions of external
commentators, to agency reclaiming activists, the discourse many promote is fundamentally
framed by the idea that the community has been the casualty of a catalogue of betrayal and
abandonment perpetrated by others. In both cases, pressing for recognition on these grounds
represents a form of competition to be the ‘best’ victim that negates the suffering of others
and thus perpetuates the ‘dialogue of the deaf’ aspect of memory wars.
This is the antithesis of Stora’s proposed remedy which, reflecting the thoughts of
many other intellectuals who have concerned themselves with this phenomenon, is based on
symbolic ‘reconnaissance et réparation’ in order to produce ‘une sorte de réconciliation des
mémoires’.772 As Robert Frank writes, ‘une bonne commémoration’ requires ‘une belle
harmonie’ between the memory of protagonists, official memory, and public memory.773
However, for Peter Dunwoodie the fixation with what he calls the ‘fantasy’ of a single
collective memory as an ‘instrument of national identity’ is not the solution, but part of the
problem, particularly because it privileges memory over the more complex, evidence-based
alternative of history, construes memory as a moral duty, and ignores the important functions
770 www.parti-piednoir.org/sommaire_texte.php3 [7 March 2008]
771 Benjamin Stora and Thierry Leclère, La guerre des mémoires: La France face à son passé colonial,
(Paris, 2007), p.41.
772 For Stora in particular, the present climate demands that historians act as a ‘juge de paix de la
réconciliation mémorielle’. Ibid. pp.89-91, 98.
773 Robert Frank, ‘Les troubles de la mémoire française’, in La guerre d’Algérie et les Français, ed. by
Jean-Pierre Rioux, (Paris, 1994), p.605.
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fulfilled by forgetting.774 His criticism alludes to the already mentioned efforts to contain the
wealth of postcolonial identities within the parameters of the one and indivisible Republic, a
struggle that should alert us to the fact that fragmented, or cloistered, memories are not
peculiar to the War of Independence, but rather a feature of the postcolonial period more
generally. Furthermore, they are not inherently negative but can, in certain cases, be positive
indicators of diversity and plurality. While it is clearly important for France to find a way to
move beyond the current reductive and destructive guerres de mémoire and towards a more
productive relationship to the Franco-Algerian past, the belief that this must be achieved
within a single cohesive and consensual narrative, no matter how accommodating of plurality,
is perhaps counter-productive. Recognising, as Philip Schlesinger and Peter Dunwoodie do,
that ‘National cultures are not simple repositories of shared symbols to which the population
stands in identical relation’, but rather ‘sites of contestation in which competition over
definition takes place’ would perhaps allow attention to be diverted from the elusive (and
possibly futile) quest for suitable shared symbols and narratives in which to anchor a national
identity and towards the process of contestation and the competitors themselves.775 A
thematic micro-history of the sort undertaken here therefore posits an alternative approach
which, by challenging conventional paradigms and seeking to build knowledge and context
from the ground upwards, may alter perspectives and ultimately yield new ways to tackle the
larger questions of history and memory that continue to hang over the War of Independence
and its legacies.
774 Peter Dunwoodie, ‘Postface: History, Memory and Identity – Today’s Crisis, Yesterday’s Issue’,
French History, 20.3 (September 2006), 322-323.
775 Philip Schlesinger, ‘On National Identity, Some Conceptions and Misconceptions Criticized’, Social
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Appendices: Questionnaire Responses
From: Harkis Honneur Histoire, Nasser Sahour (President)
Received: 7 February 2007 by email
Mademoiselle,
Nous avons bien reçu votre lettre relative à la thèse que vous préparez sur la guerre
d'indépendance de l'Algérie. Bien entendu, nous vous retournons le questionnaire complété, et
vous encourageons à découvrir cette histoire passionnante, déroutate parfois triste qu'est celle
des harkis et de leur famille.
Les rapatriés ont été divers, plurielles, certains aux idéologies condamnables, d'autres aspirés
par l'essence d'un humanisme où la paix, l'amour de son prochain étaient les maîtres mots.
Cette histoire, celle des harkis rencontre des grands hommes de l'histoire, mais chacun dans
son parcours a été meurtri par l'utilisation de ces hommes de leur population a des fins
politiques alors que cette tranche de la population française n'aspirait qu'à une seule volonté,
celle de rester Française, sans sang ni haine.
L’Histoire commence à montrer les vérités, les hommes continus à mentir, mais l'inexorable
et heureusement la page de cette histoire s'écrit avec des preuves incontournable tel que les
supports d'images, de témoignages d'hommes et de femmes, elle montre que cette histoire est
celle d'un GENOCIDE d'une population entière,
Les harkis, (mouvement), n'appartienne pas à un idéal, ils sont aussi bien de droite que de
gauche, certains ont soutenu même l'indépendance algérienne et pensait rester en algérie avec
leur nationalité française, la France leur a pris celà. Les mémoires collectives 'n'amalgameront
pas les collaborteurs Français de la guerre avec les Harkis, l'histoire retient déjà que les harkis
étaient Français au moins depuis plus de Trois générations, les collaborateurs avec le nazisme
avait fait ce choix sur le temps même!
Je souhaite que votre thèse présente le génocide fait par l'abandon des harkis par la France
lors de l'indépendance de l'Algérie, Je souhaite que vous montrez que les harkis ne sont pas
des extrémistes de droite, mais qu'ils ont dans leur ensemble un esprit de laïcité et de lutte
contre les déviances,je souhaite que vous ressentiez de celles et ceux qui furent torturés en
Algérie, et humiliés en France leur visage, celui d'hommes a qui ont a tenté de voler leur
liberté et qu'on a souhaité enfermer dans les couloirs des enfants sans nations.
Les harkis aujourd'hui sont pour la France cette population qui démontre que notre grande
Nation a dans sa boite de pandor encore des malheurs qu'elle ne veut pas reconnaître dans sa
totalité et qui de ce fait assombrissent sa grandeur.
La France aujourd'hui reconnait progressivement ses erreurs, ses responsabilités dans les
drames passés, il est temps qu'ensemble, nous tirions les conséquences de ces agissements
bassements politiques sur des populations qui n'aspire qu'à une seule vérité, celle de vivre en
paix.
Les peuples ont droit à leur auto-détermination, chaque identité nationale se battit sur des
révoltes, parfois dans le sang, parfois de velours ou parfois même de paix.
Retenons que les harkis étaient le trait d'union de cette histoire qui se voulait la construction
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d'une paix et d'une identité qui mélangeait l'ensemble de la population de l'algérien, mais
qu'au grand malheur de cette même population, terreur, masscre et génocide obligea l'histoire
à s'écrire autrement, dans le plus terrible, dans les sillons du sang des deux répulbliques.
n'oubliez que les harkis sont des hommes d'honneur, pas des indigénes imbéciles, qu'ils ont
été des combattants de la liberté à Verdun et ailleurs, Monté cassino...




From: Amicale des Pieds Noirs, M. Jean Louis Jover (Secretary)
Received: 5 February 2007 by post
1. Quand et par qui était vôtre association fondée?
Notre amicale a été créée en 2002 par un groupe de pieds-noirs habitant Mornas.
2. Combien d’adhérents avez-vouz actuellement?
65 (mais 35 seulement sont natifs d’Algérie, le reste étant des sympathisants)
3. Comment décriviez-vous le profil de vos adhérents? Par exemple, sont-ils en
majeure partie des hommes ou des femmes, les jeunes ou les plus âgés?etc etc
La moyenne d’âge est d’environ 60 ans. Moitié hommes, moitié femmes, surtout les
couples.
4. Quels sont les buts et les activités principaux de vôtre association? Et, est-ce qu’ont-
ils changé depuis que vôtre association a été fondé ?
Notre amicale a pour but de nous réunir au moins une fois par mois autour d’un repas
(souvent dansant) et surtout nous en profitons pour parler de nos souvenirs.
5. De quel succès sentez-vous que vôtre association a eu en ce qui concerne la
réalisation de vos objectifs?
Nous participons aussi à la vie associative de notre village.
6. Quelles événements annuels tenez-vous ou dates commémorez-vous? Et en quelle
manière?
Nous participons aux commémorations du 8 mai et 11 novembre, aux fêtes du 14 juillet et
15 août et autres fêtes telles que (brocante – fête médiéval – journée provençale – marche
de Noël etc...)
7. Produisez-vous des bulletins, journaux ou quelques autres formes de publicité? Et,
si oui, pouvez-vous me donner des informations supplémentaires à propos d’ eux?
Non.
8. Coopérez-vous ou avez-vous des rapports avec quelques autres associations ? Et, si
oui, pouvez-vous me décrire la nature de ces collaborations et rapports ?
Non.
9. Quel rôle sentez-vous que l’histoire de l’algérie coloniale et, plus précisément, la
guerre d’indépendance, jouent dans l’agenda et les activités de vôtre association ?
Nous avons crée cette amicale en essayant de laisser de côté (religion et politique).
10. De quelle importance est la préservation, la mobilisation et la transmission de la
mémoire dans le travail de vôtre association ? Et en quelle manière essayez-vous
l’accomplir ?
Nous nous retrouvons une fois par mois dans une ambiance familiale en essayant de
laisser de côté tous nos soucis.
11. Comment voyez-vous les liens entre vôtre association et la soi-disante ‘seconde
génération’? Ou, si vôtre association est essentiellement une tentative de la ‘seconde
génération’, comment décririez-vous vôtre rapport à la première génération ? Par
exemple, voyez-vous un lien de continuité entre les générations, ou voyez-vous vos
buts et actions comme complètement différent à ceux de l’autre génération ?
La ‘seconde génération’ (nos enfants) bien qu’étant concernés par la vie ‘pied-noir’ ne
sont pas aussi interessés que nous.
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12. Comment pensez-vous que vôtre association et les gens qui vous représentez sont
pérçus par la société française en général? Sentez-vous que c’est une perception
exacte?
Après quelques années assez dures pour notre intégration, je pense que maintenant après
45 ans nous sommes maintenant complètement intégrés. La preuve c’est beaucoup de
personnes autre que pieds noirs rejoignent notre amicale et que le nombre d’adhérents
augmente d’année en année.
13. Qu’est-ce que vous-pensez et espérez que l’avenir tiendra pour vôtre association?
Vu notre moyenne d’âge notre amicale ne devrait plus exister d’ici 10 à 15 ans.
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From : Unknown Harki association in Bordeaux
Received: 1 February 2007 by post
1. Quand et par qui était vôtre association fondée?
2004 par moi même et des amis (e)
2. Combien d’adhérents avez-vouz actuellement?
188
3. Comment décriviez-vous le profil de vos adhérents? Par exemple, sont-ils en
majeure partie des hommes ou des femmes, les jeunes ou les plus âgés?etc etc
Il y a des hommes (majorité) des femmes et des jeunes (18-40 ans)
4. Quels sont les buts et les activités principaux de vôtre association? Et, est-ce qu’ont-
ils changé depuis que vôtre association a été fondé ?
Entraide de la communauté des Français-Musulmans Rapatriés d’Algérie
5. De quel succès sentez-vous que vôtre association a eu en ce qui concerne la
réalisation de vos objectifs?
L’association est jeune (3 ans) mais la communauté est satisfaite.
6. Quelles événements annuels tenez-vous ou dates commémorez-vous? Et en quelle
manière?
Journée hommage aux harkis – dépôt de geste au monument – hommage à toute les
victimes de la sale guerre d’Algérie.
7. Produisez-vous des bulletins, journaux ou quelques autres formes de publicité? Et,
si oui, pouvez-vous me donner des informations supplémentaires à propos d’ eux?
Non, nous ne produisons aucun journal.
8. Coopérez-vous ou avez-vous des rapports avec quelques autres associations ? Et, si
oui, pouvez-vous me décrire la nature de ces collaborations et rapports ?
Oui, d’autre association des Rapartiés d’Algérie – des échanges d’information
uniquement.
9. Quel rôle sentez-vous que l’histoire de l’algérie coloniale et, plus précisément, la
guerre d’indépendance, jouent dans l’agenda et les activités de vôtre association ?
La guerre d’Algérie est présente dans la mémoire de tous ancien soldat de la guerre
d’Algérie – il y a traumatisme de tous (sic) un peuple.
10. De quelle importance est la préservation, la mobilisation et la transmission de la
mémoire dans le travail de vôtre association ? Et en quelle manière essayez-vous
l’accomplir ?
L’association s’occupe beaucoups des jeunes pour l’intégration dans la communauté
française – mais aussi pour leur mémoire pour qu’ils oublient pas leur histoire.
11. Comment voyez-vous les liens entre vôtre association et la soi-disante ‘seconde
génération’? Ou, si vôtre association est essentiellement une tentative de la ‘seconde
génération’, comment décririez-vous vôtre rapport à la première génération ? Par
exemple, voyez-vous un lien de continuité entre les générations, ou voyez-vous vos
buts et actions comme complètement différent à ceux de l’autre génération ?
Comme je l’ai dit plus haut, notre travail consiste à intégré nos jeunes dans la
communauté française, dont ils font partie – la deuxième génération est moins
traumatisée que leur parents! Sa va de mieu en mieu (sic).
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12. Comment pensez-vous que vôtre association et les gens qui vous représentez sont
pérçus par la société française en général? Sentez-vous que c’est une perception
exacte?
Pas toujours – Mais les anciens sont là pour faire comprendre à tous, que la communauté
Harkis, est française, européenne, et doit donc être aidé pour son intégration la/en
république française dont ils sont les enfants.
13. Qu’est-ce que vous-pensez et espérez que l’avenir tiendra pour vôtre association?
L’intégration, l’assimilation de notre jeunesse, la/en société française – alors notre
mission sera couronnée de succès.
Card attached which reads:
Pour votre travail, je vous recommande vivement de lire le livre de: GEORGES-MARC
BENAMOU, sur la guerre d’Algérie – livre édité chez Robert Laffont et qui s’appel le
Mensonge Français
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From: Cercle Algérianiste des Pyrénées Orientales, M. Jean Scotto, (Vice President)
Received: 2 February 2007 by post
Mademoiselle
Ci-joint vous trouverez quelques réponses au questionnaire que vous nous avez adressé.
Je me suis permis d’y ajouter quelques documents à l’appui, voir des textes transmis à
différents médias.
Nous restons à votre disposition pour des applications plus particulières.
Avec nos souhaits de réussite et nos meilleirs sentiments algérianistes.
J. Scotto
1. Quand et par qui était vôtre association fondée?
Le Cercle Algérianiste est une association culturelle de FRANÇAIS d’Afrique du Nord
avec un président national. Dans chaque région de FRANCE il y a un cercle
départemental.
L’association a été créée le 1er Nov 1973 par un petit groupe de jeunes ‘Pieds Noirs’ à
TOULOUSE.
2. Combien d’adhérents avez-vouz actuellement?
L’ensemble compte 8000 adhérents. Ici, dans les Pyrénées Orientales nous comptons 325
adhérents.
3. Comment décriviez-vous le profil de vos adhérents? Par exemple, sont-ils en
majeure partie des hommes ou des femmes, les jeunes ou les plus âgés?etc etc
Toutes les classes sont représentées de 40 à 93 ans! Cependant un fort pourcentage
d’adhérents est plutôt agé puisque 45 ans se sont écoulés depuis ‘exode d’Algérie.
4. Quels sont les buts et les activités principaux de vôtre association? Et, est-ce qu’ont-
ils changé depuis que vôtre association a été fondé ?
Les buts sont clairement définis dans les STATUTS que nous vous joignons (DOC 1), les
activités sont expliquées sur la plaquette ‘Cercle Algérianiste’ (DOC 2)
5. De quel succès sentez-vous que vôtre association a eu en ce qui concerne la
réalisation de vos objectifs?
a) Créee par une cinquantaine de personnes à TOULOUSE nous en sommes à plus de
8000 ! Succès d’envergure.
b) Reconnaissance nationale de notre existence.
c) Lutte contre la désinformation de l’action de la FRANCE en Algérie particulièrement.
6. Quelles événements annuels tenez-vous ou dates commémorez-vous? Et en quelle
manière?
Événements annuels :
1) 26 Mars : fusillade de la rue d’Islie (sic?) à Alger (des dizaines de morts)
2) 5 Déc. Fin de la guerre d’Algérie (et non le 19 Mars car afins le 19 Mars 1962 les
exactions ont continué)
3) 5 Juillet : massacres d’Oran (1962)
7. Produisez-vous des bulletins, journaux ou quelques autres formes de publicité? Et,
si oui, pouvez-vous me donner des informations supplémentaires à propos d’ eux?
Oui :
1) Chaque mois un bulletin destiné à nos adhérents (DOC 3)
2) Tous les trimestres une fonction au niveau national (‘l’Algérianiste’ ci-joint un
exemplaire DOC 4) qui traite d’Histoire, de géographie, d’Art, de lettres, de
différents témoignages etc...
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8. Coopérez-vous ou avez-vous des rapports avec quelques autres associations ? Et, si
oui, pouvez-vous me décrire la nature de ces collaborations et rapports ?
Oui, surtout d’autres associations de Français d’A.F.N (nombreuses car cahcune se
revendique d’une ville, d’un village, d’un quartier, d’une paroisse d’Algérie mais aucune
ne développe l’aspect culturel et nous délégue cette représentativité.)
9. Quel rôle sentez-vous que l’histoire de l’algérie coloniale et, plus précisément, la
guerre d’indépendance, jouent dans l’agenda et les activités de vôtre association ?
L’exil, nous a dispersés mais les plaies sont toujours ouvertes sur un passé magnifique et
cruel à la bas. Le 20 octobre 2007 nous inauguerons à Perpignan le monument des
disparus – Algérie 1954-1963- 4000 noms gravés sur des plaques de bronze, plus les
plaques vides des milliers de HARKIS dont nous ignorons les noms. Un acte de Mémoire
(DOC 5A, 5B) Nous attendons entre 2000 et 3000 personnes (vous pouvez venir si le
coeur avons en dit!)
10. De quelle importance est la préservation, la mobilisation et la transmission de la
mémoire dans le travail de vôtre association ? Et en quelle manière essayez-vous
l’accomplir ?
Le cercle a été créé pour justement approfondir notre connaissance du passé algérien afin
de mieux nous connaître, faire découvrir l’originalité de la culture qui se faisait jour en
Algérie, pour diffuser l’oeuvre d’écrivains algérianistes (DOC 6).
- nous donnons régulièrement des conférences sur différents sujets.
11. Comment voyez-vous les liens entre vôtre association et la soi-disante ‘seconde
génération’? Ou, si vôtre association est essentiellement une tentative de la ‘seconde
génération’, comment décririez-vous vôtre rapport à la première génération ? Par
exemple, voyez-vous un lien de continuité entre les générations, ou voyez-vous vos
buts et actions comme complètement différent à ceux de l’autre génération ?
Disons que les liens entre la première et la seconde génération était encore fort, la
transmission s’est bien effectuée. Ces relations se sont distendues avec la 3ème génération
qui – sans avoir tiré un trait sur le passé – est respecteuse de nos valeurs. Les objectifs
restent les mêmes, reste la façon de les appréhender (savoir qui on est pour savoir où l’on
va!)
12. Comment pensez-vous que vôtre association et les gens qui vous représentez sont
pérçus par la société française en général? Sentez-vous que c’est une perception
exacte?
La société française ne nous connait pas, nous ignore souvent : nos relations ont été
faussées par la désinformation, de la propagande, des manipulations (voir comment notre
communauté a été accueillie en 1962...), perception négative, attitudes politiques qui
saisonnent par récurrence, non la société française se refuse à tendre la main...
13. Qu’est-ce que vous-pensez et espérez que l’avenir tiendra pour vôtre association?
Nous espérons que nos enfants voir petits enfants se souviennent, qu’ils aient une vision
juste de ce que fut l’oeuvre de la FRANCE dans ce pays, une oeuvre réalisée souvent par
un peuple original (au contact de l’orient et l’occident), un peuple d’hommes et de
femmes simples et travailleurs.
(Various association literature included)
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From: Cercle algérianiste de Champagne, Gérard Rosenzweig (President)
Received: 15 February 2006 by post
1. Quand et par qui était vôtre association fondée?
Le Cercle algérainiste a été fondé en 1973 par Maurice Calmein à Toulouse. Le Cercle
algérianiste de champagne par moi-même en 2003.
2. Combien d’adhérents avez-vouz actuellement?
Cercle national : 10,000 membres.
Le Cercle de Champagne : 45 membres.
3. Comment décriviez-vous le profil de vos adhérents? Par exemple, sont-ils en
majeure partie des hommes ou des femmes, les jeunes ou les plus âgés?etc etc
Des hommes et des femmes âgés entre 50 et 70 ans – tous nés en Algérie française et qui
sont restés fidèles à leur patrie et à l’histoire de leurs parents.
4. Quels sont les buts et les activités principaux de vôtre association? Et, est-ce qu’ont-
ils changé depuis que vôtre association a été fondé ?
- Sauver la culture française d’Afrique du Nord
- Etablir un lien entre les française d’Algérie
- Lutter contre toute désinformation sur notre histoire
- Travailleur pour la reconnaissance de l’action positive de la France en Algérie
5. De quel succès sentez-vous que vôtre association a eu en ce qui concerne la
réalisation de vos objectifs?
Très peu – les français d’Algérie sont toujours considérés comme responsables seuls des
malheurs de leur pays natal – Ce modèle est un mensonge et une caricature d’histoire.
6. Quelles événements annuels tenez-vous ou dates commémorez-vous? Et en quelle
manière?
Essentiellement :
- le 26 mars ‘62 (80 Algérois tués par l’armée française)
- le 5 juillet ‘62 (800 Oranais enlevés et disparus par l’armée algérienne)
- le 19 mars ‘62 signature des accords d’Evian
7. Produisez-vous des bulletins, journaux ou quelques autres formes de publicité? Et,
si oui, pouvez-vous me donner des informations supplémentaires à propos d’ eux?
Oui : ci-joint deux de nos bulletins trimestriels.
8. Coopérez-vous ou avez-vous des rapports avec quelques autres associations ? Et, si
oui, pouvez-vous me décrire la nature de ces collaborations et rapports ?
Oui, avec celles qui défendre les mêmes buts que nous, pour nous rendre plus efficaces
9. Quel rôle sentez-vous que l’histoire de l’algérie coloniale et, plus précisément, la
guerre d’indépendance, jouent dans l’agenda et les activités de vôtre association ?
Les 2 sont au centre de notre action – Nous luttons pour une histoire équilibrée de
l’Algérie française, et que pour les deux parties reconaissent leurs fautes et leurs
responsabilités – Nous voulons une écriture objective et sans passion de la guerre
d’indépendance.
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10. De quelle importance est la préservation, la mobilisation et la transmission de la
mémoire dans le travail de vôtre association ? Et en quelle manière essayez-vous
l’accomplir ?
Cette importance est priomrdiale – Personne ne transmettera la mémoire de notre peuple à
notre place. Nous éditons une revue depuis plus de 30 ans pour fournir aux historiens
futurs une source d’informations – Nous organisons des congrés et des colloques.
11. Comment voyez-vous les liens entre vôtre association et la soi-disante ‘seconde
génération’? Ou, si vôtre association est essentiellement une tentative de la ‘seconde
génération’, comment décririez-vous vôtre rapport à la première génération ? Par
exemple, voyez-vous un lien de continuité entre les générations, ou voyez-vous vos
buts et actions comme complètement différent à ceux de l’autre génération ?
Nous sommes tous de la 1ère génération – Nous agissons beaucoup aussi pour la
génération suivante – Pour qu’elle conserve de ses origines un souvenir objectif et positif
et pour qu’elle n’ait pas honte de ses ancêtres à cause de la propagande qui ment sur notre
histoire.
12. Comment pensez-vous que vôtre association et les gens qui vous représentez sont
pérçus par la société française en général? Sentez-vous que c’est une perception
exacte?
Pas toujours d’une façon très positive – car nous refusons le rôle de ‘bouc-emissaire’ que
la France veut nous faire porter. Nous refusons d’être coupable de tout. Notre association
gêne beaucoup le gouvernement français.
13. Qu’est-ce que vous-pensez et espérez que l’avenir tiendra pour vôtre association?
Pas beaucoup de choses – Mais nous devons continuer d’agir, jusqu’ à notre mort, pour
laisser derrière nous les témoignages, les traces et les preuves qui établissent que nous
n’avons pas été des bandits et des salauds.
Back page:
Pour mon cas, j’ai 64 ans
- mon père est né en Algérie en 1904
- mon grand-père est né en Algérie en 1875
- mon arrière-grand-père est né en Algérie en 1852
- mon aïeul est né en 1820 à Lwow en Ukraine – il est arrive en Algérie en 1845
(Tous enterrés en Algérie)
Ils étaient tous des employés ou des ouvriers et pas agriculteurs (= colons) – Ils vivaient en
ville et n’ont jamais été bien riches.
Si vous désirez d’autres reseignements vous pouvez m’écrire
Gérard Rosenzweig
(September and December 2006 issues of L’Algérianiste enclosed)
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From: Souvenir des Français disparus en Algérie, Christian Gille (President)
Received: 17 February 2007 by email
SOUVENIR DES FRANÇAIS DISPARUS EN ALGÉRIE
‘Les vérités que l’on aime le moins à entendre, Sont celles qu’il importe le plus de savoir’
(BOISTE)
Le Président Christian GILLE
à Mademoiselle Claire ELDRIDGE. Je vous adresse quelques notes sur la guerre civile dans
les départements Français d'Algérie entre 1954 et 1962. Je peux développer ce que vous
souhaitez. Gardez en toile de fond explicative les débuts d'exploitations de gisements
pétroliers et gaziers qui intéressaient vivement les société américaines et anglaises, ainsi que
le souhait des Russes qui espéraient déstabiliser l'Europe en contournant le mur de Berlin par
la Méditerranée.
Je me place à votre disposition.
1954. 1er novembre: A 18 heures, la voix des arabes émission de radio installée en Egypte
lançait sur les ondes un long communiqué et précisait l'objectif de la guerre de religion qui
venait de commencer en Algérie. ‘L'Algérie a engagé aujourd'hui une lutte grandiose pour la
liberté, l'ARABISME et l'ISLAM’. Ben Bella, Mohamed Khider et Aît Hamed se trouvaient
au Caire, pris en charge par les Services Secrets Egyptiens. Ce jour là, 7 crimes odieux
venaient d'être commis en Algérie contre des personnes, qui n'étaient ni des colons, ni des
colonialistes.
Deux victimes du 1er novembre 1954 resteront des symboles permanents de la nature des
assassinats à venir. Venant de métropole, un couple d'instituteur travaille depuis un mois dans
les Aurès. Il voyage ce 1er novembre dans un vieux car qui est bloqué dans un virage près
d'Arris par des ‘fellagha’ (coupeurs de route). MONNEROT, Guy 23 ans et Janine 21 ans,
sont triés et mis à part au bord de la route. Ils sont européens et cela suffit désormais pour
qu'ils méritent la mort. Le Caïd Hadj Saddok, qui voyage dans lui aussi dans le même car,
s'interpose en ces termes: ‘vous n'avez pas honte de vous attaquer à ces enfants; ce sont des
instituteurs qui viennent pour nous aider’. Une rafale de mitraillette règle le problème. Le
Caïd et l'instituteur sont tués; Madame Monnerot abandonnée grièvement blessée, sera
miraculeusement sauvée.
Pour ceux qui ont bien connu les populations rurales de l'Algérie Française, ils ne peuvent que
retrouver dans le geste protecteur du Caïd, une tradition permanente d'accueil qui existait
alors en Algérie, mais aussi un symbole des liens affectueux très particuliers, existants entre
la communauté dite européenne de culture judéo chrétienne, et des populations musulmanes
très proches de leur culte.
Pour Mendes-France Chef du Gouvernement, et François Mitterand Ministre de l'Algérie, qui
connaissent tous deux fort bien l'Algérie, ainsi que Jacques Chevalier député Maire d'Alger,
Secrétaire d'Etat, la solution est évidente: ‘ L'Algérie c'est la France, et qui hésiterait à
employer tous les moyens pour protéger La France’.
Si les fellagha dans les Aurès, ne représentent au départ que 352 personnes faiblement
armées, le Gouverneur Général de l'Algérie ne dispose pour rétablir l'ordre, que d'une
cinquantaine de milliers de militaires dont seulement 15.000 de réellement opérationnels. Or
le territoire à contrôler équivalait celui de la France. La commune d'Arris par exemple, ne
disposait que de 7 gendarmes, pour une population de 60.000 ruraux dispersés dans la
montagne.
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Jusqu'en 1960, la moyenne restera d'un européen massacré, pour neuf musulmans martyrisés.
Progressivement ces derniers qui ne peuvent être protégés nuit et jour par la France contre les
crimes du F.L.N., préféreront en nombre croissant, se plier aux exigences des terroristes, et à
l'appel pour la guerre sainte qui par principe ne peut se discuter. Ils risquent la prison
française, mais ils évitent ainsi (ils le savent tous) les gorges tranchées pour eux et leurs
familles.
1955. Nos militaires sont toujours soumis aux règles du ‘maintien de l'ordre’ et doivent faire
appel à un juge d’instruction dès qu’il y a un blessé ou un mort.
Le 21 août, trente neuf localités, un aérodrome, et un casernement de gendarmerie sont
attaqués à midi. 171 européens sont massacrés dont 1/3 d'enfants. Le Chef du Gouvernement
Edgar Faure assiste à des obsèques collectives. Les familles ouvrières européennes de la mine
isolée d'El Halia sont martyrisées: 35 morts dont des enfants de 9 mois et 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 13, et
16 ans (hommes émasculés, têtes, lèvres membres coupés ; femmes violées, égorgées,
éventrées ; enfants têtes éclatées. Le 30 août, ‘l'état d'urgence est proclamé en Algérie’. En
novembre le Gouverneur SOUSTELLE crée les S.A.S. (Sections Administratives
Spécialisées) afin de regrouper et ainsi protéger les populations rurales. Un magnifique travail
à caractère social, (construction de maisons et locaux par les hommes, alphabétisation pour
tous, travaux de couture pour les femmes, hygiène,), avec l'auto défense du hameau, entraîne
le retour de la confiance, avec la présence nuit et jour sur les lieux d'un jeune officier souvent
rappelé.
1956. le 30 janvier Guy Mollet, Secrétaire Général de la S.F.I.O. pendant 10 ans, devient
Chef du Gouvernement. Il charge Mendes France d'ouvrir des négociations secrètes avec le
F.L.N. Il n'est jamais venu en Algérie, où il provoque suite à la nomination du Général
Catroux (qui avait participé à l'abandon du LIBAN) comme ‘Ministre résidant’ une tempête
de mécontentement dans nos anciens départements. Le 6 février une manifestation populaire
grandiose accueille Guy Mollet: c'est la journée des tomates. L'ancien syndicaliste est
notamment surpris, d'être conspué par des masses populaires, des ouvriers en bleu de chauffe,
et non pas par de riches colons ce qui l'aurait laissé indifférent. Il remplace immédiatement
Catroux par Robert Lacoste, un politique socialiste et patriote.
Le 11 mars l'Assemblée Nationale au complet vote des pouvoirs spéciaux par 455 voix contre
76 (Poujadiste et droite). Le 18 mars Lacoste déclare ‘Il est impossible d'assurer la sécurité
des personnes avec les textes de droit actuellement en vigueur’. En juillet une directive de
l'Etat Major Général permet d'abattre tout rebelle aperçu une arme à la main, ou suspect
s'enfuyant. L'armée peut également procéder à des interrogatoires de suspects.
Le 4 avril l'aspirant Maillot (communiste) livre un camion d'armes au F.L.N. Une partie
servira le 18 mai au massacre de 21 soldats originaires de métropole dont 15 jeunes pères de
familles.
Le 15 avril le Service militaire passe à 27 mois et 70.000 réservistes sont rappelés
Le 16 octobre le navire ATHOS chargé de 72 tonnes d'armes par des soldats Egyptiens est
arraisonné. Le 22 octobre c'est l'avion des chefs rebelles, Ben Bella, Khider, Aït Hamed et
autres qui est détourné sur Maison Blanche par l'Armée de l'Air. Le Gouvernement approuve.
Suite à la nationalisation du canal de Suez fin juillet, le 5 novembre nos paras débarquent
avec les Britanniques à Port Saïd et Port Fouad. Succès militaire mais grave échec politique.
(U.S.A et U.R.S.S)
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600.000 hommes sont maintenant sous les drapeaux en Algérie.
Depuis la fin juin des bombes explosent à Alger dans des lieux publics et font de nombreuses
victimes. Le 28 décembre Amédée Froger, Président des Maires et grand mutilé est abattu,
des bombes explosent même dans des églises, la coupe est pleine et la population réagit avec
colère.
1957. 7 janvier: LACOSTE donne les pleins pouvoirs à l'Armée et au Général MASSU pour
agir et mettre fin aux attentats commis dans tout l'Algérois par le F.L.N., et à l'interdiction
pour tous les musulmans de travailler à partir du 28 janvier à venir au moment où le problème
algérien sera évoqué à l'O.N.U.: ‘Frères Musulmans, tous les partisans appartenant au F.L.N.
auront à détruire et à exterminer tous les européens, y compris les enfants’.
Le 26 janvier interviennent les 66ème, 67ème, 68ème explosions de bombes à l'automatic,
cafétéria et Coq Hardi (4 morts, 38 blessés - dont des enfants amputés). Le 17 février les
Responsables F.L.N. décident de quitter l'Algérie, mais Ben M'Hidi - qui avait donné l'ordre
de l’insurrection en 1954 – pas assez rapide est arrêté et exécuté.
Le 28 février, les paras ont déjà récupéré 87 bombes, 200 kg d'explosifs, 158 grenades. En
moins de é mois la région d'Alger est reprise en main, les renseignements affluent, et des
unités repartent dans les djebels.
Le 4 mars Lacoste annonce la mise en place du D.P.U. (dispositif de Protection Urbaine), et
l’Assemblée Nationale renouvelle sa confiance.
Le 24 septembre Yacef Saadi et de Zohra Drif sont arrêtés.
Le 8 octobre à 6 heures du matin la bataille d'Alger prend fin avec l'explosion d'une cache où
se terrait Ali la Pointe et 3 terroristes. Les populations algéroises libérées ne savent comment
manifester leur reconnaissance. Les Paras ont mis fin en neuf mois aux carnages journaliers
de civils de femmes et d'enfants. Ils avaient disposé pour cela des pleins pouvoirs, de la
compréhension des autorités civiles et de l'appui unanime des différents groupes de
l’Assemblée Nationale.
Les lignes Morice (Tunisie) et Pédron (Maroc) rendent hermétiques les frontières latérales de
l'Algérie.
1958. 8 février: bombardement de Sakhiet Sidi Youssef en Tunisie en représailles décidées
par le Général Salan. Le Gouvernement Félix Gaillard en position de faiblesse démissionne le
15 avril.
Le 8 mai, 3 soldats français sont fusillés en Tunisie (Sergent Richomme, soldats Decourteix et
Feuillebois). Une grande manifestation est organisée à Alger le 13 mai pour rendre hommage
à ces soldats que l'on considère comme victimes des positions prises par les intellectuels et les
politiques de métropole.
Le 13 mai, en l'absence de Lacoste appelé à Paris, le Gouvernement Général est pris d'assaut.
Pour le faire évacuer, le Général Massu doit prendre la tête d'un Comité qui veut imposer au
pays, la création d'un Gouvernement de Salut Public présidé par le Général De Gaulle. Dans
la nuit, en toute hâte, après 29 jours de palabres pour mettre en place un Gouvernement,
Pflimlin devient Chef du Gouvernement et confie au Général Salan tous les pouvoirs en
Algérie pour rétablir l’ordre républicain.
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Neuf mois après la bataille d'Alger, le Forum sera en permanence jour et nuit pendant 3
semaines, un haut lieu de manifestations patriotiques, sans aucun attentat ni explosion de
bombes.
Le 27 mai, le plan résurrection qui prévoyait le largage de parachutistes sur Paris, et l'arrivée
de blindés sur la capitale est ajourné. En effet De Gaulle négocie notamment avec Guy
Mollet et obtient l’investiture gouvernementale le 1er juin.
Le 4 juin il est à Alger, le 5 à Constantine et Bône, le 6 à Oran où les cris de ‘Vive Soustelle’
et ‘Vive Salan’ dominent. De Gaulle ne dispose que de 21 députés à l'Assemblée Nationale
n'est au pouvoir que grâce à l'Algérie et peut être renversé dès son retour en métropole. Le
même jour à Mostaganem en donnant ‘sa parole’, et ‘au nom de la France’ il clame ‘Vive
l'Algérie Française’, et dans son ordre du jour à l'armée confirme la mission des militaires de
‘garder l’Algérie à la France et de la garder Française’.
3 mois plus tard, le 28 septembre la constitution est adoptée par référendum. Tous les
citoyens de l'Algérie ont voté avec un seul bulletin de vote et l'article 72 intègre les
départements
d’Algérie avec ceux de la métropole.
Le 23 octobre, il évoque ‘ l'avenir de l'Algérie en association étroite avec la métropole ‘ ! , et
après Jouhau (sic), le 18 décembre Salan est nommé à Paris. Challe devient Commandant en
Chef en Algérie.
1959. 8 janvier: De Gaulle devient Président de la République et par-là même inamovible
pendant 7 ans. Il gracie 7.000 membres du F.L.N. dont Yacef Saadi condamné à mort. Dans
ses mémoires il expliquera bien plus tard ce que fut sa politique en Algérie en avouant ‘Si de
but en blanc j'affichais mes sentiments, nul doute que .se fût levé dans tous les milieux une
vague de stupeur et de fureur qui eût fait chavirer le navire. Sans jamais changer de cap, il me
faudrait donc manouvrer (sic) jusqu'au moment où, décidément le bon sen saurait percé les
brumes’. ‘
En février le Général Challe avec des unités opérationnelles très mobiles suivie de troupes au
contact des populations, met en route un véritable rouleau compresseur. Partant en février de
l'Oranie et se déplaçant vers le Constantinois, il écrasera la quasi-totalité des terroristes. Fin
août, au contact des militaires, De Gaulle déclarera en Algérie ‘moi vivant, jamais le drapeau
F.L.N. ne flottera sur Alger’.
Le 29 juillet Debré Premier Ministre répondait par écrit au député d'Alger Vinciguerra
‘qu'aucune transformation en état de communauté, aucune sécession de la République ne sont
constitutionnellement possible’. Pourtant le16 septembre De Gaulle proclamera le droit à
l'autodétermination pour l'Algérie en contradiction notamment avec les articles, 2 (la France
est une république une et indvisible), 3, 5, et 72 de la Constitution.
La colère s'installe en Algérie et le doute s'installe chez les musulmans qui ne savent plus ce
que veut faire la France.
1960. 22 janvier: Massu qui s'est fait piéger par un journaliste allemand à qui il a confié ses
états d'ame est convoqué à Paris. Alger s'organise pour exiger son retour.
Les barricades se dressent au cour d'Alger le dimanche 24 janvier. Challe s'engage à ne pas
intervenir, et pourtant à 18 heures c'est le drame. Sans aucune sommation, le colonel
Debrosse charge les civils et les territoriaux armés avec 15 escadrons de gendarmes, et des
tirs au fusil mitrailleur interviennent à partir de leur point de départ. Les territoriaux en auto
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défense ripostent, et les Paras des colonels Dufour et Broizat n'arriveront que 15 minutes plus
tard, mettant fin par leur seule présence aux échanges meurtriers.
De Gaulle par téléphone à Delouvrier, puis Debré et le Ministre des Armées Guillaumat sur
place dans la nuit du 26 au 27 janvier, donneront l'ordre aux militaires de réduire les
barricades. Les Colonels exprimeront leur refus de tirer sur des Français qui veulent le rester,
et d'aller mourir dans les djebels si ce n'est plus pour maintenir notre drapeau.
Pour mettre fin aux barricades, De Gaulle devra déclarer dans un discours pathétique que
‘rien ne causerait plus de joie à la Patrie et à De Gaulle que de voir choisir entre telle ou telle
solution celle qui serait la plus française’. Le Général Gaulliste Challe sera alors persuadé que
De Gaulle souhaite la solution de l'Algérie Française. Il pratiquera un putsch en avril 1961
estimant avoir été trompé, et d'avoir involontairement trompé les populations musulmanes qui
faisaient confiance à l’armée française.
Tous les inculpés présents au tribunal militaire de Paris obtiendront la relaxe en février 1961,
dont Mourad Kaouah et Pierre Lagaillarde députés élus sous l'étiquette ‘Algérie Française’.
Du 3 au 5 mars en tournée des popotes en Algérie De Gaulle déclare ‘les musulmans ne
peuvent être ni des Provençaux, ni des Bretons’. (1ère page du journal Le Monde des 5 et 6
mars 1960. Phrase aujourd'hui raciste, amplement confirmée par Alain Peyrefitte dans son
livre c’était De Gaulle).
En avril 1960 Crépin remplace Challe. De Gaulle négocie avec le F.L.N. de l'extérieur et
refuse en mai la rédition de Si Salah chef de la willaya d'Alger. Les 3 témoins musulmans de
la rencontre avec le Chef de l'Etat seront tués, dont le dernier Si Mohamed caché dans une
armoire dans les faubourgs de Blida par les paras de la 11ème demi-brigade mise à la
disposition des services spéciaux français.
Du 9 au 13 décembre dernier voyage du Chef de l'Etat en Algérie. Des barbouzes gaullistes
du M.P.C. richement dotées s'activent dans les cartiers (sic) musulmans pour les faire
manifester aux cris de: ‘Vive l'Algérie Algérienne’ et ‘Vive De Gaulle’. Mais les slogans
‘Vive le F.L.N’ et ‘Vive le G.P.R.A.’ prennent le dessus. 119 morts à Alger. De Gaulle
mécontent évitera les grandes villes et écoutera son voyage.
1961. 8 janvier: Vote sur l'autodétermination de l'Algérie. Les Français approuvent. Mais si
De Gaulle respecte ses engagements il devrait négocier maintenant avec toutes les tendances
algériennes et après le retour de la paix organiser le vote en Algérie puis faire approuver le
résultat par le peuple Français. Il préfère déclarer le 11 avril ‘que la France ne fera nul
obstacle à l'instauration d'un Etat Algérien souverain au-dedans et au dehors’.
Du 22 au 25 janvier putsch du Général Challe qui refuse de mobiliser et d'armer les civils, et
de faire couler le sang. Au procès du Général Salan, le Général de Pouilly illustrera de façon
remarquable le drame des officiers en déclarant ‘j'ai choisi la discipline, mais choisissant la
discipline j'ai également choisi de partager avec mes concitoyens et la nation française, la
honte d’un abandon’.
Sciemment trompés les français d'Algérie sont littéralement effondrés, et savent qu'ils ne
pourront plus vivre chez eux. Debré avait écrit dans le courrier de la colère ‘l'abandon de la
souveraineté française en Algérie est un acte illégitime. C'est à dire qu'il met ceux qui si
opposent, quel que soit le moyen employé, en état légal de légitime défense’. Sous le sigle de
l'O.A.S. le Général Salan, des officiers, des soldats et des civils incarneront cette légitime
défénse du territoire national.
Dans son dernier livre, le Général Faivre révèle des propos tenus officiellement le 12 mai
1962 par Christian Fouchet Haut Commissaire: ‘Il faut remonter au 16ème Siècle pour
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trouver l'équivalent dans les mesures répressives. Ces bouclages (de quartiers des villes
européennes) sont donc une espèce de punition collective’.
Le 8 septembre madame SALASC suspectée d'être la secrétaire d'un officier en fuite est
affreusement torturée aux Tagarins par les gendarmes du Colonel Debrosse. Mrs Falcone,
Bonabe, Garci, Servolle et autres subiront les mêmes traitements.
Dans la nuit du 12 au 13 septembre 258 européens sont déportés au camp de Djorff. Ils ne
sont pas poursuivis et donc pas présentés au Parquet. Une femme internée de 78 ans y
trouvera le mort dans les bâtiments insalubres et sans eau.
Les ‘barbouzes’ Gaullistes commettent ‘des attentats, des explosions, des meurtres’ comme le
précisera une note du 18 décembre signée De Gaulle et publiée dans son livre par le Délégué
Général Morin.
1962. 18 mars: De Gaulle annonce la signature d'un accord à Evien avec le seul F.L.N. Ne
pouvant signer un traité de paix officiel, cela se dénommera ‘Déclarations Gouvernementales
du 19 mars 1962’.
Saad Dalab Ministre des Affaires étrangères du G.P.R.A. avait déclaré ‘tout ira bien si le
gouvernement français est décidé à BRISER l'O.A.S.’. De Gaulle écrit le 23 mars: ‘mon cher
Premier Ministre, Tout doit être fait pour BRISER et châtier l'action criminelle des bandes
terroristes d'Alger et d'Oran’; c'est à dire uniquement la résistance des villes à forte densité
européenne, et surtout pas les bandes terroristes du F.L.N. qui prennent possession des
campagnes et martyrisent nos anciens supplétifs, maires conseillers municipaux et anciens
combattants qui avaient fait confiance aux engagements successifs de l'armée Française. Ce
même 23 mars le quartier populaire de Bab-el-Oued est encerclé par l'armée, le couvre feu
permanent et l’accès interdit à la croix-rouge.
Par solidarité, les populations européennes des autres quartiers manifeste le 26 mars et c'est le
carnage. John Wallis dans le Daily Télégraph écrit ‘Personne ne semble savoir qui a tiré. Une
seule chose est certaine c'est que le premier coup de feu n'est pas venu des manifestants. Les
soldats, environ 20 hommes, ont ouvert le feu dans la foule à quelques mètres devant eux’.
Autre vocabulaire: ‘sauvagerie, indicible brutalité, cruauté sans provocation, atrocités
militaires qui n'ont de précédent que dans les répressions de la commune’. En fait 1.135
cartouches de pistolet mitrailleur, 427 de fusil, et 420 de fusil mitrailleur tirées dans un espace
de 3.000 mètres carrés environ. Les victimes furent enterrées de nuit. Combien étaient-elles
réellement? A noter que la hiérarchie rédigeait ‘une demande en urgence de propositions de
témoignages de satisfaction pour les gradés qui se sont distingués ce jour là’. 8 jour après le
Ministre MESSMER estimait normal de les rencontrer à Courbet Marine.
Réunis à Tripoli du 27 mai au 7 juin le Parlement du F.L.N. rejetait et dénonçait les accords
d’Evian et préconisait la poursuite de la revolution, et l’Islamisation.
C'est donc en toute connaissance de ce refus que le référendum en Algérie posait néanmoins
comme question unique: ‘Voulez-vous que l'Algérie devienne un état indépendant coopérant
avec la France dans les conditions définies par les déclarations gouvernementales du 19 mars
1962?’
Neuf mois après l'indépendance, dans deux rapports remis au Président du Conseil d'Etat, M.
de Saint-Salvy ancien Contrôleur Général de l'Armée précisait: que du 27 juillet au 15
septembre 1962 furent parfaitement connus d'innombrables tortures et massacres. Il estimait à
150.000 le nombre de musulmans victimes d'un véritable génocide: harkis, moghaznis,
anciens combattants, maires, conseillers municipaux et autres francophiles.
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14 ans après l'indépendance, dans une note interne, le Général Porret Chef du Service
Historique du Ministère de la défense cite comme probable le même chiffre, obtenu à partir
de données établies par le Bureau d’aide aux Français Musulmans.
Monsieur André Santini, ancien secrétaire d'Etat aux rapatriés demande toujours la
reconnaissance officielle de la disparition de 150.000 harkis et 25.000 européens.
Monsieur Pierre Pasquini, Gaulliste historique, et ancien Ministre des Anciens Combattants, a
parfaitement évoqué le massacre de ‘plus de 2.000 européens’ à Oran le 5 juillet 1962 en
présence de notre armée l'arme au pied: ‘des femmes françaises furent violées devant leurs
maris et leurs enfants, les hommes étaient saignés et laissés dans les caniveaux’.
212
From: Association pour la promotion sociale educative et culturelle du Tarn,
Received: 20 February 2007 by post
1. Quand et par qui était vôtre association fondée?
En 1975, par Mr ALITEBIB
2. Combien d’adhérents avez-vouz actuellement?
Environ 36.
3. Comment décriviez-vous le profil de vos adhérents? Par exemple, sont-ils en
majeure partie des hommes ou des femmes, les jeunes ou les plus âgés?etc etc
À la fois hommes et femmes, jeunes et âgés, harkis ou non.
4. Quels sont les buts et les activités principaux de vôtre association? Et, est-ce qu’ont-
ils changé depuis que vôtre association a été fondé ?
Défendre les intérêts matériels et moraux des harkis, ouverture à toute autre personne en
difficulté.
5. De quel succès sentez-vous que vôtre association a eu en ce qui concerne la
réalisation de vos objectifs?
Avec des locaux fonctionnels, augmentation de l’efficacité pour les questions
administratives. Association reconnue au niveau local.
6. Quelles événements annuels tenez-vous ou dates commémorez-vous? Et en quelle
manière?
Nombreuses commémorations et invitations, concernant les harkis, rapatriés, anciens
combattants.
7. Produisez-vous des bulletins, journaux ou quelques autres formes de publicité? Et,
si oui, pouvez-vous me donner des informations supplémentaires à propos d’ eux?
Non, mais nous avons un attaché de presse qui publie des articles.
8. Coopérez-vous ou avez-vous des rapports avec quelques autres associations ? Et, si
oui, pouvez-vous me décrire la nature de ces collaborations et rapports ?
Parfois avec d’autres associations ou avec des historiens, au sujet de projets en commun
ponctuels.
9. Quel rôle sentez-vous que l’histoire de l’algérie coloniale et, plus précisément, la
guerre d’indépendance, jouent dans l’agenda et les activités de vôtre association ?
Rôle majeur puisque notre objectif est de defendre les intérêts des harksi suite à la guerre.
10. De quelle importance est la préservation, la mobilisation et la transmission de la
mémoire dans le travail de vôtre association ? Et en quelle manière essayez-vous
l’accomplir ?
Importance extrème – Nous organisons des colloques, des expositions, avec des
historiens. Nous avons également produit un film ‘Portraits d’union – 42 ans après’.
11. Comment voyez-vous les liens entre vôtre association et la soi-disante ‘seconde
génération’? Ou, si vôtre association est essentiellement une tentative de la ‘seconde
génération’, comment décririez-vous vôtre rapport à la première génération ? Par
exemple, voyez-vous un lien de continuité entre les générations, ou voyez-vous vos
buts et actions comme complètement différent à ceux de l’autre génération ?
La 1ème génération est très respecteuse de la République, alors que la 2ème est plus amène
par rapport au drame qu’ont vécu leurs parents.
213
12. Comment pensez-vous que vôtre association et les gens qui vous représentez sont
pérçus par la société française en général? Sentez-vous que c’est une perception
exacte?
L’association est très présente au niveau local et régional. Le Président est convié à de
nombreuses manifestations.
13. Qu’est-ce que vous-pensez et espérez que l’avenir tiendra pour vôtre association?
Grand espoir dans la génération qui arrive, et notamments les femmes, pour parler des
harkis. Il y a une culpabilité des hommes par rapport à leur femmes concernant ce drame,
et ils ne parlent pas beaucoup.
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From: Association des Harkis de Seine-Maritime (ASHM), M. Ahmed Boutedja
(President)
Received: 24 February 2007 by post
Mademoiselle,
Je vous fait parvenir le questionnqire concernant vos études, j’espére que mes réponses vous
aiderons dans votre thèse.
Je vous addresse un livre écrit par la Fille d’un Harki retraçant notre combat de 1954 à 1962 –
il s’agit du témoignage de douze de mes comarades et de moi-même.
J’aimerai si possible qu’une fois votre thèse termine même écrite en Anglais vous m’en
fassiez porter un exemplaire. Je vous en reglerai le cout.
Bon courage pour votre travaux. Recevez l’expression de mes salutations les meilleurs.
1. Quand et par qui était vôtre association fondée?
Par moi même en 2001.
2. Combien d’adhérents avez-vouz actuellement?
Environ 200.
3. Comment décriviez-vous le profil de vos adhérents? Par exemple, sont-ils en
majeure partie des hommes ou des femmes, les jeunes ou les plus âgés?etc etc
La 1ère génération sont vieux, les plus jeunes 65 ans. La guerre fut entre 1954 et 1962 –
peu de femmes quelques souvent … le Devoir de Mémoire.
4. Quels sont les buts et les activités principaux de vôtre association? Et, est-ce qu’ont-
ils changé depuis que vôtre association a été fondé ?
Réunir les Anciens Harkis et leurs familles – défendre la mémoire et les intérêts de ces
anciens combattants. Apporter une Assistance et assumer une médiation dans tous les
domaines à cette communaté.
5. De quel succès sentez-vous que vôtre association a eu en ce qui concerne la
réalisation de vos objectifs?
En nous regroupant nous avons senti que les politiques écoutaient mieux nos doléances et
mettaient un frein avec promesses jamais tenues car voilà 44 ans que nous luttons pour
une véritable reconnaissance.
6. Quelles événements annuels tenez-vous ou dates commémorez-vous? Et en quelle
manière?
Étant Français nous commémorons le 14 juillet Fête Nationale, le 8 mai 1945 Armistice
fins des combats, capitulation de l’armée Allemande, le 25 septembre journée Hommage
aux Harkis, le 11 novembre Armistice guerre 14-18, le 5 décembre date commémorant le
cessez-le-feu en Algérie.
7. Produisez-vous des bulletins, journaux ou quelques autres formes de publicité? Et,
si oui, pouvez-vous me donner des informations supplémentaires à propos d’ eux?
Je vous joint un livre en hommage à quelques vieux Harkis dont je suis – les journaux et
publicités trop chères pour nos failles ressources.
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8. Coopérez-vous ou avez-vous des rapports avec quelques autres associations ? Et, si
oui, pouvez-vous me décrire la nature de ces collaborations et rapports ?
Avec l UNH qui regroupe le les Associations régionales avec qui nous avons deux ou
trois réunions annuelles + un congrès dans une ville jamais la même.
Avec AGIR qui englobe les plus jeunes enfants des Harkis dont la majorité sont nés en
Métropole.
9. Quel rôle sentez-vous que l’histoire de l’algérie coloniale et, plus précisément, la
guerre d’indépendance, jouent dans l’agenda et les activités de vôtre association ?
Nous sentant Français nous luttons contre le racisme et l’interdiction toujours en vigueur
du Gouvernement Algérien nous interdissant un retour vers la Terre de nos ancêtres.
Nous ne revenons pas la Terre qui nous vit naître.
10. De quelle importance est la préservation, la mobilisation et la transmission de la
mémoire dans le travail de vôtre association ? Et en quelle manière essayez-vous
l’accomplir ?
Déjà par notre langue, nos coutumes nous nous réunissons, parlons de notre passé,
essayons que nos enfants n’aient pas Honte – inculquons le devoir de mémoire à nos
enfants petits enfants, en ayant de bons rapports avec les Associations d’anciens
combattants.
11. Comment voyez-vous les liens entre vôtre association et la soi-disante ‘seconde
génération’? Ou, si vôtre association est essentiellement une tentative de la ‘seconde
génération’, comment décririez-vous vôtre rapport à la première génération ? Par
exemple, voyez-vous un lien de continuité entre les générations, ou voyez-vous vos
buts et actions comme complètement différent à ceux de l’autre génération ?
Pour moi la seconde génération n’ayant vécu nos douleurs, notre abandon, ont fondé trop
d’associations, certaines politisées, donc pas le même discours ce qui fait la force cle nos
gouvernements pour maniplue et promette – et rien n’arrive.
12. Comment pensez-vous que vôtre association et les gens qui vous représentez sont
pérçus par la société française en général? Sentez-vous que c’est une perception
exacte?
Il y a plusieurs sont de cloches, certains nous considèrent comme des Traîtres, nos enfants
sont souvent bafoués non considèrés Français à part entière. Les Français qui ont fait la
guerre nous acceptent, et nos gouvernants en période électorale car nous sommes Français
par le sang versé.
13. Qu’est-ce que vous-pensez et espérez que l’avenir tiendra pour vôtre association?
J’espére avant de disparaitre, quand il y aura un Accord nous donnant le droit de retour au
sol natal au moins pour un pélerinage et que les dédommagements promis et toujours
repoussés nous serons enfin donnés.
(Copy of Treize Chibanis Harkis enclosed)
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From: Mr Mohamed Ali SAÏHI, Bercy,
Received: 27 February 2007 by post
1. Quand et par qui était vôtre association fondée?
Fondée en juin 1999 par Mr Mohammed Ali SAÏHI (déclaration publiée au Journal
Officiel de la République française)
2. Combien d’adhérents avez-vouz actuellement?
Voir question no. 13.
3. Comment décriviez-vous le profil de vos adhérents? Par exemple, sont-ils en
majeure partie des hommes ou des femmes, les jeunes ou les plus âgés?etc etc
Il y a 2 catégories: des jeunes couples avec et sans enfants, des personnes âgées.
4. Quels sont les buts et les activités principaux de vôtre association? Et, est-ce qu’ont-
ils changé depuis que vôtre association a été fondé ?
Il s’agit d’aider des personnes immigrées ou de la seconde et troisième générations dans
leurs demarches administratives : quels sont leurs droits et leurs devoirs, à qui
s’adresser...
5. De quel succès sentez-vous que vôtre association a eu en ce qui concerne la
réalisation de vos objectifs?
Succès en terme de regroupement familial en terms d’obtention de logement pour une
famille, le démarche pour l’obtention d’une pension d’accident du travail pour une
personne âgée, immigrés dans les années 60 démandes pour l’obtention de la nationalité
française. Aide à la recherche d’emploi.
6. Quelles événements annuels tenez-vous ou dates commémorez-vous? Et en quelle
manière?
7. Produisez-vous des bulletins, journaux ou quelques autres formes de publicité? Et,
si oui, pouvez-vous me donner des informations supplémentaires à propos d’ eux?
Non.
8. Coopérez-vous ou avez-vous des rapports avec quelques autres associations ? Et, si
oui, pouvez-vous me décrire la nature de ces collaborations et rapports ?
Non.
9. Quel rôle sentez-vous que l’histoire de l’algérie coloniale et, plus précisément, la
guerre d’indépendance, jouent dans l’agenda et les activités de vôtre association ?
Étant moi-même, immigré dans les années 1974-1975, j’ai confronté quotidiennement
aux demarches pour obtenir tel et tel ‘papier’. Je fallait revenir plusieurs fois dans chaque
administrations, les renseignements étaient souvent différents, voire même
contradictories. Et encore je parle et j’écris très correctement le français. J’ai donc
imaginé les difficultés pour les personnes non francophones et ai voulu servir d’interpréte
pour les arabophones.
10. De quelle importance est la préservation, la mobilisation et la transmission de la
mémoire dans le travail de vôtre association ? Et en quelle manière essayez-vous
l’accomplir ?
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11. Comment voyez-vous les liens entre vôtre association et la soi-disante ‘seconde
génération’? Ou, si vôtre association est essentiellement une tentative de la ‘seconde
génération’, comment décririez-vous vôtre rapport à la première génération ? Par
exemple, voyez-vous un lien de continuité entre les générations, ou voyez-vous vos
buts et actions comme complètement différent à ceux de l’autre génération ?
La civilisation dont je suis issu a par définition un profond respect pour les plus anciens.
Au départ j’ai eu l’occasion d’aider des sous de mon âge (2e génération) et ai découvert
que ce génération avait aussi des difficultés et ne pensait avoir que des devoirs envers le
France ou ils ont aussi les droits!
12. Comment pensez-vous que vôtre association et les gens qui vous représentez sont
pérçus par la société française en général? Sentez-vous que c’est une perception
exacte?
Notre activité étant tournée essentiellement vers des étrangers et leurs descendants, même
s’ils ont choisi par la suite de devenir français est totalement ignorée au moins dans notre
milieu, par les Français d’origine!
13. Qu’est-ce que vous-pensez et espérez que l’avenir tiendra pour vôtre association?
Pour des raisons personnels l’association n’a plus la possibilité de continuer ses activités
bien que le bilan soit, à notre point de vue, positif.
Merci à vous et bon courage pour la suite de votre thèse. Il existe plusieurs bibliothèques
à Paris ouverts aux étudiants: Par courier séparé je vous enverrai quelques addresses.
Meilleures salutations!
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From: Pieds-noirs et enfants de pieds-noirs, Mme Pascale Bagur (President)
Received: 9 March 2007 by post
Mlle Claire Eldridge
Je suis Présidente de l’association Pieds-Noirs et Enfants de Pieds-Noirs, je vous fais parvenir
en return le réponses à votre enquête. J’ai fais passer un exemplaire à chacun de mes
membres. Merci à vous de vos interesse à nous.
1. Quand et par qui était vôtre association fondée?
Mme Pascale BAGUR en 2004.
2. Combien d’adhérents avez-vouz actuellement?
Nous sommes une vingtaine.
3. Comment décriviez-vous le profil de vos adhérents? Par exemple, sont-ils en
majeure partie des hommes ou des femmes, les jeunes ou les plus âgés?etc etc
C’est mixte et il y a deux générations, les Pieds-Noirs (60-70) et les enfants de Pieds-
Noirs (40-50 ans).
4. Quels sont les buts et les activités principaux de vôtre association? Et, est-ce qu’ont-
ils changé depuis que vôtre association a été fondé ?
Faire perdurer la culture Pieds-Noirs au-delà des générations et du temps/et en plus leur
faire obtenir les indemnisations auxquels ils ont droit.
5. De quel succès sentez-vous que vôtre association a eu en ce qui concerne la
réalisation de vos objectifs?
Cela a réveillé chez quelques enfants de Pieds-Noirs le sentiment d’aurai une culture
propre et d’appartenir à une communauté à part entière.
6. Quelles événements annuels tenez-vous ou dates commémorez-vous? Et en quelle
manière?
Nous commémorons trois dates sous forme de recueillement (contemplation) :
- 26 mars 1962 – Massacre de la Rue d’Isli (sic) à Alger.
- 7 juillet 1962 – Massacre d’Oran.
- 5 décembre - date d’uniformité pour la fin de la guerre.
7. Produisez-vous des bulletins, journaux ou quelques autres formes de publicité? Et,
si oui, pouvez-vous me donner des informations supplémentaires à propos d’ eux?
Nous essayons de faire passer des informations par voix de presse locale mais cela est très
très difficile.
8. Coopérez-vous ou avez-vous des rapports avec quelques autres associations ? Et, si
oui, pouvez-vous me décrire la nature de ces collaborations et rapports ?
Nous sommes membres d’une association humanitaine ASAI pour les enfants d’un
orphelinat au Sri lanka suite au TSUNAMI. Dont je suis la secrétaire.
9. Quel rôle sentez-vous que l’histoire de l’algérie coloniale et, plus précisément, la
guerre d’indépendance, jouent dans l’agenda et les activités de vôtre association ?
Nous faisons en sorte de ne pas oublier ce qu’il n’est passé pas respect pour toutes les
victimes, mais nous avançons toujours vers l’avenir.
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10. De quelle importance est la préservation, la mobilisation et la transmission de la
mémoire dans le travail de vôtre association ? Et en quelle manière essayez-vous
l’accomplir ?
Par le fait de la faire connaître.
11. Comment voyez-vous les liens entre vôtre association et la soi-disante ‘seconde
génération’? Ou, si vôtre association est essentiellement une tentative de la ‘seconde
génération’, comment décririez-vous vôtre rapport à la première génération ? Par
exemple, voyez-vous un lien de continuité entre les générations, ou voyez-vous vos
buts et actions comme complètement différent à ceux de l’autre génération ?
Notre action doit se faire dans la continuité de la première génération tant en tenant
compte de l’évolution du monde. C’est très difficile pour la première génération qui est
née sur le continent de se faire reconnaître comme Pieds-Noirs au comme français.
12. Comment pensez-vous que vôtre association et les gens qui vous représentez sont
pérçus par la société française en général? Sentez-vous que c’est une perception
exacte?
La société française a une très mauvaise image de la communauté Pied-Noir et sa
descendances. Nous ne somme toujours pas reconnus en tant que français à part entière.
13. Qu’est-ce que vous-pensez et espérez que l’avenir tiendra pour vôtre association?
J’espère que ma communauté ne disparitra pas, et qu’enfin nous aurons une place à part
entière dans ce pays qui est le notre la France.
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From: Racine Pieds Noirs: Association Culturelle des Français d’origine Pieds-Noirs et
de leurs amis, Christian Fenech (President)
Received: 17 March 2007 via Post
Mademoiselle
Votre lettre du 20 janvier dernier a retenu toute mon attention.
Je suis heureuse de constater combien ce sujet intéresse encore les étudiants et vous félicite
pour le choix du theme de votre thèse.
Vous trouverez en retour le questionnaire dûment rempli ainsi que plusieurs documents
complémentaires qui vous éclairont sur notre démarche.
Nous nous situons en effet au plan de la Mémoire et de la Culture pour rétablir dans sa
véracité les réalités historiques et sociologiques de l’épopée française en Afrique du Nord.
Nous avons souhaité du reste, pour inscrire cette démarche dans le temps, nous addresser à la
fois aux aînés et aux jeunes générations, tel pont entre la génération des souvenirs et celles de
la Mémoire.
Je demeure bien sûr à votre disposition pour tout éventuel complement d’information ou pour
vous rencontrer, ici ou sur Paris (je dois peut-être m’y render courant mai pour raison
professionnelle).
Je serais reste honoré de recevoir un exemplaire de vos travaux.
Vous en souhaitant bonne reception, recevez, Mademoiselle, l’expression de mes meilleurs
sentiments.
Christian C. FENECH
1. Quand et par qui était vôtre association fondée?
‘ Racine Pieds-Noirs ’ fondée par Christian FENECH en 1999
2. Combien d’adhérents avez-vouz actuellement?
+ de 200
3. Comment décriviez-vous le profil de vos adhérents? Par exemple, sont-ils en
majeure partie des hommes ou des femmes, les jeunes ou les plus âgés?etc etc
(cf pièce-jointe)
4. Quels sont les buts et les activités principaux de vôtre association? Et, est-ce qu’ont-
ils changé depuis que vôtre association a été fondé ?
(cf pièce-jointe)
5. De quel succès sentez-vous que vôtre association a eu en ce qui concerne la
réalisation de vos objectifs?
Nouvelle approche culturelle et mémorielle.
6. Quelles événements annuels tenez-vous ou dates commémorez-vous? Et en quelle
manière?
(cf pièce-jointe)
7. Produisez-vous des bulletins, journaux ou quelques autres formes de publicité? Et,
si oui, pouvez-vous me donner des informations supplémentaires à propos d’ eux?
(cf pièce-jointe)
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8. Coopérez-vous ou avez-vous des rapports avec quelques autres associations ? Et, si
oui, pouvez-vous me décrire la nature de ces collaborations et rapports ?
Oui, participation réciproques aux conférences ou expositions.
9. Quel rôle sentez-vous que l’histoire de l’algérie coloniale et, plus précisément, la
guerre d’indépendance, jouent dans l’agenda et les activités de vôtre association ?
Nous souhaitons rétablir les faits dans leur authenticité.
10. De quelle importance est la préservation, la mobilisation et la transmission de la
mémoire dans le travail de vôtre association ? Et en quelle manière essayez-vous
l’accomplir ?
C’est le but même puisque nous faisons un point entre les générations.
11. Comment voyez-vous les liens entre vôtre association et la soi-disante ‘seconde
génération’? Ou, si vôtre association est essentiellement une tentative de la ‘seconde
génération’, comment décririez-vous vôtre rapport à la première génération ? Par
exemple, voyez-vous un lien de continuité entre les générations, ou voyez-vous vos
buts et actions comme complètement différent à ceux de l’autre génération ?
L’approche par rapport aux générations va differer selon que l’on se souvient ou pas. Le
but même de notre association est de s’adresser à tous; la moitié de nos adhérents n’est
pas née en Afrique du Nord.
12. Comment pensez-vous que vôtre association et les gens qui vous représentez sont
pérçus par la société française en général? Sentez-vous que c’est une perception
exacte?
La perception se modifié au cours des années dans le bon sens, mais beausoup reste
encore à faire.
13. Qu’est-ce que vous-pensez et espérez que l’avenir tiendra pour vôtre association?
Une approche franche des événements historiques et sociologiques pour le rétablissement
de notre mémoire, à travers les jeunes générations.
(Various Racine Pieds-Noirs literature enclosed including a Bulletin d’adhésion, General
Assembly programme for 2007, annual financial statement, summary of recent newletters and
an ‘organigramme’ for the association)
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From: Mémoire d’Afrique du Nord: Algérie, Maroc et Tunisie, Marie-Claire Micouleau-
Sicault (Secretary)
Received: 18 May 2007 by post
1. Quand et par qui était vôtre association fondée?
1994 par Jeanine de la Hogue et Anne Marie Briat
2. Combien d’adhérents avez-vouz actuellement?
Environ 450.
3. Comment décriviez-vous le profil de vos adhérents? Par exemple, sont-ils en
majeure partie des hommes ou des femmes, les jeunes ou les plus âgés?etc etc
Plutôt âgés de 2 sexes.
4. Quels sont les buts et les activités principaux de vôtre association? Et, est-ce qu’ont-
ils changé depuis que vôtre association a été fondé ?
Mémoire, culture, souvenirs littéraires et artistiques.
5. De quel succès sentez-vous que vôtre association a eu en ce qui concerne la
réalisation de vos objectifs?
Bon, succès sur les rapatriés intellectuellement évolués
6. Quelles événements annuels tenez-vous ou dates commémorez-vous? Et en quelle
manière?
Une A.G en avril
Un déjeuner
Des visites (musées, châteaux etc)
7. Produisez-vous des bulletins, journaux ou quelques autres formes de publicité? Et,
si oui, pouvez-vous me donner des informations supplémentaires à propos d’ eux?
Revue trimestrielle (Mémoire plurielle) des fiches biographies.
8. Coopérez-vous ou avez-vous des rapports avec quelques autres associations ? Et, si
oui, pouvez-vous me décrire la nature de ces collaborations et rapports ?
Oui, avec toutes les associations de rapatriés (courriers, activités communes etc)
9. Quel rôle sentez-vous que l’histoire de l’algérie coloniale et, plus précisément, la
guerre d’indépendance, jouent dans l’agenda et les activités de vôtre association ?
L’association tourne y autour de l’histoire coloniale.
10. De quelle importance est la préservation, la mobilisation et la transmission de la
mémoire dans le travail de vôtre association ? Et en quelle manière essayez-vous
l’accomplir ?
Par la revue, nous solicitons les adhérents de produire des textes, récits, poemes et nous
recherchons les textes de grands auteurs sur les colonies françaises.
11. Comment voyez-vous les liens entre vôtre association et la soi-disante ‘seconde
génération’? Ou, si vôtre association est essentiellement une tentative de la ‘seconde
génération’, comment décririez-vous vôtre rapport à la première génération ? Par
exemple, voyez-vous un lien de continuité entre les générations, ou voyez-vous vos
buts et actions comme complètement différent à ceux de l’autre génération ?
Difficiles les liens avec les générations suivantes !! Ils ont d’autres centres d’intérêt,
d’autres chats à fouetter.
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12. Comment pensez-vous que vôtre association et les gens qui vous représentez sont
pérçus par la société française en général? Sentez-vous que c’est une perception
exacte?
Ils sont encore 3 millions d’individus mais, ils disparaissent peu à peu et ils sont un peu
considères comme des ‘has been’!
13. Qu’est-ce que vous-pensez et espérez que l’avenir tiendra pour vôtre association?
Les grand chose, mais elle le mérite de consoler unpeu les gens chasses de leurs maisons,
et de leur aise revivre le passé.
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From: ANFAMONA, Yves Sainsot (President)
Received: 27 June 2007 by post
Mademoiselle,
Je réponds volontiers bien que tardivement à votre questionnaire et vous indique que nous
nous tenons à votre disposition pour vous rencontrer, sur rendez-vous ou répondre à d’autres
questions. Nous sommes en effet particulièrement heureux que notre histoire intéresse les
jeunes étudiants au-delà de nos frontières.
1. Quand et par qui était vôtre association fondée?
Octobre 1956 (notre cinquantenaire est atteint). L’association a été fondée par les
Français de Tunisie et du Maroc, juste après l’indépendance accordée à ces deux
protectorats. Elle a ensuite accueilli, en 1962, les Français d’Algérie contraints à fuir leur
terre.
2. Combien d’adhérents avez-vouz actuellement?
4000 environ, sur le plan national, les uns étant rattachés à des sections décentralisées, les
autres étant seulement abonnés à notre journal (qui atteignait son cinquantenaire en mars
2007)
3. Comment décriviez-vous le profil de vos adhérents? Par exemple, sont-ils en
majeure partie des hommes ou des femmes, les jeunes ou les plus âgés?etc etc
‘clientèle’ vieillissante dans son ensemble et, naturellement, progression de nombre de
femmes par rapport aux hommes (mais sans statistiques précises)
4. Quels sont les buts et les activités principaux de vôtre association? Et, est-ce qu’ont-
ils changé depuis que vôtre association a été fondé ?
Entraide, solidarité, secours mutuel (image de l’ambulance); défense face aux pouvoirs
publics (image syndicat); les préoccupations matérielles ont longtemps été dominantes
sans être exclusives (l’association est fondamentalement ‘généraliste’); depuis de
nombreuses années elle s’est ouverte à la mémoire et à la culture; défense et mémoire
sont deux domaines aujourd’hui équilibrées.
5. De quel succès sentez-vous que vôtre association a eu en ce qui concerne la
réalisation de vos objectifs?
L’association a enregistré des succès partiels tout au long de son parcours, dans la mesure
où les gouvernements successifs ont observé la même attitude à notre égard: accorder le
moins possible, le plus tard possible. Pour l’ANFANOMA: Principal succès: l’amnistie,
mais il a fallu trois lois! Succès très partiel: l’indemnisation trois, voire quatre lois, cette
dernière étant négligeable (forfait 10000f pour la perte des biens meublants : mobilier).
Autre succès, encore partiels: les retraites. Long combat, très long: le Mémorial (toujours
pas sorti de terre)… Le non à la commémoration du 19 Mars… mais succès partiel et
peut-être temporaire; l’hommage aux victimes civiles mais avec en corollaire retentissant
l’échec de l’hommage 26 mars / 5 juillet 1962… M Sarkozy a pris des engagements forts
sur ce point… Ce serait une grande victoire pour notre association, pratiquement seule à
l’avoir demandé.
6. Quelles événements annuels tenez-vous ou dates commémorez-vous? Et en quelle
manière?
Participation aux cérémonies locales et nationales : cérémonies patriotiques: 8 mai; 11
novembre; 26 mars; 5 juillet; 25 septembre; 5 décembre plus récemment.
En règle générale, dépôt de gerbe devant monuments aux Morts ou stèles Rapatriés (très
souvent installées par l’ANFANOMA ou à son initiative). Certaines de nos sections
organisent des sorties, voyages, réunions festives
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7. Produisez-vous des bulletins, journaux ou quelques autres formes de publicité? Et,
si oui, pouvez-vous me donner des informations supplémentaires à propos d’ eux?
Un organe de presse, bimestriel qui paraît depuis 1957, journal d’information spécialisé et
national. Abonnements et vente en kiosques; un site informatique.
A l’initiative des sections, plusieurs bulletins d’information locaux.
8. Coopérez-vous ou avez-vous des rapports avec quelques autres associations ? Et, si
oui, pouvez-vous me décrire la nature de ces collaborations et rapports ?
Autres associations: esprit de coopération et d’ouverture mais assez difficile dans la
pratique face à esprit de clocher fréquemment répandu. Attaches étroites avec
l’Association des Familles de Victimes du 26 mars 1962 et de leurs Alliés, avec
l’Association du Souvenir des Français Disparus en Algérie; coopération régulière avec la
Maison des Agriculteurs Français d’Algérie, l’Association des Rapatriés Mineurs au
moment du Rapatriement et le Cercle Algérianiste. Bons rapports avec la communauté
‘Harkis’, notamment AFRONAA et Forces de Police Auxiliaires, U.N.H. et plusieurs
autres…
9. Quel rôle sentez-vous que l’histoire de l’algérie coloniale et, plus précisément, la
guerre d’indépendance, jouent dans l’agenda et les activités de vôtre association ?
L’Histoire de la présence française en Algérie et les séquelles des affrontements
meurtriers qui ont ensanglanté l’Algérie de 1954 à 1962 envahissent l’activité de
l’association par les nécessaires répliques aux agressions constantes dans les médias,
presse écrite, cinéma, télévision, colloques, conférences.
Les manifestations du souvenir et du recueillement jalonnent notre activité annuelle. Nos
sections qui résistent le mieux à l’usure sont celles qui organisent une ou deux fois par an
des manifestations festives, de détente (de la couronne des Rois au méchoui…)
10. De quelle importance est la préservation, la mobilisation et la transmission de la
mémoire dans le travail de vôtre association ? Et en quelle manière essayez-vous
l’accomplir ?
Nous veillons, dans chacune de nos publications à réserver un développement au rappel
du passé et à la bibliographie. Mais nous devons accomplir un effort plus important dans
ce domaine qui nous tient particulièrement à cœur.
11. Comment voyez-vous les liens entre vôtre association et la soi-disante ‘seconde
génération’? Ou, si vôtre association est essentiellement une tentative de la ‘seconde
génération’, comment décririez-vous vôtre rapport à la première génération ? Par
exemple, voyez-vous un lien de continuité entre les générations, ou voyez-vous vos
buts et actions comme complètement différent à ceux de l’autre génération ?
La seconde génération ‘Pieds-noirs’ peut être considérée comme fondue dans la société
métropolitaine tout en gardant une attache forte à ce que nous représentons. Elle n’est pas
prête à assumer une véritable relève. Son attitude est très différente de la seconde
génération ‘Harkie’, actuellement dominante. Mais il faut remarquer qu’il ne s’agit pas à
proprement parler d’une relève véritable mais d’une nouvelle catégorie,
fondamentalement différente.
Des ‘ponts’ existent cependant lorsque les contacts s’établissent, mais à la marge.
Pour en revenir à la seconde génération ‘Pieds-noirs’, ceux qui militent s’intéressent
exclusivement à la mémoire et écartent en règle générale le rôle revendicatif matériel.
Notre association demeure très attachée à son rôle généraliste et s’efforce de mener le
combat sur les deux fronts, ce qui est très lourd.
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12. Comment pensez-vous que vôtre association et les gens qui vous représentez sont
pérçus par la société française en général? Sentez-vous que c’est une perception
exacte?
Les Métropolitains qui nous côtoient, en règle générale sont des sympathisants et ils sont
relativement nombreux. Ils respectent nos engagements et parfois le soutiennent. Dans ce
dernier cas ils sont même souvent les plus actifs. Ceux qui ne nous connaissent pas nous
ignorent, sont surpris de découvrir, d’apprendre… et oublient aussi vite. Il s’agit dans ce
cas d’une grande indifférence. Reste le quartier de France profonde résolument hostile,
critique qui reste à la légende de l’exploitation et de la dépossession sans vouloir admettre
le volet positif qui existe heureusement dans toute action humaine. Cette fraction
d’opinion se trompe, souvent volontairement…
13. Qu’est-ce que vous-pensez et espérez que l’avenir tiendra pour vôtre association?
L’avenir sera difficile. A court terme nous venons de tenter d’approcher les candidats aux
présidentielles susceptibles d’être présents au second tour, tous les candidats, sans
exclusive. Nous avons sollicité leurs engagements, avec conviction, comme nous l’avons
toujours fait. Le candidat élu a pris des positions encourageantes. Nous espérons que les
freins dans son entourage ne modifieront ses intentions…
A plus long terme, devrait demeurer une forme de quête de retour sur le passé, de
connaissance de l’existence réelle que nous avons menée là-bas, avant les événements
tragiques. Les jeunes sont toujours surpris et intéressés par les rapports chaleureux qu’ils
découvrent entre compatriotes mais aussi entre Pieds-Noirs et Harkis de première génération.
Nous regrettons dans ce domaine les multiples ralentissements et obstacles auxquels s’est
heurté le projet de Mémorial (qui semblait au point mort hier encore) Son rôle aurait été
essentiel s’il n’avait pas été dévié en dépit de toutes nos interventions et mises en garde.
Le cinéma reste le grand absent. La télévision pour une fois a diffusé voici quelques mois en
ce moment, mais au niveau régional et à des heures tardives le tout premier film que nous
pouvons qualifier d’excellent ‘Les Pieds-Noirs, histoires d’une blessure’ (édition d’un DVD
par ‘Treize au Sud’ à Aix en Provence. Souhaitons que d’autres producteurs s’intéressent à ce
sujet peu populaire!
PS Dans le cadre de la commémoration de notre cinquantenaire, nous préparons l’édition
d’une revue qui devrait vous intéresser, mais elle ne sera prêt qu’à la rentrée. D’ici là nous
vous ferons envoyer quelques uns de nos journaux pour vous donner les moyens d’apprécier
le climat dans lequel évolue l’association.
Vos contacts :
Yves Sainsot, président
Nicole Ferrandis-Delvarre, vice-présidente (elle-même présidente d’une association, celle des
Familles des Victimes du 26 mars 1962) cette tragédie pouvant être comparée sous certains de
ses aspects à celle du ‘bloody Sunday’ en Irlande dont vous avez sans aucun doute entendu
parler. Une différence fondamentale toutefois: les manifestants à Alger ont été victimes des
forces censées les protéger, les défendre ; en Irlande il s’agissait de heurts entre forces de
l’ordre anglaises et manifestants séparatistes. En tout état de cause, un point commun
essentiel: des victimes civiles innocentes abattues tragiquement…




L’Algérianiste, 1 (1975) - 119 (September 2007), ed. by le Cercle Algérianiste.
L’Algérien en Europe, 1 (1965) - 366 (July 1982); becomes La semaine de l’émigration, 1
(July 1982) - 138 (June 1985); becomes L’actualité de l’émigration, 1 (July 1985) - 209
(January 1991), ed. by l’Amicale des Algériens en Europe
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Spoliés ou Perdus Outre-Mer (GNPI).
Coup de soleil info, 6 (October-November 1990); 7 (February 1991); 10 (September-October
1991), ed. by Coup de Soleil.
Différences, 0 (1980) - 216 (December 2000), ed. by le Mouvement Contre le Racisme et
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L’écho d’oran, 9 (January-February-March1964) - 21 (May 1966); becomes L’écho de
l’Oranie, 22 (June 1966) - 313 (November-December 2007), ed. by l’Amicale des
Oraniennes du Côte d’Azur (AOCAZ).
Aux échos d’Alger, 1 (November 1980) - 99 (December 2007), ed. by L’Amicale Gardoise
des Enfants Algérois; becomes l’Amicale des Enfants de l’Algérois et Leurs Amis
Ensemble: le journal Franco-Maghrébin, 1 (October 1997) - 7 (May 1998)
L’eveil des français d’Algérie: bulletin d’infomration des harkis rapatriés d’Algérie et leurs
amis, 5 (April 1995) - 8 (April 1997), ed. by l’Union Départemental des Anciens Rapatriés
Français-Musulmans (UDARFM)
Exil: Communautés algériennes, 2 (Summer 1983) - 4 (Winter 1983-1984), ed. by Pieds-
noirs pour l’Algérie
France Horizon: le cri du rapatrié, 1 (March 1957) - 476-477 (December-January 2007), ed.
by l’Association Nationale des Français d'Afrique du Nord, d'Outre-Mer et de leurs Amis
(ANFANOMA)
FMR: le journal, 1 (December 1984), ed. by Sécretaire d’État aux Rapatriés via l’Office
Nationale à l’Action Sociale, Educative et Culturelle
FONDA: Lettre d’infomration, 1 (29 July 1981) - 74 (July 1990); becomes La tribune
FONDA, 75 (October 1990) -176 (December 2005), ed. by la Fondation pour la vie
associative (FONDA)
Horizons-Maghrébins: le droit à la mémoire, 1 (November 1984) - 49 (2003)
IM’média magazine, 1 (Autumn 1984) - 8 (Spring-Summer 1988), ed. by IM’média
La lettre jeune pied-noir, 1 (January 1981); becomes Vocation Française: Bulletin trimestriel
de liaison et d’information politique, culturelle et sociale des jeunes pieds noirs, 3 (June
1985) - 4 (January 1986)
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La lettre de la maison des rapatriés de Cannes et leurs amis, 1 (February 1994) - 4 (February
1995) ed. by. la Maison des Rapatriés (Cannes)
La lettre du RECOURS France, 10 (June 1995), ed. by RECOURS France.
La lettre de Véritas, 1 (March 1996) - 118 (December 2007), ed. by Véritas
Mémoire plurielle: Les cahiers d’Afrique du Nord, 1 (October 1994) - 34 (December 2002-
February 2003), ed. by Mémoire d’Afrique du Nord
Mémoire vive: Algérie-Maroc-Tunisie, 28 (2004) - 33 (2006), ed. by le Centre de
Documentation Historique sur l’Algérie (CDHA)
Pieds-Noirs Magazine, 1 (February 1990) - 40 (December 1993); becomes Pieds-Noirs
d’Hier et d’Aujourd’hui, 41 (January 1994) - 144 (September 2006)
Le Rappel, 1 (September 1982) - 40 (October 1991), ed. by la Convention Nationale des
Français Musulmans (CNFM)
RECOURS Infos 34, 1 (September 1985) ed. by RECOURS France
Sétif de l’hexagone, 1 (October 1970) - 129 (December 2006), ed. by l’Amicale des Sétifiens
Printed Sources: Brochures
Algérie: Ici vivent côte à côte 9.500.00 Français dont 8.400.00 Français Musulmans,
1.100.000 Français d’origine Européenne. Brochure. BDIC. Undated
Boualam, Bachaga Saïd, SECOURS de France: Joyeuses vacances de soleil…mais n’oubliez
pas ceux qui sont à l’ombre, (1965) Brochure. BDIC Q pièce 7442 3
Boualam, Bachaga Saïd, Discours prononcé à l’Assemblée Nationale par le Bachaga Saïd
Boualam, Vice-Président de l’Assmblée Nationale le 7 décembre 1960, (Paris, 1960)
Centre Georges Pompidou, Les enfants de l’immigration, (Paris, 1984)
Comité Maurice Audin et Vérité-Liberté (eds), Octobre à Paris, (Paris, 1962)
En Algérie, l’OAS fait régner la terreur, (Paris, 1961) BDIC F delta 1297: Receuil. Algérie.
Brochures (1946-1987)
‘Livre blanc de notre honte et de la passion des harkis’, La Nation Française, supplement 317
(1962), 1-16
Rapport du bureau national au congrés du MRAP (14-15 November 1987), BDIC F delta
1271: Recueil. Racisme en France. Brochures (1979-1993)
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Audiovisual Sources
Titles in single quotation marks refer to programmes that are part of a series, or segments
within a single broadcast, for example a news programme. Titles in italics refer either to the
series to which a particular episode or segment belongs, or to stand alone programmes. The
brackets indicate the channel on which the programme was broadcast.
‘17 octobre 1961: une journée portée disparue’, Les mercredis de l’Histoire, aired 17 October
2001 (ARTE)
1830-1962 Quand l’Algérie était française, aired 16 May 2006 (M6)
‘1965: des Français en Algérie’, Cinq colonnes à l’une, aired 3 March 1965 (Channel 1)
‘35 ans Pieds-noirs’, TF1 20 heures, aired 14 June 1997 (TF1)
‘L’adieu aux larmes’, Strip tease, aired 21 August 2005 (Fr3)
‘Affaire Roseau’, JA2 20 heures, aired 6 April 1993 (Channel 2)
‘Affaire Roseau’, Midi 2, aired 7 April 1993 (Channel 2).
‘Aide harkis’, TF120 heures, aired 2 December 2003 (TF1)
‘L’Algérie dix ans après: Deuxième volet’, Quatrième mardi, aired 30 May 1972 (Channel 1)
‘Algérie: la fin d’une guerre’, Cinq colonnes à l’une, aired 6 April 1962 (Channel 1)
‘Algérie: de la France à la guerre civile des blessures toujours à vif’, Ex libris, aired 21
September 1995 (Channel 1)
Algérie maintenant = Algérien heurte. Plateau invités: Mehdi Lallaoui, Bachir Boumaza,
aired 5 May 1995 (ARTE)
‘Algérie: mémoires d’une guerre’, Caractères, aired 22 November 1991 (Channel 3)
‘Algérie: le mois de l’exode’, Cinq colonnes à l’une, aired 1 June 1962 (Channel 1)
Algérie, Montpellier: aller simple, aired 25 May 2002 (Fr5)
‘Algérie: reveils de mémoires’, Saga cities, aired 16 March 2002 (Fr3)
Les Algériens de Lyon: Français d’ici, peuples d’ailleurs, aired 2 May 2002 (Fr5)
‘Amère patrie’, Documents x3, aired 13 October 2006 (Fr5)
‘Un an après: être français en Algérie’, Cinq colonnes à l’une, aired 1 March 1963 (Channel
1)
Les années algériennes, (4 episodes), aired 23 September 1991 to 8 October 1991 (A2)
Arrêt sur images, aired 7 January 2001 (La cinquième)
‘Assassinat Roseau’, IT1 20 heures, aired 5 March 1993 (Channel 1)
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‘L’association France Plus’, Du côté de chez Fred, aired 30 May 1990 (Channel 2)
‘Une autre guerre d’Algérie’, La case de l’oncle doc, aired 2 November 2004 (Fr3)
‘Benjamin Stora’, Le Divan, aired 10 February 1991 (Channel 3)
‘Le bidonville de Gennevilliers’, Cinq colonnes à l’une, aired 4 March 1960 (Channel 1)
‘C’étaient les harkis’, Cinq colonnes à l’une, aired 7 June 1963 (Channel 1)
‘Charonne 62: neuf morts sur ordonnance’, Laser, aired 8 February 1982 (Channel 3)
Les cheveaux du soleil tribune, aired 27 November 1980 (Channel 1)
‘Les cicatrices françaises’, C dans l’air, aired 12 March 2002 (Fr5)
Ciel mon mardi: Arlette Laguiller. aired 4 June 1991 (Channel 3)
‘La cité des pieds-noirs’, La cinquième rencontre, aired 6 June 2000 (La cinquième)
Colloque rapatriés, aired 30 May 1987 (Channel 2)
‘Commémoration du 17 octobre 1961’, Le six minutes: Souvenirs, aired 17 October 2001
(M6)
‘Communauté harki’, ARTE info, aired 29 August 2001 (ARTE)
‘Communauté harki’, TF1 20 heures, aired 11 November 1999 (Channel 1)
‘La communauté harki, toujours indésirable en Algérie et mal intégrée en France’, Soir 3
journal, aired 24 September 2003 (Fr3)
‘Congrès harkis’, TF1 20 heures, aired 9 March 2002 (TF1)
‘Convention RECOURS’, IT1 20 heures, aired 6 March 1993 (Channel 1)
De Gaulle et l’OAS: L’Algérie c’est la France, aired 2 January 1991 (Channel 1)
‘Déchirures algériennes’, De Gaulle ou l’éternel défi, aired 12 October 1988 (TF1)
‘Émission du 19 octobre 1997’, Dimanche Soir, aired 19 October 1997 (Fr3)
‘Le drame algérien’, C dans l’air, aired 5 to 6 December 2002 (Fr5)
Drame harkis, aired 25 December 1988 (Channel 1)
Droit de réponse aux pieds-noirs, aired 8 November 1986 (Channel 1)
‘Duplex à Bouteflika’, JA2 20 heures, aired 16 June 2000 (Fr2)
‘Émission du 11 novembre 1998’, Saga cites, aired 11 November 1998 (Fr3)
L’émotion: retour de pieds-noirs en Algérie, aired 6 June 2005 (M6)
‘Encadré rapatriés’, IT1 13 heures, aired 29 April 1987 (Channel 1)
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L’ennemi intime, (3 episodes) aired 4 March 2002 to 6 March 2002 (Fr3)
‘Enquête J. Roseau’, IT1 13 heures, aired 8 March 1993 (Channel 1)
‘Enquête Roseau’, JA2 20 heures, aired 6 March 1993 (Channel 2)
‘Enquête Roseau’, JA2 20 heures, aired 7 March 1993 (Channel 2)
‘Être pied-noir trente ans après’, Français si vous parliez, aired 1 February 1993 (Channel 3)
‘Factuel Roseau’, IT1 13 heures, aired 6 March 1993 (Channel 1)
‘Fils de harkis’, Chronqiues d’ici, aired 8 November 2001 (Fr3)
‘Le fils du harki’, Pour changer aller simple, aired 20 March 1982 (Channel 1)
France Algérie: L’amour impossible, aired 12 April 2006 (ARTE)
‘France-Algérie: la blessure ouverte’, 7 et demi, aired 17 December 1996 (ARTE)
France-Algérie: une histoire d’amour, aired 16 May 2006 (M6)
Grève des harkis, aired 20 February 1987 (Channel 1)
‘La guerre d’Algérie’, Apostrophes, aired 11 September 1981 (Channel 2)
La guerre d’Algérie (5 episodes) aired 12 August 1990 to 9 September 1990 (Fr3)
La guerre d’Algérie dans les actualités filmées de Pathé, aired 17 March 2002 (Fr5)
‘Guerre d’Algérie: La fin des mensonges’, Mots croisés, aired 3 November 2003 (Fr2)
La guerre d’Algérie: malentendu ou absurdité? aired 9 September 1990 (Channel 3)
‘Guerre d’Algérie: Mémoire enfouie d’une génération: 3. Déchirements et fidelités’, Moeurs
en direct, aired 21 November 1982 (Channel 2)
La guerre sans nom, aired 12 February 1992, (Fr3)
‘Hamlaoui Mekachera et la cause des anciens combatants, Les chemins de la foi, aired 25
April 2004 (Fr2)
Harki: un traître mot, aired 29 April 2002 (Fr5)
‘Harki’, Les dossiers de l’écran, aired 17 May 1977 (Channel 2)
Harkis, 2006 (Fr2) [on DVD]
Harkis: le crime, aired 12 February 2002 (ARTE)
‘Harkis: des français entièrement à part?’, Contre courant, aired 25 April 2003 (Fr2)
‘Harkis: la mémoire sacrifiée?’, Ripostes, aired 7 December 2003 (Fr5)
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‘Les harkis’, Planète chaude (3 episodes), aired 12 December 1993 to 8 November 1994
(Channel 3)
‘Les harkis portent plainte contre la France’, Infos, aired 29 August 2001 (Canal+)
‘Les harkis de Saint-Valérien’, Panorama, aired 17 April 1970 (Channel 1)
‘Identité française’, IT1 20 heures, aired 3 April 1990 (Channel 1)
‘Il y a 40 ans déjà l’histoire déchirée des Français d’Algérie’, La case de l’oncle doc, aired 18
March 2002 (Fr3)
‘L’immigration’, La marche de siècle, aired 12 September 1990 (Channel 3)
‘Immigration en questions’, Plateau invités: Le Pen et Tapie, aired 8 December 1989
(Channel 3)
‘Inauguration plaque 17 octobre 1961’, ARTE info, aired 17 October 2001 (ARTE)
‘Interview de Mohand Hamoumou sur la communauté des harkis en France’, 20 heures le
journal, aired 17 June 2000 (Fr2)
‘Les jardiniers de la rue des martyrs’, Grand format, aired 10 February 2003 (ARTE)
‘Jean-Luc Einaudi’, Le journal de l’histoire, aired 1 November 2000 (La cinquième)
‘Manifestation pieds-noirs’, Édition national, aired 19 March 2002 (Fr3)
‘Manifestation de pieds-noirs à Paris’, TF1 20 heures, aired 19 March 2002 (TF1)
‘Massacres pieds-noirs et harkis en 1962’, Mots croisés, aired 3 November 2003 (Fr2)
Les massacres de Sétif: un certain 8 mai 1945, aired 10 May 1995 (ARTE)
‘La mémoire des harkis’, Édition national, aired 30 August 2001 (Fr3)
Mémoires d’immigrés: L’héritage maghrébin, aired 30 May 1997 (Canal+)
Merci pour l’info, aired 7 November 2003 (Canal+)
‘Un million de Français, les rapatriés d’Algérie: L’île du Rhône’, Sept jours du monde, aired
15 May 1964 (Channel 1)
‘Mohammed et Jacques’, Sept sur sept, aired 22 March 1987 (Channel 1)
Montpellier: 20 ans accords d’Evian, aired 19 March 1982 (Channel 2)
‘Le mouchoir de mon père’, La case de l’oncle doc, aired 21 September 2002 (Fr3)
‘Naissance d’un village: Carnoux’, Cinq colonnes à l’une, aired 7 October 1966 (Channel 1)
‘Nice: pieds-noirs’, JA2 20 heures, aired 28 June 1987 (Channel 2)
Nuit noire, aired 7 June 2005 (Canal+)
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‘Où en sont les rapatriés’, Cinq colonnes à l’une, aired 3 May 1963 (Channel 1)
Un parcours algérien, (3 episodes), aired 27 June 2003 to 30 November 2003 (Fr2)
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